University of BRISTOL

MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF

TAMIL NADU AND ANDHRA PRADESH, INDIA

Carole Spary

(PhD Candidate, Department of Politics)

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law (Department of Politics), January 2008.

Word Count: 79,857

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the significance of institutions, discourse, and agency in determining the opportunities for mainstreaming gender in state development policy at the national and subnational level in India. It seeks to address lacunae in the literatures on Indian development policy and gender mainstreaming. The methodology combines insights from feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis, to enable an exploration of both the institutional context of gender mainstreaming as well as how some gendered discourses of development become dominant and how others are marginalized. The comparative analysis of two case studies, the southern Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, draws on fieldwork based on interviews conducted in these two states, and in New Delhi, as well as an analysis of policy documents and other relevant government and non-government documentation. I argue that similarities and differences in institutions can be observed both between and within the two states. The analysis demonstrates how the Indian state is not a monolith but a highly complex and differentiated set of institutional norms, structures, and practices, which offer varying possibilities for feminists engaging the state. Three gendered discourses of development dominate policy in these two states, namely, protective-paternalist, competitive-capability, and structural-transformative. These discourses interact with the states' two wider discourses of development (reformist and populist). Their discursive framing has significant effects on how gender is constituted in development policy, as well as how actors are positioned as subjects and objects of development. Considerable differences can be observed between the two states regarding the dominance or marginalization of each discourse, suggesting that both the institutional context and the broader socio-political and historical context matter. This research shows that the institutional and discursive constitutive contexts combine to create varying possibilities for agency, not all of which are enabling for gender mainstreaming strategies.

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author:.

SIGNED: ....C Spary..... DATE: 23/05/08

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to the Economic and Social Research Council for providing me with a +3 studentship without which it would have been difficult to pursue this research, particularly the long period of fieldwork I was fortunate to undertake in India. I would like to sincerely thank my supervisors, Professor Judith Squires and Dr Andrew Wyatt, for their continuous support and encouragement, insight and experience, and infallible patience on having to read and comment on drafts in the face of tight timescales. I particularly thank Andrew for sharing his enthusiasm for, and guiding me through, the intricate and fascinating world of Indian politics, and Judith for her immense clarity of thought and direction which was of immeasurable benefit to me when at times it seemed as though the complexity traversed all limits of possible comprehension. I would also like to express my gratitude to the many individuals who spent time to speak with me and share their thoughts and experiences on gender and development in India, and to the organizations in India who granted me access to their library collections, namely in Chennai, the Madras Institute of Development Studies, the MS Swaminathan Research Foundation, the Institute for Financial Management and Research, and the Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women, in Hyderabad, the Anveshi Research Centre for Women's Studies, the Centre for Economic and Social Studies, and the National Institute of Rural Development, and in New Delhi, the Centre for Women's Development Studies. Their generosity inevitably enriched the analysis presented in this thesis. I have also benefited from an immensely supportive PhD research environment at Bristol and would like to acknowledge with gratitude my fellow PhD student community, particularly Ana Jordan and Christina Rowley, for sharing the highs and lows, for being there when things became difficult, and for enabling me to explore intellectual worlds that I may not have otherwise encountered. I would also like to thank my family for their unending support, love, and inspiration, and for their patience when my visits home became few and far between. Lastly, and most importantly, I would like to thank David, for his enduring companionship which I cherish, and without whom none of the last seven years would have been anywhere near as enjoyable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT I

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III

INTRODUCTION 1

The research problem 1

Situating the thesis in the literature 2

The research question, aims and objectives 3

Structure and content of the thesis 6

1 LITERATURE REVIEW 9

1.1 Introduction 9

1.2 Development Policy in India 11

1.3 Gender Mainstreaming 34

1.4 Mainstreaming Gender in Indian Development Policy 39

1.5 Conclusion 43

2 METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 44

2.1 Introduction 44

2.2 Feminist Institutionalism 45

2.3 Feminist Discourse Analysis 51

2.4 Subjectivity and Agency 55

2.5 Methods 59

2.6 Research Ethics 64

2.7 Conclusions 65

3 MAPPING NATIONAL POLICY – 1990S TO PRESENT 67

3.1 Introduction 67

3.2 The Gendered Institutional Context of National Development 69

3.3 Gendered Development Discourse in the Post-1990 Period 89

3.4 Agents of national development 102

3.5 Conclusions 109

4 THE BROADER SOCIAL CONTEXT: A PROFILE AND HISTORY OF TWO INDIAN STATES 110

4.1 Introduction 110

4.2 Gendered inequalities in socio-economic development in two States 116

4.3 Socio-political constructions of gender in State politics 146

4.4 Conclusions.....162

5 THE GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT.....163

5.1 Introduction.....163

5.2 The Gendered Institutions of the State.....165

5.3 Feminist bureaucratic spaces? The State-level machinery for women.....179

5.4 Conclusions.....196

6 STATE LEVEL DISCOURSES OF GENDER EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT.....198

6.1 Introduction.....198

6.2 State Level Development Policy: Reformist and Populist Discourses.....199

6.3 Discourses of gendered development.....208

6.4 Comparative discussion: discursive interaction within and between states.....222

6.5 Conclusions.....224

7 GENDERED DEVELOPMENTAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY 227

7.1 Introduction.....227

7.2 The Women of the Self-Help Groups.....229

7.3 Bureaucratic actors.....235

7.4 The Political Leadership.....238

7.5 The role of the women's movement at the State level.....244

7.6 Conclusions.....248

CONCLUSIONS.....252

Discourse, institutions and agency: comparative findings.....252

Limitations and opportunities for further research.....255

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....260

APPENDICES.....283

Appendix I – Developments in the National Machinery for Women.....283

Appendix II – Tables for Gendered Development Indicators (Supplementary to Chapter 4).285

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1 Approach to women and/or gender and development in Five Year Plans 1951-1997.....42

Table 2 Women in Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections (1984-2006).....167

Table 3 Women in Andhra Pradesh Assembly Elections (1985-2004).....168

Table 4 Women and Men Officers Posted to Department of Women Development and Child Welfare since the year 2000.....177

Table 5 Population and general profile indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India.....285

Table 6 Economic Indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India.....285

Table 7 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Tamil Nadu and all-India.....286

Table 8 Work Participation Rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....286

Table 9 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....286

Table 10 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....287

Table 11 Literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....287

Table 12 Changes in literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 1991-2001.....288

Table 13 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....288

Table 14 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Tamil Nadu and All-India, 2004.....289

Table 15 Sex ratios for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001.....289

Table 16 Population and general profile indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....290

Table 17 Economic Indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India.....290

Table 18 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Andhra Pradesh and all-India.....291

Table 19 Work Participation Rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....291

Table 20 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....291

Table 21 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....292

Table 22 Literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....292

Table 23 Changes in literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh, and all-India, 1991-2001.....293

Table 24 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....293

Table 25 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Andhra Pradesh and All-India, 2004.....294

Table 26 Sex ratios for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001.....294

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Points of Convergence in the Literature (scale indicative only) 3
Figure 2 Map of the Case Study States and their Location in India 61
Figure 3 Location of the State of Tamil Nadu in India (left) and District Map of Tamil Nadu (right) 123
Figure 4 Spatial concentration of below state average child sex ratios in Tamil Nadu, 2001 130
Figure 5 Location of the State of Andhra Pradesh in India (left) and District Map of Andhra Pradesh (right) 132
Figure 6 Work Participation Rates in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and All-India, 2001 141
Figure 7 Composition of working and non-working population, 2001 142
Figure 8 Increases in literacy, 1981-1991 and 1991-2001 143
Figure 9 Comparative sex ratios for Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and all-India (1901-2001) 145
Figure 10 Mutram, a potter's wheel, and the self-regulating technologies of empowerment discourse 231
Figure 11 Promotional literature for the 'Chenmathi' (abbreviating Chennai Mahalir Thittam) brand of SHG products (left) the Chennai District Project Implementation Unit of TNCDW (middle) and success narratives of the TNCDW (right) 242

INTRODUCTION

The research problem

Increasingly since the 1970s, the Government of India has formulated and enacted policy initiatives which recognize the gendered character of national development. At the beginning of the 1990s, the development policy of the Indian state shifted towards a neo-liberal economic discourse. This coincided with the international growth of gender mainstreaming strategies, consolidated at the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.

While development policy formation in India has been more extensively theorised, especially economic policy, less is known about the factors influencing gender and development policy formulation in India, particularly in terms of gender mainstreaming strategies. Evidence suggests that the self-help group model of women's empowerment is becoming almost ubiquitous as a policy instrument of the Government of India, and in turn, the proportion of self-help groups (SHGs) in India which are promoted by government agencies as opposed to civil society organisations is increasing, with one study estimating that SHGs promoted by the government in 2005 constituted approximately half of all SHGs in India, compared to only 11 per cent in 2000 (EDA/APMAS, 2006: 20). Furthermore, while several relationships between key actors are long established, the emergence of a donor relationship between international development institutions and multilateral partners such as the World Bank and DFID, bring to light new patterns of influence at the *subnational* level of India's state government.[1] More than a decade ago, two Indian feminists, K. Lalitha and Mary John, suggested that in the post-1991 policy environment, where states now have more autonomy in formulating development policy, 'there may be new opportunities at the [subnational] state level to demand more comprehensive policies on gender and funding commitments for women' (IDS Bridge, 1995: 4-5). Yet very few studies have emerged since, exploring the importance of state government gendered development

[1] I am thankful to Andrew Wyatt for this observation on the emerging relationship between State level governments and the World Bank. See also Jenkins (2003) for a related discussion regarding India and the World Trade Organization.

policy and the subnational context for gender mainstreaming strategies. This highlights the need for research to examine the complex changing relationships and influential factors surrounding these new initiatives, particularly in the face of gender-differentiated effects and outcomes of development policy.

Situating the thesis in the literature

This thesis feeds into two broad literatures: the literature on development policy in India and a literature on gender mainstreaming in development institutions. It also feeds into debates on the Centre-State relationship in India, including a growing interest in intra-state comparisons (Jenkins, 2004b). Within the first literature of Indian development policy it aims to contribute a gendered analysis of the institutional, discursive, and agential factors that have influenced gender and development policy since 1991. Within the second literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy it builds on the work of Kabeer and Subrahmanian (1999a), Rai (2001, 2003b), Goetz (1997a); and Miller and Razavi (1998b), Moser (1993) and Kapadia (2002b).

This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in the area of gender mainstreaming in development policy in India. It makes an original contribution as an *in-depth*, *comparative* study of Indian subnational policy on gendered development which looks explicitly at the role of three factors (institutions, discourse, and agency) in determining the possibilities for mainstreaming gender in development policy. Where studies exist on gendered development policy and programmes in India at the subnational level (such as comparative evaluations of self-help group programs in different states), few consider the relationship between subnational level factors and their impact on possibilities for gender mainstreaming. Furthermore, few studies have considered *in-depth* the broader institutional context for gendered development policy at the subnational level, beyond more focused issue-based studies of policy.

This thesis will make a timely contribution to studies on the Indian empirical case. Methodologically, it will also feed into calls for combining discourse analysis with more conventional political science methods to build on new feminist research methodologies for research on gendered state action and policies (Mottier, 2004). As such, this research differentiates itself from the feminist comparative politics literature which focuses mainly on

formal institutions and advanced industrial democracies, and which is currently moving towards more quantitative analyses (Stetson and Mazur, 1995; RNGS, 2002).

Figure 1 Points of Convergence in the Literature (scale indicative only)



The research question, aims and objectives

The research question driving this thesis is:

In what ways is gender mainstreaming in development policy affected by institutions, discourse, and agency?

The research **aims** to understand: (a) the politics of formulating and implementing gendered development policy in an *institutional* context; (b) how the process and content of policy-making is affected by *discourse*; and (c) how particular *agents* are positioned as more influential than others in the development policy-making process. The more specific **objectives** of the research are firstly, to discern how institutional structure and context affects the efforts to mainstream gender in development policy; secondly to discern how specific discourses of development, with particular reference to gender issues, become prevalent in governmental and non-governmental institutions and produce certain effects; and thirdly to discern how individuals or groups are influential in promoting or obfuscating gender mainstreaming in development policy.

To operationalise the research objectives, I focus on the following factors, which map on to the categories outlined above. For institutional context, both formal and informal norms, structures, processes, and practices are encompassed including institutional structures and mandates of the main policy-making institutions and national women's machinery, as well as institutional norms and culture. For discourse, I analyse gendered development discourses articulated in government policy both at the Centre (national) and State (subnational) level. I identify three prominent discourses: *protective-paternalist*, *competitive-capability*, and *structural-transformative*. For agency, I explore how the discursive and institutional context offers positions subjects of development within development differentially, and how this creates various possibilities for agency. I then compare these forms of agentic capacity to determine their potential enabling or constraining opportunities for gender mainstreaming in development policy.

The analysis presented in this thesis rests upon three sets of specific theoretical arguments (with subsets) which map on to the concepts of institutions, discourse and agency, one comparative argument, and one more general argument about the state. Firstly, on institutions, I argue that i) institutional context matters, ii) that different institutional contexts produce different policies on gendered development and iii) that this creates different opportunities for the implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies. Secondly, on discourse, I argue that i) multiple discourses of gender and development exist, ii) that these discourses frame different policies on gendered development, and that iii) these discourses vary both within and across states within India. Thirdly, on agency, I argue that i) agency is a product of institutional norms and practices and institutionally embedded discourses, ii) that agency is also made possible as a product of the conflicting positions possible within competing institutions and discourses, and that iii) some forms of agency will be enabling for gender mainstreaming efforts and others will be obfuscatory. I also argue that the broader social context matters to the extent that it provides the conditions of possibility for which institutional norms and which discourses are appropriate, and therefore that differences between states at the subnational level may generate differences in the institutional norms and discourses arising in each state. Finally, at the most general level I argue that the state is not a monolith but a heterogeneous, internally differentiated collection of institutions, which offers complex and varying opportunities for feminists engaging the state.

With these aims, objectives, and arguments in mind, this thesis sets out to address a number of sub-questions related to the broader research question.

On institutions: What are the institutional contexts in which these discourses emerge? What do we know about how institutions themselves affect the formulation of development policy? What kind of institutional structures and cultures are conducive to gender mainstreaming? To what extent can mainstreaming strategies be institutionalised into the existing institutional norms and culture of development planning institutions in India?

On discourse: What are the main ways of thinking, speaking and practising development in India? What are the effects of these discourses on formulations of development policy? How do they define the subjects, objects, techniques and practices of development? How do these discourses make some strategies possible and not others? To what extent is the current neo-liberal discourse dominant and pervasive in development? To what extent has it closed off other alternatives? How do the discourses of donor development organisations influence government discourse? Are the goals of the dominant development discourse congruent with the goals of gender mainstreaming?

On agency: What role do political leaders, bureaucrats, and the women's movement play in influencing gendered development policy? What kind of agency is available to these actors and is it conducive to gender mainstreaming? Can any of India's top political leaders be called 'policy entrepreneurs' in this sense? What are the options available to the women's movement for influencing development policy towards the goal of gender equitable development processes? How can bureaucrats become internal advocates and play a role in transformative change through mainstreaming gender? Which kinds of agency are enabling for gender mainstreaming and which kinds of agency are constraining?

The methodology underpinning the research in this thesis argues in favour of methodological pluralism. Firstly, it utilizes the emerging approach of feminist institutionalism to conceptualise institutions, combining the feminist focus on power and change with the new institutionalist focus on informal institutional norms and practices. Secondly, it draws on a poststructural approach to discourse analysis informed by the Foucauldian concept of discourse. As a product

of these two methodologies, it engages with a post-structural conception of agency and subjectivity. In terms of methods for data collection, this thesis adopts a small N qualitative twin case study approach to comparative analysis. The primary reasons for this are firstly, to enable a comparative analysis of rich descriptive case studies, and secondly, to identify and compare similarities and differences in institutions, discourse, and agency both between the centre and state, and between and within states.

Structure and content of the thesis

The structure and content of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter One, I critically review the most relevant literature on development policy in India and on gender mainstreaming. I argue that prominent studies on development policy in India do not adequately address the gendered dimensions of development, and also that there are very few studies of gender mainstreaming in the Indian case. By bringing together these two literatures, I argue that a lacuna exists in the literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India, for which this thesis seeks to make a contribution. Chapter Two outlines the methodological, theoretical and conceptual framework that this thesis draws upon, as well as the methods that were employed in data collection. I argue that, given the research problem, there is a strong case for methodological pluralism: combining feminist institutionalism and feminist post-structural approaches to discourse analysis. Informed by these two methodologies, I also outline how the thesis conceptualizes agency. The use of case studies, interviews and documentary analysis are detailed as the methods of data collection optimally suited to the research problem, and a more post-positivist or interpretive approach to the comparative method is presented as an analytical strategy for comparing the two case studies. Chapter Two also includes a consideration of research ethics, namely issues of data protection and informed consent, reflection on the sensitivities pertaining to my position as a Western feminist researcher of gendered development informed by 'Third World feminist' debates, and of the power dynamics involved in researching policy elites.

Chapter Three represents the first substantive empirical chapter, and maps the national level policy in India since the beginning of the 1990s. This chapter forms the national policy backdrop to the case studies which are detailed in the following four chapters. I examine the institutional

context for gendered development policy, and discuss gendered institutional norms and practices within the Indian bureaucracy, as well as a number of initiatives during the 1990s and beyond designed to increase the gender-responsiveness of mainstream Indian state institutions, such as the Planning Commission, the Finance Ministry, and the Indian bureaucracy itself. I pay particular attention to what these initiatives signified in terms of their approach to gender-equitable development and the role of the state. I then discuss the changing discourse(s) articulated within national development planning policy beginning from the Eighth Five Year Plan in 1992 until the Tenth Five Year Plan in 2002. I also briefly comment on preparations for the Eleventh Five Year Plan, which at the time of writing, had not been finalized. Finally, I consider the role of three important actors: bureaucratic actors, political leaders, and the women's movement. I argue that initiatives to transform institutional norms and practices have met with only limited success and that the state's discourse(s) of gendered development has increasingly accommodated concerns of gender equality and women's empowerment, but this has involved a 'responsibilisation' of women as agents of the development process, which seeks to integrate them into the national process of development without largely altering the main development agenda.

Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven represent the core of the original contribution of the thesis, which shift the focus from the national level to the subnational level in India. I focus on the two case study states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Each chapter presents a comparative analysis of the two case studies but each has a different focus: the broader social context (Chapter Four), the gendered *institutional* context of State-level development (Chapter Five), state-level *discourses* of gendered development (Chapter Six), and gendered developmental subjectivities and the importance of *agency* (Chapter Seven). Thus, Chapters Five, Six and Seven map onto the three key analytical concepts driving the research questions of this thesis: institutions, discourse, and agency. Chapter Four serves as a preliminary chapter to outline the broader socio-historical context of the two case studies, highlighting the importance of this context for creating the conditions of possibilities for what can be said, thought and done at the state level in terms of gendered development policy. This chapter emphasizes the complexity, specificity, and internal diversity of these two states providing a rich descriptive profile. Chapter Five explores the similarities and differences between state-specific developments of institutional

norms and structures in each state, in order to understand how each state is an internally differentiated gendered institution with varying opportunities for mainstreaming gender at the subnational level. Chapter Six compares discourses of state level gendered development through analyzing articulations of the three discourses outlined above, to understand the dominant or marginal status of each, how they relate to the wider reformist and populist discourses of development in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and what opportunities they therefore provide for different gender mainstreaming strategies. Chapter Seven explores how the discursive and institutional context of state policy on gendered development creates different degrees and kinds of agency for different sets of actors: women as subjects, targets and agents of development policy and as participants in each state's parastatal program for women's empowerment, political leaders, bureaucratic actors, and the women's movement. The final conclusions chapter begins by revisiting the research questions, aims and objectives and draws together the findings from the four case study chapters into a comparative synthesis. It reflects on the complexity of these findings, and suggests implications for mainstreaming gender in development policy in India. I discuss some limitations of the research, all of which present significant opportunities for further research. I conclude by identifying how the findings of the research build on existing knowledge in the literature on gender mainstreaming and development.

1 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Introduction

This literature review presents a critical review of existing knowledge and debates within the broad based literatures on development policy and on gender mainstreaming both in general and in the Indian context. The analysis of each is structured according to the three analytical concepts that are of major concern: institutions, discourse and agency. My aim is to demonstrate two substantive arguments: firstly, that several classic works on Indian development policy rarely pay attention to development as a *gendered* concept, process, or outcome; and secondly that the growing body of research on gender mainstreaming in development policy has, to date, had little to say about the Indian case. Beyond surveying how the central research problem of the thesis has been understood so far, the purpose therefore is to outline the lacunae in the literature for which this thesis makes an original contribution: mainstreaming gender in development policy in India.

To demonstrate these arguments, in the first section of the review, I present insights from the vast literature on Indian development policy, focusing on the institutional norms and structures of development policy-making in India and on the changing institutional norms of the federal relationship between the Centre and the States in the post-1991 period, arguing the case for more attention to the factors which affect development policy making at the subnational level. I also discuss the shifting dominant post-independence discourses of development (bearing in mind that these discourses are always context-specific but rarely context-exclusive) as well as the role of different actors in the development policy process, including political leaders, bureaucrats, and the women's movement. The review in this section illustrates the complexity of the institutional, discursive, and agential influences and relationships in the formulation and implementation of Indian development policy. It also provides some informative empirical background of the trajectory of Indian development from Independence to the present day. However, despite these insights, I conclude this section by noting the largely absent considerations in mainstream studies of Indian development policy of development as gendered.

In the second section, I review the gender mainstreaming literature, of which a large and coherent concentration of academic studies is to be found addressing gender mainstreaming policies in the European Union (EU) context, and to a lesser extent in the context of development organisations and policies. This section identifies the focus of debates in the literature, critically reviews some of the concepts and definitions of gender mainstreaming, and draws upon insights from several studies to understand the role and strategies of women's national machineries (as complementary institutional structures) providing openings for feminists to mainstream gender, and the obstacles and resistance they face. The focus then narrows to studies of gender mainstreaming in development policy including the role and influence of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.

Based on the analysis of the two broad literatures discussed, the third section draws from the two broad literatures to discuss what appears to be an absence of literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India. This is not to suggest that the subject of women, gender and development in India has not been researched or commented upon – indeed there exists a varied literature on this subject, but it is often dispersed and lacks dialogue for the most part, both internally and externally with the literatures outlined earlier. Yet, while wider studies on women, gender, and development exists, there are less than a handful of relevant studies on gender mainstreaming in India. I argue that this is particularly striking given the increasing number of initiatives which have been undertaken during the nineties, which I explore in more detail in Chapter Three. I discuss the insights of the small number of relevant studies of gendered development policy in India including the institutional context such as the national machinery for women in India. I conclude by arguing that, given the emergence of new initiatives in the 1990s, which highlighted gender mainstreaming as one of a number of strategies to improve the gender-responsiveness of Indian development policy, there is a need to research the significance of these policy changes and their effects. This is particularly important in respect of the changing relationships between key development institutions, discourses, and agents, and how these policy changes inform the strategies of feminists seeking to engage the state on gender and development issues.

1.2 Development Policy in India

What do existing studies tell us about the significance of institutions, discourse and agency for development policy, both generally and more specifically in the Indian context? India presents an interest case for studies of development , although as Harriss (1998) suggests, the literature on development in India has developed somewhat disconnected to the more general development literature.

1.2.1 Institutions of development[2]

Development has often been identified as primarily a state-led, nationalist, project of modernisation, and the state is often presented as a central actor, whether as a director, or a facilitator, or as a conduit for interest groups or international capital. *Planning* for development has been a central institutional feature of the Indian state's development policy-making history since Independence. The case of development planning in India demonstrates the importance of understanding the state not as a coherent, co-ordinated, monolithic entity, but as a differentiated account of state institutions involved in formulating development policy. Development planning in India took place principally through the Planning Commission, although the authority of this institutional structure has not been consistent over the years.

Hanson's (1966) early study – and possibly the most thorough – of Indian planning offers some insight into the relationships between state institutions concerned with development planning, in particular the role of the Planning Commission. Particularly useful is his discussion of the relationship of the Commission to government ministries and the National Development Council.[3] Writing in the 1960s, Hanson presented the Commission as primarily a consultative body which makes recommendations upon which the government may or may not decide to act. He argued however that the Commission had become more of a ministerial body over time, which was reflected in its close relationship with the Ministry of Finance, despite a tension

---

[2] The conceptual approach to institutions is discussed in detail in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to say that a new institutionalist approach to institutions informs this section of the literature review, where both formal institutional structures as well as informal norms, processes and conventions within and between institutions are considered important.

[3] The National Development Council brings together the Chief Ministers of all India's subnational state governments, is chaired by the Prime Minister, and deputy-chaired by the member-secretary of the Planning Commission.

between a focus on the economy and a focus on development (1966: 58). Hanson also charts the rise of the National Development Council (NDC) as a rival to the Planning Commission and whose influence on the planning process is 'imperfectly revealed' in plan documents (1966: 61-2).[4] Hanson concludes however that the NDC had far from replaced the Commission at the time of writing (1966: 62).

Chhibber's analysis (2003) provides a more recent view of the Planning Commission's influence and intra-governmental relationship. He traces the decline of the capacity and influence of the Planning Commission vis-à-vis the Ministries. Despite significant support from its ardent proponent, Jawarhalal Nehru, the Planning Commission experienced considerable resistance to operational co-operation from the Ministries. This process accelerated under the leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-67) and Indira Gandhi (1967-77, 1980-84), until the Planning Commission was firmly re-established as a consultative body.[5] The declining influence of the Planning Commission shifts attention to the new locus of development policy – the Ministries, in particular the Finance Ministry, and the National Development Council, which bears significance for the centre-state relationship (Jenkins, 1999: 227).

Critical analyses of planning have often invoked images of Foucauldian governmentality. James C. Scott (1998: 88) sees planning or "the administrative ordering of nature and society" as part of a wider phase of high modernity whereby pervasive social engineering by the state is discursively justified in the name of the people and according to universal benefit. Similarly, Arturo Escobar asserts that '[p]lanning techniques and practices have been central to development since its inception. As the application of scientific and technical knowledge to the public domain, planning lent legitimacy to, and fuelled hopes about, the development enterprise. Generally speaking the concept of planning embodies the belief that social change can be engineered and directed, produced at will' (Escobar, 1992: 132). Opponents of dirigiste approaches to development became increasing unpopular from the late 1970s onwards with the rise of a neo-liberal discourse of development influenced by neo-classical economics.

---

[4] Hanson claims that even the anticipated reactions of states' Chief Ministers (among the council members) influence the Commission's proposals (1966: 62).

[5] Mathur (2001: 120) makes a similar observation of institutional changes instigating the decline of the Planning Commission, including the establishment of a Prime Minister's Secretariat as an alternative source of advice.

Chatterjee (1997) argues that even though state institutional bodies, such as the Planning Commission in India, are set up to remove politically contentious issues from the political arena, and appeal to a panel of technocratic experts for policy decision-making, such an arrangement will inevitably become used as a political tool by the very forces it endeavours to transcend. This, however, does not presume that the Planning Commission is a neutral institution, devoid of its own norms – indeed, as Chatterjee argues, state institutions like the Planning Commission will embody their own political objectives and ideals, and they will be designed to legitimate the very basis of the state's sovereign power as the sole planning authority 'on behalf of the nation'.

Despite the reorientation of the state's role in development since 1991 towards a more facilitative rather than directive role, the Planning Commission has arguably retained its predominance as the preeminent authority on development policy in India. This has led some to question the extent to which the change in Indian development discourse since 1991 (discussed further below) has actually represented a withdrawing of the state. For example, Gupta (2001), employing the example of the Integrated Child Development Scheme, has shown that under a neo-liberal governmentality, the government of the population involves more subtle processes of intervention, so that while the state appears to roll back, its techniques of normalising the population may penetrate deeper into society. To support this claim, he contrasts empirical data on cuts in social sector spending under neo-liberal policies with data on increased allocation for the ICDS program (2001: 109). Thus, shifts in the form of technologies of development may accompany wider discursive shifts.

The federal relationship has long been considered an important element with respect to the planning process (Chakravarty, 1987: 47). It is a controversial relationship, partly for reasons to do with the fiscal redistribution of resources between the Centre and the States, and partly because of the historical legacy of the Emergency with regards to the abuse of the Centre in interfering or intervening in government at the subnational level of state government. It is also significant for the distribution of responsibilities, particularly for the 'extensive' responsibilities of States in the realm of economic and social development (Guhan, 2001 [1995]: 127).[6]

---

[6] Guhan (2001 [1995]: 127) lists the responsibilities of the centre or national government as core elements such as defence, foreign policy, currency, central banking, national transport and communication infrastructure, as well as

Chakravarty (1987: 47) briefly outlines the relationship by explaining that due to the Indian federal political structure, the planning process takes place at multiple levels and with vertically divided responsibilities. Plans are formulated at Central and State levels as well as yearly and Five Year Plans formulated by the Planning Commission and approved by the National Development Council, the latter of which consists of the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Planning Commission and States' and Union Territories' chief ministers (Chakravarty, 1987: 47). Chakravarty presents three common criticisms of the federal planning system, namely a perception that state governments are under-funded by the central government, state ministries are subordinated under centrally sponsored schemes, and that funds and responsibilities are self-allocated to the centre excessively, at the expense of the states (1987: 48).

But there appear to be two main reasons for the renewed importance of studying the federal dynamic with regards to development, both of which point to the different developmental experiences arising at state level. Firstly, several studies argue that the greater (but still limited) fiscal autonomy afforded to the states from the centre as a result of liberalisation has produced both varied approaches to development as well as a competitive dynamic for reforms among a few states, in the race to produce a conducive environment for private investment (Jenkins, 1999, 2004; Guhan, 2001 [1995]; Kennedy, 2004).

Secondly – and this is not such a new development, or perhaps surprising – claims of widening disparities between state level indicators of both economic and human development suggest that economic growth and improvements in well being in areas such as education and health are not occurring universally across Indian states. Chakravarty emphasises the almost inevitability of differential growth due to the uneven resource endowment of different regions in India (1987: 45). But he also asserts that 'the problem of poverty is beginning to emerge as more of an *inter*-regional problem than before...[It] is no longer homogeneous, regionally undifferentiated poverty that we are dealing with, but areas of rising economic well-being accompanied by

---

finance, insurance, capital market regulation, electoral regulation and audit, civil and police service recruitment, broadcasting, basic employment law, research investment, legislation on industrial regulation and promotion, mines and oil resources. It is also responsible for inter-state issues. The states' responsibilities are listed as law and order, primary judicial administration, and economic and social development. The latter includes agriculture and related sectors such as fisheries, animal husbandry and dairying, and forests, irrigation, power, roads (not national motorways), education, health, water supply, and urban development.

stagnating economic zones' (p. 46-7). However, it is very questionable as to the extent to which poverty was ever as inter-regionally homogenous as he suggests, given long-standing divisions between class, caste, gender, and religious identities.

Recent studies have begun to analyse the changing dynamics between the central and state governments as well as differences between states in terms of reform packaging due to differential development levels. As Kennedy (2004) shows, following the 1991 liberalisation reforms, individual states have been afforded much more autonomy from the centre, yet have followed different paths. Kennedy (2004) relates this *inter alia* to varying styles of reform "packaging" contrasting the approaches of the state governments of Andhra Pradesh (before the fall of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) to Congress in 2004) and Tamil Nadu. She argues that these different styles of reform packaging derive in turn from two political variables: the extent of fragmentation in state-level party system and the extent of political mobilisation of *dalits* and other traditionally low status groups, allowing one state government (Andhra Pradesh) to be more vocal about their reforms agenda than the other. In other words, Kennedy's contribution demonstrates the importance of taking into account how differences in the institutional context may lead to different outcomes in development policy at the subnational level. Drawing from the above insights, the federal relationship is important for both continuous and newly emergent reasons and thus warrants attention to how it affects the form and representation of policy, the nature of the relationship between the state and Centre in policy debates, as well as the capacity for the State to implement development policy.

The senior Indian bureaucracy, as an all-India institution, also plays an important part in formulating development policy. Several studies of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and its colonial predecessor, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), have documented characteristic features of the Indian bureaucracy (Potter, 1986, 1996; Mathur, 1996; Mars, 1974; Bhattacharya, 2003 [1989]; Rudolph and Rudolph, 2003 [1987]; Thakur, c.1997, 2000). Mathur (1994) for example argues that a fundamental tension exists between the elite and professional background of civil servants and the constituency-facing politician. Civil servants tend to be careerists and will therefore act to support their superiors, and they tend to be educated in cosmopolitan institutions. While Potter's study (1986) is certainly not an explicit focus on the gendered institutional norms

and practices of the Indian civil services, his observation that a dominant norm of civil service was the 'gentlemanly mode' is particularly relevant to understanding how the bureaucracy is a gendered institution. The 'gentlemanly mode' emphasised 'the virtue of public service,... the amateur ideal, and... the norms of courage, confidence and self-discipline' as well as service-class values, namely the importance of being a loyal servant to government in exchange for trust from the political leadership and 'autonomy and discretion to act appropriately (in accordance with the law) for those they served' (Potter, 1986: 233).

Some notable features of these studies of the Indian bureaucracy implicitly demonstrate the gendered institutional context of the bureaucracy. But what is missing from all of the above studies is an *explicit* and *detailed* analysis of the gendered character of these institutions, which is particularly striking given the extensive literature on other empirical cases (discussed later in the chapter). The extent to which development planning institutions produce gendered policy has been addressed by studies on gendered discourses of development. It has also been addressed by studies of the gendered institutional norms and mandates of development institutions more generally, discussed further below. What is specific to the Indian case is that there exists few systematic, comprehensive, or detailed study of the gendered institutional contexts (norms, processes, structures) of Indian development institutions from within which development policy emerges. Two important exceptions to this observation. The first includes Thakur's study (c.1997) of the gendered institutional norms of the All India Administrative Services, which features a discussion of recruitment practices, service rules, incentive structures, and gendered patterns in postings within the IAS. The second is the collection by Kabeer and Subrahmanian (1999a) on the Gender Planning Training Project in India. The third (Kabeer and Murthy, 1999) is a study of gendered institutional exclusion within the government development programmes of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) programme. The latter however is not a study of institutional contexts in which policy is formulated but implemented.[7]

---

[7] This is not to deny the importance of implementation and the distinction is more blurred than suggested here. It can provide important policy feedback affecting the formulation of new policies and is also a site of contestation and struggle within which initial policy intentions may take on new forms.

Neither of these studies have, however, formed the basis for, or supplement, further research on the gendered institutional context of state development policy-making in India.[8]

1.2.2 Discourse(s) of Development

What do existing studies tell us about how discourses of development become embedded in development policy? What are the main ways of doing, thinking and speaking about development according to the literature? What are the dominant and marginal discourses within the field of development? How do they define the subjects, objects, techniques and practices of development? What are the effects of these discourses on formulations of development policy? How do they make some strategies possible and not others? In what ways are discourses of development gendered? To what extent can we identify discourses of development specific to the Indian context?

Before we can explore these questions, a brief note on 'discourse(s)' of development is required.[9] What do we mean when we talk of a discourse of development? According to Grillo, who draws upon Foucault, '[a] discourse (e.g. of development) identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it' (1997: 12). Therefore, identifying or labelling a discourse of development is more encompassing than identifying only theories or only strategies of development. Barbara Harriss-White (2002) argues that the conceptualisation of policy and the policy process can vary according to the discursive context. She states that

> in economics, policy is commonly presented and understood as meaning the course of action that ought to follow, based on the results of hypothesis-testing or a set of deductions from economic theory. In rational choice discourse, policy is seen as the product of social interests; and in Foucauldian analysis development agencies generate discourse creating in turn a structure of knowledge which, while failing in its own terms, has effects including the entrenchment of bureaucratic power and the denial of politics. In the case of economics, policy is seen in terms of 'implications' - and neither the character of the state nor the operating costs of the policy implications are usually considered. In rational choice theory, the metaphors of policy as a 'commodity', of lobbies as 'interests' or 'purchasers', and of votes as 'currency' are abstracted from any

---

[8] In Chapter Three, and Chapter Five I engage with Thakur's study to analysis gendered norms in the senior civil services at the national and subnational level respectively.

[9] A more extensive discussion of the conceptual framework on discourse employed in this thesis is provided in Chapter Two.

> history - and the history of the evolution of the deep social forces shaping the volatile 'epiphenomena' of policy is outside the frame.
>
> (2002: p.2)

The body of work once labelled as development 'theory' is now more commonly referred to as development 'studies' reflecting the proliferation of different approaches to the study of development, some of which are heavily critical of the original modernist project (Leys, 1995; Harriss, 1998). Several of the new approaches reflect the incorporation of previously marginalised or alternative discourses into dominant policy practices of governmental and international agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in development. Since the early 1980s, clearly the development industry has diversified enormously, but Mosse (2005) suggests that though the industry has experienced an expansion of 'means', it has also witnessed a closing down of the 'ends'.

A common narrative of development theories in the latter half of the twentieth century up until the 1970s is usually presented as modernisation theory versus dependency theory. The former was influenced by normative prescriptions of political development invoking a dichotomy of tradition and modernity, and development economics prescribing welfarist state intervention. The latter was influenced by neo-Marxist and Latin American structuralist thought. This division led to what Schuurman among others have labelled an impasse in development thought, not least because both theories were underpinned by a teleological notion of progress rooted in Enlightenment thought (Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995). 'Development' (perhaps an overly homogenised discourse) first came under attack from different quarters in the decade of the 1980s due to several events; the popularisation of postmodern thought and its rejection of 'development' as one of many grand narratives; growing recognition of the failure of development in the 'South'; a problematisation of the state due to the incursion of globalisation onto nation-state sovereignty and the rise of neo-liberalism; and capitalist triumphalism and the seeming delegitimisation of socialism and planning following the end of the Cold War (Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995). [10]

[10] It is acknowledge that 'development' has a long history that precedes the twentieth century post-colonial context but will not be traced here for reasons of focus and space.

The 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of neo-liberal thought and policy, underpinned by a 'counter-revolution' of neo-classical economics and liberalisation and restructuring policies known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (Toye, 1993; see Lal, 1997[1983] for a neo-classical critique of development economics). The state minimalism of neo-liberalism is contrasted against the institutionalist and interventionist theories of the developmental state literature, with reference to the development of East Asian economies (Johnson, 1982, see also Woo-Cummings, for a collection of this literature). The capitalist triumphalism of the early 1990s, spurred on by the end of the Cold War, became faced with new challenges from alternative discourses replacing the capitalist adversary of socialism.

Beyond the 1990s, the neo-liberal agenda adapted to form a post-Washington Consensus, conceding a greater role for the state and institutions in development, while incorporating some selective elements of critical opposing discourses such as human, sustainable[11] and participatory development.[12] More recently, development has become increasingly identified by donor governments and international development agencies with security issues in the context of globalisation and less developed states are identified with instability (Duffield, 2001). Development thus becomes identified as an investment in conflict prevention as well as a post-conflict issue.

Feminist critiques of development did not become prominent until the 1970s, and the literature conventionally traces the first critique to Esther Boserup's 1970 study *Women's Role in Economic Development* (Boserup, 1970). Boserup's argument drew on liberal feminist theory and argued that, to their detriment, women had been excluded from the process of development and modernization and that their inclusion would be both beneficial on grounds of equity and

---

[11] Similarly 'sustainable' development reflected the incorporation of environmentalist, human rights, and (to a lesser extent) the impact of development on 'sustainable livelihoods' and community practices. Rai (2001: 114) links the impact of these new discourses of development with the 1990 launch of the annual United Nations Human Development Reports.

[12] Chambers (1997) is perhaps the strongest proponent of participatory approaches as a means for increasing stakeholder participation. Others note however, that despite its radical origins in the 'South', 'participatory' development, has been adopted as an attempt to increase, particularly by development 'beneficiaries' and increase the effectiveness (read legitimacy) of development programs and projects, utilising techniques such as a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). However, several examples of bad practice have shown efforts to increase the participation of development beneficiaries to be tokenistic (Mosse, 2001),that participatory programmes rarely address and may reproduce gendered power relations (Chhotray, 2004) – for some, it constitutes the new 'tyranny' of development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

efficiency. Boserup thus saw development as a necessary and positive project, and her critique soon formed the basis of an emerging discourse later identified as Women in Development (WID) which remains popular among development agencies today (Tinker, 1990: 30).

While initially the WID critique was a major contribution in that it made visible questions regarding women in development processes, later critiques highlighted its fundamental shortcomings, one of which was its lack of critical attention to gendered structural relations of power. A critical response came from a number of feminist scholars who were associated with the second major discourse of gendered development to emerge, Women and Development (WAD). The emergence of WAD discourse as a critique of WID mirrored dependency theory's critique of modernisation theory, but incorporated feminist insights. Contrary to WID discourse, proponents of WAD argued that women had always been part of the development process, (for example, Benería, 1982; Benería and Sen, 1982). Benería and Sen (1982) criticised Boserup in particular for lack of attention to women's productive and reproductive roles within the household.

Conceptual shifts in development approaches to women's issues and gender relations and their policy impacts have been outlined by several studies (Kabeer, 1994; Visvanathan et al., 1997; Parpart and Marchand, 1995; Jackson and Pearson, 1998). The three most frequently identified discourses in the literature of women, gender and development are Women in Development, Women and Development, and Gender and Development, abbreviated to WID, WAD and GAD respectively. Women, Environment and Development (WED) is slightly less common but has proved important in the Indian context.

The WED discourse surfaced as a radical critique of the Western development project, stressing the detrimental effects of the project of development upon the environment, and linking this oppression of nature with the oppression of women. However, opinion divided over the reasons for this oppression. One strand within this discourse made a crucial link between women's frequently overlooked economic role as manager of natural resources and the subjugation of this knowledge in development thinking and policy (for example, Agarwal, 1994). WED's accent on the importance of subjugated knowledge has influenced the shift to more participatory approaches to development, whilst avoiding charges of epistemic privilege that is often attributed

to standpoint theory. Another strand draws upon elements of ecofeminist thought, exemplified by Shiva (1988), and Mies and Shiva (1993) and Merchant (cited in Agarwal, 1998). It provides a romanticised and essentialised account of the relationship between women and the project of development by asserting woman's seemingly 'special' relationship with nature (see Agarwal (1998) for a critique). In the Indian context, Roy and Borowiak (2003) provide an important critique of Shiva by drawing out the gendered essentialisms that she makes explicit in the urban/rural dichotomy. Yet ecofeminism has resonated with certain sections of the women's movement in India.

Southern and Third World feminists' rejection of WID agenda saw the emergence of Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), exemplified in the publication *Development Crises and Alternative Visions* (Sen and Grown, 1988). This coincided with the shift from WID to gender and development, or GAD, in the 1980s. This shifted the focus from women-specific development studies and strategies to one which examined gender, as a socially constructed set of differentiated roles and relations of and between men and women, and how development affected the roles and relationships of both men and women. It stressed the importance of *empowerment*, rather than equity (WAD) or efficiency (WID) (Kabeer, 1994). GAD was initially seen as a potentially more transformative approach than WID, WAD and WED discourses. While state institutions, if professing a gender and development discourse at all, may veer towards the WID discourse, several non-governmental and women's organisations can be identified as reflecting a GAD perspective. Arguably, it is a mixture of WID and GAD that dominate development discourses in policy-making institutions, although WID discourse still informs many women-specific development projects because it is less threatening than a GAD perspective (Moser, 1993).

Despite its more progressive position in comparison to WID and WAD discourse, GAD discourse and its discursive practices and effects have also come under scrutiny. Assumptions that women's increased participation in the labour force will reduce gender discrimination and enhance women's autonomy is both a simplistic assumption (Swaminathan, 2002) and is certainly not guaranteed (Mukhopadhyay, 2003a). Jeffrey and Jeffrey (1998) suggest that education policies aimed to bring about changes in women's status and behaviour have been

used instrumentally rather than aimed at women's empowerment, such as to inform fertility choices in the pursuit of population control. Furthermore, development agencies promoting microcredit programs for women have co-opted GAD's language of empowerment (Rankin, 2001; Rankin, 2002).

Furthermore, postmodern feminist critiques of development have raised some particularly challenging issues that relate to the effects of mainstream and gendered development discourse, such as the representations of Third World women as 'the backward, vulnerable, 'other'' that these discourses construct (Parpart and Marchand, 1995). Catherine V. Scott (1995) provides a feminist critical rereading of modernisation and dependency theory and attempts to show that both, for different reasons, opt for a scientific and technological pursuit of progress, through evolutionary and revolutionary means respectively, and the dichotomy of modernity/tradition is reflected in dichotomies of male/female, independence/dependence, detachment/family, city/village, urban/rural. Marchand's and Parpart's edited collection (1995) is a refreshing encounter compared to the outright rejection of development of some postmodern theorists on development. Parpart and Marchand (1995: 17) underscore the need to deconstruct development discourse. It is part of a more general postmodern project of 'deconstructing the West' (Pieterse, 2001). However, rather than rejecting development, they aim to explore how postmodern feminists can contribute to addressing developmental questions.

Until recently, few studies on the Indian case explicitly identify development as a discourse in the definition employed here. As noted earlier, development scholarship on the Indian case has tended to develop in a somewhat disconnected manner for the more general literature. One exception is the work of Amartya Sen. Sen's work, most notably the capabilities approach (summarised in a later collection, 1999; also edited with Nussbaum, 1993) has been influential in the reorientation (beyond just the Indian context) towards "human" development, valorising the measurement of more social, people-oriented, quality of life development indicators, stressing the development of individual capability rather than abstract, impersonal economic goals.[13]

---

[13] Speaking of Sen, and another scholar with a similar message, Sukhatme, Harriss states 'these ways of thinking - about "human development" and the conceptualisation of poverty in terms which are wider than those of income deprivation alone – are absolutely at the heart of current discourses on development...If these ways of thinking are

Otherwise, the vast scholarship on the Indian post-Independence development path is dominated by economic and class-based analyses that attempt to explain the success or failure of state-led development policy. Two major periods in the history of post-independent India with regards to development discourse are the establishment of planning at Independence accompanied by a modernising discourse, and the shift to a neo-liberal economic policy in 1991.[14] In the newly independent state of India, a non-aligned post-colonial development discourse in India was founded on a Nehruvian socialist development strategy in the 1950s aimed at 'redistribution with growth'. The Nehruvian modernising approach, underpinned by scientism, based on heavy industrialisation, influenced heavily by the economist Mahalanobis, and reflected in the Second Five Year Plan, was favoured over the alternative Gandhian approach (Chakravarty, 1987: 8).[15] Chakravarty's seminal study on development planning in India sums up the debate as 'plan vs. market' (Chakravarty, 1987). More specifically, Nayar presents economic planning, autarky and socialism[16] as the three key features particular to the development pattern of post-Independence India (2001: 51). Autarky, represented as export pessimism, self-sufficiency, and tight controls over foreign investment, has been explained explicitly in terms of the Nehruvian socialist

---

not altogether the gift of Indian development scholarship, they have certainly been influenced very profoundly by it' (Harriss, 1998: 299).

[14] Other notable periods in India's pre-1991 development history that studies focus on have included attempted moves towards more market-oriented policies representative of a neo-liberal discourse under the premiership of Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966), the shift in agricultural strategy that led to the Green Revolution (through the use of imported agro-technologies of high yielding seed varieties), and Rajiv Gandhi's failed attempts at liberalisation in the 1980s. While notions of path-dependence suggest these periods will have an effect on current development discourse, the focus here is limited on the two major periods mentioned above.

[15] Chakravarty notes how the pre-independence debate polarised around a Gandhian and a Nehruvian approach, but that the latter was never a serious contender for strategies of post-colonial national development (1987: 7). He asserts that 'the Gandhian approach has never been seriously discussed by either mainstream economists or by its left-wing critics. There are good reasons for this neglect as both sides share fundamental propositions regarding the way one should view the central *problematique* of development. [Both mainstream theorists and their critics] have largely accepted a commodity-centred approach...Thus in either system, more goods are preferred to less...In contrast the Gandhian approach has always talked about the voluntary limitation of wants, the need for having self-reproducing village communities, and about issues bearing on a better balance between man and nature' (1987: 7-8). Chakravarty thus demonstrates the foreclosure of the Gandhian approach as a discursive possibility for India at Independence.

[16] The influence of "socialism" in India's developmental outlook is not the same as a socialist approach which strictly adheres to Marxist prescriptions, but rather economic development tied to the pursuit of socially beneficial outcomes for all Indians, and this is acknowledged in the Second Five Year Plan (Government of India, 1956).

approach to development (Nayar, 2001) although Ahluwalia (1998) among others points out that self-reliance was not a significant feature until the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66).[17]

But what was the historical context within which these discourses emerged? Chatterjee (1997) argues that for the **post-colonial** Indian state, freed from the impediments and stagnation imposed by its former oppressive colonial ruler, the project of development became a national imperative. Thus 'a developmental ideology then was a constituent part of the self-definition of the post-colonial state' (1997: 277). Drawing on Gramsci, Chatterjee argues that this does not involve a radical shake up of existing administrative or class structu*res but a 'passive revolution'*, in which the state 'seeks to limit [the]... former power [of the pre-capitalist dominant classes], neutralise them where necessary, attack them only selectively, and in general bring them round to a position of subsidiary allies' (1997: 288).

Economic reforms since 1991 have ushered in a neo-liberal discourse with an IMF loan (and its accompanying conditionalities of structural adjustment) which had been sought in response to a fiscal crisis. This fiscal crisis has been seen by many as a critical juncture although largely as an opportunity for neo-liberal proponents to bring in reforms, rather than an ideological conversion (Sachs et al., 1999: 22). Analyses have established that by 1991, this neo-liberal shift represented far from anything like shock therapy, not least because reforms had already been attempted earlier, briefly in the 1960s, and in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi.

Debates about the manner and progress of reforms differ over whether their implementation has been predominantly incremental and partial (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Nayar, 2001), insufficient (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993), stunted by 'vested interests' (Chhibber, 2003) or 'demand-groups' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987), or have been implemented with unanticipated continuity and skill – by 'stealth' (Jenkins, 1999). This is commonly a discussion about the extent to which a neo-liberal discourse of development has become embedded within Indian development institutions and policy.

---

[17] Harriss (1998) asserts that dependency thinking had little influence on development thinking in India, despite a significant contribution by Bagchi on underdevelopment (1982).

In contrast to the picture of discursive hegemony that Chatterjee portrays of the postcolonial project of development (discussed above), Kaviraj (1991) argues that the Nehruvian developmental state failed to popularise its modernising discourse and to legitimise state planned development.[18] He employs the concepts of 'upper' or elite and 'lower' or mass discourses, which he argues both emerged from the colonial period. Williams (1997) takes a more favourable view of Kaviraj's account than Jeffrey and Lerche (2000) who problematize the absence of a class analysis, although Williams justifiably criticises Kaviraj's account for the absence of a 'voice' of the Indian masses (1997: 2102). Corbridge and Harriss (2000) extend this to argue that the masses have been able to recycle universalistic values of the Nehruvian era to contest state-led neo-liberal development.

Kaviraj's account is useful for an explanation of the (lack of) dominance of neo-liberal discourses among the masses. It may also be extended to provide a potential explanation for the absence of a mass mobilisation of women beyond the more urban-concentrated women's movement engaged in a debate for more gender-aware development policies. Such an extension would need to compensate for the fact that Kaviraj does not consider the gendered relations of power inherent in the 'lower' discourse.

To recap, so far I have discussed studies that identify in various ways multiple discourses of development both in general and in the Indian context specifically. Generally, the mainstream literature on Indian development discourse has not paid attention to the gendered character of development. Two exceptions to this are the work of Amartya Sen, most notably on gendered patterns of household resource distribution (Sen, 1990) and (with Jean Drèze) on the declining female-male child sex ratio in India (Drèze and Sen, 2002) , and that also of Partha Chatterjee (Chatterjee, 1989) on the nationalist resolution of the women's question at Independence. Chatterjee suggests that the question of women's equality was resolved in a way which fitted with nationalist sentiments - that nationalists viewed women's domesticity and reproduction of cultural values as symbolic of the spiritual superiority of the Indian nation over its colonial oppressors. The logical progression of his argument is that the state did not consider women's

---

[18] Varshney (1999) makes a similar but less nuanced argument that a shift to neo-liberal economic policy has not become an important issue in 'mass politics', otherwise dominated by identity politics, but is confined to the realm of 'elite politics', of bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals and graduates.

inferior status or gender inequitable relations as a central concern of national development in the immediate post-Independence years. This concurs with Chaudhuri's analysis of an early planning document which suggested while a progressive discussion of women status and gender inequality took place among senior nationalist leaders in the years just before Independence, this debate almost disappeared without a trace in the years following Independence (Chaudhuri, 1996).

Feminist critiques of neoliberal development in India and other national contexts have voiced anticipated detrimental gendered effects of neo-liberal economic policies and the adoption of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Policies on a state's economy and social sector (Craske, 1998; Mukhopadhyay and Sudarshan, 2003; Upadhyay, 2000; Arora, 1999). In the few studies on India, only some possess detailed evidence on the effects of the New Economic Policy on poor and marginalised sections of society despite a proliferation of analyses that discuss the predicted effects of both the NEP and structural adjustment programmes in general.[19] Little information exists, says Mukhopadhyay (2003b), on the actual presence of anticipated gendered effects of structural adjustment programmes.

Population policy, a central component of Indian national development policy is one of the most consistently analysed policy area with an overwhelming bias towards the repressive and coercive practices of state fertility programmes (with some notable exceptions). This reflects a strength of the more extensively developed feminist literature in India on the gendered violence of the state. Chatterjee and Riley's analysis (2001) highlights the historically and sustained central position of population policies within the goals of Indian planned development, as gendered and class-differentiated. Rao (2005) notes that the National Population Policy of 2000 represents a more progressive move by the government towards a Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) approach, in the spirit of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. However, this progression has been countered by regressive State level policies which have reinstated the two-child norm, especially for eligibility to contest *panchayat* elections. While the

---

[19] Swapna Mukhopadhyay (2003a: 9) groups "apprehensive accounts" into three arguments. Firstly, SAPs are inherently bias against women due to the partial view ignoring women's reproductive labour in the household. Secondly, job security requirements and labour rights are downplayed resulting in lower job security in the private sector which may effect women more than men due to their greater concentration in the lower end of the labour market spectrum. Thirdly, adverse changes in the household economic environment may occur such as increased workloads, livelihood and budgetary adjustments and "reduction in state responsibility in the social sector".

Centre has reemphasised the non-coercive RCH approach, in some cases the legislature of both the Supreme Court and State Governments High Courts have upheld the two-child norm (Rao, 2005).

1.2.3 Agents of Gendered Development

Studies of Indian development and development more generally have attributed varying degrees of agency to different actors involved in the development process. Generally, political leaders, bureaucrats, bilateral and multilateral donors, international development agencies, and powerful interest groups in society have been assigned as more powerful actors than those who are often the targets or beneficiaries of development policies or those who are facilitators of state policy such as non-governmental organisations, civil society groups or voluntary organizations.

As mentioned already, in the general development literature, the state is often positioned as the most prominent agent of national development policy, for benign or predatory reasons, or to the benefit or detriment of development, depending on the development discourse. The literature on the 'developmental state' is largely devoted to the issue of the capacity of the state to act as an agent of development and to implement the state's development agenda. This literature has conceptualised the Indian state variously as "embedded" (Herring, 1999), as "soft" (Myrdal, 1968), as a "pluralist class state" (Bardhan, 1990), and as "weak-strong" (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). These important distinctions represent different arguments about the manner in which the definition, structure and characteristics of state and society determine the state's capacity to formulate and implement development policy as well as the motivational forces that influence the substantive content of policy.

However, at the risk of simplification, what many of these approaches tend towards, possibly with the exception of Herring's embedded state model, is a monolithic representation of the state, which obscures the complex and diverse forms of interaction between, and organizational culture within, different institutions of the state. While these accounts may illuminate the role of non-state actors in relation to the capacity of the state to effect policy, some have a tendency to downplay the internal politics among different state actors and institutions – the state is

conceived as an undifferentiated entity. Furthermore, these accounts do not make explicit the gendered character of state institutions.[20]

Studies of political leadership in the pre-1991 national context are dominated by studies of key leadership roles and influential policy-makers. Prominent subjects in these accounts are Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru (1947-64), as well as other members of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, Indira Gandhi (1967-77, 1980-84), and her son Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). The influence of Nehru's leadership on the early phase of India's post-Independence development experience is well established, as is the centralising, institutional weakening effects and the authoritarian aspects of Indira Gandhi's rule.

While the study of development policy in India has afforded significance to individual political leaders, rarely has it occurred without reference to overwhelming structural forces or interest groups. This does not however dilute the intentionality of actors in these accounts but limits them to the structure-agency dilemma.[21] Jenkins (1999) provides a more institutionalist perspective which also touches on motivational issues for political leaders. In his study of the economic reforms of the 1990s, Jenkins concludes that 'political actors are more in an ongoing improvisation than a scripted piece of theatre' prompted by signals from the elections, protests and public opinion (1999: 208). But this 'intransigence' is mediated by the institutional context within which political actors operate, the latter being highly influenced by historical contingency (Jenkins, 1999: 209-10). If this is taken to be accurate, it demonstrates an important contrast to the *modus operandi* of civil service policy planners discussed above.

Subnational leaders in TN and AP have also garnered attention, partly due to the recognition of the proximity of Chief Ministers to implementation (Manor, 1995). For example, Andhra

---

[20] Feminists have attempted to theorise the gendered character of the state in more general terms but vary in terms of their treatment of the 'state' and the interests it represents. Whereas Marxist and radical feminist accounts have been criticised for portraying undifferentiated accounts of the state, institutionalist and post-structuralist feminists have seen the state as a heterogeneous set of institutions, agencies and discourses, and the product of a particular historical and political conjuncture (Waylen, 1998: 5-6' Pringle and Watson, 1992: 57-58, 62-63)[20]. The state becomes a site of the construction of problems and identities and of contestation and struggle.

[21] For example, studies on Rajiv Gandhi associate his leadership *inter alia* with the failure of liberalisation reforms to take off in the 1980s. Manor's (1988) study of the government's failure to implement liberalisation reforms placed considerable blame on the personality traits of Gandhi. On the other hand, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his Finance Minister tend to accompany each other in studies of the early nineties liberalisation reforms.

Pradesh ex-Chief Minister and leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Chandrababu Naidu (1995-2004) is never far from accounts of nineties economic and governance reforms in AP (Kennedy, 2004; Manor, 2004; Mooij, 2003). Kennedy (2004) and Mooij (2003) in particular note the central role of Naidu in the orchestration of reforms with specific insights on the representation of reforms as 'signalling' reform intentions to other key actors. For example, Jos Mooij's (2003) study of the policy process in Andhra Pradesh under Naidu focuses on the strategic image-building of both Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP regime, the centralisation of policy-making (despite more participatory tones in the developmentalist discourse), and the use of policy implementation for party-building purposes. Mooij argues that Naidu attempts to combine two faces of leadership: the first to enhance regime legitimacy among voters and the latter to create legitimacy in the international arena which is consistent with Kennedy's signalling theory, discussed above (Mooij 2003: p.22; Kennedy: 2004). The first consists of attempts to ensure the legitimacy of his regime through schemes such as Janmabhoomi, which also has the purpose of strengthening and extending the TDP network by bypassing established channels. The second consists of an outward-facing, dynamic, reformist regime and represented in Naidu's personal image as IT enthusiast and World Bank client. However, the effect of the developmentalist discourse is that it produces expectation of delivery and as such the government is under pressure to deliver according to self-established standards in order to secure re-election (2003: p.22).

Few in-depth studies have linked individual political leaders in India with gendered development policy; few have examined the key role that leadership has to play in championing gender-sensitive development policy. Can any of India's top political leaders be called 'policy entrepreneurs' (True, 2003) in this sense? To what extent have political leaders demonstrated accountability to the women's movement? A few studies have discussed how political leaders have rhetorically appealed to women and attempted to exploit them as a vote bank.

An increasing number of studies on female politicians emerged in the 1990s as a result of the increasing number of women (although still in the minority) occupying senior positions within Indian electoral politics. What several studies of senior female politicians in India show is that

the presence of female political leaders does not guarantee the inclusion into the political agenda of demands central to the women's movement.[22]

Bureaucrats have also been an important object of study for analyses of Indian development policy, including the way they bring ideas into the policy-making process. Several commentators have debated the influence of epistemic communities (although not always employing this term) on policy-making, including with regards to 1990s liberalisation reforms. Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area'. This differs in relation to advocacy coalitions which are conceived as more ad hoc arrangements around certain policy issues and whose members are seen as acting according to a logic of self-maximising interest.

The concept of epistemic communities blurs the line between bureaucrats and political actors. In a study of India's liberalisation policies under the premierships of Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) and Narasimha Rao (1991-1996), Vanita Shastri (1997: 28) depicts the epistemic community around liberalisation as consisting of 'political leaders and bureaucrats both career and 'laterals'. According to Shastri, the impetus for change emerged from the state: from both political decision-makers and bureaucrats situated within state institutions. But 'laterals' - individuals entering the Indian civil service laterally rather than through career progression – manage to institutionalise external ideas and influences as a result of their foreign-based education (UK – older generation, US – younger generation) and exposure to different work ethics and ideas (Shastri, 1997: 38). They have diverse career backgrounds and importantly 'they are key links in a process of international networking and policy co-ordination' (ibid).[23] Their significance is that 'through the 1980s, the "new laterals" have played a key role in developing the more technical aspects of the liberalizing program' but not without some resistance (ibid).[24]

---

[22] Studies of female political leaders that extend beyond the India press include Skoda (2004), Basu (1993), Sarkar (1993), Chowdhry (2000), Banerjee (2004), and Keating (2001).

[23] For example, Shastri asserts that laterals with experience working in the World Bank "bring to India their cross-country experience and knowledge of how similar reform programmes have been introduced and operated elsewhere" (1997: 39).

[24] Following a similar line, Baldev Raj Nayar (2001) suggests contact with overseas economists as well as the overseas training of many of the top Indian economic theorists and planners may have had a disproportional effect

Both Terence Byres and Ashok Rudra (cited in Byres, 1998) disagree with this view of 'foreign' influence. While Rudra sees the development of economic models in India as more independent and autonomous than Nayar has argued, Byres goes further by posturing that "India's contributions have been in advance of contributions made anywhere else" (Byres, 1998: 14). However, Byres rejects Bhagwati's and Srinivasan's assertion that

> [Liberalisation ideas] rejected at the time by our authorities and by many of our economists as well, have now been adopted worldwide but have come to be adopted by us only at the end of this revolutionary change. Indeed, these ideas have been *recycled back to us, in many cases, by the staff of the multilateral institutions who learnt them from our own pioneering economists.* The claim that the ideas are foreign and hence ill-suited to us is therefore incorrect.
>
> (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, quoted in Byres, 1998: 8, orig. emphasis)

Arguably, Byres' and Rudra's accounts introduce an unnecessary tension that emerges in attempts to distinguish between 'national' or 'Indian' and 'external' influences on policy, not least because Byres attributes the architecture of the 1991 reforms to Montek S. Ahluwalia, then Finance Secretary of the Government of India but with previous tenure at the World Bank (1998: 3). Shastri's use of laterals is both a convincing and useful concept but says less about the wider epistemic community, for instance the role of members located in international institutions. It also says less about how such exposure to a different work ethic and ideas may not be a guarantee for progressive reforms, particularly towards more transformative policy proposals such as those of gender and development policy advocates, and whether bureaucrats or political leaders may also be influenced by, or linked to, wider (trans)national feminist networks.

Literature on the women's movement in India is extensive and feminist engagement with the state is a prominent topic.[25] A key theme is the crucial importance of the movement in 'articulating and making demands on the government on specific issues as they arise, and for the

---

on the economic outlook of the Second Five Year plan in India's early planning years. Sukhamoy Chakravarty suggests a more two-way interaction asserting that "[a]lmost all major contemporary economists who took an interest in problems of development had occasion to interact with India's planners and policy-makers in the fifties and early sixties...The result was a process of two-way interaction. Dominant ideas of contemporary development economics influenced the logic of India's plans, and correspondingly, development theory was for a while greatly influenced by the Indian case." (1987: 4).

[25] For a general overview see Akerkar (1995), Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995), Kumar (1989), and Forbes (1982).. For a detailed history see Forbes (1998). See various chapters in Murthy (2001) and Kannabiran and Kannabiran (2002) on capacity-building experiences with women's organisations. See the latter and also Mageli (1997) for studies of women's organisations in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu respectively. Akerkar (1995) is particularly. interesting as a rare post-structuralist discourse analysis of the women's movement in India.

setting up of appropriate policies and programmes by the state...' (Karlekar, 2004: 148-9).[26] Karlekar argues that combined with grassroots organisations they have been 'imperative for the purposes of women's development and empowerment on a wider scale.' (2004: 148-9). Women's organisations are diverse in structure, leadership, and mandate.[27]

The literature centres around key issues such as engagement with the state and the associated risks of co-optation, risks of fragmentation and lack of solidarity of the women's movement, welfare versus agitational feminist organisations, the structure and leadership style within women's organisations, women's organisations as a form of capacity-building and gender sensitisation in themselves, and the transforming character of the women's movement in response to socio-economic changes in government policy and Indian society.[28]

Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995: 1874) make the important observation that socio-economic development policy has provided academics with the impetus to enter the women's movement. They argue that, more so than in other areas, academics have entered the movement straddling the academic-activist divide, and have been highly influential regarding the 'priorities and lines of advocacy for dialogues with policy-makers' (ibid).

Rai (2003) is right to question, as others have done more generally, whether there is a homogeneous 'women's interest' to represent, given the diverse, plural and fragmented nature of the women's movement, which highlights the various and potentially conflicting interests of the women's movement. Recent challenges to the women's movement have emerged from the rise in Hindu nationalism but Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995) stress that resistance to neo-liberal economic policies has proved to be a source of unity. Instead, it may be more productive to adopt

---

[26] Studies point to the rise and decline and subsequent rise of the women's movement during, respectively, the pre-Independence nationalist movement, the early post-Independence period, and the post-Emergency period and beyond (Agnihotri and Mazumdar, 1995).

[27] Karlekar (2004: 149-50) divides women's organisations in to four categories, namely those which are connected to political parties, autonomous apolitical women's groups, rural and urban grassroots women's organisations, and women's research, development and documentation organisations. She notes that grassroots organisations have been particularly effective.

[28] The women's movement itself has organised on diverse issues from dowry, arrack, violence (including rape), equal economic and employment opportunities, and anti-development protests. In the last two decades, the Hindutva movement has also become a site of women's right-wing political mobilisation although with dubious potential for the empowerment of women, and has become particularly militant around communal issues (Basu, 1993). The latter will not be considered here as part of the feminist women's movement.

Akerkar's perspective in that rather than the prospect of a unified women's interest, 'the different fragmented contexts of struggle suggest...that there can be no...one way of understanding or locating women's oppression (Akerkar, 1995: WS-13).

The literature is also extensive on the more formal political participation of women, on Indian women's quotas (or 'reservations' in India) at the panchayat (local council) level and the ongoing debates over the proposed 84th Amendment Bill for reserving a third of seats for women in Parliament (Randall, 2006; Rai and Sharma, 2000; Rai, 1999). Women are engaged in electoral politics with similar overall turnouts for men and women at Assembly and Lok Sabha elections, with some regional variance, but there is far less descriptive representation of women by women in politics.[29] While the panchayat reservations legislation passed in the was hailed as a progressive development for women, many have questioned whether panchayats offer real opportunities for women's political participation given what were early signs of the dominance of women elected panchayat representatives by their family members (see Kudva, 2003 for a discussion on '*pradhan patis*' or proxy participation). It is also questionable as to whether formal political participation is an effective institutional route for feminist organizations for lobbying. Rai (2002) suggests that the women's wings of political parties have few links with organizations from the women's movement or their feminist agendas.

Therefore, questions remain as to how the women's movement can generate new and better strategies for building networks of advocacy with transnational feminist organisations and for engaging in effective influential dialogue with policy-makers, outside of the formal channels of electoral participation.

1.2.4 Summary

The literature on Indian development policy is vast and represents a complex array of factors that go beyond those factors studied here. Some broad conclusions can be drawn at this point. Classic studies of Indian development policy lack a systematic detailed analysis of its gendered character. Few of these studies have considered how development institutions are gendered, and

---

[29] For example, the Lok Sabha elections in May 2004 elected just over 8% of female candidates to the Lok Sabha, with proportions of contesting and elected women candidates varying considerably among political parties.

few engage with feminist critiques of development discourse. of the Indian institution of planning. Studies of political leadership have yet to encompass an analysis of the role and potential of political leaders as advocates for gender and development policy, beyond issues of their own gendered rhetorical appeals to women as voters. The women's movement has in the past proved to be an effective advocate for change but how is can this relationship be sustained and improved? What are the options available to the women's movement for influencing development policy towards the goal of transformative change?

1.3 Gender Mainstreaming

How have feminists interested in explicitly gendering development policies and institutional practices theorised this process of reform? What do studies of gender mainstreaming, as a strategy to mainstream a transformative gender equality perspective into development policies, say about institutions, discourses, and agency? In this section, I explore the gender mainstreaming literature and I briefly outline relevant concepts and definitions before focusing specifically on gender mainstreaming in the context of development policy. This section includes a discussion of the institutional structures and contexts that are linked to gender mainstreaming strategies, and the role of policy entrepreneurs and transnational feminist advocacy and activism. Key questions include: from where does the impetus for mainstreaming emerge and how can individuals or groups affect its adoption? How do the goals of development and gender mainstreaming coincide and how do they differ? What kind of institutional structures and cultures are conducive to gender mainstreaming?

1.3.1 Concepts, Definitions and Debates

Gender mainstreaming is a relatively new strategy to be applied to the goals of addressing gender equality but has already established a considerable space in a policy context and in academic scholarship. Mieke Verloo provides one definition of gender mainstreaming in an increasingly crowded conceptual space:

> "[g]*ender mainstreaming* addresses the problem of gender inequality at a more structural level [than targeted gender equality policies], identifying gender biases in current policies, and addressing the impact of these gender biases in the reproduction of gender policy. By reorganising policy processes so that the regular policy makers will be obliged and capable to incorporate a perspective of gender equality in their policies,

> this strategy aims at a fundamental transformation, eliminating gender biases, and redirecting policies so that they can contribute towards the goal of gender equality"
> (2001: 3).

For Judith Squires (2005), Verloo's definition would equate to a transformative approach to mainstreaming, which is identified as the most desirable in terms of transformative change. It is based on a diversity perspective and follows a strategy of displacement through the destabilisation of hegemonic norms. But Squires also includes integrationist and agenda-setting strategies in her definition of mainstreaming. Squires (2005) sets out a three-by-three matrix of mainstreaming approaches and associated gender perspectives and policy forms. According to this matrix, a strategy of inclusion is represented by an equality perspective, an equal opportunity approach to equality policy, and an integrationist approach. A strategy of reversal is represented by a gender perspective based on difference, a positive action approach to equality policy and an agenda-setting approach to mainstreaming. Lastly, a strategy of displacement represents a gender perspective based on diversity, an equality policy of gender mainstreaming and a transformative approach to mainstreaming in general. Yet these conceptual distinctions do not prevent the adoption of one or more of these approaches in mainstreaming practices (Squires, 2005a: 2).

Similarly, Rounaq Jahan (1995) differentiates between two approaches to mainstreaming; that of integrationist and agenda-setting. Jacqui True takes an even more encompassing definition; she asserts that gender mainstreaming "can be understood as an umbrella term that includes gender-differentiated policy analysis as well as the whole range of contemporary innovations designed to achieve more gender-equitable outcomes..." (2003: 369). There is some value in recognising the diversity of techniques and approaches adopted. However, it is useful for analytical purposes to adopt a more narrow conception of gender mainstreaming in line with Verloo's transformative definition above.

A universal acknowledgement among gender mainstreaming proponents is that engagement with the state is a necessary strategy for change (Razavi and Miller, 1998). The level of inquiry for gender mainstreaming analyses is at the institutional level and strategies advocated for mainstreaming are usually underpinned by an institutionalist perspective, concerned with norms, processes, and informal structures (Goetz, 1997). In general, the literature is dominated more by combined empirical analyses than theoretical discussion (although the latter has grown

considerably in the last four years) and this reflects the policy orientation of the field. Several studies of gender mainstreaming, and related studies of state feminism or feminist comparative policy adopt a comparative perspective or are collaborated in a comparative venture, enabling increased dialogue among advocates and analysts in the field (Randall and Waylen, 1998; Goetz, 1997a; Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Mazur, 2002; Liebert, 2003; Rai, 2003b).

Some general debates on gender mainstreaming can be identified. One is a constructivist IR debate which discusses the role of international institutions in the transnational diffusion of norms. A large European Union literature analyses gender mainstreaming in the context of the EU (Rees, 1998; Liebert, 2003). EU debates focus more generally on mainstreaming Equal Opportunity strategies, extending into all areas of policy. The EU provides a good comparative context in which to examine how a regional supranational body may influence policy change in national contexts. It also suggests important issues of pre-prescribed institutional design and policy adoption for newly integrating member governments under EU enlargement processes.

Another debate is whether the introduction of gender mainstreaming strategies places the status of national commissions in question or whether gender mainstreaming actually increases the legitimacy of these organizational bodies. Lastly, a normative debate questions whether the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming loses the critical transformative edge of agitational politics. A related issue is whether gender mainstreaming strategies are elitist in that the main feminist actors are gender experts. Most of these debates feed into wider issues of governance and reform, accountability, citizenship and democratic participation, and transnational social movements, advocacy and activism.

1.3.2 Gender Mainstreaming in Development Policy

Many academic studies use the fourth United Nations conference at Beijing in 1995 as a focusing event for the recognition and consolidation of gender mainstreaming strategies in development (for example Baden and Goetz, 1998).

As opposed to gender equality strategies set in an EU context, by and large gender mainstreaming strategies for development policy aim to make development policy more gender-sensitive. Some important early studies drawing from the WID/GAD discourse drew attention to

gendered hierarchies in development institutions and gendered policies (Kabeer, 1994; Goetz, 1997). Caroline Moser suggests a link between discourses underpinning gender mainstreaming strategies and their attractiveness to policy-makers:

> Because it is a less 'threatening' approach, planning for Women in Development is far more popular. However, by its very definition it is an add-on, rather than an integrative issue. Gender planning, with the fundamental goal of emancipation, is by definition a more 'confrontational' approach. Based on the premise that the major issue is one of subordination and inequality, its purpose is that women through empowerment achieve equality and equity with men in society.
>
> (1993: 4)

However, Moser questions the extent to which institutions can be gendered (1993: 109). This is reiterated by Standing (2004) who goes as far to question the basic assumptions underpinning gender mainstreaming of the policy route to transformative institutional change.

1.3.3 The Role of Women's National Machineries

The creation of new institutional structures to institutionalize gender planning has taken place in both non-state and state administrative contexts; in national and subnational governments, in multilateral donor agencies, and in non-governmental and civil society organisations (Moser, 1993: 108). Departments and National Commissions have proliferated in national governments. Moser traces the drive for the creation of national commissions for women to the recommendation of the first major conference of the UN Decade for Women (1975-85). It recommended 'the establishment of interdisciplinary and multisectoral machinery within government, such as national commissions, women's bureaux and other bodies...' (UN 1976: para 34; cited in Moser, 1993: 111).

A consistent theme on women's national machineries, usually in relation to their failure, is their institutional exclusion from planning processes and underfunding (Moser, 1993: 1). Several studies highlight not only exclusion and lack of resourcing, but resistance in the form of a lack of political will and leadership, continuous dislocation within government structures, short-termism of party politics and electoral cycles, and resistance to cross-party initiatives. Some internal difficulties include overambitious mandates, tenuous alliances with women's movements, confusion over objectives, the continuation of welfarist approaches, charges of elitism and co-optation, and dependency as a result of patronage (Beall, 1998; Rai, 2003a). Goetz notes that the

institutional location and role assignment of WID/GAD units can marginalise and stigmatise their ambitions in *advance* (Goetz, 1997b: 2). This raises interesting questions about institutional design and how it produces asymmetrical power relations within institutional structures.

As Gita Sen (2000) and Miller and Razavi (1998a) argue, Finance Ministries have proven the hardest to penetrate in terms of mainstreaming strategies. Miller and Razavi attribute this to the dominance in these bodies of neo-classical economics and emphasises the importance of the skills and advocacy of feminist economists such as Diane Elson in scrutinising their work in their language. This also raises questions about inter-ministerial relationships and the lack of accountability or enforcement in the higher echelons of political leadership.

A discernible component of the literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy emanates from international development agencies, some of which are introspective about developing gender mainstreaming strategies; most of their efforts are designed to institutionalise their own gender mainstreaming policy. This component also includes output strategies which are usually prescriptive, sometimes evaluative, but less often critical.[30] This component provides some empirical insights on particular cases and on varying institutional discourses and practices of gender mainstreaming, but in general they provide little theoretical or critical discussion.

Particular to mainstreaming in development is the presence of multiple actors besides the national government such as non-governmental civil society organisations, bilateral partnerships between national governments, and the international development agencies. More recent debates have focused on the rising importance of international donor discourses and the gains of transnational feminist networks in pushing for change. In Jahan's study of Bangladesh and Tanzania, two multilateral donors (World Bank and UNDP) and two bilateral donors (Norway and Canada), an insider-outsider alliance was important in institutionalising policy (Jahan, 1995). Jahan found that within bilateral agencies, a few feminist staff acted to mobilise externals. Multilateral agencies were influenced by powerful country members, feminist advocates, top leadership and outside women's lobby groups. Partner governments were more influenced by

---

[30] An example of the latter is the series of handbooks produced by the Commonwealth Secretariat entitled *New Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues* (see Kabeer, 2003, for the volume on gender mainstreaming in poverty eradication).

women's organisations, political leadership and donor agencies, more so than their apparently weak and ineffective national machineries. Interestingly, partner country women's organisations influenced donor and international agencies more than their own governments.

A more recent study by Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002) of four major international organisations (World Bank, UNDP, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the EU) similarly showed a large variation in implementing strategies with the UN most hospitable, which is consistent with the overall frame of the organisation. The low adoption by the World Bank observed by Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002) is consistent with Bergeron (2003) who argues that despite the World Bank's move towards a post-Washington consensus, which incorporates more social aspects of development, representations of women in development at the Bank have changed little.

A degree of skepticism over gender mainstreaming strategies has emerged in the literature. Mukhopadhyay (2004) notes that after three decades of activism, advocacy is still essential for reminding institutions of the need to mainstream gender into policy. This suggests a lack of institutionalisation. Subrahmanian (2004: 89) goes as far to say that gender mainstreaming has become a 'hollow discourse, a generator of myths that simplifies the complexity of gender in ways that are counterproductive, and in many ways a constraint on political action by feminists'.

1.4 Mainstreaming Gender in Indian Development Policy

The literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India is an underdeveloped area, particularly in academic circles, and most analysis is situated at the level of development organisations, NGO practitioners and grassroots projects rather than government policy level (Murthy, 2001a). A possible explanation for this is that gender mainstreaming initiatives are relatively new in India which may mean research and analysis has not yet grown to represent a substantial body of literature.[31] Another explanation may reflect the limited uptake, impact, or perceived importance of gender mainstreaming strategies in Indian development policy. The prospect of the absence of gender mainstreaming is in itself interesting and warrants study into

---

[31] Murthy (1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30-31) found that of training programmes in108 development organizations in India, '70%-75% of training programmes for development functionaries in India were found to be gender-blind...[they] are implicitly male-biased as they do not delve into gender biases within mainstream thinking'.

the factors which have contributed to its marginal or ineffective position. It may reflect an absence of political will to follow gender mainstreaming strategies or an absence of external donor influence, pressure, or incentive to adopt such strategies. Both explanations highlight the need for research on this topic. The following review will be limited to a few important and relevant studies on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India. Firstly, it brings together important insights from studies on the institutional structure and policy legacy that constitutes the environment for gender mainstreaming initiatives in India.

Desai (1998) and Raju (1997) have charted several of the main developments in Indian policy and state institutional structure and design on women's issues and gender relations (see Table 1 below and Appendix I). What this shows is the existence of the institutional development of a bureaucratic structure to address gender and development issues. One such development has been the creation of a National Commission for Women. The Commission was set up by parliamentary legislation in January 1992 under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 (Rai, 2003: 230).[32] The Commission is not solely constituted for the purpose of advising on women-specific or gendered development policy, and this reflects the wider agenda of the Indian women's movement. The efficacy of the National Commission for Women in India has not been studied extensively. Rai (2003) provides one account. According to Rai, the NCW was established in response to the National Perspective Plan for Women and after consulting various members and organisations from the women's movement (1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30-31) and feminist advocates in mainstream electoral politics (Rai, 2003: 229). Rai asserts that support from women's organisation for the constitution of a national commission for women created legitimacy for the institutional body and identifies four reasons for their support. Firstly, the growth of the Indian women's movement prompted increased confidence to make demands on the state. Secondly, a politics of presence was acknowledged as necessary in order for policy to be gender-sensitive. Thirdly, feminist activist and feminist academic capacity existed for training on gender issues. Fourthly, engagement with the state was acknowledged as necessary due to the

---

[32] The Commission's mandate is "to review the Constitutional and legal safeguards for women, recommend remedial legislative measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and advise the Government on all policy matters affecting women" (NCW, cited in Rai, 2003: p. 231). The Commission's focus is on legal safeguards, rights, provisions, violations and policy-related matters as well as participating in the planning process for socio-economic development of women and evaluates progress.

growing conservatism of civil society groups. Lastly, policy change from the top was deemed important (2003: 229).

The lack of adequate studies on this topic means that several questions remain as to the efficacy of the National Commission for Women, its relationship (other than structural) to its parent department (the Department of Women and Child Development) and parent ministry (the Ministry of Human Resource Development), and above all to other Ministries in government. Furthermore, what is the role of leadership of the Commission? Does its structural location preclude a serious engagement with other ministries as Goetz (1995) suggests? To what extent is the Commission really consulted in policy-making? Crucially, does the existence of a WID unit such as the National Commission, or perhaps the Department of Women and Child Development undermine efforts to institutionalise a mainstream approach?

On gendered development policy, Saraswati Raju (1997) and Murli Desai (1998) provide analyses of how India's successive Five Year Plans (up to the Eighth Five Year Plan) have articulated the development approach to women and gender. Raju (1997) highlights a significant shift from welfare to development in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) and from development to empowerment in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997). Some of the main developments are summarised in Table 1 below. The question remains as to whether developments in the Ninth (1997-2002) and Tenth Five Year Plans (2002-2007) have remained consistent with the empowerment approach.

What literature does exist on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India indicates that a relatively small number of acadmic-activists have collaborated with the Government of India on this topic (Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1999a). The Gender Planning Training Project, a 'landmark' collaboration between the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the UK, and the Government of India, aimed to develop training modules for gender mainstreaming to train would-be trainers. The project included training sessions for civil servants at IDS, with sessions later transferred to the Indian civil service training institute, the National Academy of Administration in Mussorie, Uttar

Table 1 Approach to women and/or gender and development in Five Year Plans 1951-1997

Year(s)	Plan	Approach to women and/or gender
1951-56	First Five Year Plan	Focus on welfare; development of maternal and child health and family planning services
1956-60	Second Five Year Plan	Focused on women workers: less organised and vulnerable to social prejudices and physical disabilities. Suggested protection against injurious work, equal pay for equal work, crèches, training facilities, expanding opportunities for part-time employment.
1960-66	Third Five Year Plan	Focus on expansion of girls' education
1969-74	Fourth Five Year Plan	Continued focus of previous plan.
1974-79	Fifth Five Year Plan	Shift from welfare to development; need to train women in need of income and protection.
1980-85	Sixth Five Year Plan	Women's development recognised as specific development sector with separate chapter. Three-pronged thrust on education, employment and health. Several schemes launched to benefit women.
1985-90	Seventh Five Year Plan	Included a separate chapter on women entitled "Socio-economic Programmes for Women".
1992-1997	Eighth Five Year Plan	Shift from development to empowerment. Focus on three key sectors of education, health and employment. Women now seen as equal partners and participants in development and must be empowered for this.

Source: Adapted from Murli Desai (1998) and Raju (1997)

Pradesh (Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1999b; Subrahmanian et al., 1999). However, few studies have explored the effects of this training on development policy formulation and administration. The collections in Murthy (2001) focus mainly on gender sensitisation training by NGOs for societal groups at the grassroots level, but an important exception is the chapter by Stephen (2001) on NGO training for women in gram panchayats. Stephen highlights the ministerial conflicts and attitudes of high-level government functionaries of gender-sensitisation

programmes, in this case between the Department of Women and Child Development and the Panchayat Raj Department.[33]

1.5 Conclusion

Some key themes that emerge from this review is a vast literature on development policy but one which has key areas of deficiency and integration in terms of analysing the gendered character of state-led development in India. The preceding critical analysis of the literature has found accounts which present the state as an undifferentiated entity unable to address some of the complex relationships between and within state institutions, particularly gendered practices, norms, structures and processes. The Centre-State relationship is an interesting dynamic, and one on which the literature is beginning to grow. State level discourses need to be explored as to their differential impact in comparison to national level discourses of development. The synthesis of literature on development policy in India and gender mainstreaming in development policy shows limited coverage of the Indian case. This is most likely a result of a lack of uptake of strategies or the relatively new development of these strategies in the Indian case. In both instances, the process of research can only contribute to exploring these reasons further as questions remain unanswered. Emerging initiatives combined with the lack of detailed study on the Indian case with regards to gender mainstreaming in development policy suggests room for a valuable and original contribution to the literature.

---

[33] Stephen claims that while the DWCD was in approval of the programme, the Secretary of the *Panchayat Raj* Department 'fiercely resisted' the proposal on the grounds that responsibilities and funds had already been allocated for their training at a national institute, and that no further training would be required or funds allocated for that purpose (2001: 136). Resistance also came from the Panchayat Raj Department Secretary to the gender-specific training needs of women gram panchayat members (2001: 136).

2 METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

To reiterate, the research aims are to understand (a) the politics of formulating and implementing gendered development policy in an *institutional* context; (b) how the process and content of policy-making is affected by *discourse*; and (c) how particular *agents* can exert more influence than others on the development policy-making process. The research objectives are to discern how institutional context affects the efforts to mainstream gender in development policy, to discern how specific gendered discourses of development become prevalent in state institutions; and to discern how influential actors may potentially promote or obfuscate gender mainstreaming in development policy. Thus, institutions, discourse, and agency are the three key analytical concepts central to the research question of this thesis. The main aim of this chapter is to outline the methodologies which underpin these three concepts as well as the methods I will use for data collection.

I draw upon two principal methodologies: firstly, the emerging approach of feminist institutionalism to inform my conceptualization of institutions, and secondly, for discourse, a poststructural approach to feminist discourse analysis. Lastly, a poststructural perspective informs how agency is conceptualized, specifically as a product of institutional norms and practices and of the various subject positions made available through discourses as well as the destabilizing effect arising from their conflicting and contradictory juxtaposition. Given the combination of feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis, throughout this chapter I argue the case for methodological pluralism as a means to address the research problem. A key component of the analytical structure is the post-positivist approach to the comparative analysis of two case studies. The main methods of data collection employed are semi-structured (predominantly elite) interviews and documentary analysis. The chapter also includes a

consideration of research ethics as details of the planned fieldwork period and destinations. The methodology is designed in order to produce synergies that take advantage of different methodological approaches while remaining internally consistent in order to understand the relationship between institutions, discourse and agency, in a comparative context.

2.2 Feminist Institutionalism

2.2.1 From 'old' to 'new' institutionalism

The 'new' institutionalism(s) emerged from growing dissatisfaction with the dominance of behaviouralist approaches, the latter themselves emerging from dissatisfaction with the 'old' institutionalism. 'Old' institutionalism focused on the formal-legal political structure of a polity, and its subject matter consists of the formal organisations, rules and procedures of government (Rhodes, 1997: 6). 'Old' institutionalists follow a descriptive, inductive, historical and comparative approach, using the tools of the historian and the lawyer (*ibid*: 64-5). Old institutionalism conceptualised government as an allocative-functional institution designed to *mediate* between competing interest groups in society rather than an *actor* with its own interests to pursue (Skocpol, 1985: 4). Behaviouralists in the 1950s criticised institutionalism for its overly structural-functional and macro-level account of political systems. Behaviouralists downplayed institutional structures and saw politics as the 'aggregate consequences of individual behaviour' (March and Olsen, 1984). Behaviouralists focused more on the informal distributions of power rather than the formal legal structures of government institutions to explain political behaviour (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 4). Nevertheless, behaviouralism's hegemonic position in political science was undermined by its tendency toward reductionism in theorising outcomes as the aggregated result of individual behaviour, as well as utilitarian and instrumentalist tendencies towards decision-making behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984, 735). Renewed interest in political institutions was reflected in calls for "bringing the state back in" (Evans et al., 1985) and a re-emergence of structural explanations as opposed to the micro-level of behaviouralism (although a lasting behaviouralist legacy can be seen in elements of the "new" institutionalism(s)).

The central distinction between old and new institutionalism derives from the shift in focus from formal conceptions of institutions to include a focus on the more informal or "rules of the game"

(North, 1990: 3). As Lowndes (2002: 103, orig. italics) states, "[by] including informal conventions as well as formal procedures, the new institutionalists are able to build a more fine-grained, and realistic, picture of what *really* constrains political behaviour and decision-making". Power is fluid rather than static and can be used by and against traditional sites of power in government. New institutionalists focus on a more intermediate level of institutional factors (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 6).

The three variants of new institutionalism - rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism – largely differ on how they define institutions and particularly how they theorise individual behaviour in relation to institutions. Historical institutionalism offers a more nuanced alternative to the more reductionist sociological and rational choice institutionalisms, which rely, respectively, on culture and a logic of appropriateness (sociological) or on calculus and a logic of instrumentality (rational choice) to explain the relationship between individual behaviour and institutions. Unlike sociological institutionalists, historical institutionalists focus on the intermediate level of institutions and argue that institutions cannot be reduced simply to the wider societal culture, as they are significant forces in their own right (March and Olsen, 1984). They therefore avoid the tendency of sociological institutionalism known as 'conceptual stretching' (Sartori, 1970, cited in Daly, 2003; Collier and Mahon Jr, 1993). Historical institutionalism also avoids reducing institutions to the functionalism of rational choice approaches. It is the most adept of all three new institutionalisms in addressing the historically embedded character of institutions. Also, it is a more inductive approach and is arguably geared more to complexity than parsimony (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

Thelen and Steinmo (1992) offer one of the first attempts to coherently sketch out and summarise the historical institutionalist project, followed up by Thelen (1999).[34] Some key features of historical institutionalism are the study of institutional stasis and change, institutional norms, culture, processes and practices, organizational configurations conducive to innovative policy, the interrelationship between ideas and institutions, the concept of 'critical junctures',

[34] Thelen and Steinmo (1992) recognised two main variants of the new institutionalism, that of historical and rational choice institutionalism, but for the purposes of this brief review, I will employ the three variant typology put forward by Hall and Taylor (1996) discussed above.

and perhaps above all the notion of path-dependence (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hall, 1989; Weir, 1989; Thelen, 1999; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

For historical institutionalists, the focus of inquiry is on intermediate level institutions rather than a broadly structural analysis of social change. Accordingly, 'institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole "cause" of outcomes. [Historical] Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of politics...Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure these battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes." (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 3). They are concerned with the relational process of interactions within institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12).

In the institutional context of policy-making, the latter's organizational configuration affects the power relations among actors involved (Hall, 1986: 19, cited in Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2-3). The definition of actors' interests rather than the mere choices with which they are faced will be influenced by their organizational position (*ibid*). In contrast to rational choice institutionalists, the historical institutionalist approach posits that individuals are more likely to follow routine behaviour than constantly calculate optimal outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 8). With regards to institutionalised, routine-enacting behaviour, this provides a related tension for institutionalising a gender perspective into development policy-making institutions. As Inhetveen (1999) suggests, institutionalising, routinising, or normalising behaviour is the opposite of rational purposive action. Therefore, strategies aimed explicitly at mainstreaming a gender-sensitive perspective into institutional culture may fail to institutionalize such behaviour if they do not attempt to *routinise* gender-equitable norms and practices into institutional culture. What is needed therefore is a clearer understanding of how particular norms and processes become institutionalised in certain contexts.

Institutional arrangements affect the potential for innovative policy which is determined *inter alia*. by patterns of recruitment and procedures governing career progression (Weir, 1989: 59). Weir's concept of 'bounded innovation' is an important insight for the institutional context in which transformative gender mainstreaming strategies may be adopted. Weir argues that 'when recruitment is governed by rigid guidelines that emphasize conformity to established civil service norms, bureaucrats are more likely to display attachment to standard procedures and established

policy positions than a willingness to strike out in innovative policy directions' (Weir, 1989: 59). Therefore, state institutional culture and norms are likely to have an impact on potential innovations in gendered development policy. These two examples of institutionalising norms and bounded innovation both stress the importance of informal institutional features such as norms and culture in studying policy change.

Institutional change is conceived as messy and contingent and as such contrasts with a functionalist approach (1999: 382). Change produces incongruent institutional configurations that 'yield new interweavings of the multiple social logics...' (Orren and Skowronek, 1998: 7, cited in Thelen, 1999: 383). This suggests considerable potential for unintended consequences and knock-on effects of institutional change in different arenas. However, only some of these unintended consequences will prove to be consequential (Thelen, 1999: 400).

The concept of 'critical juncture' is part of the conceptual machinery of historical institutionalists and can be understood as a moment or event during which the logic of institutional structure becomes destabilised. Thelen's notion of 'reproduction mechanisms' provides an important insight into the contingency of change, which to an extent addresses the disjuncture between explanations of institutional stability and change that have constrained several historical institutionalist accounts (1999). Thelen asks the question: why do particular critical junctures produce lasting legacies and others do not? Thelen argues against separating stability and change; she addresses this question by expanding on the critical junctures and policy feedbacks literature, with reference to the notions of mechanisms of reproduction and policy feedback. Mechanisms of reproduction refer to the bases on and processes in which institutional configurations are sustained. Policy feedback mechanisms refer to how power relations are embedded in institutional contexts and configurations, and produce power laden distributional effects which empower some and marginalise others. These two mechanisms determine the extent to which institutions and their configurations are vulnerable or resilient to change. Thus the very conditions of institutional stability may be the same conditions for institutional change.

Feminist scholars concerned with institutional change have embraced historical institutionalism and sought to combine these insights with a feminist concern with power. 'Feminist institutionalism' has recently emerged as a methodological approach which seeks to combine a

feminist approach to political problems which are often centrally concerned with power and hold a normative commitment towards change and a *new institutionalist*, most often an historical institutionalist, approach to the study of institutions (Kenny, 2007). Feminist institutionalism draws from the new institutionalist conceptualisation of institutions as encompassing *informal* rules, norms and practices as opposed to the 'old institutionalist' focus on formal rules, organisations and structures. Kenny argues that 'a gendered [or feminist] approach would offer important insights into power relations, which are often underplayed in new institutional analysis' (Kenny, 2007: 91). In particular historical institutionalism benefits from the feminist focus on power and change, given that historical institutionalism is the most conservative of the three institutionalisms due to its focus on institutional stability (Paantjens, 2006). A key question feminist institutionalists are concerned with is how to *produce* institutional change (and how to direct the form it takes). In other words, feminist institutionalists try to build on studies of institutional change by trying to understand how to change an institution *towards a particular form*.

Thus, an appealing feature of the applicability of feminist institutionalist approaches to this research problem is its direct engagement with issues concerning gender mainstreaming – how to change institutional norms, practices, processes and outcomes to make them more responsive to concerns of gender-equitable development. As Paantjen argues, 'gender mainstreaming is per definition institutionalist' (Paantjens, 2006). However, studies of gender mainstreaming rarely employ an institutionalist framework (Kenny and Paantjens, 2006) - although Goetz (1997a) is an exception - and thus could therefore benefit from the elaboration of the methodological framework of feminist institutionalism. In turn, studies of gender mainstreaming may offer an empirical context and a particularly promising avenue for a growing feminist institutionalist body of work (Kenny and Paantjens, 2006).

The methodology this thesis employs assumes a synergistic relationship between the study of discourse and the study of institutions from a feminist institutionalist perspective. The relationship between discourse and institutions is critical to understanding how to change institutionally embedded gender-inequitable norms and practices, underpinned by the sedimentation of gendered discourses within institutions.

> The most powerful discourses in our society have firm institutional bases, in the law, for example, or in medicine, social welfare, education and in the organisation of the family and work. Yet these institutional locations are themselves sites of contest, and the dominant discourses governing the organisation and practices of social institutions are under constant challenge.
>
> (Weedon, 1987: 109)

Such a synergy arises from the mutual understanding that routinised behaviour embedded within institutions, a key concern of gender mainstreaming, is difficult to change. As Goetz explains, 'the project for gender-sensitive institutional change is to routinise gender-equitable forms of social interaction and to challenge the legitimacy of forms of social organisation which discriminate against women' (Goetz, 1997b: 2).

Paying particular attention to the institutional context becomes important to understand exactly what are the norms and practices one is trying to change: 'context is highly important...because 'problems' are often constituted differently due to location-specific, institution-specific and history-specific factors. Attention to these specifics will provide insights into why some versions of a policy 'problem' appear in one place and other versions appear elsewhere' (Bacchi, 1999). This is all the more so if one employs a post-structural understanding of the state, as increasingly are both scholars of feminist engagement with state (Rai, 1996; Chappell, 2002; Waylen, 1998; Pringle and Watson, 1992; Mottier, 2004) and anthropologists of the developmental state (Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Mitchell, 1991).

Therefore, while it is also important to examine existing discourses and the emergence of new ones, we also need to understand how they become or remain embedded within a particular institutional context. The project to identify and understand mechanisms of reproduction and the institutionally configured relations of power suggests a fruitful synergy with discourse analysis. Furthermore, these analytical devices are particularly appropriate to the study of why critical junctures such as constitutional affirmations of gender equality or the creation of national women's machineries sometimes fail to institutionalise gender equality in institutions of the state.

2.3 Feminist Discourse Analysis

A key concern of this thesis is firstly, how particular gendered discourses of development and not others become prevalent in state development policy through their sedimentation in state institutions; secondly, how these discourses shape what can be said, thought and done in development policy; and thirdly, the implications these discourses have for transforming development policy through gender mainstreaming strategies in order to increase its gender responsiveness. In Chapter 6 (and, more briefly, in Chapter 3) I undertake a discourse analysis of Indian development policy in order to identify the multiple gendered discourses of development embedded within policy and to deconstruct what they signify in terms of the state's commitment (or not) to making the state-led project of development more gender-equitable. Here I outline the approach to discourse analysis which underpins the analysis I present in these later chapters.

2.3.1 Variations in discourse analysis

Discourse analysis can be traced to the rise of dissatisfaction of positivist approaches in the social sciences in the 20th century, the growth of interpretative approaches and hermeneutics, the subsequent linguistic turn in the social sciences, and the rise of linguistics in literary theory (Howarth, 2000). While the intellectual legacy of discourse analysis is acknowledged in the work of Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Derrida, among others, the work of Michel Foucault is most central to the conception of discourse employed in this thesis.

Discourse analysis is more of an umbrella term rather than a single method. Within the overarching category of discourse analysis, there are several approaches, many of which can be distinguished by epistemological and philosophical perspectives as well as methodological approach. For example, while Norman Fairclough's (2005) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) explicitly adopts a critical realist epistemology or philosophical perspective, Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) post-structural, post-Marxist approach strongly rejects positivistic, foundationalist and essentialist perspectives. Content analysis, which is sometimes subsumed under the category of discourse analysis, is different again, and relies on a more positivistic and, in many cases, a quantitative approach to analysis. More positivistic approaches to discourse analysis such as content analysis and conversation analysis have not been considered as

appropriate methodologies for this thesis. Also not considered, though somewhat closer to the approach adopted here, are more interpretivist and social constructionist approaches to discourse and policy. This approach is self-proclaimed as part of the 'argumentative turn' in policy analysis and is more broadly situated within a 'deliberative', Habermasian literature (Fischer and Forrester, 1993; Fischer, 1998; Hajer, 1993; Majone, 1989). At risk of simplification, while this approach recognises the social construction of policy problems, it conceptualises the concept of discourse as mainly an argumentative, framing strategy used by actors to persuade policy-makers of the importance of particular policy alternatives, which is more akin to a concept of rhetoric than discourse, and which attributes a higher level of instrumentality to actors than that which is allowed here. Thus, given the ubiquity of the term 'discourse' and the consequences of employing particular conceptualisations, below I clarify exactly how discourse is understood here.

2.3.2 Foucault and discourse

Discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, may be understood as 'a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation;...[that which] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined.' (1972: 117). Discourse is more than just language – discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). In other words, discourse produces material effects. In contrast to CDA, but consistent with the Essex School, and also with Laffey and Weldes (2004: 28), discourse is not reducible or equivalent to language, but consists of structures and practices. Discourse is more than just language – 'discourses manifest themselves in both linguistic and non-linguistic practices' (Laffey and Weldes, 2004: 28). As Doty argues, 'to attempt a neat separation between discursive and non-discursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies – thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective' which should be questioned (Doty, 1996: 5). Thus, for Foucault, the task is not to treat

> discourses as groups of signs...but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs: but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe.

(Foucault, 1972: 49)

Thus, it is the *description* of what discourses '*do*', their ordering of objects and subjects and their legitimating effects, that is significant. But without understanding discourses as the products and effects of 'power/knowledge' all one is left with is a non-descript infinite multitude of competing discourses. Foucault's shift from his earlier archaeological form of analysis to his later concerns with genealogy was driven by a reconstituted conception of power as existing in a symbiotic relationship with knowledge. He explains that what was 'lacking' in earlier archaeological works was 'this problem of the "discursive regime", of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements.' (Foucault, 1980: 113). Hence, one must understand discourse as an effect of power/knowledge which provides the conditions of existence and ordering of subjects and objects under particular regimes of truth, and also determines what counts as truth, knowledge, and expertise:

> ...truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power... [Truth] induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
>
> (Foucault, 1980: 131)

The significance of Foucault's work for this thesis arises, firstly, from his conception of discourse as outlined above and its importance for identifying and understanding the effects of discourse on the formulation of policy and institutional practices in policy-making processes. Secondly, the relationship Foucault outlines between truth, power and knowledge, is important for the production and legitimation of discourses, institutions, and experts in the development industry, the organization of relationships between them, and the marginalisation and exclusion of other claims to knowledge. Scholars of development have embraced Foucault's conceptualization of discourse, albeit in varied ways and for different purposes (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995; Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Abrahamsen, 2000; Rossi, 2004; Mawdsley and Rigg, 2002; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Moore and Schmitz, 1995). However, few of these have been explicitly concerned with feminist questions.

2.3.3 Feminist discourse analysis

Variations in approaches to feminist discourse analysis mirror variations in the wider practice of discourse analysis discussed above, with some focusing on conversation analysis (Tannen, 1994), sociolinguistics (Wodak, 1997), and Critical Discourse Analysis (Lazar, 2005). Arguably the most useful approach to discourse analysis of *gendered* development policy, including the discursive construction of gender equality as a policy problem, and which draws upon a Foucauldian conceptualization of discourse, may be found in feminist poststructural approaches to discourse analysis. As Weedon argues

> ...feminist poststructuralism, concerned as it must be with power, looks to the historically and socially specific discursive production of conflicting and competing meanings... In order to develop strategies to contest hegemonic assumptions and the social practices which they guarantee, we need to understand the intricate network of discourses, the sites where they are articulated and the institutionally legitimised forms of knowledge to which they look for their justification.
>
> (Weedon, 1987: 86, 126)

Mottier (2004) refers to feminist discourse analysis as the 'discursive turn in feminist analysis'. Discourse analysis, she argues, is particularly well suited to feminist analyses which consider the state not as a monolith but as a multiplicity of hetereogeneous state arenas (Mottier, 2004). I draw primarily on the work of Carol Lee Bacchi (1999, 2000, 2004), who employs a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and whose aim is to deconstruct the discursive construction of policy 'problems', specifically those concerned with gender (in)equality.[35] Bacchi's 'What's the Problem' approach 'starts from the premise that problematizations ought to feature as a central focus of analysis' (1999: 41). She succinctly outlines her approach as follows

> one way to understand what is at stake in policy contests is to identify what is represented to be the problem. This position starts from the premise that policy 'problems' do not exist separate from their representations. It also contends that an examination of postulated policy 'solutions' will reveal what is represented to be the problem. Representations of a 'problem' must then be closely examined to see what assumptions underpin different representations, what effects follow from them, and how subjects are constituted within them. Crucially we need to reflect upon what is left unproblematic, what is likely to change and what is likely to stay the same.
>
> (Bacchi, 2004: 131; cf. Bacchi, 1999)

---

[35] While some might argue that Bacchi is based within the field social constructionism, in that her main focus of enquiry is the social construction of policy problems, she criticises social constructionism on many accounts, and in a way which draws her closer to what she calls an 'affirmative postmodernist' position (1999: 64). As will also be demonstrated, much of her approach to discourse and her rejection of the autonomous subject, including the positioning of individuals within discourse, demonstrates strong poststructural leanings.

For Bacchi, 'the idea of policy as discursive activity...promotes consideration of the ways in which the terms of a discourse limit what can be talked about' (Bacchi, 2000: 49). This is a political exercise in demystification, and enables hitherto unproblematised discourses to be debated and therefore challenged (Bacchi, 2000: 50).

Analysts of gender mainstreaming and gender equality policies in Europe have drawn to some extent on Bacchi's work in establishing a Critical Frame Analysis approach (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007). However, this approach differs slightly in that it derives from frame theory, having a broader background in social movement theory, and that it emphasises frames and strategical framing rather than discourse, and thus a higher degree of agency for actors engaged in the policy-making process (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007). As Bacchi argues, 'in contrast to studies which emphasize a historical agent's ability to frame proposals rhetorically, I insist upon the need to draw attention to the constitutive power of discourse, to the difficulty of stepping outside of structuring discourses' (Bacchi, 1999: 45). I would argue with Bacchi that the emphasis on strategic framing creates a tension between 'the extent to which we are "in" discourses and the extent to which we "use" discourses' (Bacchi, 2004: 129). However, I also recognize that it is possible for subjects to be aware of how they are located within different discourses. With this approach in mind, it is important to explore further the possibilities for agency given that feminist analyses of gender mainstreaming are principally concerned with effecting change.

2.4 Subjectivity and Agency

The key research question on agency is to what extent institutional norms and practices and discourses make possible particular kinds of agency and to what extent these opportunities for agency are likely to promote or obfuscate gender mainstreaming strategies. If agency here is considered as a product of institutional norms and practices and of discourses, what then does feminist institutionalism and feminist poststructural discourse analysis say about agency? I argue that agency – as opposed to behavior – has been a more thoroughly debated issue among poststructural theorists, partly because the rejection of the transcendental, autonomous, subject has been one of its key distinguishing features in relation to more modernist and humanist philosophical perspectives. For instance, the place for agency in Foucault's work rests with his

conception of the subject, which is based on the rejection of humanist accounts of the transcendental subject as well as psychoanalytical models of subjectivity.

> [D]iscourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself [sic] may be determined... [I]t is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of its enunciations should be defined.
>
> (1972: 55)

Therefore, to employ a Foucauldian conceptualisation of the subject is to reject humanist theories of autonomy that present the individual as a preconstituted, transcendental, Cartesian subject. Such an approach also entails rejecting psychoanalytic explanations because they posit an ahistorical and undifferentiated account of the formation of the self (McNay, 1992: 9).

We may recall Foucault's notion that discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (1972: 49). Specifically, discourse creates a variety of subject positions through which it is (re)articulated, practiced, and reproduced. Discourse as an effect of power/knowledge provides the conditions of existence and ordering of subjects and objects under particular regimes of truth, and also determines what counts as truth, knowledge, and expertise. In this sense, discourse constructs an enunciative hierarchy of these subject positions, allowing particular subjects to be heard and not others, some with more power and authority than others. In other words, discourse determines the possibilities for agency of the subjects it constitutes.

It is also important to recognize the contingency of discourse within institutional contexts to understand how some actors are positioned in ways that enable agency and others in ways that constrain agency, and to resist more instrumental understandings of agency. According to Bacchi

> ...discourses are not the direct product of intentional manipulation by a few key political actors, but neither are they transhistorical structures operating outside of human intervention' It is inadequate to suggest that some groups wield power over knowledge systems to the extent that they can put in place understandings which eliminate or contain other understandings. This description is too instrumental. It creates a vision of those with power imposing meanings which suit their purposes on dupes who know no better. Rather we need to reflect upon the extent to which we are all 'in' discourses that shape and limit the possibilities of 'what can be said', without suggesting that discourses are monolithic and that contestation is impossible.
>
> (Bacchi, 1999: 43)

Foucault's work and Foucauldian conceptions of agency are particularly frustrating for some feminists because of the challenges it poses to the feminist political emancipatory project on two

counts. Firstly, Foucault's anti-humanist approach to the subject has been met with resentment particularly by feminists because it challenged the basis upon which feminists could appeal to a shared experience of oppression among women and thus destabilized their claims to solidarity (Weedon, 1987: 125). Secondly, Foucault refused to elaborate on the normative basis for social change and thus similarly precluded a strategy for the feminist emancipatory political project (McNay, 1992: 8). However, his is a different political project which may be just as important:

> The essential political problem for the intellectual is ... that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's consciousness...but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power...but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.
>
> (Foucault, 1980: 133)

However, he does not provide any basis upon which a new politics of truth may be constituted, concerned that such an elaboration would have a normalizing effect.

Bacchi rejects claims that poststructural deconstruction cannot adequately engage in political projects, arguing that 'discourses as we have seen, are complex and contradictory, and constructions can be challenged. If we accept that our world is socially constructed, then it can be changed by challenging – deconstructing – constructions which have effects we wish to reduce or eliminate' (Bacchi, 1999: 62).

Another related criticism of Foucault's understanding of agency as demonstrated through his work on discipline (elaborated in his accounts of incarceration and sexuality) is that it precludes a theory of agency, positing individuals as little more than 'docile bodies' (McNay, 1992). While Foucault's concept of 'technologies of the self' was a later attempt to overcome some of the limitations of his 'docile bodies' in that discourses engage individuals in the self-(re)fashioning of their bodies and identities, the concept is under-theorised and does not offer an adequate theory of agency (McNay, 2000: 8-9). It fails to extend beyond the self-government of individuals to how agents may actively and creatively transform the very discourses that constitute them.

However, agency may emerge as a result of the contingent and unstable character of discourse, and the inability of discourse to dominate the field of discursive possibilities. The contingent

character of discourse and the co-existence of multiple contending discourses prevents the ultimate fixity and domination of any one discourse over the discursive field of possibilities. As Howarth and Stavrakakis emphasise, 'discourses are *contingent* and *historical* constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production' (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3-4, orig. italics). This enables the contestation of even the most hegemonic of discourses.

Because discourses are partial, contingent, relational, and a product of power/knowledge, and are also productive (of meaning, possibilities, identities, actions, but also silences and exclusions), they allow varying possibilities for *agency*. As Weedon explains, 'different discourses provide for a range of modes of subjectivity and the ways in which particular discourses constitute subjectivity have implications for the process of reproducing or contesting power relations' (Weedon, 1987: 92). Thus, the existence of multiple discourses also enables an array of subjectivities through which a collective or alternative subjectivity may emerge, albeit one which is relational to and contingent on its constitutive discourses, but one which may have the capacity to contest and rearticulate hegemonic subjectivities in new ways. The possibilities of contesting dominant subjectivities, are crucial for a feminist transformative politics that seeks new ways of imagining and realising a form of development or social change that is gender-equitable.

2.4.1 Combining feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse analysis

Combining feminist institutionalist and feminist discourse analytic approaches offers fruitful opportunities for understanding the complexity of the effects of institutions, discourse, and agency on efforts to mainstream gender in development policy. Both methodologies focus on power and change. Both methodologies adopt a view of the state as a heterogeneous arena of institutions, some offering more potential for feminist transformative strategies than others. Lastly, the differences between these two strategies are highly complementary for a study of gender mainstreaming in development policy. Feminist institutionalism enables a detailed understanding of how gender mainstreaming strategies attempt to effect change in state institutional norms, structures, and processes. Feminist discourse analysis of policy makes possible an understanding of how discourses constitute the policy problem of gender-inequitable development in different ways, often leading to multiple, sometimes complementary and

sometimes contradictory policy 'solutions', some of which offer more potential for gender-equitable development than others. Because discourses are institutionally embedded, it is important to combine an analysis of the two to understand the contingent political processes involved in the formation of gendered development policy – why some discourses become embedded in particular institutional contexts and others do not, as well as their effects – and thus the opportunities for gender mainstreaming.

2.5 Methods

In this section I outline the methods the thesis employed for data collection and the strategies I used for the analysis of data. Interviews, documentary analysis, and analysis of secondary data were combined to produce descriptive case studies for comparative analysis according to the research aims and objectives. These methods were consistent with the Foucauldian and feminist institutionalist methodological approaches in that they focus more on contextualised complexity and description, rather than parsimony, abstraction and universal generalisation. However, the use of the comparative method provides some opportunity for explanation, after acknowledging certain limitations. Its use is consistent with the concern to develop the conceptual apparatus in order to contribute to a wider body of knowledge beyond the case-specific context.

2.5.1 Case Studies and the Comparative Method

This thesis adopted a small N qualitative twin case study approach to comparative analysis. The primary reasons for this were to study the centre-state institutional relationship, and to identify and compare similarities and differences in Centre and State level discourses of gender and development, institutional contexts, and possibilities for agency. These three features will be analysed comparatively to examine the extent to which they influence the possibilities for mainstreaming gender in development policy.

The approach adopted is less conventional compared to the 'scientific' concerns of both small and large N approaches in comparative politics (Peters, 1998). This is in line with the philosophical concerns of the methodological approaches employed. More conventional or positivistic approaches emphasise the importance of causal relationships requiring identifiable independent and dependent variables, as well as systems of comparison such as 'most-similar'

and 'most-different systems' for control purposes, and the importance of the need to generalise findings (Landman, 2003; Peters, 1998). In contrast, the methodological focus on intersubjective meaning and the importance of constitutive relationships renders concepts and processes under study less amenable to abstraction for purposes of generalisation and causal analysis. Despite this, the approach adopted here acknowledges the importance of — but does not prioritise the need to — generalise findings at the expense of a detailed understanding of the case.[36] It is sensitive to the need for developing concepts which one can apply across cases for the purposes of contributing to a wider body of knowledge.[37]

The adoption of a case study approach is driven by the research aims and objectives. The purpose of the research is more geared towards description rather than explanation. The main benefit of a case study approach is the potential for rich description and deeper understanding of concepts and relationships. Exploratory accounts are appropriate when little is known about the specific research topic prior to the research, as is in this case here. However, this is not to preclude the generation of causal relationships. Description and exploration can facilitate an inductive approach to generating hypotheses (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 176; Peters, 1998: 69). Nevertheless, at early stages of the project it is more appropriate to talk of anticipated observations of relationship rather than concrete hypotheses.

The two cases studies chosen for comparative analysis consist of two sub-national units of government, the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (see Figure 2 below). As a federal polity, India is particularly conducive to comparison (Jenkins, 2004a: 3-4). It is important to understand the national policy framework, which is the focus of Chapter Three, because it represents the wider national context in which the states are embedded. Furthermore, similar institutional infrastructure allows some common grounds for comparison of one of the key

---

[36] Peters (1998) emphasises that quantitative statistical approaches that employ a large number of quantitative cases for the purpose of generalisation are fraught with as many pitfalls as are approaches adopting a small number of cases. Employing a large N technique carries the danger of abstracting concepts too far out of context that they are abstracted beyond meaningful use.

[37] For example, see Green's (2002) proposed framework for a constructivist comparative politics in International Relations. Green's attempt to develop a comparative politics which incorporates a constructionist perspective emphasises 'causal *and* constitutive explanation *and* understanding..., [seeks] compelling concepts that can be applied to and illuminate phenomena across cases...[and is]...sensitive to the possibility of more generalizable conclusions, beyond the specificities of case studies." (2002: 12).

factors. Limiting the study to two cases allowed the project to remain operationally manageable within the given constraints.[38] Utilizing two cases rather than one enables a comparison of findings both between national and sub-national units as well as between sub-national units; states do not solely exist in relation to the centre but also to each other. The potential danger of a single case as compared against the national policy framework, is to over-determine the relationship between the state and the centre.

Figure 2 Map of the Case Study States and their Location in India



Source: adapted from www.mapsofindia.com

These specific two cases have been chosen as they share several similarities in relation to their status vis-à-vis New Delhi. Both States have been labelled 'reform-oriented' (Bajpai and Sachs, 1999: 2; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34n).[39] Both states are considered to be linguistically marginal from the Hindi-speaking North, and language has a political, historical and cultural significance.[40] Both states are geographically marginal from New Delhi and constitute part of the

---

[38] Arguably there are three case studies if the national policy framework is included but here it is taken as the basis for comparison.

[39] At least up until May 2004, Andhra Pradesh had an explicitly reformist Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, until he was defeated at the state elections by Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy of the Congress (I) Party.

[40] Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were among the States linguistically redrawn in the late 1950s.

Dravidian South along with the states of Karnataka and Kerala. Both states boast regional parties and have experienced populist politics to some degree.[41]

2.5.2 Fieldwork Interviews and Documentary Analysis

The period of fieldwork took place in India from November 2005 to July 2006 in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu with visits also to New Delhi and Mussorie (for the LBS National Academy of Administration). The majority of time was spent in the states, roughly four months in each. During this time interviews, documentary analysis and secondary data collection and analysis were undertaken as the primary methods of data collection for this research.

Interviews were conducted with civil servants accountable for policy and/or engaged in the policy-making process, as well as non-governmental organizations and academics involved with, affected by, or interested in the policy-making process and the implementation of policy. The interviews were predominantly semi-structured rather than structured in line with the methodological and theoretical interest in rich description, detail and complexity. This allowed the interviews to be structured more around the experiences of the interviewees, while still remaining focused on issues central to the research.

The interviews served four purposes. Firstly, they provided insight into the discourse influencing policy, especially how policy issues are perceived according to the different subject positions of authority. Secondly, they provided some valuable inside knowledge on the informal norms and codes of conduct of institutional structures, processes and practices. Thirdly, they were a vital source of empirical information about the people, policies and processes involved, their interaction, and their interpretations of experiences of successes and failures, information which was difficult to gather elsewhere. Lastly, they also acted as a source for further contacts and access to documentary material. As such, interviewees often proved pivotal to the collection of primary data for this research. The latter two purposes of conducting interviews are referred to snowballing and gate-keeping in the research methodology literature and are presented as a key method (Arber, 1993) and key issue (Scheyvens et al., 2003a; Scheyvens et al., 2003b) for

---

[41] Tamil Nadu electoral politics has been dominated more by regional parties than national parties in the last four decades while the Congress (I) is still a key player in electoral politics in Andhra Pradesh.

primary research. On several occasions, access was gained to interviewees primarily through referral.

With regards to governmental officials, at the central level, interviews were solicited from current and former personnel working in the Department of Women and Child Development, the Planning Commission and the LBS National Academy of Administration (the new home of the DFID-IDS-Government of India collaboration on the Gender Planning Training Project); and at the state level, from the Andhra Pradesh State Department of Women Development and Child Welfare (and relevant organisations therein) and the Commissionerate of Women Empowerment and Self Employment (within the department of Panchayat Raj and Rural Development), and the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (the state-level parastatal administering the AP state self-help group program for women), the Tamil Nadu State Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Noon Meal Programme (and its subsidiary government undertaking, the parastatal Tamil Nadu Corporation for Development of Women) and the Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission. I also interviewed the former and then-current Chairpersons of the AP State Commission for Women, and solicited an interview from the Chairperson of the TN State Commission for Women. Beyond these government personnel I also visited for the purpose of interviews the following institutions: the Centre for Women and Development Studies (CWDS), UNDP Delhi, UNIFEM, and DFID India (both New Delhi and regional offices in Chennai and Hyderabad), and the National Institute for Rural Development (NIRD) in Hyderabad.

Analysing documentary material served four purposes. Firstly, discourse(s) articulated in official policy and non-official government and non-governmental documents was identified as well as institutional mandates, functions, and objectives. Secondly, a wide coverage enabled a larger narrative of multiple, intersecting discourses, and provided insights into how discourses are reiterated and thus become normalised into policy prescriptions or institutional domains. Thirdly, documentary analysis provided some, but not extensive, insight into institutional culture, norms and mandates. Lastly, documentary analysis provided an evaluative perspective on progress against own targets (through governmental Mid Term Appraisals and independent evaluations) which suggested norms of organizational learning, and also acted as supplementary and partial corrective to overly prescriptive policy documents. The following is a illustrative list of the

official policy documents that were analysed at the national level: National Five Year Plans from Sixth (1980-85) to Tenth (2002-2007) Five Year Plans;[42]: National Perspective Plan (NPP) (1988); National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (2000); State Level Plans and policy notes; Annual Plans; Mid Term Appraisals; Department of Women and Child Development Annual Reports; documentation of parastatal agencies at the subnational level and State level government employee service rules. Other official documentation included speeches, meeting minutes, reports of parliamentary and other committees, World Bank reports on India (including Country Assistance Strategy reports and Operations Evaluations Department reports), and UNDP India policy reports on India.

Special recognition was afforded to potential asymmetric power relations in interviews with policy elites, although in practice I found this experience extremely varied. Limitations arose as to the extent to which government officials were available and willing to talk. The quality and depth of interviews varied greatly. Most interviews were not recorded. In the course of the fieldwork and the following data analysis period, it became increasingly clear that limitations of access and availability to interviewees meant that greater reliance had to be placed on documentary analysis, something which was itself problematic at times due to the inaccessibility to or lack of archived records and policy documents. The Internet became an important source of documentary material, and fortunately it appeared that over the course of the data collection period, both national and state governments were making increasing use of the Internet to deposit government documents. I also conducted a number of interviews over the telephone with officials in India who were uncontactable at the time of fieldwork. This was at the expense of the planned research time schedule but greatly supplemented the data collected.

2.6 Research Ethics

Where interviews were recorded, interviewees were provided with the option of a transcript of the interview for confirmation and agreement over content. However, very few interviews were recorded as some interviewees were generally not very comfortable and in other circumstances it

---

[42] Due to the timing of the thesis and the conclusion of the current Five Year Plan in 2007, details of the Eleventh Five Year Plan will emerge during the later stages of this thesis. Some attempt will be made to analyse developments although the Tenth Five Year Plan will act as a tentative cut off point.

was either not possible or impractical to record the interview, or at times I would have significantly interrupted rapport between myself and the interviewee. Consent to the interview was obtained from all interviewees, all were offered anonymity, and all were provided with an explanation for why the research was being conducted and how the data might be used in the future. The research process, including the interview record-keeping procedure, conformed to the University of Bristol's data protection requirements ensuring responsible and ethical research procedures.

On a more reflexive level, throughout the period of research I was critically aware of my position as a Western feminist researcher. Western feminist scholarship on so-called 'third world' women has been accused of ethnocentrism and an 'inadequate self-consciousness about the effect of Western scholarship on the "third world" in the context of a world system dominated by the West' (Mohanty, 1984: 335). In other words, reflexivity of my position as a Western feminist researcher is particularly important because 'feminist scholarly practices...are inscribed in relations of power' (Mohanty, 1984: 334). It is also important because a key concern of this thesis is to understand the gendered discourses and institutions of *development*, which has been a central political project of Western, Eurocentric modernity. As Mohanty explains,

> Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and examining its role in such a global economic and political framework...Western feminist writing on women in the third world must be considered in the context of the global hegemony of Western scholarship- i.e., the production, publication, distribution and consumption of information and ideas. Marginal or not, this writing has political effects and implications beyond the immediate feminist or disciplinary audience. One such significant effect of the dominant "representations" of Western feminism is its conflation with imperialism in the eyes of particular third world women. Hence the urgent need to examine the *political* implications of *analytic* strategies and principles.
>
> (Mohanty, 1984: 336)

Thus, reflexivity on my position as researcher was particularly important not just for the research process but also for consideration of the uses to which the research I conducted may be put (Bacchi, 1999: 62).

2.7 Conclusions

In order to address the research question, the methodological and conceptual framework innovatively combines two methodologies: feminist institutionalism and feminist discourse

analysis. This methodological pluralism enables the analysis of both a deconstruction of the meaning-making occurring within policy as well as attention to the normative institutional context in which policy is made. Recognising that feminist institutionalism is an emerging methodology, and that methodological pluralism within feminist political science is increasingly being encouraged in order to combine conventional and non-conventional methods, this thesis seeks to make a modest contribution to these endeavours. Choosing the case study method and focusing on only two case studies provides for rich description and complexity rather than parsimony and abstracted explanation. Yet, structuring the analysis by adopting a post-positivist comparative method enables the analysis to move beyond 'within-case' to 'between-case', allowing for a further level of analysis to be undertaken, and one which is able to better address the research question. Interviews and documentary analysis were chosen as the most suitable methods of data collection. Because of limitations of access, elite interviews required a snowballing technique. Care was taken to ensure that data collection procedures adhered to regulations on data protection and ethical considerations of informed consent. Lastly, I considered my situatedness as a researcher in complex relations of power, as both a feminist and as a researcher based in a western educational institution, for its potential ethical implications.

3 MAPPING NATIONAL POLICY – 1990S TO PRESENT

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of institutions, discourse, and agency on strategies to mainstream gender in national development policy in India throughout the 1990s to the present. The chapter explores the gendered institutional context of development policy (concentrating particularly on the Planning Commission, the National Machinery for Women, and the Indian bureaucracy), the discourses underpinning gendered development policy at the national level (in the form of the Five Year Plans and the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women), and the agency of political leaders, individual bureaucrats and the women's movement in determining the success or failure of gender mainstreaming strategies.

I put forward two related arguments. Firstly, a number of gender mainstreaming initiatives undertaken during the 1990s have shown a reasonable impact on the government's dominant discourse(s) of gendered development. This has altered the way in which women have been constituted as subjects and objects of development, with more recognition increasingly given to women's participation in development processes as a producer and not merely as a welfare recipient. However, the shift towards women's empowerment was constituted through, and therefore consistent with, the government's overarching, liberalising discourse.

Secondly, several gender mainstreaming initiatives have succeeded in making inroads into prevailing institutional practices to affect change in government development policy-making and planning processes. I argue that, consistently, the approach has been based on an equality discourse that emphasises gender *difference*. Feminist theorists define a difference perspective towards gender equality as one which 'seeks to reverse the order of things: to place at the centre that which is currently marginalized, to value that which is currently devalued, to privilege that which is currently subordinated' (Squires, 2000: 118). This strategy of reversal 'involves replacing male-ordered thinking with a discourse that privileges women's experiences and women's perspectives' (ibid). Being able to influence and effectively replace the male-

dominated agenda with a feminist standpoint based on women's experiences becomes imperative. However, the pursuit of a strategy of reversal has shown limits as a strategy for transforming mainstreaming development institutions, something which I explore in the conclusion.

In order to demonstrate these arguments, the chapter is structured as follows. I begin by exploring the gendered institutional context for development policy through gendered norms within state institutions as well as discussing three key institutional developments that have taken place at the national level since 1990 which were designed to bring about more gender-equitable development policy. A brief examination of each of these initiatives demonstrates the extent to which the Indian state has attempted to transform its institutional structure, open up its policy-making process, increase its technical competency, modify its conceptual perspective, and bring about normative, structural, and attitudinal changes in the Indian bureaucracy with the ostensible objective of making the Indian state and national development policy more gender-responsive. After, a necessarily brief account of the historical context of gender and development planning in India, I then focus on gendered development discourse in Indian national development policy, beginning with the larger context of economic reforms in India beginning in the 1990s. The purpose of this prefatory discussion is not so much to provide context understood as 'background', but to highlight the *constitutive* role of contexts, as providing the *conditions of possibility* (John, 1999: 102) for that which emerges in gendered development discourse in the 1990s and after. I then go on to examine the government's discourse on women, gender and development priorities as articulated in the three most recent Five Year Plans. These policy documents were selected for analysis as they represent key sites for the articulation of the Government of India's approach to women, gender and development. The last section discusses the agency of particular actors in the development process, focusing in particular on women as subjects of development, on the political leadership, on bureaucratic actors and on the women's movement.

3.2 The Gendered Institutional Context of National Development

3.2.1 Gender and the bureaucracy

As outlined already in Chapter 1, few studies exist which explicitly analyse the gendered institutional norms and practices of Indian state institutions, including the Indian bureaucracy. Potter (1986) depicted the endurance of the colonial ICS traditions in the state bureaucracy of post-Independence India: the 'gentlemanly mode' which emphasised 'the virtue of public service,... the amateur ideal, and... the norms of courage, confidence and self-discipline' as well as service-class values, namely the importance of being a loyal servant to government in exchange for trust from the political leadership and 'autonomy and discretion to act appropriately (in accordance with the law) for those they served' (Potter, 1986: 233). The Indian bureaucracy was referred to as the 'steel frame' of the state, which instilled in officers a sense of responsibility to 'the people'. This also however generated a sense of 'superiority' among officers, as well as depicting society as 'internally divided and potentially conflict-ridden' (Mars, 1974: 323, 344). Thus it was the administrator's duty, as a generalist, to deal swiftly and effectively, rationally and objectively, and impartially in an emotionally detached manner with a range of scenarios and challenges: 'in the midst of raging controversy when people are swayed by passions, the civil servant detaches himself from these...' (Shrimali, 1960, quoted in Mars, 1974: 324).

What these studies implicitly demonstrate is the masculinist character of bureaucratic norms and practices, which feminist analysts of state bureaucracies have suggested make them either incompatible institutional contexts with feminist goals or at least resistant to them (Ferguson, 1984; Staudt, 1997). However, they do not *explicitly* explore the gendered character of the bureaucracy in India and remarkably few studies exist on this subject. Sarojini Thakur's study of gender in the Indian civil services stands out as the most detailed of very few major studies of the civil services in India that pay specific attention to the bureaucracy's gendered norms and practices (Thakur, c.1997; see also Thakur, 2000)[43] India's new constitution at Independence gave women the right to equal employment opportunities in state employment (Article 16,

[43] At the time of the study, Thakur was an IAS officer posted at the LBS National Academy of Administration in Mussorie.

quoted in Thakur, c.1997: 14). In contrast, however, the 1954 IAS Recruitment Rules stipulated that no married woman could be appointed to the service. Furthermore, a woman officer who subsequently married would be asked to resign if it was deemed that her role as wife interfered with her role as officer (Thakur, c.1997: 15). While this rule was deleted in 1972, Thakur argues that this manifests an implicit assumption that for women, 'family and domestic commitments are solely a woman's responsibility...The career is viewed as an adjunct or supplementary activity to the responsibility of family commitments' (Thakur, c.1997: 15). Furthermore, Thakur observes that 'whereas spouses of male officers are almost automatically considered to be extensions of their husbands, for female officers if their spouses do not share the same career there is often a sharp division between activities on the home front and in office. This impacts on the nature of informal networks', placing constraints on women officers' informal social interactions and opportunities to build rapport with more senior colleagues given domestic and other commitments (Thakur, c.1997: 27). Combined with the tendency for male homosociability in informal networks in the bureaucracy, these practices are seen by some women officers to deny them the same career opportunities as their male colleagues (Thakur, c.1997: 27). The asymmetrical 'hypervisibility' (Hawkesworth, 2003: 531) of gender for women officers also becomes a problem when linked to judgements about their performance. As Thakur's respondents noted, 'one has to be better than a man to prove that official duties are seriously taken', and

> 'You have to keep proving yourself at every point. The slightest slip up on your part is immediately attributed to your being a woman. If you are successful it is because you have taken undue advantage of being a lady; if you are bad it was to be expected.'
> (quoted in Thakur, c.1997: 25)

In addition, sexual harassment was considered more of a problem in the IAS by Thakur's women respondents, than men, with more than 90 per cent of the latter not seeing it as a problem. Although, as she points out, those women that did see it as a problem were in the minority as a whole, representing just over a fifth of all women respondents (Thakur, c.1997: 21-2).

The gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic postings

Thakur's sample study analysis suggested a gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic postings. Thakur found that women in the bureaucracy were concentrated in social sector postings (20.3 per cent

of all women officers surveyed) and men in field postings (43.9 per cent of all men officers surveyed) (Thakur, c.1997: 20). This can be seen, she argues, as an effect of how postings in government sectors are ordered according to a gendered hierarchy which devalues social sector postings:

> In terms of people's perceptions regarding what posts are typically given to women and men, respondents felt that posts in the Women and Child Directorate and posts related to Social Welfare were most often given to women. Social sector posts which have traditionally been labelled "soft" (especially Health, Rural Development and Education) were also listed as generally being given to women followed by, to a lesser extent, Secretariat postings such as Personnel.
>
> (Thakur, c.1997: 18)

Analysts of the Indian bureaucracy have observed that the presence of international donors in social sectors have to some extent changed the way bureaucrats view posts in the social sector, given the perquisites involved such as foreign travel and opportunities for postings in international organisations (Das, 2005). Thakur also observes this phenomenon, and argues that 'with increasing interest and investment in the social sectors, today posts in these areas are likely to attract men because they represent areas which have better perks' (Thakur, c.1997: 21). For instance, one senior bureaucrat remarked in an interview

> in the normal scheme of things the Women and Child Ministry is looked down upon, it's viewed as a Women's Ministry, though there are very competent men who have worked there. Men have become more interested in working there, you know, when perks are available, like they'd love to work on the seat which has UNICEF, or which is linked with UNIFEM, and there may be foreign travel involved. They wouldn't like to work on programs in the field. I mean they're not really enamoured by it... The common perception is that people who are in the economics ministries or commerce ministries are highly successful...[N]o careerist man would necessarily want to be in Women and Child.
>
> (Interview, February 2007)

However, for Thakur, to understand the extent to which gender stereotypes are being displaced, one should look not at the increasing number of men posted to jobs in the social sector, but to whether there has been an increase in the number of women in areas which have traditionally been male preserves and also an increase in the overall proportion of women' (Thakur, c.1997: 21). Finance is one such area that has been dominated by men officers. As Thakur reports,

> One senior officer observed that "even within social sectors, posts concerned with 'economic and financial' principles are viewed as male preserves, as if women cannot master such subjects unless they are financial advisers with accounts backgrounds. If at all women get an opportunity to work in male preserves they are given personnel,

> housekeeping, and co-ordination jobs and invariably asked whether they have science and maths qualifications. This is a question rarely put to a male."
>
> (Thakur, c.1997: 18)

Therefore, the appointment (or not) of women officers to posts such as finance and economics, conventionally considered as a male domain, is an indicator of the bureaucracy's gendered institutional culture, and generates considerable interest, not least among women officers. In contrast, men officers in Thakur's study remarked that women officers benefitted from 'comfortable' and 'safe' postings whereas men officers were assigned to dangerous postings, suggesting that men officers felt disadvantaged by what they saw as positive discrimination in favour of women. The implications of this institutional culture for gender-equitable development policy are clear: as a result of institutional norms, areas such as planning, finance and economic affairs are constituted as domains of policy which women officers are effectively marginalized within or excluded from entirely because they are assumed to be incapable of administrating in these areas or unconcerned with such policy issues. Instead, they are assigned to social sector postings, such as Health, Nutrition, and Social Welfare, a practice which foregrounds and reproduces the gendered division of labour in Indian society.

A key debate among 'new institutionalist' approaches underpinning studies of gender mainstreaming centres on the extent to which institutions mirror the wider societal context, or whether they can be seen as (re)productive of norms and practices specific to particular institutions. Such a debate has implications for how gender-equitable change might be brought about: whether to focus internally on changing both formal rules and informal norms and practices or to focus on societal change which will then be reflected at the institutional level; gender mainstreaming strategies tend to favour the former.

Thakur (c.1997) sees the bureaucracy as reflecting as well as reproducing gender inequalities that can be observed in the wider societal context. She argues that 'while bureaucracies may be differentiated from other organisations by the existence of a formal set of rules, they function within a wider societal context, and the rules and practices reflect and reproduce gender inequalities. They too represent, like other institutions a site where the changing nature of gender relations shape the organisation, and where in turn the organisation/state can structure gender relations' (Thakur, c.1997: 32). Thakur perhaps, therefore, understates the extent to which

particular gendered norms and practices are embedded in, are reproduced by, specific institutional contexts (in this case the Indian bureaucracy), and moreover, how they might effectively *constitute* gender relations in the wider societal context.

The capacity for change in the IAS has usually been framed in one of two ways. The first relates to how the IAS has itself endured and evaded reforms. Potter has focused on the enduring legacy of the ICS 'tradition' from the colonial period to the present day through deliberate processes of reproduction, as well as how the Indian bureaucracy has twice evaded reform. The first occasion was at Independence, when Nehru reluctantly adopted almost unchanged the colonial Indian Civil Service. The second came during the 1960s when the Committee on Administrative Reforms presented a series of recommendations which envisaged a transformation of the role and character of the IAS (Potter, 1986,, 1996). How the IAS managed to avoid reform in this instance has been explained by the ability of senior IAS officers to position themselves in important posts dealing with implementing the recommended reforms (Potter, 1996).

The second approach relates to how the IAS has responded to changes in the political and socio-economic context of the country, including how, as a political class it accumulated power and benefits under the command-and-control system before the 1990s (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Weiner, 2002). But many in the IAS have also managed to adjust to benefit from the changing environment since the economy liberalized in 1991 (Das, 2005).

Yet the bureaucracy has undergone a transformation of sorts, both in terms of being more concerned with development administration, and to become more representative of marginalized communities in India. If the 1950s and 1960s were a gestation period for the induction into the bureaucracy of ideas about development and planning (Mars, 1974: 337), by the 1980s the subject of development administration had become a core part of IAS training (Potter, 1996). However, Weiner argues that this has had little effect on public policy and redistribution:

> ...The incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and members of the scheduled castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous social and economic disparities that persist in India's hierarchical and inegalitarian social order. That raises the fundamental question: if there are now so many OBC and scheduled caste bureaucrats and politicians, why is this not reflected in state policies to promote the well-being of their communities? ... Given the very considerable increase in the number of individuals from the scheduled castes and tribes in the higher ranks of the

> civil service and the role the bureaucracy has played in the distribution of public goods in India, one might have expected to see a significant rise in public expenditure for services that benefit the lower castes...
>
> (Weiner, 2002: 212-3)

While efforts were made to make the IAS more representative of society, with reservations for the recruitment of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, even into the 1980s the majority of IAS officers came from an urban professional middle class background (Potter, 1986: 231). Recruitment to the IAS has traditionally been, and largely remains, based on competitive examination, reflecting the importance placed on achievement according to merit and the bureaucracy's middle class orientation. The implications of this bureaucratic resistance to change, when it is not perceived as beneficial to the dominant institutional culture of the IAS, does not bode well for feminist transformative strategies, but it is within this context that feminist strategic clarity becomes all the more important.

Reforming the Indian bureaucracy to make it more responsive to gender issues *within its own institutional culture* has rarely found a place on the wider agenda of administrative reforms, which is usually dominated by discussions over remuneration, increasing the specialisation of civil servants, improving accountability, transparency and 'good governance', curbing corruption, and streamlining the bureaucracy to increase its administrative efficiency. For example, no mention was made of gender issues in the four reports so far released by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2005.[44] The report of the Committee on Civil Service Reforms (or the Hota Committee, after its Chairperson P.C.Hota, former Chairperson of the Union Public Service Commission) restricted its comments to the low numbers of women in the higher civil service and recommended preferential policies to enable higher levels of recruitment. The aim was to double the proportion of women in the higher civil service to at least 25 per cent in the next 15 years from its current level of 12 to 13 per cent (GoI, 2004: 80). The report attributed the problem of low numbers of women in the civil service to the gendered division of labour which made it difficult for women to perform official duties:

> In our country women are meritorious enough to come in larger number into the higher civil service but they do not feel encouraged to join the service as they have to balance their roles as wives and mothers with highly demanding roles as civil servants. Higher civil service – particularly the All India Services and some other Central Services which

[44] The reports are available on the website of the Administrative Reforms Commission 2005 (GoI, n.d.-a).

> have field duties – makes a lot of demand on the time of officers and women officers often find it difficult to apportion time to official work at the expense of their domestic responsibilities.
>
> (GoI, 2004: 79)

Significantly, the report suggested that reservation was not a favoured strategy for increasing recruitment of women into the higher levels of the civil service *among women officers themselves*:

> Women officers of the higher civil service have pointed out that they do not want either any reservation of posts for them or any other concessions to join the civil service in larger number.
>
> (GoI, 2004: 79)

Instead, responding to the perceived demands from women officers, the Hota Committee recommended preferential policies which would increase their entitlements to paid leave from the current entitlement of 135 days paid maternity leave, which the Committee deemed 'not at all adequate to enable women in the higher civil service to play their roles effectively as mothers and wives' (GoI, 2004: 79). The Committee recommended increasing this four years of paid leave over and above that already provided under service rules to 'enable them to balance their roles as officers with their roles as mothers/housewives' (GoI, 2004: 104).

The All India Services is one state institution for which reservation for women has not been a favoured policy, perhaps because the strength of its institutional norm of merit. As a senior female bureaucrat explained

> there's a lot of resistance. I'll tell you, in fact it's quite interesting, women who are just got into the civil service resist tremendously. And the reason they resist, which is understandable, see I've been in the civil service so long, and it's come to me at a later stage, but people who have just come in on their merit, it's like doing an exam, [an individual] gets into the civil service because she's a bright student... So she doesn't like to hear [about quotas]
>
> (Interview, February 2007)

However, a key question this prompts is why the All India Services have been able to defend the institutional norm of merit against recruitment policies underpinned by special treatment *on the grounds of gender but not caste*. In other words, why have reservations based on caste criteria become an institutional norm but not reservations based on gendered exclusion? Why is the civil

service norm of merit upheld in the case of gender but not caste?[45] One possibility is the class and caste composition of women who enter the service – to what extent are women able to (willing to?) avail of caste reservations in the absence of reservations for women?

Even in central government service, reservation has not been adopted as a strategy to increase numbers of women in government service. In a response to a question in the Rajya Sabha in August 2005, the Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Suresh Pachouri, rejected the possibility of the reason for low numbers of women in government service to be a direct result of discrimination against women. The Minister referred to the constitutional provision of equal opportunities for women and men in government employment, suggesting that this provision was adequate. Pachouri attributed the low number of women in government employment to 'various social, economic and cultural factors' (Rajya Sabha, 2005b) without specifying exactly what these factors were or the reason why they might result in low numbers of women in government employment. Instead, it has been the decision of several state governments to reserve government jobs for women although these have been restricted to lower levels of the public sector; as an All India Service, state governments have no authority to implement a reservation policy for women (I discuss state reservation policy further in Chapter 5).

3.2.2 State feminist initiatives in the 1990s and Beyond

Three distinguishable but complementary strategies have been employed to transform the institutional context of national development with the aim of making it more gender-responsive. The first has been to reorient existing state institutional structures and build new ones in order to create a national institutional machinery for women to improve the responsiveness of the state to women's empowerment and gender equality and to increase the recognition of women within government structures. The second has been to target specific institutions within the mainstream governmental structure to make them more responsive to gender, including the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The third strategy has been to try to transform the

[45] It should be acknowledged here that SC, ST, and OBC candidates enter as direct recruits to the All India Services through two streams: in the general category (based on competition and merit) and the reserved category (for which 'relaxed standards' in the process of recruitment examination are allowed) (GoI, 1989).

gendered institutional norms and practices of the bureaucracy and inculcate a more gender-responsive institutional culture, a strategy more representative of gender mainstreaming.

One development in the national machinery was the establishment of a National Commission for Women in 1992 'to review the Constitutional and legal safeguards for women, recommend remedial legislative measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and advise the Government on all policy matters affecting women' (NCW, cited in Rai, 2003c: 231).[46] The National Commission for Women was subsumed under the nodal department for the national machinery for women in India, the Department of Women and Child Development. Prior to 1985, the Ministry of Social Welfare was charged to deal with 'women's issues', until in that year the Department for Women and Child Development was established and subsumed under the Ministry of Human Resource Development. The Department's position within the government structure remained this way until only recently, when in January 2006, it was promoted to Ministry status. As a nodal agency rather than just a department, the Ministry has to some extent managed to transcend its narrow mandate, which is dominated by the national ICDS scheme for child development within government, and various more welfarist schemes for women, to further the cause of gendered policy concerns across government. This new role has proved important to the three other mainstreaming initiatives which took place in the 1990s and after.

The second initiative represented a consultative dialogue with non-governmental activists and scholars to bring about a more gender-sensitive development planning process. In August 1995, pre-Beijing, UNIFEM initiated the establishment of a Think Tank to work with the Planning Commission to 'engender' the Ninth Five Year Plan. The initiative involved different agencies within the Union government (such as the Department of Women and Child Development and the Planning Commission), international development organisations (UNIFEM and UNDP), and a number of Indian scholars and activists including members of a national non-governmental organisation representing women's NGOs from different regions of India (National Alliance for

---

[46] Prior to the establishment of the National Commission for Women in 1992, the other main government interface with women, besides the Department of Women and Child Welfare was the Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB), established in 1953, which co-ordinated programmes for women's welfare through a number of voluntary organisations (Mazumdar et al., 2001: 33). See Rai (2003c) for a discussion of the efficacy of the Commission – here I will largely concentrate on the Department for Women and Child Development as a central co-ordinating department for the initiatives discussed below.

Women's Organisations, or NAWO). UNIFEM described the planning process for the Ninth Five Year Plan as providing 'a necessary entry point for articulating gender concerns in policies and programmes in India' (UNIFEM, 2000: 3). Similarly, the Think Tank identified the importance of their efforts to engender the development planning process in India:

> **[The Five Year Plan is]...the most critical policymaking instrument. It is the Five-Year Plan, which sets the development agenda, gives broad directions and defines priority areas. Therefore, it is essential that the policy documents and plans reflect the voices, concerns and perspectives of both women and men. Hence, engendering plans is critical.... Engendering the nation's development plan and processes means recognising that women and men are socialised differently. And, as gender is a macroeconomic variable, it needs to be incorporated into the growth model.**
>
> (Think Tank, 2006: 1)

The Think Tank originally consisted of seven women members with activist and academic backgrounds many of whom were nationally renowned for their part in the women's movement and represented a wide regional base.[47] Through NAWO's regional network, the Think Tank members were able to organise regional consultations to consult women's organisations from around the country on issues of concern to women regarding the national development process and their lived realities. As part of the engendering initiative for each Plan, a number of regional consultations and a national consultation in Delhi were organised.[48]

Some of the main issues that emerged were listed by a UNIFEM publication on the initiative as: guaranteeing women's right to information; deepening democracy through decentralisation; ensuring the right to work by introducing employment guarantee schemes throughout the country; gender sensitisation of all functionaries of government; increased resource allocation for the social sectors; the inclusion of women's issues and perspectives in every sectoral plan and programme, not limited to the Department of Women and Child Development (gender mainstreaming); gender analysis and audit of plans, programmes and policies; and elimination of violence against women and girls (UNIFEM, 2000: 9). The issues were subsequently presented

---

[47] When the Think Tank set about engendering the Eleventh Plan in 2006, the size of the Think Tank had increased to sixteen members from the original seven, including all of the original members. It represented a similar mix of feminist scholars and activists as well as two former secretaries of the Department of Women and Child Development.

[48] For the Ninth Plan, the regional consultations took place in 1997 in Calcutta (West Bengal, for eastern states, January), Pune (Maharastra, for western states, February), Bangalore (Karnataka, for southern states, February), Chandigarh (for northern states, February), and Umiam (Meghalaya, for north eastern states, December). The national consultation took place in Delhi in March 1997.

to the Planning Commission for consideration when formulating the Plan document. The initiative was subsequently repeated for the Tenth and Eleventh Five Year Plans. Arguably, the initiative has become an institutionalized exercise which allows for feminist scrutiny of national development plans and planning processes. However, the extent to which the initiative has successfully transformed the state's development discourse by mainstreaming a gender perspective in development policy is questionable. Later in the chapter, I return to this issue after having examined the shifting gendered discourses of development in the Five Year Plans.

Gender training in the institutional bureaucratic context represents a significant development given that, for several reasons, in India the femocrat strategy has not represented a significant or straightforward option for feminists in India for at least three reasons, all of which have to do with the institutional norms and practices of the Indian bureaucracy. The 'bureaucratic-individual', feminist bureaucrat or 'femocrat' strategy as an *entry* strategy for feminists to work within the state, as discussed in Chapter 1, is one possible intervention for feminists engaging with the state. The term 'femocrat' refers to 'those women appointed to work in "women's affairs" and women's units in the state apparatus, ...now expanding to include feminist bureaucrats who seek to work on behalf of women whatever their position' (Franzway et al., 1989: 133-4). This term has been associated most closely with the feminist strategies in Australia and New Zealand (Franzway et al., 1989: 133). It is a strategy which is not without its own problems: a key dilemma is 'do female staff and clients of state bureaucracies...transform the masculinism of the bureaucracy or reiterate it, becoming servants disciplined and produced by it?' (Brown, 2006: 191). Notwithstanding this and other problematic features, the femocrat strategy remains one of the few strategies open to feminists engaging directly with the state. Its potential, however, is determined largely by the institutional context in which it is employed, and three features that determined its success in Australia and New Zealand need to be examined to understand its potential as a strategy in the Indian context.

In India, many of the conventional features of a femocrat strategy are precluded by state institutional norms of the bureaucracy. Firstly, femocrats are conventionally recruited by virtue of their *specialist* expertise in order to design public policy to address issues of gender equality. However, in India, recruitment and training processes in the Indian Administrative Service have

traditionally conditioned officers as *generalists*. As discussed above, they are expected to deal with a wide variety of situations and they are put through a rigorous selection procedure which requires them to be knowledgeable in a wide range of subjects. While there has been some debate around the increasing need for specialists within public administration (as part of the Administrative Reforms discussed earlier), the generalist ethic of IAS recruitment remains standard practice. Even specialisation is somewhat gendered, however, as it is more common for bureaucrats posted in areas of finance and commerce (typically male according to Thakur's study) to have specialist training and to be posted on deputation to international development agencies such as the World Bank, although this is increasingly being recognised as important in the social sectors of development policy where policy on women, gender and development is typically located.

Secondly, the femocrat strategy has been largely characterised by lateral entry into the bureaucracy from outside public service, usually from tertiary education. Appointment of femocrats is usually made at a level of seniority in order to have influence and visibility, sometimes as high as advisor to the Prime Minister (Franzway et al., 1989: 138-9). However, in the IAS, lateral entry is uncommon. Recruits join as trainee officers and work their way up through promotion in the bureaucratic structure, or, far less commonly, senior employees of the State Civil Services are promoted into the IAS. Furthermore, this pattern is often gendered, where although on average around three quarters of recruitment to the IAS takes place through the regular recruitment method (the national competitive Civil Service Examination) nearly all women officers are recruited through this method (Goyal, 1989: 427). In other words, nearly a quarter of men IAS recruits do not enter via the competitive examination, while nearly all women do.[49]

Thirdly, the norms and practices that determine promotion are not encouraging for a femocrat strategy. Despite the premium placed on merit by IAS recruitment practices, promotion is often also determined by the number of years the officer has served. Thus, seniority in the bureaucratic hierarchy is determined not as much by performance as it is by years of service. As a result, two

---

[49] Here I am assuming that femocrats will most frequently be women, but recognise that this is a problematic assumption, as suggested later in the chapter. The point being made refers to the *effects* of gendered institutional norms which may in turn affect the possibilities for feminist bureaucrats.

of the features characteristic of a femocrat strategy – lateral entry and seniority – are not made available by the norms and practices operating in the Indian bureaucratic context.

Finally, the implications of this last point are related to another feature of IAS recruitment and concern the opportunities for changing the 'rule of the game' once in service, which is considered central to a feminist strategy of transformation. If seniority is determined by the number of years in service, it makes it all the more difficult for femocrats to sustain such a strategy of resistance over time in the face of a routinisation and institutionalisation of gendered bureaucratic norms and practices. As CK Gariyali, a senior woman IAS officer from Tamil Nadu states, 'I lost my gender consciousness long ago. But I have been able to help many women who are deprived and oppressed through my job' (quoted in Santhanam, 2005).

When combined, these institutional norms and practices of the Indian bureaucracy provide little opportunity to feminists for working *in* the state as bureaucrats to further an agenda of gender equality within state practices and policies. However, it has to be acknowledged that lateral femocrat appointments, in the Australian context at least, were made *in view of* the acknowledgement that 'the Australian Public Service is a complex hierarchical system dominated by men'. An institutional context resistant to feminist bureaucrats also does not discount the possibility that through exposure to issues of gender equality and women's empowerment in service posts or ad hoc career training that individual officers will *become* interested in these issues (explored further in Chapter 7). But the opportunities for institutionalising this organisational learning need to be further understood. To some extent therefore, the existence of state-bureaucratic institutional norms which are not conducive to a femocrat strategy (as conventionally defined) means that a training policy which aims to sensitise recruits to the importance of gender-equitable development issues appears as a positive development.

The third initiative sought to institutionalise civil service training on gender and development as a precursor to a larger capacity-building project of the Department of Personnel and Training (Government of India) and UNDP aimed at administrative reform of the civil services. In 1993, a three-year collaborative civil service training project was set in motion as a concerted attempt to 'establish gender issues as a priority concern in development initiatives' (GoI and British

Council, 1996: 1). A key outcome of the project was the development of a 'national gender training resource'.

The Gender Planning Training Project was an international collaboration between the Governments of India and the UK, involving the Department of Personnel and Training (Government of India), the British Council Division in New Delhi (on behalf of DFID, at that time still the Overseas Development Administration), the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex, UK, the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (India's premier civil service training institute), and five participating states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karanataka, and Rajasthan). The project adopted the analytical framework of a course on women, men and development from IDS, Sussex (UK) and adapted it for the Indian context (GoI and British Council, 1996: 1). This framework underpinned the development of ten gender training modules and their application for gender training in policy analysis and the planning process.[50] Evaluation feedback suggested there had been some successes. Institutionalisation of the project was a key issue for sustainability (GoI and British Council, 1996: 5). There were signs of early success in this regard in terms of application and coverage among the participating states involved, and individual thematic modules had been adapted and delivered as stand alone modules. As the designated lead training institute, LBSNAA established a National Centre for Gender Training, Planning and Research within the academy in 1998.

By 2003, however, LBSNAA had proposed a change in their approach to delivering gender training to civil service officers, placing an emphasis on *mainstreaming gender* issues in development policy and planning. They recognised that 'in order to give gender issues the necessary attention there is a felt need to shift the focus from running "stand alone modules" on gender-specific topics, to integration of gender issues into the existing syllabi and curriculum of the Academy, which is developed for the Officer Trainees.' (LBSNAA, 2003: 1-2). The proposal for the new format retained the analytical gender relations framework from the GPTP phase, but also reiterated the need for a 'focus on gender rather than women..., [which] implies not looking

[50] The topics of these modules included a general module on gender and development, violence against women, gender and forestry, women and *panchayati raj*, gender and access to health care, gender and literacy, girls' education, gender and co-operatives, gender issues in anti-poverty programmes, and gender and entrepreneurship development.

at 'women' and 'women's issues' in isolation.' (LBSNAA, 2003: 3). This shift in focus required a consideration of both women's and men's concerns and experiences, and that this emphasis should 'recognize the different needs of women and men' (LBSNAA, 2003: 3). It was also proposed that mainstreaming gender in the training curriculum would contribute towards 'good governance'. Other key objectives included gender sensitisation of officers and officer trainees, familiarity with the rights based approach to development, and training on the recently adopted strategy of gender budgeting as part of gender-sensitive planning.

As a result of this initiative, gender training has become formally institutionalized into state bureaucratic structures in India at the level of the All India Services. However, it is less clear as to whether it has had the desired effect. Three questions remain. Firstly, to what extent is the presumed new awareness of the need for gender-responsiveness in development policy actually translated into gender-equitable development policy (and is it a naïve assumption that it would)?; Secondly, to what extent has the impetus for gender training been sustained beyond the National Academy at Mussorie in government departments and state-level training institutes, some of which were involved in the original training project? In other words, has gender training become embedded within bureaucratic institutional norms and practice? Has it become substantively institutionalized? Thirdly, what are the limits to gender sensitization in the Indian context? I explore these issues in more detail later on in the chapter in the discussion on the agency of bureaucratic actors.

Linkd to the initiative aimed at engendering the planning process has been the most recent initiative - the Government of India's experiment with gender budgeting from the year 2000 onwards. Gender budgeting as a strategy to mainstream a gender perspective into national budgets is based on the recognition that the conventional state institutional processes and practices of formulating budgets are gender-blind. The gender budgeting initiative in India again represented a collaborative effort which engaged a number of government, non-governmental, and international actors. The Department of Women and Child Development and the Finance Ministry were the key governmental agencies involved in the gender budgeting initiative, the latter playing an unfamiliar role in championing gender mainstreaming. Following the adoption of the initiative beyond its preliminary development phase, it was decided to locate the hub of

gender budgeting in the Finance Ministry rather than the Department of Women and Child Development.[51] Nevertheless, the Department of Women and Child Development still retained a key co-ordinating role.

UNIFEM also played a significant role in promoting and facilitating the adoption, training, and implementation of gender budgeting in India. The National Institute for Public Policy and Finance (NIPFP), the government's foremost think tank on public finance and policy, was commissioned to develop conceptual and methodological tools for the implementation of gender budgeting in India as well as to undertake a gender analysis of Union budgets. Leading the project for NIPFP was the then-Director Ashok K. Lahiri, who later became the Chief Economic Advisor to the government, supported by Lekha Chakraborty, a senior economist at NIPFP, and P N Bhattacharyya, a former budget finance officer for the Government of India and a consultant at NIPFP.

The introduction of gender budgeting was legitimised by reference to calls for engendering macro-economic policy-making in both international contexts such as Beijing and other UN and international fora, and initiatives in other national contexts such as Australia (1984), South Africa (1995), and 35 other countries including members of the Commonwealth (GoI, 2002a: para 11.1.3). At the same time, several government policy references to gender budgeting claimed that many of the principles of gender budgeting were not alien to the Indian context. A link was made between the concept of gender budgeting and schemes which existed previous to the introduction of the term 'gender budgeting', arguing that the same or similar ideas have surfaced in different ways in the past, such as the Women's Component Plan (extract from the Seventh Five Year Plan, cited in GoI, 2005b). In this way, the rationale for gender budgeting was presented to an extent not as the introduction of gender budgeting as a completely new concept or tool, but as a rearticulation and continuity of the policies which had preceded it.

Even so, it is only in the last seven years since 2000, that the terminology and practice of 'gender budgeting' has taken off in India. According to government documents, the initiation of gender

---

[51] Not only does the Finance Ministry have responsibility for budgets, but it also contains the highest concentration of IFS officers in the Central government whose technical competency and familiarity with budgeting and finance procedures outweigh the majority of senior personnel in the Ministry of Women and Child Development.

budgeting was identified with a workshop held in New Delhi in July 2000 in collaboration with UNIFEM on 'Engendering National Budgets in the South Asian Region' (GoI, 2002a: para 11.2.4). In the same year, the first of NIPFP's commissioned studies formed the basis of a new section on gender inequality in the social sector chapter of the Government of India's 'Economic Survey 2000-2001', an annual survey produced by the Finance Ministry (GoI, 2002a). The second study by the NIPFP was a gender budget analysis of the Union Budget for 2001-02, the findings of which were discussed in two follow-up workshops in October and December 2001.

Gender budgeting was also included in the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (2001) as part of the strategies recommended for resource management in implementing the Policy. The 2001-2002 Annual Report of the Department of Women and Child Development included for the first time a chapter on gender budgeting and outlined its main objectives:

> Gender Budgeting is not a separate budget for women; rather it is a dissection of the government budget to establish its gender-differential impacts and to translate gender commitments into budgetary commitments. The main objective of a gender-sensitive budget is to improve the analysis of incidence of budgets, attain more effective targeting of public expenditure and offset any undesirable gender-specific consequences of previous budgetary measures.
>
> (GoI, 2002a: para 11.1.1)

Two more chapters on gender budgeting followed in the Department's Annual Reports for 2004-05 and 2005-06. Meanwhile, the Department undertook gender budget analyses of the Union Budgets for the years 2002-03 and 2003-04. At the same time, institutional mechanisms for gender budgeting were established in several Central government departments in the form of Gender Focal Points. Ministries and Departments were directed by the Cabinet Secretary to include in their Annual Reports a chapter identifying gender issues, initiatives, and allocations for each department.

Later, in 2004, gender budgeting was mentioned in the Union Budget Speech for the first time, when the new Finance Minister, P Chidambaram, made his first Union Budget Speech. He acknowledged the concerns of women's groups regarding gender budgeting and promised to review the recommendations of an expert group set up to develop procedural methods for this purpose (Chidambaram, 2004). Gender budgeting again received a mention the following year in

2005, recognising that the progress that had been made was important but only the beginning, and communicated to other departments that they would also be required to undertake gender budget exercises (Chidambaram, 2005).

By this time, the concept of gender budgeting had extended beyond the identification of budgetary allocations in Union and State Budgets for women in a few so-called women-specific and women-related sectors to encompass a wider range of public and fiscal policy instruments and sectors (GoI, 2005b: para 6.3). This approach was underpinned by a commitment to gender mainstreaming which extended beyond the social sector. The Department of Women and Child Development's Annual Report 2004-05 stated:

> ...there is a perceived need for a broader perspective under the concept of gender budgeting - Gender Mainstreaming. The gender perspective on Public Expenditure and Policy is no longer restricted to the realm of social sector departments like Education, Health, Rural Development etc. All areas of public expenditure, Revenue and Policy need to be viewed with a gender perspective... [*I*]*t is not adequate to analyze in detail, allocation of resources for a few sectors of the economy which are traditionally considered as women related. The analysis has to cover every rupee of public expenditure. It has to cover the way schemes are conceptualized and how women friendly they are in implementation and targeting of beneficiaries.* It has to embrace a gender sensitive analysis of monetary policies, covering impact of indicators like inflation, interest rates etc and fiscal policies covering taxation, excise etc. Thus gender budgeting analysis has to go hand in hand with gender mainstreaming.
>
> (GoI, 2005b: para 6.5a, my emphasis)

Yet the Department was not naïve as to the implications of this new approach – it represented a 'mammoth task' (ibid).

Two features of the gender budgeting initiative may help to explain the high profile and activity that surrounded gender budgeting in India: the role of the Finance Ministry and the twin concerns of efficiency and equity in the rationale for its adoption. The engagement of the Finance Ministry with the gender budgeting initiative in India *prima facie* represents a considerable coup for feminist economists and feminist organizations interested in the gendered dimensions of macroeconomic policy in India more generally for several reasons. Firstly, as Gita Sen explains, 'Ministries of Finance appear largely to have escaped careful scrutiny in attempts to sensitize different divisions of government to gender concerns... There are not many Finance Ministries that have taken much action toward engendering what they do' (Sen, 2000: 1379).

Secondly, with the exception of feminist economists, the two disciplines of macroeconomics and feminist theory rarely come into contact with one another. Thus on the one hand,

> macroeconomics, even at its simplest, can be quite incomprehensible for noneconomists or those who are not specialists in finance...Those who work in Finance Ministries often come to feel themselves more powerful on the basis of superior knowledge and skills that few others can penetrate, and hence are less open to challenge by those outside the discipline.
>
> (Sen, 2000: 1380)

On the other hand, 'Finance Ministry officials who are used to thinking in terms of macro-financial variables, are likely to be somewhat at a loss when asked to engender their work' (Sen, 2000). As one former official of the Ministry of Women and child Development pointed out, 'even when talking about gender budgets they take a very technicist kind of view rather than empowerment kind of view, and that makes a huge difference' (Interview, February 2007).

Perhaps most significantly, however, Gita Sen argues that it is particularly important to locate gender mainstreaming initiatives within Finance Ministries 'because of the central and powerful role of the Finance Ministry in current structural reform processes.' and because of their higher relative status in relation to other government departments, their expertise, their macroeconomic focus, and the support they can then provide to less powerful ministries (Sen, 2000: 1388). This may explain why the gender budgeting initiative in India managed to achieve as much as it did in seven years. The Department of Women and Child Development acknowledged that 'the lead taken by the Ministry of Finance has also lent strength to the Department's efforts' (GoI, 2005b: para 6.13). They also acknowledged that the response from other Departments had been positive (ibid). Similarly, gender budgeting received the support and endorsement of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development when they reported on the gender budgeting initiative in 2004 and 2005 (Rajya Sabha, 2004: para 3.5).

However, the involvement of the Finance Ministry has not been without tradeoffs. With regards to the efficiency/equity rationale, the language involved in the strategic framing of initiatives plays a key part in how the initiative is perceived and whether it is taken on board. Both concerns of equity and efficiency were deployed as the rationale to persuade the government to adopt gender budgeting practices. In attempting to develop a gender-sensitive budget, gender budgeting embraced equity as a central concern. Yet the rationale for gender budgeting was also

articulated in a way that made economic sense to policy-makers who may otherwise be unconcerned with equity issues, which has elsewhere been referred to the 'business case' for gender budgeting.

On this basis, the efficiency rationale asserts that gender-blind policies and budgets will be badly targeted and thus wasteful; on the contrary, gender-sensitive budgets and policies would be better targeted and more *efficient*. Therefore, gender budgeting was appealing as it would not necessarily require *more* budgetary allocation, but a more *efficient* distribution, or a '*reprioritisation* rather than an increase in overall public expenditure and, in particular, the *reorientation* of programmes within sectors rather than changes in the overall amounts allocated to particular sectors' (Lahiri et al., 2005). This was consistent with the government's ongoing fiscal reforms.

Himmelweit presents a similar scenario for gender budgeting initiatives in the UK, in that they are often draw on both an equity and efficiency rationale (Himmelweit, 2002). She argues that an efficiency rationale is more likely to appeal to policy makers than an equity rationale. However, gender budgeting highlights the risks gender mainstreaming advocates may take and the compromises they make in order to bring their concerns onto the mainstream agenda. On one level, the foregrounding of efficiency concerns to the marginalization of equity concerns represents an instance of 'rhetorical entrapment' whereby feminist agendas become diluted as they become mainstreamed. As Verloo argues, 'rhetorical entrapment will always remain a risk in strategies that involve strategic framing' (Verloo, 2001: 10).

Two further shortcomings of gender budgeting approaches are the underlying rational choice understanding of individual behavior and the overemphasis on gender difference at the expense of differences between men and between women. Gender budgeting approaches present men and women as two sets of economic actors, with different preferences and affected by different incentives by virtue of their different socio-economic roles and structural locations in both paid and unpaid economies. As a result, men and women are affected by and respond to budgetary policies differently (Lahiri et al., 2005: 2). This approach tends to fall back upon a rational choice explanation of economic behavior which is problematic because it assumes that men and women will always try to maximize the utility of their responses to public policy, on the basis

that they are fully informed about the range of choices available. Clearly, this understates the differential access to resources in state and market institutions but perhaps more importantly, the focus on gender difference between women and men tends to marginalize the differences *between* men and *between* women, by other stratifiers of caste and class which to some extent become lost in the focus on gender difference.

However, the gender budgeting initiative has given impetus to a potentially more radical development – the reform of how women and men's paid and *unpaid* labour, including the care economy, is measured and recorded in the system of national accounts. This has implications for the ways in which women are seen to contribute to the national economy, including a potential revalorisation of their unpaid labour. For example, with regards to the gender budgeting initiative, the Department of Women and Child Development asserted

> It is necessary to recognize that women are equal players in the economy whether they participate directly as workers or indirectly as members of the care economy. To that extent, every policy of the Government fiscal, monetary or trade, has a direct impact on the well being of women.
>
> (GoI, 2005b: 6.5a)

In the next section, I examine the gendered development discourse of the Indian state as articulated in the Five Year Plans. I conclude by assessing whether the initiatives outlined in the previous section have made an impact in transforming mainstream development discourse. It becomes apparent that some of the language from Beijing has since become part of the discourse articulated in the Five Year Plans, but it also appears that this has not largely affected the larger model of macroeconomic growth.

3.3 Gendered Development Discourse in the Post-1990 Period

3.3.1 Gender and development in pre-1990s post-independence planning

Apart from a pre-Independence Report of the National Planning Committee on Women's Role in the Planned Economy, a relatively progressive document which was conspicuous by its absence in post-Independence planning (Chaudhuri, 1996), women and gender was not considered a significant aspect of development until the 1970s. Prior to 1990, there were two landmark government reports on women, gender and development in the post-Independence phase. The first was the report of the government-commissioned study on the status of women in India,

Towards Equality (CSWI, 1974). The report was written by a committee especially constituted for the purpose, the Committee on the Status of Women in India. The terms of reference for the committee were to examine the status of women in relation to constitutional, legal and administrative provision; education and employment; the 'changing social pattern'; population policy and family planning programmes; and with regards to enabling women 'to play their full and proper role in building up the nation.' *Towards Equality* highlighted the continuing low status of women in India, despite constitutional guarantees for equality and nearly thirty years of post-independence development planning.

The second was a government-commissioned report on the status of self-employed women workers and women working in the informal sector, *Shramshakti* (NCSEWWIS, 1988). Similarly, the report was written by a commission constituted for the purposes of carrying out the study, the National Commission on Self Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector, and chaired by Ela Bhatt (of SEWA). *Shramshakti* outlined the precarious status and working conditions of self-employed women and women working in the informal sector. Both reports are widely acknowledged within narratives of both the government and the women's movement as constituting key milestones in the treatment of women, gender and development issues in India in the pre-1990s period.

The third key milestone in the historical narrative of government action on women, gender and development was the Sixth Plan (1980-85), which for the first time included a separate chapter on women. Yet at the same time, intentions to mainstream the concerns of women can be found as early as 1978, in the papers and minutes of a National Committee formed out of the National Plan of Action. Mazumdar *et al* described the sentiment at the time:

> Women were no longer the responsibility or the constituency of one Department or Bureau, nor confined to the 'soft' social sectors. It was accepted that the plans and policies of all departments and sectors affected women...It was realised that all Government agencies should take into account the effect of their policies and programmes on women and should specifically mention the special steps taken by them for improving the condition of women...
>
> (Mazumdar *et al.*, 2001: 63)

Attempts were also made to improve the status of the national machinery for women in central government structures, as were similar efforts during the 1990s (Mazumdar *et al.*, 2001: 65).

3.3.2 Economic Reform Discourse

The Eighth Plan (1992-1997) was released shortly after an important turning point in Indian policy, precipitated by a balance of payments crisis in 1991 and subsequent high inflation. To address the crisis, the Government of India agreed to an IMF loan to stabilise the deficit, and also subscribed to a number of structural adjustment measures.

The economic reforms undertaken at the start of the 1990s represented a consolidation of previous attempts at liberalisation rather than any radical break with the immediate past (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). A number of studies have discussed whether the Indian government have been able to implement the economic reforms to the full extent intended (Jenkins, 1999; Nayar, 2001; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993; Chhibber, 2003). Yet at the time, it appeared as a final, symbolic defeat of the Nehruvian socialist strategy of heavy industrialisation and 'redistribution with growth' upon which development planning in the newly independent state of India had been established and which had been in a state of demise since the 1960s. The 1991 crisis provided a backdrop to, and justification for, the immediate corrective measures taken, and longer term changes including fiscal reforms, changes to macroeconomic policy designed to bring about higher growth, and a reduced role for the institution of planning in the newly liberalised economy (Frankel, 2005).

These longer term changes involved a new approach to what the Plan identified as the inefficient, uncompetitive, and dependency-creating public sector to make it 'efficient and surplus generating' (GoI, 1992: para 1.1.4). The manufacturing sector was identified as the crucial sector for high growth, and efforts were to be focused on creating an environment for 'industrial growth, modernisation, and productivity improvements' (ibid: 1.2.4). All of these reform strategies had consequences for the perspective on women, gender and development in the government's development discourse.

Furthermore, the Eighth Plan firmly outlined the reduced role of planning, which was to become largely 'indicative' rather than directive, now advising on the 'optimal utilisation' of limited resources (ibid: para 1.1.5). At the same time, it went to great lengths to justify the continued importance of planning. The Plan acknowledged the shortcomings of economic growth as a

redistributive measure and prescribed compensatory measures to those excluded from the benefits of growth, preferring to leave the growth model unchanged rather than alter its structure. Thus, the continued role of the Planning Commission was to provide infrastructure, but also to compensate the 'poor', 'backward', and the 'weaker sections' of society excluded from the full benefits of the growth process:

> The backward regions and the weaker sections of the society, if not protected fully, are more likely to be left behind in the *natural* process of growth. Adequate protection will have to be continued to be provided to the poor and the weaker sections of the society.
>
> (ibid : para 1.4.22, my emphasis)

> Planning in our country still has a large role to play. Planning is needed for creating social infrastructure and for human development...[T]he private sector, as yet, is not capable of taking care of the entire needs of the society, particularly of the poor and the weak, in remote and the rural areas...Planning is necessary to take care of the poor and the downtrodden who have little asset endowments to benefit from the natural growth of economic activities.
>
> (ibid: paras 1.5.5-6)

Planning therefore remained important to women, as a category constitutive of the 'weaker sections':

> Although development brings economic gains to society in general, specific measures become necessary to ensure that they reach the disadvantaged and the weaker sections of the population such as women, children, the disabled, the elderly, and the destitute. The welfare and development of these weaker sections of the society largely depend upon suitable policy directions executed through appropriate programmes and strategies.
>
> (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 15.1.1)

The NEP was not well received by the women's movement in India. Many scholars and activists contested the shift in government policy, drawing upon years of feminist critiques of Structural Adjustment Programmes from around the world, made accessible through the transnational women's movement (John, 1996). Indian feminist critiques forewarned that the deleterious effects of structural adjustment programmes, particularly on women, that had been the concern of other feminist studies around the world, would be reproduced in India, should the government proceed with the IMF-advocated measures. In particular, they condemned the possibility of state withdrawal from the social sector and warned that globalisation would bring new gender inequalities to the Indian informal sector, as a result of the lack of regulatory labour protection for workers in this sector and increased competition from foreign companies.

These concerns were voiced at the United Nation's Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995. The gendered outcomes of processes of liberalisation and structural adjustment constituted one of twelve key concerns that formed the Beijing Platform for Action. The lack of voice for women in national development planning processes was also a concern and addressing this formed part of the commitment towards improving institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women. As a result, a collaborative attempt to engender the Government of India's Ninth Five Year Plan was initiated after the Beijing conference (discussed earlier).

Many of the macroeconomic policy changes outlined in the Eighth Plan remained central to the Ninth Plan, despite a subsequent period of unstable government formation at the centre after the 1998 national election and a change in government which saw the Hindu nationalist BJP-led coalition finally establishing a stable majority government in 1999. The Ninth Plan was even more aggressively in favour of liberalisation, combined with a more nationalist discourse, and pushed for further reforms, both at the Central and State level.

> There should be no doubt that the process of reforms...which has yielded many good results, must be continued and strengthened...The remaining controls [on the industrial sector] at the Central Government level need to be reviewed for further liberalisation...[T]he major effort in the future has to be to extend liberalisation to the level of State Government.
>
> (GoI, 1997: Vol 1, para 1.10-12)

The government's discourse on liberalisation as a development strategy presented the reforms in a positive light but also attempted to close down the alternatives to opening up the economy to foreign competition. The Ninth Plan, for example, stressed that the process of globalisation was *undeniable*, and should not be avoided but managed, with much to gain from being involved. Liberalisation was the 'necessary' strategy to reap maximum rewards, including the development of an internationally competitive export-oriented Indian industry:

> ...[P]olicies in the Ninth Plan must be tailored to the objective of accelerating growth in an environment in which the world is becoming increasing integrated and globalised. *The process of globalisation is a reality which cannot be denied and also should not be avoided.* However, it needs to be managed so that we can derive the maximum advantage from world markets...[I]t is necessary to continue the process of opening up of the economy to international competition...while making parallel efforts to strengthen the potential of Indian industry to compete effectively in world markets.
>
> (GoI, 1997, my emphasis)

Dependence on the government by 'socially disadvantaged groups' was to be heavily discouraged. It was for this reason that those income-generating schemes that were assessed and found to be unproductive would be phased out wherever possible. Instead, self-reliance was the new goal, which also carried nationalist undertones. Both the emphasis on productivity and self-reliance were also to be found in the government's new 'empowerment' discourse on women's development.

Much like the Eighth Plan set out, in the Tenth Plan the role of government in development continued to retain importance in infrastructure development and the social sectors. Government would also play a facilitative role for private sector investment. The Tenth Plan also continued to recognise the shortcomings of economic growth as a redistributive measure and continued to envision the need for special programmes for those excluded from the benefits of growth as part of a three-pronged strategy to achieve equity and social justice alongside high rates of growth. But there was also an evident re-imagining of the poor, their role in development processes, and the importance of human development objectives in the Tenth Plan.

Firstly, self-reliance remained important as in the Ninth Plan, but a new emphasis was placed on encouraging individual *entrepreneurship* and self-employment. This was reflected in calls for more democratised development and increased participation of the poor in shaping their own destinies (GoI, 1997: Vol 1, para 1.1), as opposed to merely being more involved in the implementation of development activities as the Eighth Plan proposed (GoI, 1992: preface). Self-reliance was also part of the strategy to deal with one of the most significant challenges for the Tenth Plan, the creation of sufficient employment opportunities. The importance of providing employment was two-fold – to encourage individuals to fulfil their full potential, and to prevent social unrest and disorder (GoI, 1997). The Plan forecast that the growth process alone would not be able to fulfil the demand for employment without some kind of intervention, or improvements in vocational education in this case.

Secondly, the rationale for investing in human development became linked more closely to growth objectives. As before, improvement in human development was seen as both 'socially desirable' and as a 'valuable input' for ensuring sustained development in the long term, but the

Tenth Plan stressed new targets for improvements in human development indicators such as literacy and health.:

> It is important to re-emphasise that the equity related objectives of the Plan, which are extremely important, are intimately linked to the growth objective, and attainment of one may not be possible without the attainment of the other...[H]igh growth rates may not be sustainable if they are not accompanied by a dispersion of purchasing power which can provide the demand needed to support the increase in output without having to rely excessively on external markets.
>
> (GoI, 2002d: Vol 1, para 1.33)

Thus, the Tenth Plan recognised the central role of the 'poor and the disadvantaged' as *consumers* in the achievement of high rates of growth.

3.3.3 Gendered development discourse in the Five Year Plans

Constituting women as a category of development

The *location* in the Plans of 'women' as a category of development signified how gender issues were perceived in the government's development discourse. While this changed over the three Plans, the subject of women's welfare, development, or empowerment was consistently located in the social sector. As stated above, in the Eighth Plan, women were identified as belonging to the 'weaker sections' of society. Given that the development of the 'weaker sections' in the Plan came under the ambit of the Social Welfare chapter, it was perhaps not surprising that the approach to women continued to be largely welfarist, despite claims to the contrary. In the Ninth Plan, the language and location had changed from Social Welfare and women's development came under the ambit of Human and Social Development. Examples of other chapters in this sector include 'Health', 'Family Welfare', several chapters on education, 'Youth and Sports', and 'Art and Culture', women were situated within the 'sector' of human and social development'.

Furthermore, women as a category of development were consistently *segregated* into a separate chapter or section for all three Plans. Of the whole Eighth Plan, the Social Welfare chapter represented the government's most explicit and systematic articulation of its perspective on

women, gender and development in the Eighth Plan.[52] But there was also some indication that 'women's issues' were being taken into consideration and integrated on a sectoral level. References to women appeared in thirteen of nineteen sectoral chapters.[53] However, these mainly related to 'special schemes' and 'special measures' within general schemes that were designed for women often as a result of their 'disadvantaged' or 'weak' status, or 'special provisions' such as separate training institutes for women and support services such as housing schemes for working women. Similarly, in the Ninth and Tenth Plans women were located in a separate chapter with children.

Women's *role* in the national development project as articulated in the Plans effectively constituted a hierarchy of gendered developmental subjectivities by virtue of their relative inclusion in the development process. The Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and participatory *role* for women in the development process than the beneficiary-oriented role it had identified under previous Plans. It maintained that 'women must be enabled to function as equal partners and *participants* in development and not merely as *beneficiaries* of various schemes' (GoI, 1992: para 15.5.1, my emphasis). In the Ninth Plan, the goal entailed 'empowering women as the *agents* of social change and development' (GoI, 1997: Vol 2, para 3.8.27). The Tenth Plan continued with the role for women as agents of development envisioned in the Ninth Plan. It also explicitly stated that the aim of empowerment strategies in the Tenth Plan was for 'women and girls to act as catalysts, participants and recipients in the country's development process' (GoI, 2002d: Vol 2, para 2.11.60).

---

[52] Despite references to the disabled, the elderly, and the destitute as well as women and children, the contents of the Social Welfare chapter is divided into only two sections, one on the 'development of women' and one on 'child development'. The chapter did refer to projects for assisting destitute women to become 'economically self-sufficient' and the 'economic rehabilitation of socially disadvantaged groups of women like *devadasis* and prostitutes' (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 15.5.25). Otherwise, the disabled, the elderly and the destitute have been largely excluded from consideration. According to this hierarchy of exclusion, women and children remained albeit marginally included in the development vision by virtue of their perceived current and future contributions.

[53] These chapters include Agricultural and Allied Activities, Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation, Environment and Forests, Village and Small Industries and Food Processing Industries, Labour and Labour Welfare, Education, Culture and Sports, Health and Family Welfare, Urban Development, Housing, Water Supply and Sanitation, Social Welfare, Welfare and Development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Special Area Development Programmes, Science and Technology. There are no references to women in the remaining six chapters of Irrigation, Command Area Development and Flood Control, Industry and Minerals, Energy, Transport, Communication, Information and Broadcasting, and Plan Implementation and Evaluation.

In the Eighth Plan, concerns of women's developmental status overwhelmingly related to women's role as *producers*, a role for which, the Plan claimed, they were still not fully recognised. This included agricultural production, construction work, and other informal sector work, including home-based activities. The Plan stated that women as workers in these sectors suffered from lack of protection from labour laws, lack of access to credit, training and technology, wage discrimination, insecurity and poor working conditions. They also faced increasing competition from new technologies. The lack of recognition of women as producers was also extended to subsistence activities and the unpaid care economy and identified conventional measures of women's contribution to the economy as gender biased:

> The contribution of women to the economy continues to remain grossly under-reported due to certain conceptual, methodological and perception problems, reflecting a gender bias since economic value is not assigned to unpaid household work and various kinds of subsistence activities. Home-based production activities and unpaid family work also tend to be grossly under-reported.
>
> (GoI, 1992: para 15.4.6)

The Ninth and Tenth Plans were largely based on the draft and final draft of the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women. As the title suggests, the gendered development discourse shifted towards empowerment. The Ninth Plan defined empowerment as creating 'an enabling environment where women can freely exercise their rights both within and outside home, as equal partners along with men' (GoI, 1997: 3.8.27). Both Plans presented a more coherent strategy for social and economic *empowerment* and gender justice. Strategies for social empowerment included affirmative developmental policies and programmes for the development of women and access to all the basic minimum services. Economic empowerment included provision of training, employment and income-generation activities with the objective of making all potential women economically independent and self-reliant. The strategy to achieve gender justice aimed to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination so women enjoy de facto as well as de jure 'rights and fundamental freedoms *on par* with men in all spheres' (GoI, 2002d: Vol 2, para 2.11.57).

But the empowerment discourse was largely articulated as an approach to empowerment in which self-maximisation of the individual was prominent, and consistent with the government's liberal discourse. Strategies for women's development were not always pursued in the name of

gender equality *per se* but as a means for development. The creation an enabling environment was frequently justified to enable women to become agents of development.

Policies for women's development

Affirmative action was the most consistent policy instrument proposed for women's development, and increasingly so after the Eighth Plan which also stressed remedial measures for discriminatory societal attitudes. Legal provisions in the Constitution were used to justify the use of affirmative action:

> Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits any discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, etc. Article 15(3), however, clarifies that this provision will not prevent the State from making any special provisions for women and children.
>
> (GoI, 1992: para 15.2.2)

All three Plans justified special treatment based on women's difference in the pursuit of equality. Nowhere clearer was the importance of affirmative action as a strategy for empowerment foreseen than in participation in decision-making. An important omission in the Eighth Plan which the Ninth Plan did include was a consideration of women's political participation.

> The status-quo...can only change when women's concerns gain political prominence and a fairly representative number of women are in a position not only at grass-roots level, but also at the state and national levels to convert them into a political will.
>
> (GoI, 1997: para 3.8.24)

For women to be empowered, not only did they have to be represented in decision-making but that this required their direct participation:

> As the representation of women in the decision-making levels has a direct bearing on all the affirmative actions directed towards their well-being and empowerment, every effort will be made to ensure that women are in adequate numbers at the decision-making levels.
>
> (ibid: para 3.8.49)

Affirmative action was also the core element of several other schemes. A 'special strategy' named the 'Women's Component Plan' directed that 'not less than 30 per cent of funds/benefits are earmarked in all the women-related sectors...[and] through an effective mechanism...ensure that the [WCP] brings forth a holistic approach towards empowering women' (ibid: para 3.8.28).

Yet by placing an emphasis on gender mainstreaming across all sectors the Tenth Plan appeared to be setting a new trend against the segregation of women's issues. But this was still a strategy

that was premised on gender difference, and based on the interpretation of gender mainstreaming in the NPEW. One of several goals of the policy was 'mainstreaming a gender perspective in the development process' which was interpreted thus:

> Policies, programmes and systems will be established to ensure mainstreaming of *women's* perspectives in all developmental processes, as catalysts, participants and recipients. Wherever there are gaps in policies and programmes, women specific interventions would be undertaken to bridge these. Coordinating and monitoring mechanisms will also be devised to assess from time to time the progress of such mainstreaming mechanisms. Women's issues and concerns as a result will specially be addressed and reflected in all concerned laws, sectoral policies, plans and programmes of action'
>
> (GoI, 2005c: article 4.1, my emphasis)

Evidently, mainstreaming gender was interpreted as mainstreaming women's perspectives, and not necessarily gender. Furthermore, it was not clear as to what constituted women's perspectives which not only served to homogenise diversity among women but also did not explicitly associate women's perspectives as synonymous with a gender equality, or gender-sensitive perspective.

Heteroglossia in the Plans

At times, the Plans were not always consistent and a number of significant contradictions can be identified. As stated above, the Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and participatory role for women in the development process than the beneficiary-oriented role it had identified under previous Plans. It maintained that 'women must be enabled to function as equal partners and participants in development and not merely as beneficiaries of various schemes' (ibid: para 15.5.1). Yet this vision was accompanied by a more beneficiary-oriented commitment to

> ensure that the benefits of development from different sectors do not bypass women and special programmes are implemented to complement the general development programmes
>
> (ibid: para 15.5.1)

This strategy represented a continuation of the segregation of women's development from mainstream development, despite a commitment earlier that 'the issues relating to women will be integrated in the total development endeavours' (ibid: para 15.5.2). Similarly, while the stated goal of the Ninth Plan was to empower women as the agents of social change and development, women as a group were identified as 'the most important *target groups* in the context of the

present day developmental planning' (GoI, 1997: Vol 2, para 3.8.1, my emphasis). Moreover, a five fold category was used to identify the different developmental needs of women and girl children: girl children (0-14), adolescent girls (15-18/19), women of reproductive age (15-44), women of economically active age (15-59), and elderly women (60+). Elderly women appeared as a residual category with only 'limited needs mainly relating to health, emotional and financial support' (ibid: para 3.8.2). Women in the reproductive age group needed 'special care and attention' and economically active women had 'different demands' including for education, training, and income generation. This had the effect of objectifying women as categories of development.

Silences and exclusions

Notably missing from the chapter on women's development in the Eighth Plan was any detailed consideration of how caste and other identity markers interacted with gender; this is touched upon but not in any great depth in another chapter that identifies the increased 'poverty and deprivation' faced by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women by virtue of the intersections of their caste or tribal status and gender.

Also, men were also frequently made invisible in the Plans, whereas women frequently appeared as a category of development. Women appeared as 'women' in the Plan document courtesy of their 'special' status. Men rarely appeared as 'men', but instead were defined by other categories relating to their status as workers (farmers, agricultural labourers, fisher*men*, etc) and the general invisibility of men within the Plan documents was seldom interrupted.[54] In contrast, women appeared *in spite of* their status as workers which demonstrated the foregrounding of women as a category of development:

> Animal husbandry is one of the important sub sector[s] of agricultural economy and plays a significant role in the rural economy by providing gainful employment particularly to the small/marginal farmers, *women* and agricultural landless labourers.
> (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 1.8.1, my emphasis)

[54] An important exception includes the reference to men's migration from hill areas and the effects this has on women as heads of households (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 17.4.5). Another includes a family planning initiative to regulate men's as well as women's fertility, but the reader is told this is a 'new thrust' but is given little detail and it appears as largely supplementary to the core strategies (GoI, 1992: Vol 2, para 12.5.3 xix).

Moreover, often when men did appear in the Plans, they were provided as a normative benchmark to compare the magnitude of women's lagging status (literacy rates, the sex ratio, work participation rates). 'Men as men' faded into the subtext as a norm that was rarely questioned. In contrast, 'women as women' as a category became inscribed as an object of the development vision, a deviant category along with others such as SCs, STs, the elderly, the destitute, the disabled and others. While, of course, the elderly can also be disabled, and SCs can also be destitute, and more importantly men can also be identified by using all of these identity categories, it is also the invisibility of 'men as men' as a category that demonstrated the ways in which the development vision of the Government of India was gendered.

The impact of engendering initiatives

Having reviewed the three most recent Five Year Plans, it is difficult to assess whether the engendering initiative discussed earlier has been successful in transforming the government's gendered development discourse. In assessing the impact of the Think Tank initiative, UNIFEM claimed several successes. UNIFEM described it as 'an orchestrated gender sensitisation of the planning process' (2000: 18). Several policy documents make reference to Beijing and the subsequent National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (a commitment made at Beijing) is seen as an important milestone in the explicit engendering of development planning and policy in India.

However, to date, a plan of action for the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (NPEW) has still to be drafted. Furthermore, the most recent initiative, of engendering the Eleventh Plan, has fallen far short of expectations. In August 2006, members of the UNIFEM/UNDP Think Tank presented their recommendations for engendering the Eleventh Five Year Plan to the Planning Commission. Subsequently, the Planning Commission released the Approach Paper to the Plan, entitled 'Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth'. The Approach Paper is usually considered as a good indicator of the flavour of the Final Plan, but in this case it fell short of the expectations of Think Tank members and a working group on 'Empowerment of Women' constituted by the Planning Commission in 2006 and chaired by the secretary of the MWCD (GoI, 2006). Indira Hirway, a Think Tank member, criticised the

Eleventh Plan Approach Paper for failing to address gender concerns and for overlooking the dynamic processes which excluded many from the development process (Hirway, 2006).

However, Hirway opened her critique with the acknowledgement that 'India definitely needs faster and more inclusive growth' and only questioned as to whether the proposed strategy in the Approach Paper would ensure inclusive growth (Hirway, 2006: 3464). Similarly, a report produced by the MWCD-led Working Group commented that

> Though for the first time, a separate section on 'Gender Equity' was included in the Draft Approach Paper to the 11th Five Year Plan, the paper has not given enough focus on women's empowerment issues in the country. The strategy for women is confined to three areas - violence against women, economic empowerment and women's' health. There has been no attempt to understand that empowerment of women has to be visualized as a holistic integrated approach and not in a piece meal manner or as water tight compartments.
>
> (GoI, 2006: 11)

The strategy forwarded by the Ministry of Women and Child Development for the Eleventh Plan was that of 'inclusive and integrated policy and strategy for economic, social and political empowerment of women', and consistently emphasised the importance of integrated, holistic, and inclusive policy for the empowerment of women from different sections of society (GoI, 2006). Thus, both critiques did not fundamentally dislodge the logic of faster growth as essential for development, as contained in the 11th Plan Approach Paper ('sustained and rapid growth rates are the most effective route to poverty reduction') but did question whether the government's approach would be inclusive, re-emphasising that such growth needed to be pro-poor and *pro-women'* (GoI, 2006: 20).

3.4 Agents of national development

The preceding discussion of gendered development discourse in the Five Year Plans demonstrates that women were positioned within a spectrum of possibilities for agency ranging from passive recipients to catalytic agents of development. To summarise the observations made above, the government's development discourse changed over time which also shifted how women were constituted as a category of development. Women were articulated as a category of development in various ways: constituted as welfare recipients, as workers and producers, as agents, catalysts, participants and equal partners of development; as weak, special,

disadvantaged, vulnerable, lagging, and nurturing; located outside of different sectoral concerns, deserving of a separate chapter; as a constituency needing protection, recognition, special treatment, justice and empowerment; and sometimes as an homogenous category devoid of caste, class, and religious identity. Women constituted a category sometimes by virtue of their visibility in the Plans, compared to the frequent invisibility of men. While a shift towards empowerment was visible, it was also consistent with the government' liberal discourse. Furthermore, the shift did not always occur in ways that were consistent, and a welfarist approach continued, particularly within the overall development discourse. The Plans tended to foreground an analysis of women rather than gender. An equality discourse based on gender difference both underpinned the construction of women's poor development status as well as prescribe affirmative action strategies.

Yet, the interpellation of women into subject position of enhanced agency does not appear to be uniformly positive for enabling gender-equitable development or participative-democratic modes of gender mainstreaming. As we have seen in the foregoing analysis, over the course of the 1990s and beyond, the government's gendered development discourse has placed increasing emphasis on productivity, entrepreneurship, self-reliance, and individual choice. Poor women are now seen as 'harder working, easier to mobilise, better credit risks, more selfless because they are concerned with their entire families and communities, more loyal voters, the best anti-corruption vigilantes, and the best agents to uplift their families and communities...' (Batliwala and Dhanraj, 2004: 12-13). Women's role as mother is rearticulated in the new social empowerment discourse. Targeted improvements in women's education are linked to and justified as an instrument of fertility control to restrict population growth, a key objective of national planning. Thus, women as mothers retain a key role in development discourse, but in a way which fits uneasily with the notion of empowerment.

On the other hand, the heteroglossic articulation of women as subjects or categories of development does suggest significant possibilities for agency, given that it demonstrates that the state's attempt to hegemonise the field of discursive possibilities has been unsuccessful. However, the extent to which possibilities for agency may be realized are perhaps more likely to occur at the local level and will be contingent on context-specific factors.

A key concern of support for gender-equitable development policies is the support of the political leadership. However, the extent of support and the form it takes is often dependent on the political party or coalition in government. As one feminist observer explained,

> Government has many faces, the government has many forms, and whether we like it or not, it depends a lot on who is in power. For instance, when the right-wing BJP-kind of parties in power, you find that there is almost no space for women at all. There is a kind of... maybe that's the nature of their politics. Similarly when you look at the extreme Left parties like CPIM in West Bengal, even there they don't like to talk about women's issues as women's issues. As you know that when you look back at the whole tradition of communist parties across the world, this has been a big issue... [T]here is a lot of resistance in some political parties to be able to engage with women. On the other hand most of the centrist kind of groups which have come to power at different points of time, seem to be wanting to use the women's constituency a lot more than maybe people who are on the extreme right or extreme left. So I think... in India it depends a lot on who is in power, and what the equations are, and how we are able to pressurise or mediate at any given point in time.
>
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

Thus, feminists have often viewed the opportunities for articulating concerns about gender in state arenas as limited, depending on which party is in power. Ramachandran suggests this was particularly the case for the right-wing Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, which led the NDA coalition government from 1999-2004. Yet, as a former official of the Ministry of Women and Child Development explained, perhaps *in spite of* particular ideological considerations of the political parties in power, this did not preclude policy developments in the area of women, gender and development. She argued that in relation to the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women: '...we had a pushing minister who wanted to get it through, we got it through *even though he was from the BJP*, [there was] a lot of support from him and a lot of resistance at various levels from other ministries but yes we did get that through (interview with former MWCD official, February 2007).

It is clear from the analysis of mainstreaming initiatives that specialisation and gender-sensitisation of *bureaucrats* have become important issues. Where successive administrative reforms committees have recommended efforts to increase the specialisation of bureaucrats, this presents both opportunities and concerns for mainstreaming gender in development policy. This is assuming of course that the specialisation includes all sectors. According to Ramachandran, slowly the need for specialists in the area of women's development to work within the government is being recognised but that it needs to be done a lot more (interview, December

2007) . She also suggests that this is a sector-specific problem and that the movement between government and non-government specialists in other government ministries such as Finance has been a lot more fluid in the past:

> For instance, if you look at the economic advisors that the government has had, very senior economic advisors, most of them are people that have been in and out of universities, research institutions, World Bank, and things like that. But when it came to social sector programmes, this was not a practice, because somehow there was a feeling that you don't need somebody with any kind of specialisation to work on these issues, anyone, any woman with sensitivity can do it. And then suddenly there was a realisation that 'No I think it's important to get people who maybe from the university who can actually do this kind of work'. And once there was a recognition, then it became easy, because there are systems in India to do that. For instance, as I said, in the Finance Ministry there have been systems like this for a long time, and they have used these systems, they have in fact worked with them. But when it came to women's development, for instance women's empowerment, these systems were not being used to the same extent.
>
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

On the one hand, increasing the specialisation of bureaucrats may mean that bureaucrats can opt to become 'gender experts' which may strengthen the efforts of bureaucrats to convince policy-makers of the benefits of making development policy more gender-equitable, where policy on women, gender and development becomes increasingly dependent on expertise and knowledge in order to 'prove' the case for gender-equitable development. On the other hand, this may lead to a situation whereby gender expertise in government become increasingly concentrated, which suggests the opposite of the 'democratisation of expertise' (Squires, 2007a)..

However, gender sensitisation training may enable bureaucrats to develop new administrative subjectivities in relation to gender-equitable development, in particular enabling male bureaucrats to become engaged in gendered policy issues in an institutional context where they have long been considered 'women's issues'. Particular cases have also challenged the notion that feminist bureaucrats can only be women, or that women bureaucrats are more sensitive to gender policy concerns than men bureaucrats: 'we have such fantastic men who have done such fantastic work on gender, they become role models' (interview with senior bureaucrat, February 2007). One male bureaucrat she highlighted in particular was V.K. Chaturvedi, who was secretary of MWCD (then having only Department Status) but who later went on to become Chief Secretary.

> Though he had always worked in economics ministries, he was a dynamo. He pushed things which had been lingering for years and you know it was really actually good having, I think it did the Women and Child Ministry a lot of good, shook it up and got it moving, got lots of stuff through, he initiated a lot of stuff. But as I said, I don't think he would have, I mean five years in Women and Child would have been too much. I think he moved on... And now of course he's Cabinet Secretary
>
> (interview with former MWCD official, February 2007)

Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate the extent to which gender training and gender sensitisation can bring about transformative change, as the same official remarked: 'to a large extent it is a long haul, and I don't think one should actually pretend or fool oneself to think that you get a massive attitudinal change at the end, you know things are so deeply embedded' (interview with author, February 2007).

Contrary to expectations however, the success or failure of mainstreaming initiatives often hinge on whether individual bureaucrats occupying senior positions are supportive or not to such initiatives. The commitment of individual actors to pursue progressive policies is perhaps just as important as their discursive and institutional context, and includes the extent to which some bureaucratic actors are able to bargain and negotiate with others in the policy process. As the former MWCD official points out, however, passing of the NPEW was not without compromise, which she sees as a common occurrence with particularly progressive policy.

> I don't think the final product was the ideal empowerment policy but you know sometimes to get something through you have to compromise, and it is actually a lot of compromise on this and that and so on, but we were very pleased that we could get the policy through.
>
> (Interview, former official of MWCD, February 2007)

The National Policy for the Empowerment of Women explicitly provided for the inclusion of organizations from the *women's movement* as non-government representatives on national and state councils envisaged to monitor the operationalisation of the policy (GoI, 2001). International fora also provided a significant space for feminist mobilization among the women's movement in India. The importance of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 for providing a space for the women's movement to renew old demands on the Indian state and make new ones, cannot be underestimated. Nearly all the initiatives undertaken in the 1990s drew on the Beijing framework of 1995, or made reference to it for purposes of legitimizing new policy. For example, several members of the Think Tank involved in the Engendering Five Year Plans initiative were members of a nascent organisation called National Alliance of Women's

Organisations (NAWO), the establishment of which was a direct outcome of the mobilisation of the women's movement for the Beijing conference in 1995 (NAWO, 2000: iii). NAWO fully endorsed the goals and language of the Platform for Action. One of its objectives explicitly included working towards and monitoring the Beijing Platform for Action (NAWO, n.d.). In its Beijing+5 report, NAWO described the Beijing Platform for Action as a 'powerful framework and reference point' for different actors to 'advance the goals of equality, development and peace (2000: i). UN committees which review state government action under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Woman (CEDAW) have also provided an important forum for co-ordinated efforts of the women's movement to hold the Indian government accountable (although these have not been exclusively concerned with gender-equitable development). International agencies such as DFID, UNIFEM, and UNDP have played important facilitating roles in several of the mainstreaming initiatives.

Feminists that have sought to work within the state have also played important roles on the few occasions that these opportunities have become available. Vimala Ramachandran was one of a small number of individuals that came from outside of the government, from a university on a secondment and was invited with another colleague, Srilatha Batliwala, as specialists to work within government. Their task was to design a programme for women's adult education which would implement part of the new education policy aimed at education for women's equality. The programme they designed became known as the *Mahila Samakhya* programme. She strongly believes that feminist must engage with the state in order to bring about change, that 'women have to come into these [government] spaces and drive them from within' (interview, December 2007).

But for people like Vimala to be brought into the government space, the will from within government also needs to be there, as she explains.

> I think somewhere there is a sort of a realisation within the government that maybe certain things are better done by civil society organisations. But very often people in government do not know how to go about it. ...So it depends a lot on who is actually driving this within the government. You need a sensitive civil servant or you need a group of civil servants who are willing to drive this from within, and when that happens then it's possible to get people from outside to come into the government and work and go out again.
>
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

However, her experience in working from within and outside of government has led her to believe that working within government alone is not sufficient, and that it is important 'to have people with different skills who can leverage what they can do from different spaces' whether it be from within the government or outside. She suggests that it is the coming together of four groups - social activists, people within government, bilateral and multilateral donors, and the research and academic community – and of them working from their respective spaces that will bring about systemic change (interview, December 2007).

Part of the reluctance to engage with non-government specialists on gender and development issues has been the hostile relationship or 'inherent suspicion' between the state and the women's movement dating back to the 1970s when the feminist movement 'was essentially directed against the government' (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007. The state has been resistant to highly progressive civil society organisations: 'there's no doubt that the state always pulls back when civil society is very progressive and starts challenging the state too much and the state does tend to pull back' (interview with former MWCD official, February 2007). Despite this reluctance from the state, it is therefore encouraging that observers believe that civil society has had a 'huge impact...and still does' in the area of women, gender and development policy (ibid).

Ramachandran is quick to point out that the Women's Studies establishment in India has provided important resources to feminists engaging with the government (interview, December 2007). However, she is also concerned that the Women's Studies departments face a dilemma regarding their research agenda, a dilemma which derives mostly from funding constraints. The picture that emerges from the institutional politics of research is not encouraging for critical analyses of gendered development in India:

> the quality of research has come down in India...partly because over the last at least ten years, there is more commissioned research than independent research...A lot of the research is purely driven by the projects that they [organisations including bilateral and multilateral donors] are funding. So the whole world of commissioned research has actually squeezed institutions and there is very little money.
>
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

In an environment where gender-responsive development policy increasingly relies on gender expertise, this raises the crucial question of how the women's movement will be able to sustain efforts to engage the state to address feminist demands.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to outline the national context of state policy on women, gender and development. Gendered development discourses, as articulated through recent national planning discourse and gender mainstreaming initiatives that have taken place in India over the 1990s and beyond, have sought to foreground *women's* development, while recognising the different experiences of women to men, and have prescribed affirmative action strategies for women's development and empowerment based on their special category status and a 'politics of presence'.[55] However, this has ensured the continued segregation and compartmentalisation of women's issues. The emphasis on difference between women and men has also effectively homogenised the different experiences *among women* and *among men.* Ultimately, this has implications for the extent to which gender mainstreaming strategies can transform gendered norms within development discourse or whether they serve to entrench them. Furthermore, as a liberal model of redistribution might suggest, remnants of a welfarist approach to women are still evident, and deemed necessary as part of the government's recognition of the failure of growth processes to benefit 'special' (read excluded) groups. This allows the main growth model to remain unaltered, continuing the need for a welfarist approach to women. Yet ironically, simultaneously women are being made increasingly responsible for the nation's development. The state, in its varied forms, has resisted substantial change although the extent of this resistance and the form it has taken is complex. Also complex is the extent to which diversely positioned subjects and agents have been afforded agency as a result of the specificities of institutional norms and practices, and at times the opportunities for agency appear as highly contingent.

---

[55] This last aspect, that women need to be present in, and part of, governmental structures in order to change them, is consistent with Rai's (2003c) study of the National Commission for Women in India.

4 THE BROADER SOCIAL CONTEXT: A PROFILE AND HISTORY OF TWO INDIAN STATES

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed gendered development policy and gender mainstreaming initiatives at the national level. From this chapter onwards, the focus shifts to the sub-national level. This chapter is the first of four case study chapters which focus on two states in south India: Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. As a precursor to the following three chapters, the aim of this chapter is to introduce the two case study states and provide a comparative analysis of their *broader social context*, by exploring two related themes. Firstly, what does official data tell us about gender inequalities in the *socio-economic development* of each state, and how have independent analyses explained, supplemented, and/or contested these findings? In what ways are the implications for gender-equitable development policy concerns comparatively similar or different for the two states? Secondly, how have wider socio-political movements in each state in the post-Independence period treated the issue of gender (equality)? How has this treatment framed the possibilities for the articulation of feminist policy goals of gender equitable development? To what extent are these possibilities comparatively similar or different in each state? Underpinning these questions is the theoretical assumption that, through a logic of interdiscursivity, the broader social context partially determines the conditions of possibility for acceptable strategies for mainstreaming gender in development policy.

I argue that significant gendered development inequalities exist within and across the two case study states which dispels a more common perception that Andhra Pradesh is universally less 'developed' than Tamil Nadu, despite its lower status in many national indices of state level development, and also that Tamil Nadu's higher achievement in many development indicators do not necessarily also suggest a greater degree of gender equality and female autonomy as indicated by data on the sex ratio and falling fertility rates. I also argue that socio-political movements and debates in Andhra Pradesh offered more opportunities for the articulation of feminist demands compared to the more conservative context of neighbouring Tamil Nadu,

particularly because in the latter women were positioned more symbolically and in the former they were interpellated with more agency in movement discourse. However, opportunities in Andhra Pradesh were not realised, largely due to the manoeuvring of both statist and non-statist forces beyond the control of the women involved in these movements. Concerns of gender equality did not find prominence in the dominant post-Independent socio-political debates in these two states, or were transformed by their articulation in conservative or paternalist discourses. Furthermore, the ways in which women have been positioned as objects and subjects in the socio-political debates examined here are already familiar, and represent some commonly observed discursive limits on women's participation in cultural nationalist (TN) and left-based movements (AP), as well as the paternalist, co-optive, and politico-economic compulsions of the state (in both TN and AP).

In order to demonstrate these arguments, in the first half of the chapter I focus on indicators of gender inequality in areas of employment, literacy, population control, and the sex ratio. These issues, and the academic debates which accompany them, are highly complex and nuanced. The analysis presented in the first half of the chapter has to be understood against the backdrop of a more commonly perceived higher status for women in south India (and which also surfaced in several of the interviews I conducted, both in the case study states and in Delhi). One explanation for the commonly held view that women's status in south India[56], measured through indicators such as education, health, and female autonomy and mobility, is higher than in other regions of India, has been provided by Dyson and Moore's classic study. Their study drew upon anthropological studies to argue that endogamous kinship patterns (marrying within one's kinship group and place of birth) more common to south India accorded more status to women and enabled them to remain closer to their natal family, in contrast to exogamous marriage practices (marrying outside one's kinship group and place of birth) more common in north India (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 43-45). Patrilocality, a practice whereby women would relocate to their husband's/in-laws place of domicile after marriage, was therefore more significant under exogamous kinship patterns, as marrying outside of one's kin generally meant relocating further from a woman's natal village and her blood relatives, resulting in a higher dependence on her

---

[56] Defined as the four southern States of Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

affinal family (ibid). The control of women's sexuality, including through practices of seclusion (*purdah*), were also understood to be more common in the north than the south.

In contrast, the political economist Pranab Bardhan (1974, cited in Das, 1976: 140) offered an explanation based more on the gendered characteristics of regional differences in agrarian systems. He drew on observations from South East Asia to suggest that women's higher status in the south was related to the prevalence of female labour-intensive wet-rice cultivation as the dominant form of agriculture, compared to dry cereal agriculture favouring male ploughing labour in the north. The relatively higher importance in south India of labour typically assigned to women, such as weeding and transplanting, accorded a higher status to women in the south (Das, 1976: 138-140).

Yet, as Dyson and Moore themselves acknowledged, considerable differences exist within each region. Thus, this chapter begins from the premise that the north-south dichotomy, influential though it has been in explaining north/south regional differences in gender inequality, is not necessarily a helpful distinction for comparisons *between* southern States. I attempt to 'co-construct' (Sunderland, 2004) a complex and dynamic picture of gendered development inequalities in both states from conventional development indicators, supplementing official data with secondary research on gendered development in these two states. Given that my limited purpose is to provide a broad overview of these issues in the case study states, my discussion is necessarily brief and more general, but hopefully demonstrates some of the complexity and cross-cutting diverse interplay of how other inequalities intersect with gender inequality in important ways.

Observable changes brought about in the processes of economic development and growth suggest it is important to sustain efforts to understand how such processes are mutually constitutive of gender relations and the effects these changes might have on the latter. This is particularly relevant for the two states analysed here, given that both have been characterised as 'reform states' (Bajpai and Sachs, 1999; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34, n.12). As will be discussed below, several contributions in the volume by Kapadia (2002b) suggest that economic development, and its wider corollary, modernity, have evinced deleterious consequences for women and girls, exacerbating rather than eradicating gender inequalities in India. The second

half of the chapter explores how gender relations have been conceived in the dominant socio-historical trajectories of the two states. I examine (again, selectively) some important post-Independence socio-political debates in order to understand the historically contingent construction of gender relations and their implications for the articulation of gendered development discourse in AP and TN in the 1990s and beyond. In Tamil Nadu, I discuss the reconstituted articulation of gender in Tamil cultural nationalist discourse in the political discourse of one of the main political parties in the state, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK), as well as gendered characteristics of competing styles of populism in the DMK and its main rival political party the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) from the 1980s onwards. In AP, I focus on the participation of women in left-wing class-oriented struggles primarily in Telangana but also elsewhere in the state, as well as the well-documented women-led prohibition movement in the early 1990s.

The first half of this chapter draws extensively on government sources of statistical data, and I use this data cautiously bearing in mind the sensitivities which surround its production. Firstly, Foucauldian perspectives on biopolitics within liberal democracies in particular have sought to highlight how the production of knowledge about populations is a central function of modern government and acts as a governmental technology which serves as a tool to produce, shape, and control populations as objects of knowledge (Rose and Miller, 1992). Secondly, in India, processes of enumeration have assumed a particular postcolonial and historiographical significance in light of their emergence (or rather acceleration) under the British colonial state in the late 19th century (Kalpagam, 2000). The colonial census has been linked to contemporary communal divisions as a result of the sedimentation of religious identity through census enumeration categories (Appadurai, 1993).[57] Thirdly, increasing recognition has been given to how categories of measurement are themselves a reflection of the construction of policy issues as well as the imperfect and power-laden processes of data collection.

Despite these concerns, Indian feminists, like elsewhere, have been positioned in tension with both of these debates, in that many have demanded *more* not less statistical data, at the same time

---

[57] See Dudley-Jenkins (2003, especially Chapter 5) for a comparative discussion of census enumeration categories in the colonial and postcolonial periods and in relation to reservation policies. See Guha (2003) for a critique of census enumeration in colonial India.

questioning the assumptions which underpin conventional categories and the methods used for data analysis.[58] To some extent government statistical officers and census officials have attempted to address these issues; several initiatives took place from the mid-1990s to produce more gender-sensitive and gender-disaggregated categories and processes of enumeration including the sensitisation of census enumerators (GoI, 1995, 1999). As a result, the increase in female work participation rates in 2001 has been partially attributed to the 'better capture of women's work' during the 2001 Census (GoI, 2002b, 1996).[59]

Furthermore, analysing official data on gender and development remains important because it performs a descriptive function in the *symbolic self-representation of the Indian state*. Firstly, as Sunder Rajan argues, statistical data pertaining to the 'status of women' or 'gender equality' has served to *construct* the state's own self-representation in its relationship with women:

> '... "women" have served to describe the state, primarily via the index of their status. The "status of women" has served as a crucial signifier in different contexts... If in the early years the Indian state had deployed its role on behalf of women primarily to initiate "social reforms" in continuation of the colonial state's perceived mission of establishing civilisational modernity, or otherwise to rescue, reclaim, and rehabilitate them in the fervour of a nationalist identity politics, it is now called on to attend to the status of women as a matter of its accountability as a state, in the international arena.
>
> (Sunder Rajan, 2003: 3, my emphasis)

Sunder Rajan argues that the pervasive adoption of international indices of human development promoted by agencies such as the UN, combined with demands of the Indian women's movement and the national machinery for women, has persuaded the Indian state to recognise women's status as an issue on the state's agenda. Thus, in the postcolonial context, the pressure on the Indian state for accountability in both national and international arenas has '*shaped its*

---

[58] Feminist economists in India have endeavoured to highlight not only the *lack* of sex-disaggregated data, which serves to make both women and gender inequality invisible, but they have also drawn attention to the assumptions made in the process of data collection and analysis such as the lack of consultation of women in the census data collection process leading to their invisibility in such data, as well as what counts as 'work' or 'economic activity' and the subsequent undervaluing of women's subsistence and domestic activities when measuring the contribution of women to the economy (see for instance Jain, 1996; Prabhu et al., 1996; Kulshreshtha and Singh, 1996; Mehta, 1996; Mukherjee, 1996).This latter point is particularly important given the highly gendered division of labour in India.

[59] Prabhu et al (1996) also made this observation for the 1991 Census.

responsiveness and thereby shaped its self-representation in noticeable ways' (Sunder Rajan, 2003: 3, my emphasis).[60]

Secondly, the self-representation of the state has become more important at the *subnational* level in recent years, where policy changes at the centre since 1991 have created a competitive dynamic *between* states, so much that the self-representation of states becomes important. As Kennedy argues, 'it has become increasingly apparent that regional [state-level] political leaders are responding differently to the new policy space that the central government's liberalization programme has created' (Kennedy, 2004: 29). This 'new policy space' has 'created opportunities for states to assert greater autonomy in the formulation and implementation of their economic policies...[which has led] to increasingly overt inter-state competition' (Kennedy, 2004: 33). As a result of this competitive dynamic, state level governments have been pressed to demonstrate to private investors how they are investing in 'human infrastructure' in order to attract private investment, and the presence of an educated, skilled, and healthy workforce. The perceived widening of inter-state level disparities in conventional indicators of human development have enabled some states to benefit more than others. Yet, intra-state inequalities pose a problem for states concerned with their overall status and competitive position vis-à-vis other states, and policy discourse and policy instruments have ostensibly sought to target the 'most backward' districts of the state or the 'weaker sections' and concentrate development resources towards these regions and groups, in order to raise the state's aggregate indicators.

Thirdly, as discussed in the previous chapter, since the Government of India's Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) there has been a reorientation of the Indian state, at least at the national level in terms of its role in planning, requiring more effective targeting of polices to increase the

---

[60] The UNDP-facilitated initiative on developing State-level Human Development Reports (SHDR) in India which began in the mid 1990s has seen sixteen Indian states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi release their own SHDR (UNDP India, n.d.). These states are Madhya Pradesh (published in 1995, 1998, 2002), Karnataka (1999), Sikkim (2001), Himachal Pradesh (2002), Maharashtra (2002), Rajasthan (2002), Tamil Nadu (2003), Assam (2004), Gujarat (2004), Nagaland (2004), Punjab (2004), West Bengal (2004), Arunachal Pradesh (2005), Chhattisgarh (2005), Kerala (2005) and Orissa (2005). Delhi released its SHDR in 2006. As of 2007, Andhra Pradesh has yet to release a SHDR. SHDRs are just one example of the increasing demand for data on human development indicators. These reports include gender-disaggregated state-level data on human development indicators such as education, employment, and health; some have compiled gender development indices and gender empowerment indices, and some have a separate chapter on gender equality and empowerment. UNDP India claim that these reports 'serve as platforms for public accountability and action' (ibid).

efficiency of its interventions. This impetus implies the need for increased knowledge of target populations, particularly as the social sectors remain a key focus of the state's continued role in planning. Intra-state inequality is again important and becomes the object of more efficient policy interventions. Indeed, one of the main recommendations of the GoTN Human Development Report 2003 was in fact to suggest that '[i]ntra-state disparities in human development can be mitigated to a large extent only if resources are allocated keeping in view the extent of deprivation. In the future, allocation of resources to social sectors should be higher in districts which have low HDI and GDI values' (GoTN, 2003b: 137).

Informed by these important discussions, in the next section I proceed to co-construct a comparative profile of gendered development inequalities in TN and AP, and conclude with a discussion of the implications for gender equitable development policy.

4.2 Gendered inequalities in socio-economic development in two States

4.2.1 Gender equality and development: policy debates

Gender and employment

Debates on gender and employment in India, with regard to gender equality concerns for development policy, often revolve around three main themes. The first concerns the extent to which women's increased employment serves a primary purpose as a mean for women's equality and empowerment, and a secondary purpose of increased and more beneficial income expenditure on the household (an assumption which is often used as a justification for increasing employment opportunities for women and the chance to earn an *independent* income). According to a WID perspective, women's participation in the labour market is understood as having mostly positive and empowering effects (Swaminathan, 2002). These include increased women's agency through augmenting her social standing and increasing her voice within the family, as a result of her ability to provide economically for the family and her reduced dependence on the household (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 246). Thus, statistics showing increases in work participation rates among women are sometimes interpreted as an indicator of higher female autonomy. This contrasts sharply with the position that women's entry into the labour force is as a result of economic necessity and thus an upward trend in work participation rates among women signifies a more

negative phenomenon of a reduced capacity to meet consumption needs. The assumption of positive secondary effects arising as a result of women's increased labour force participation, include increased household expenditure on child nutrition and health care. These assumptions have some empirical grounding, but are often based on the problematic concept of 'maternal altruism' in economic discourse (Kabeer, 1994) which exacerbates the already embedded expectation that domestic management of the household is largely the responsibility of women. Again, in contrast, women's entry into the labour force might instead take place as a result of a reduction in household income.

The second debate concerns the way in which women's work is made invisible, is insufficiently captured in statistical measurement exercises, and is undervalued by these exercises through the categories they use to determine what counts as work. The Census of India definition of work includes 'any economically productive activity with or without compensation, wages or profit...including part time help or unpaid work on farm, family enterprise or in any other economic activity' (GoI, 2005a). Since 1981, the Census of India has further classified workers using two categories, main and marginal. The definition of a main worker is having undertaken no less than six months' work in the twelve months preceding the census survey period; a marginal worker is defined as having undertaken less than six months work in the preceding twelve months. However, 'persons engaged in daily household chores like cooking, cleaning utensils, looking after children, fetching water etc' are classified as non-workers (ibid).

Thus, the intermittent character of women's paid employment combined with their domestic subsistence-based responsibilities mean that women oscillate between the status of worker and non-worker. The result is that women are overwhelmingly classified as marginal workers. This is despite the fact that they often work longer hours than their male counterparts, as Time Use studies have shown, which suggest *inter alia* that women's unpaid domestic work constitutes a shadow subsidy to the household economy.[61] I have already noted above that significant efforts have taken place in the Indian context to address this second debate by sensitising census

[61] Other non-workers include students, dependents such as infants and the elderly, not included as workers, pensioners, 'beggars, vagrants [and prostitutes', prisoners, those officially seeking work, and others deemed as not working (GoI, 2005a).

enumerators and that small successes have been achieved on this front, but much still remains to be done.

The third debate concerns whether economic growth and development processes provide beneficial employment opportunities for women, as well as whether these opportunities are accompanied by a corresponding investment for women's education and vocational and professional training. While some argue that economic development in India has brought new employment opportunities for women, and despite evidence that suggests employment growth has been low in the first decade since the economic reforms were undertaken, research has shown that new opportunities have not always been straightforwardly liberating (see for instance the collection by Mukhopadhyay and Sudarshan, 2003).

The consolidated move towards liberalisation in the early 1990s was met with some trepidation from many left-leaning Indian feminist economists. Marxist writers and socialist feminists highlighted the most harmful effects of women's participation concerning the concentration of women in the informal sector and the increasing 'feminisation' of employment in both traditional (agricultural) sectors, where male agricultural labour seek out non-agricultural forms of employment and employers favour the lower wages and more disciplined labour of women (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999), and more modern (and modernising) sectors such as factory work which favours the more docile temperament and 'nimble fingers' of women workers (Chakravarty, 2004; Elson and Pearson, 1981). Research has sought to document the concentration of women in low paid, low skilled employment, with high levels of employment insecurity and casualisation of work contracts, and poor working conditions, to suggest that gendered labour market inequalities have not receded in the process of economic development and modernisation in India, with some forms remaining persistent or becoming reconfigured while new forms emerge. Particularly worrying for some are the observed increases in female child and adolescent labour in India associated with new employment opportunities, with implications for educational achievement (Majumdar, 2001: cited in Swaminathan, 2002: 119).

Thus, more understanding is needed of the form and quality of the new employment opportunities open to women emerging through processes of economic development, their potentially harmful effects on women, and the capacity and willingness of the state to invest in

educational and vocational training for women and provide support services such as occupational health and child care (which is largely designated as the responsibility of women) to enable women to take advantage of these new opportunities if, when, and where they exist.[62]

Gender and education

Gender inequality in demand for school education is most simply explained as a result of gendered social role expectations and the perceived comparative worth of educating boys and girls. Firstly, where girls are expected to grow to become housewives and mothers, social expectations ensure that a girl's education is undervalued (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 161-2). Secondly, the practice of patrilocality in much of north India also means that the investment in a daughter's education will be transferred to the affinal family upon marriage. Thirdly, social practices commonly dictate a bride should be of equal or lower educational background than their groom; thus 'female education can turn into a liability..."over-educating" a daughter may make her more difficult – and expensive – to marry' (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 162). Thus, the prevalence of such social practices and beliefs mean that education for girls is less desirable than for boys, particularly if this involves making a decision about whether to educate sons or daughters. As a result, females generally record lower literacy rates, lower levels of educational attainment, lower enrolment ratios and higher drop out rates, particularly for educational levels beyond primary school.

Gender inequalities also intersect significantly with other educational inequalities. Poverty is also an important factor. Among lower income groups, lower literacy rates, lower levels of educational attainment, and poor attendance and higher drop-out rates of girls is explained by poverty – that by sending a daughter to school is denying the income or unpaid labour (such as caring for elderly members or younger siblings) she could be contributing to the household. Thus, elder daughters in particular may receive a lower level of schooling than their younger siblings (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 157). The social status of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes often limit access to educational opportunities as a result of social discrimination as well as poverty. Rural areas also suffer from lower educational achievement due to poorer educational

---

[62] Also relevant to this study are the implications of assumptions regarding poor women's time elasticity and their involvement with government poverty alleviation programmes which are often time-intensive.

infrastructure, proximity to schools, and higher teacher absenteeism in rural areas, which exacerbates the lower demand for education.

Supply-side factors which affect the demand for school education include affordability, accessibility, and quality of schooling (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 159). S upply-side failures in educational infrastructure impact female children more than male children because parents are less likely to forego the additional expenditure for private education for their daughters or to send their daughters to school outside of the village (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 161). Measures to increase the participation of girls in school education include subsidising girls schooling, reducing the distance to schools, providing a mid day meal, and installing toilets for girls, particularly in rural areas where they are often absent (Basu, 1999: 151). Furthermore, an important demand from the women's movement has been for educational authorities to address gender stereotypes in school curriculum textbooks and teaching practices (Patel, 1998).

Policy initiatives to increase the educational development of women and girls are driven by both intrinsic and instrumental motives; intrinsic for valuing the importance of women and girls education for its own sake, and instrumental for the perceived link female education has to lower fertility rates, lower child mortality rates, and higher child nutrition (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 39). The prevalence of conservative attitudes on gender inequalities in educational achievement as well as demographic obsession of population growth ensures that the fertility argument is a far more influential argument for women's education than, say, women's technical education and training for employment in the modernising economy (Swaminathan, 2002).

Gender inequality and the sex ratio

In India, the sex ratio, calculated as the number of females per 1,000 males, has been used in official and non-official statistical studies as a key indicator of the status of women vis-a-vis men. For many, the unfavourable sex ratio of proportionately fewer females to males, has served as an indicator of discriminatory societal practices which favour boys over girls, and men over women, including a widespread preference for sons rather than daughters, a favourable allocation of nutrition, education, and attention to the health of males often to the neglect of females, and even deliberate strategies of female deprivation commonly termed female infanticide and female

foeticide (often as a result of sex-selective abortion made possible by amniocentesis tests). These practices have resulted in the phenomenon of 'missing women' (Drèze and Sen, 2002; Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997).

The significance of low sex ratios lies partly in its appearance in areas of south India, a region where it had hitherto not been prevalent. Discriminatory practices attributed as causes of the unfavourable sex ratio were thought by some to be 'traditional practices' which would wither away during processes of modernisation. More recent research and theorising on the decline in the *child* sex ratio in a direction unfavourable to females even in high income states has suggested that such a decline must be seen as an *integral part* of economic development (Kapadia, 2002a; Swaminathan, 2002; Harriss-White, 2001). Studies have sought to delink the notion that discriminatory practices are in some way determined in a linear pattern by levels of economic deprivation and poverty, noting that some of the more economically 'developed' states such as Haryana and Punjab have some of the lowest sex ratios (in 2001, 861 and 876 respectively), whereas conversely, the State of Kerala has a low per capita income (relative to other states) but has the highest sex ratio among major states (1058 in 2001). Increasingly consumerist-oriented dowry practices which serve as a means for capital accumulation and economic upward mobility have intensified discrimination towards the girl child.[63] Kapadia's argument exemplifies this perspective:

> In relation to the new market economy, [dowry] emerges as an adaptive socio-economic strategy, intended to access a new source of capital and to assist class mobility in an increasingly mobile and competitive economy.... In relation to the processes of the making of modern selves, "dowry" emerges as a central diacritic of the recent, radical appreciation in the social value of men and the corresponding radical devaluation of women.
>
> (Kapadia, 2002a: 170)

Thus, Kapadia emphasises the importance of rethinking the practice of dowry not as a 'traditional' practice, but as an intrinsic part of modernity and modernisation, and therefore not something which is likely to be eradicated easily.

---

[63] Caplan (1985) emphasizes the distinction between consumer-oriented dowry (gifts such as cash, white goods, or even a car or moped) and the traditional '*stridhanam*' (such as gold bangles), the latter of which served as a pre-mortem inheritance given by the parents to the bride which was kept by the bride and only converted into cash in dire need. It is the former, and not *stridhanam*, that has been commonly denounced as 'the social evil of dowry', but is still widely practiced (Caplan, 1985: 45-8).

> This is why policy makers and social reformers cannot expect that "dowry" is going to disappear as India "modernises". This is a forlorn hope, because in the popular imaginary, "dowry" *is* modernity. It is the quintessential modernity because it provides the fast track to class mobility. The capital transfer embodied in "dowry" is the single largest sum of money that most men will receive in their entire lives. In a nation-state that is hurtling towards high capitalism as fast as it can, "dowry" is "necessary" to every man, because those men who don't receive it are left behind.
>
> (Kapadia, 2002a: 164)

4.2.2 Tamil Nadu

Background

Tamil Nadu is one of two southernmost states in India, with the other, Kerala, to the west, and two other southern states, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, to the north and northwest respectively (see Figure 3 below). During the pre-Independence period, parts of what is now known as Tamil Nadu State formed the Madras Presidency, a province of British India. After Independence, the Madras Presidency became Madras State, and incorporated areas of former princely states while ceding some districts to other newly forming States, with a final reorganization of state boundaries in 1956 according to linguistic criteria (co-terminous with Tamil speaking areas in the case of TN). Madras State was later renamed Tamil Nadu (meaning 'Tamil country') in 1968.

Tamil Nadu recorded a population of just over 62 million in the most recent Census in 2001. It is the sixth most populous state in India. Tamil's Nadu's success in limiting population growth rates and fertility rates in the 1980s and 1990s and increasing rates of acceptance for contraceptive methods such as intrauterine devices (IUDs), has been lauded by government officials and some demographers, and praised for its non-coercive and co-operative character. Yet a number of studies have sought to contest the notion that the success in reducing fertility rates has been as co-operative as suggested by these evaluations (Van Hollen, 1998; Swaminathan, 2002). Van Hollen's research suggested that in urban-based government hospitals, contraceptive targets were achieved through practices such as routine IUD insertion, which was frequently non-consensual and without the knowledge of patients (estimated as high as 65 per cent for patients following their first delivery) (Van Hollen, 1998: 103). Success in fertility

Figure 3 Location of the State of Tamil Nadu in India (left) and District Map of Tamil Nadu (right)



Source: Adapted from www.mapsofindia.com
Notes: Borders are unofficial. Maps are not to scale.

control programmes in the past has also been facilitated by the high proportion of institutional delivery in Tamil Nadu (Van Hollen, 1998).[64]

As of 2007, the State is made up of thirty districts, including Chennai, the State capital, which is the only district classified as 100 per cent urban in the State. Tamil Nadu is the most urbanized among the major States in India, with an urban population of 44 per cent.[65] The population density of the State is above the national average. Scheduled Caste members make up nearly one fifth of the population, a higher proportion than at the all-India level. The government identifies 76 different Scheduled Caste groups in the state, with the five most numerically large SC groups making up nearly 94 per cent of the state's SC population: Adi Dravidas (46 per cent), Pallan (19 per cent), Paraiyan (16 per cent), Chakkiliyan (7 per cent) and Arunthathiyar (7 per cent). Thiruvarur district has the highest proportion of Scheduled Caste members to the total population (32.4 per cent), while Kanyakumari district has the lowest (4 per cent). More than two thirds of Scheduled Caste members live in rural areas, with variations between different Scheduled Caste groups. In contrast, Scheduled Tribes are a much smaller minority, particularly compared to the all-India level, at only 1 per cent of the population. The Census of India identified 36 different Scheduled Tribes in Tamil Nadu, with the five most numerical making up more than 85 per cent of the state's ST population: these are Malayali (48 per cent), Irular (24 per cent), Kattunayakan (7 per cent), Kurumans (4 per cent) and Kondareddis (3 per cent). STs are concentrated in six districts of the state, Salem, Tiruvannamalai, Villupuram, Vellore, Dharmapuri, and Namakkal. The rural-urban ratio differs markedly among different groups: for the most part STs reside in rural areas with the exception of Kattunayakans, of whom nearly two thirds reside in urban areas. Hindus form the majority religious group in the State (88.1 per cent), followed by Christians (6.1 per cent) and Muslims (5.6 per cent).[66] Tamil is the predominant language spoken in the State (87 per cent of the population), followed by Telugu (7.1 per cent) and Kannada (2.2 per cent) (figures from Census of India, 1991).

---

[64] Tamil Nadu has the second highest proportion of institutional deliveries among major states after Kerala, including more than 90 per cent of urban deliveries (National Family Health Survey data for 1998-99 cited in GoI, 2002c: 248).

[65] This large increase from 34 per cent in 1991 is mostly a result of a reclassification of rural areas as urban areas (GoTN, 2003b: 5, n.3).

[66] There are also small minority religious groups of Jains (0.13%), Buddhists (0.01%), and Sikhs (0.02%).

Economic Development, Human Development, and Poverty

The Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy ranks Tamil Nadu second in the country for quality of infrastructure facilities and third for Foreign Direct Investment approval (GoTN, 2003b: 7). TN is also one of the most industrialized states in India, second only to Maharashtra in terms of manufacturing contribution to Net State Domestic Product (GoTN, 2003b: 6). Tamil Nadu ranks sixth in the country in per capita income (Rs. 23,358) after Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, Gujarat and Kerala (GoI, 2007b: Table 18).[67] Prior to the 1990s, per capita income was below the national average, until 1991-92, and has remained above the national average since (GoTN, 2003b: 8). The service sector in TN is the largest contributor to Net State Domestic Product, followed by the manufacturing and agricultural (and allied) sectors. Manufacturing and service sectors each contribute more to Net State Domestic Product than agriculture, with the latter's share of the economy declining over a number of decades. However, nearly two thirds of the state's population still depend on agriculture for their livelihood (GoTN, 2003b).

Following a sharp decline in the last two decades, the average percentage of people below the poverty line in Tamil Nadu is now lower than the all-India average (21% compared to 26% all India). Yet considerable intra-state inequalities remain. Poverty is higher among Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households, and higher in urban compared to rural areas (GoTN, 2003b: 35).

Gender and employment[68]

The data for TN follows some trends at the national level: more men are recorded as workers than women; proportionately more women are classified as marginal workers than men; and work participation rates are higher in rural areas than urban areas. On the other hand, some important differences in gender and employment patterns between TN and the national level can

---

[67] This is based on a comparison among major States defined as those with a population over 10 million. According to the Tamil Nadu Human Development Report, published in 2003 and which based its per capita income data on 2000-01 figures, Tamil Nadu was ranked fourth among major States and first among southern States. More recent figures for 2003-04 show that both Gujarat and Kerala have surpassed Tamil Nadu in per capita income, although the position of both these states relative to Tamil Nadu in terms of per capita income has fluctuated during the 1990s and 2000s.

[68] Data on gender and employment in TN compared to all-India is presented in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10. All data for this chapter unless otherwise stated is presented in Appendix II – Tables for Gendered Development Indicators (Supplementary to Chapter 4).

be observed. Work participation rates in TN for both males and females are higher than the national average (particularly for urban males). As well as higher work participation rates, the higher proportion of women workers classified as *main* as opposed to *marginal* workers suggests women's employment particularly in urban areas in Tamil Nadu is more often regular rather than casual compared to the national level (a similar pattern can be observed for males but is not so marked).

Trends during the 1990s suggest that the regularity of employment for workers is shifting from main to marginal status. During the period 1991 to 2001, the proportion of both male and female main workers actually *declined*, and this decline was more marked among male main workers. The category of urban female workers was the only main worker category to witness an increase in employment. This decline in main workers was offset by employment growth for marginal workers, seen by the increase in women's (and men's) marginal employment. Thus, census data on work participation suggests a general trend towards a casualisation of employment during the period 1991-2001.

Female workers are generally more occupationally concentrated than their male counterparts. While the proportion of workers classified as agricultural labourers in TN is higher than the national average for both male and female workers, this is particularly noticeable for female rural workers. Female rural agricultural labourers are not merely a noticeably larger majority of all female workers in rural areas (more than half) compared to their male counterparts (just over a third); remarkably, given that the ratio of female to male workers overall is roughly 40:60, female rural agricultural labourers actually *outnumber* male rural agricultural labourers, with an inverse ratio of 60:40. Female workers also make up a larger proportion of household industry workers. Where opportunities exist, research suggests that women prefer work in factories as it is regular and accords them higher status than agricultural work or household industry work.

Studies have documented significant gendered inequalities in wage rates in TN, even where such work demands a similar level of skill (Harriss-White, 2004a). The poor implementation of the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976 combines with its inadequate attention to the highly segregated gendered division of labour activities in its conception of equal pay for equal work and ensures the persistence of gendered wage inequalities. Geetha's study of women workers in the

construction industry and Dietrich's study of women workers in the fishing industry in TN suggests that hard-won industry-specific legislation at the State level to protect informal sector workers does not adequately address the causes of poor working conditions and low wages of informal workers, particularly for women (Geetha, 1990; Dietrich, 1995).

Gender and education[69]

Literacy rates in TN are above the national average and the State compares favourably with other states in India on literacy rates, ranked third among major states after Kerala and Maharashtra. Following national trends, higher literacy rates can be observed in urban as opposed to rural areas, among males as opposed to females, and among the overall population as compared to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

The State has witnessed impressive increases in literacy over the last two decades, particularly in rural areas and for females, closing the differential between rural and urban areas and male and female literacy, although despite the former, *a higher reduction in the male-female disparity in literacy can be witnessed in urban areas, despite lower increases in literacy.* Female rural literacy levels remain low and the male-female disparity in literacy is highest in rural areas. Female literacy levels still vary more between rural and urban areas than do male literacy levels. Comparing gender inequalities in literacy *across districts* of the State also suggests large variations in gender inequality. Kannyakumari and Dharmapuri districts record the highest and lowest literacy rates for both males and females overall. However, female literacy rates have a far higher variance across districts (from 85% in 51%) than male literacy rates (which range from 90% to 72%). The disparity between male and female literacy rates is highest in Ariyalur district and lowest in Kannyakumari district.

Notwithstanding TN's overall high literacy levels, literacy among Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities is much lower, particularly for females. Increases in literacy over the period 1991-2001 have been lower for these groups than for the overall population, although the differential between male and female SC literacy is comparable to the same for all males and females, and slightly lower for STs.

---

[69] Data on gender and education in TN and all-India are presented in Table 11, Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14.

Beyond achievements in literacy, gender inequalities in education can also be observed in levels of educational participation and achievement (measured by enrolment ratios, dropout ratios, and completed stages of formal education; see Table 13 and Table 14). Census data for Tamil Nadu suggests that fewer females compared to males complete higher stages of education from the Secondary stage onwards. The implications for female skilled employment in Tamil Nadu are significant; as Swaminathan suggests, 'literacy and the completion of some basic education no longer guarantees a place in the labour force...[E]mployers begin to require higher levels of attainment for the same jobs' (Swaminathan, 1994: 73). The lower level of educational attainment of women may exacerbate existing gender-based discrimination in the labour market as educational standards of recruitment increase.

The much lauded Chief Minister's Noon Meal Scheme, first launched under the government of the former Chief Minister MG Ramachandran in July 1982, aimed to 'increase enrolment in schools and reduce dropouts' by providing a nutritious meal for all children at lunchtime (GoTN, 2002-03, cited in Swaminathan et al., 2004: 4811). Studies of the scheme present evidence of the dubious quality and quantity of the food provided as part of the meal, questionable practices as regarding implementation and reporting, and wide variations in beneficiary experience of the scheme (Harriss-White, 2004b; Swaminathan et al., 2004). However, they do suggest that the scheme has encouraged enrolment and reduced dropouts even though this is by no means universal across all categories.

Gender inequality and the sex ratio[70]

The sex ratio for TN is above the national average, for all ages (987) and 0-6 years of age (942) among the overall population, and for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For these latter two groups, compared to the State average, the sex ratio is more favourable for females among Scheduled Castes (999) than Scheduled Tribes (980). Both have improved since the Census of 1991. Census data shows the SC child sex ratio (959) is higher than both the state child sex ratio for the overall population and the national child sex ratio for SCs. The SC child sex ratio in TN also shows considerable diversity among different SC groups, with the lowest among

[70] Data on the sex ratio in TN and all-India are presented in Table 15.

Arunthathiyars (928), who are relatively more urbanised compared to other SC groups. Among STs, the child sex ratio in Tamil Nadu at 945 is markedly lower than the national average for STs of 945, but is slightly higher than the state child sex ratio for the overall population (942). This differs markedly among the major ST groups with the Irulars having the highest child sex ratio at 984 and the Kondareddis having a considerably lower at 859. Sex ratios are lower in urban areas, compared to rural areas. Census data suggests that since 1901 the sex ratio in TN has seen a long-term decline in a direction unfavourable to females, decreasing sharply until the 1970s, with a more moderate decline thereafter until 1991. The State has subsequently recorded an increase in 2001, suggesting a significant change in a long-term trend.

The child sex ratio is far below the state average for all ages, and is prominently lower than its own state average 'in a contiguous belt of districts running south to north along a western corridor of the state' (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4345). Salem district, in Tamil Nadu has the most unfavourable sex ratio in the State for the 0-6 age group, at 811 (for rural areas). Disturbingly, Salem district has the second lowest district child sex ratio for *rural* areas *in the country* (GoI, 2003: 4).[71] Moreover, it is the only district in a State other than from Haryana or Punjab to feature in the bottom ten districts in the country for low child sex ratios. Both the Government of India and census data analysts have drawn attention to the alarming decline in the 0-6 child sex ratio in both urban and rural areas, but noting especially the larger decline in *urban* areas (GoI, 2003: 3). A number of ground level studies have noted the increasing acceptance of female infanticide and female foeticide in TN (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000; Harriss-White, 2001; Kapadia, 2002a). Specifically on the growing practice of female foeticide in urban TN, Athreya and Chunkath explain,

> There is considerable anecdotal evidence of the spread of the practice of female foeticide to several medium and large towns in Tamil Nadu. Increasingly female foeticide is coming to be perceived as a viable option in semi-rural areas around the urban periphery, and in the urban areas proper.
>
> (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4348)

Significantly they attribute this phenomenon in part to the government propagation of a small family norm in TN, which combines with the 'prevailing socio-cultural ethos of strong son

---

[71] This ranking, presented in GoI (2003), was based on provisional population totals from the Census of India 2001, and Salem's rural sex ratio was estimated at only 763. A revised ranking based on final population totals has not been published by the Government of India.

preference', to threaten the survival of females of higher birth orders (Athreya and Chunkath 2000: 4348).

Figure 4 Spatial concentration of below state average child sex ratios in Tamil Nadu, 2001

Source: Adapted from www.mapsofindia.com

The Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) funded project implemented by the Government of Tamil Nadu during the late 1990s focused on practices of female infanticide using a strategy of social mobilisation. Athreya and Chunkath's study of primary health centre

records suggests that the DANIDA project did help to reduce incidences of female infanticide in Dharmapuri (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4347). However, they warn that 'there is no room for complacency...[T]he one-shot mobilisation effort needs to be followed up by [the] creation and sustenance of grass roots structures that would be constantly active in the struggle against female infanticide', in which proactive government involvement is critical (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4348).

4.2.3 Andhra Pradesh

Background

The State of Andhra Pradesh is another of the four southern States of India, bordered by the States of Tamil Nadu to the South, Karnataka to the west, Maharashtra to the north, and Chhattisgarh and Orissa to the northeast (see Figure 5 below). In 2001, the State recorded a population of over 76.1 million (Census 2001 figures). It is the fifth most populous state in India, after Uttar Pradesh (166 million), Maharashtra (97 million), Bihar (83 million), and West Bengal (80 million). The decennial population growth rate was lower than the national average, and special mention of AP's 'remarkable fall in fertility and decadal growth rate during the 1990s' was made in the Government of India's Tenth Five Year Plan (GoI, 2002d: Vol. 2 Ch.2: 167).

At Independence, the Nizam of Hyderabad ceded his princely state of Hyderabad, which was formerly under the partial rule of the British (through the system of Paramountcy), to the newly formed Union Government of India. Telugu-speaking districts of northern Madras State seceded in 1953 to form Andhra State. Andhra Pradesh State came into being later in 1956, when the majority Telugu-speaking area of Hyderabad State was combined with Andhra State, as part of the linguistic reorganisation of States in India (mentioned above).

Analysts often divide the state into three distinct regions: coastal Andhra, Rayalseema, and Telangana, to reflect the different historical trajectories of these areas, their agro-climatic characteristics and levels of development.[72] AP is administratively divided into twenty three districts, with its capital of Hyderabad, classified as a district which is 100 per cent urban. The state average population density of AP is below the national average.

The proportion of Scheduled Caste members to the total population is the same as at the national level (16.2%). Members of the Scheduled Castes are most numerous in East Godavari district in coastal Andhra, but are most concentrated in Nellore district in the south of AP. Scheduled Tribe members make up nearly 7% of the population of AP, slightly below the national average. The Census of India 2001 identified 59 Scheduled Caste groups among whom four were most numerically dominant making up nearly 94 per cent of the SC population: Madiga (49 per cent), Mala (42 per cent), Adi Dravida (2 per cent) and Adi Andhra (1 per cent). Members of the Scheduled Tribes are more geographically concentrated than Scheduled Castes, and are found most in Khammam district, constituting more than a quarter of that district's population (Census 2001 data). Visakhapatnam, Warangal, Adilabad, and Nalgonda districts are also home to large numbers of STs. The Census of 2001 registered 33 different Scheduled Tribes, with the five most numerical making up 76 per cent of the Scheduled Tribe population: Sugalis (41 per cent), Koya (11 per cent), Yenadis (9 per cent), Yerukulas (9 per cent), and Gond (5 per cent). While the majority of Scheduled Tribes in AP live in rural areas (more than 92 per cent) this differs among different groups.

Hindus are the largest religious group in AP (with a majority above the national average), followed by Muslims and Christians. Nearly a quarter of AP's Muslim population live in the State's capital Hyderabad, where they constitute more than two fifths of Hyderabad residents.

---

[72] The three regional demarcations encompass the following districts: coastal Andhra consists of Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vishakapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam, and Nellore; Telangana consists of Hyderabad, Rangareddy, Mahabubnagar, Medak, Nalgonda, Nizamabad, Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal and Khammam; and Rayalseema consists of Chittoor, Cuddapah, Anantapur, and Kurnool. Occasionally, analysts have further divided coastal Andhra and Telangana into northern and southern areas of each region, and considered Hyderabad separately, demarcating six distinct regions of AP in total, and for similar purposes - to distinguish the varying experience of agrarian and industrial development in these regions (see for example Subrahmanyam (2003)).

Figure 5 Location of the State of Andhra Pradesh in India (left) and District Map of Andhra Pradesh (right)



Source: Adapted from www.mapsofindia.com
Notes: Borders are unofficial. Maps are not to scale.

Telugu is the predominant language of AP, followed by Urdu and then Hindi (figures from Census of India 1991). Telugu is the third most commonly spoken language in the country (8% of India's population), after Hindi (40%) and Bengali (8%), reflecting the fact that Telugu is also among the major languages spoken in Karnataka (7.4%), Tamil Nadu (7.1%), and Orissa (1.6%) (Census of India, 1991).

Economic Development, Human Development and Poverty[73]

In 2003-04, Andhra Pradesh ranked fourth among major States for Net State Domestic Product, just in front of TN, but seventh among major States in per capita income, just behind TN (GoI, 2007b). Growth in Gross State Domestic Product in AP for 2005-06 to 2006-07 was lower than the national average, due to negative growth rates in agriculture (GoAP, 2007b).

The tertiary sector contributes the largest share of Gross State Domestic Product, followed by primary and secondary sectors. The primary sector in AP has a larger share than the secondary sector, unlike at the national level. Since 1999-2000, the share of the tertiary sector has increased, with the primary sector's share declining, and the secondary sector staying constant (GoAP, 2007b). The primary sector registered negative growth in 2006-07, mostly due to negative growth rates in agriculture.

In 1991, the State ranked eleventh among major States on human development (GoI, 2002c). Poverty in AP is lower than the national average and declined at a much faster rate than at the national level, over the period 1983 to 1999-2000 (GoI, 2002c). This was largely a result of the sharp decline in rural poverty; urban poverty actually increased slightly during the period 1983 to 1993-94.

Gender and employment[74]

Like at the national level, male work participation rates are higher than those for women, but both in AP are higher than the national average, particularly for male urban workers. Women in

[73] Data on economic development, human development, and poverty in AP and all-India are presented in Table 17 and Table 18.
[74] Data on gender and employment in AP is presented in Table 19 and Table 20.

AP have some of the highest female WPRs in the country. District variations in female WPRs are significant, particularly in rural areas rising from 24 per cent in rural East Godavari district to 51 per cent in rural Vizianagram district.

Agricultural labourers in AP constitute 40 per cent of all workers, and nearly one half of all workers in rural areas. More than half of all female workers in AP are agricultural labourers (rising to more than 60 per cent in rural areas). Furthermore, women make up more than half of all household industry workers, representing a far higher presence in this sector compared with their proportion as workers overall. In addition to their concentration in agricultural labour, female employment is far more occupationally concentrated than male employment.

While male workers are overwhelmingly classified as *main* workers, female employment in AP is characterised by *marginal* worker status. In some cases, female marginal workers *outnumber* male marginal workers. This is particularly marked in rural areas and in sectors such as household industries (75% female and 25% male marginal workers) and factory work (manufacturing non-household industry; 53% female and 47% male).

Gender inequalities are also manifest in indicators of child labour in AP; the rural 5-14 years age category is the only category of *main* workers in which females *outnumber* males (GoAP, 2006: 47). There are more females than males in marginal worker category for all age groups in both rural and urban areas.

Research on female work participation rates in AP suggests that women constitute a reserve army of labour, with a 'rise in the rates of work participation of females during bad weather years to supplement family incomes and their withdrawal from the labour market when the crops are good' (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 811). In contrast, in a study of women and agricultural labour in AP, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) suggest that

> those women performing agricultural labour worked more days annually than men, that is, not merely working at seasonal peaks (as was the norm for women) but on a continual basis...Indeed, we found that, on average, women perform 2.7 times as much outside agricultural labour as men.
>
> (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 97)

They also suggest three important explanations for women's increasing employment in agricultural work, the first of which has to do with the gendered division of labour and the classification of agricultural activities designated as exclusively female (such as weeding and transplanting), joint work (such as seed preparation), and exclusively male (such as ploughing with bulls), and the differential wage rates attached to male and female tasks (ibid: 97). Changes in the gendered division of labour mean that activities previously designated as exclusively male are becoming designated as joint work, as well as some joint work becoming exclusively female. Because of the increasing entry of women into joint work, these activities are increasingly being seen as women's work, resulting in downward pressures in wage rates. Men are thus being deterred from low wage joint work, thus further increasing the feminisation of this category of agricultural labour (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 102).

Secondly, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu suggest that the lower wage rates for joint work in farm work are only one reason driving male agricultural labourers to look to opportunities for work in the growing off-farm sector, which offers higher wages, meaning that women are taking over some of the labour that men were performing previously (ibid: 103). Thus, women's employment in agricultural labour is increasing as a result of the exit of male workers from this category of employment.

Thirdly, and perhaps more substantially, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu suggest that women agricultural labourers are becoming increasingly responsible for household income through increasingly 'unfree' labour relations with their employers. This shift is taking place against the backdrop of the breakdown of traditional agrarian patronage relationships between higher landowning and lower labouring castes, as a result of the increasing assertion of male agricultural labourers against tied labour, in favour of better working conditions and wage rates in agricultural labour. Male labourers 'refuse offers of agricultural wage work in attempt to express their contempt for employers who attempt to impose on them the same onerous conditions associated with traditional bondage, such as low/unpaid wages, insults and physical abuse while working in the fields...' (ibid: 105). However, the same male labourers have not prevented their wives from taking up the same work they refuse. Furthermore, particularly in

cases where they refuse work but do not find any alternative, they increasingly rely on the income of their wives to support the family (ibid: 108). As a result,

> ...women's greater responsibility for feeding the family [means that] they feel compelled to take up all offers of wage work, no matter how humiliating, which increases their unfreedom, reduces their actual wages received, increases real male female wage differentials and increases hours worked per day.
>
> (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 108)

In addition to these deteriorating labour conditions for women, women's increased responsibility for household consumption expenditure has increased their demands for small loans, and to re-establish the credit ties broken between employers (who also acted as creditors) and male labourers, women increasingly entered into tied labour arrangements (exchanging labour for credit) (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 110). Thus, Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu's study suggests that changes in the gendered division of labour in agriculture have benefited male labourers at the expense of female labourers, and that gender relations cut across class interests in this instance.

In the manufacturing sector in AP, research similarly demonstrates evidence of gender inequalities in employment practices. A study of garment manufacturing firms in Hyderabad and its environs found that, similar to landowners' preference for obedient and disciplined female labour (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 109-110), gendered recruiting preferences mean women are hired for their 'characteristic docility' and the lower likelihood of trade union organising (Chakravarty, 2004: 4912). Gendered inequalities in wage remuneration are also evident in manufacturing in Andhra Pradesh (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 816).

However, the different requirements of manufacturing work compared to agricultural labour reflect a different dimension of gender inequality in employment. Labour laws which prevent women from working during the night if the company cannot provide dedicated transport facilities for women to ensure their safety, mean that male workers often benefit from additional wages from piece rate work in export manufacturing firms, which characteristically demands overtime (Chakravarty, 2004: 4913). Both these examples challenge the wider assumption outlined earlier that the increased work participation of women in paid employment is beneficial and empowering for women.

Gender and education[75]

Census data for 2001 show that, overall, literacy rates in AP are below the national average, and the State ranks a low thirteenth among major States in India (but twelfth for female literacy). Literacy in AP follows some all-India trends. Higher literacy rates are observed for males compared to females. Females are more likely to have attained lower levels of schooling. Enrolment ratios beyond primary classes are generally lower for girls, and dropout ratios are higher for girls across all class levels. Gender inequalities in literacy are also intersected by district variations, lower literacy levels in rural compared to urban areas, and lower literacy levels among SCs and STs compared to the rest of the population. After the state capital of Hyderabad, the coastal district of West Godavari has the highest literacy overall and surpasses Hyderabad for female literacy, including SC and ST females. Mahbubnagar district registers the lowest literacy for the same groups. The largest gender differential in literacy rates is recorded in Cuddapah district (76% males and 50% females); the smallest differential is in coastal East Godavari district, (70% for males and 61% for females). District variations combine with intersectional variations within districts, exacerbating inequalities in literacy levels: compare, for instance, overall male literacy in Hyderabad (84%) to female Scheduled Tribe literacy in Mahbubnagar district (11%). However, increases in literacy rates in AP over the period 1991-2001 in both rural and urban areas and for males and females have been impressive (more so in the rural areas and for females). Higher increases in literacy for females have resulted in a marginal reduction in the differential between male and female literacy.

Gender inequality and the sex ratio

In 2001, the state–level sex ratio in AP, stood at 978 females per 1000 males, above the national average but still unfavourable to females. AP's sex ratio recorded an increase over the period 1991-2001, one which was also above the national average. Like that seen in Tamil Nadu and at the national level, the child sex ratio, at 961 is lower than that for all ages, *except in rural areas.* Interestingly it is higher than that in TN. The sex ratio for all ages among all districts in AP is

[75] Data on literacy rates for AP compared to all-India are presented in Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25.

lowest in Hyderabad and highest in Nizamabad. The sex ratio for Scheduled Castes is slightly higher than the state average at 981, but lower than the state average for Scheduled Tribes, at 972, and both have increased in a direction favourable to females since 1991. Like the average sex ratio for the state, the SC sex ratio has increased since 1991. Hyderabad and Nizamabad are again the districts with the lowest and highest sex ratios for SCs and STs. Scheduled Castes in AP have higher sex ratios than the national average for Scheduled Castes, and this is also true for all the major SC groups in AP, although sex ratios still vary between SC groups. Apart from *Madigas*, the child sex ratio is lower than that for all ages. The child sex ratio for STs in AP at 972 is almost the same as the national average for STs, but higher than the state level but this varies quite strongly among different ST groups, with *Sugalis* having the lowest child sex ratio at 944 and the *Koyas* having the highest child sex ratio at an equal 1000. The sex ratio also varies among STs geographically with the ratio for all ages varying between 921 in Nalgonda district and 1009 in Srikakulam.

4.2.4 Comparative discussion

The analysis I have presented suggests that Tamil Nadu is considered more 'developed' than Andhra Pradesh according to many conventional development indicators, but that gender inequalities are discernible in both states and not always less so in Tamil Nadu.

Gender and employment

Gendered patterns of work participation in TN and AP follow some more general all-India trends. Generally, male workers make up a larger proportion of the total workforce than female workers, more men are recorded as 'working' than women, and far more female workers are classified as marginal than male workers, according to Census definitions. Howev er, some important difference can be observed both in relation to all-India patterns and between the two States. Historically, work participation rates of women and their proportion of the overall labour force in south India have been higher than the average for all-India (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 73). Furthermore, south India has seen a marked rise in the proportion of female workers, particularly female agricultural labourers, since the 1960s (Da Corta and

Venkateshwarlu, 1999)(Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Census data shows that both AP and TN have higher overall work participation rates (WPRs) than the all-India average (see Figure 6 below). Significantly, both these States have some of the highest female WPRs in the country, with AP having the highest female rural WPR in the country among major states. In urban areas, on the other hand, the female WPR at the all-India level is a fifth of the male WPR, while in AP it represents just over a quarter, and in TN, nearly a third. In other words, there are *noticeably more female workers to male workers in urban areas in both these States compared to the all-India average*, and slightly more so in TN than AP.

A noticeably larger proportion of female workers are classified as *main* workers in AP and TN compared to the all-India average (see Figure 7 below), despite trends to suggest increasing casualisation of work participation in both these states. Furthermore, generally data suggests that female workers are more occupationally concentrated than male workers, with a far smaller proportion of women workers in AP classified as 'other workers', in both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, female worker concentration is also more evident in AP than at the national level, and particularly compared to TN, where the proportion of female workers classified as 'other workers' is above the national average. Low employment growth in the two States is consistent with trends at the national level, as is the decline in the proportion of main workers, particularly among males.

Figure 6 Work Participation Rates in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and All-India, 2001







Source: Census of India, 2001

Figure 7 Composition of working and non-working population, 2001



Source: Census of India, 2001

Gender and education

Comparatively speaking, literacy rates are above the national average in TN, but below the national average in AP. However, increases in literacy for the period 1991-2001 have been *higher* in AP, and higher than the national average. Increases in literacy in TN have been *lower* than the national average, although this might be explained by TN's higher initial literacy levels (see Figure below). The same pattern can be observed for increases in female literacy compared to male literacy when comparing AP to TN. The larger increase in both male and female literacy in AP has thus narrowed the gap between the two states. However, the gap between male and female literacy remains larger in AP than TN and this gap has narrowed faster in TN during the period 1981-2001, despite initially higher literacy levels for both males and females in the latter. Interesting, literacy rates are similar for the two state capitals, Chennai and Hyderabad both generally (overall 80% and 79% respectively) and for males (85% and 84% respectively) and females (75% and 74% respectively).

Figure 8 Increases in literacy, 1981-1991 and 1991-2001



Source: Census of India, 2001

Figure 9 Comparative sex ratios for Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and all-India (1901-2001)



Source: Census of India, 2001

Gender inequality, development, and diversity

Significant intra-State variations according to caste, class, religion, age, and locality (by rural/urban areas, and between and within districts) have complicated any straightforward comparison, and highlighted the importance of intersectionality when considering gendered development inequalities. For example, as Dunn observes, 'relative to minority men, minority women in India have far more limited access to both educational and employment resources' (Dunn, 1993).

Similarly, Swaminathan notes in relation to female work participation rates, that these are

> noticeably higher among scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population than among the rest of the female population. Further, scheduled caste and tribal women account for nearly half of all the female agricultural labourers, although they make up only about a quarter of India's rural female population.
>
> (Swaminathan, 1994: 69)

While my point about intersectionality may be uncontroversial, given the already well rehearsed debates on gender and difference *among* women in standpoint, black, and postmodern feminisms, the implications it has for an analysis of gender

Gender inequality and the sex ratio

Both TN and AP have sex ratios unfavourable to females although they both stand above the all-India average. TN's sex ratio has been consistently above that of all-India and of Andhra Pradesh since records from 1901. But similar to the trend seen at the all-India level, both States have seen a decline in the sex ratio since 1901, with a more recent increase between 1991-2001.

In both states, the child sex ratio (0-6 years age group) is lower than the sex ratio for all ages, and decreased between 1991 and 2001, even despite the overall increase in the sex ratio in the direction favourable to females. Significantly, this disparity is more notable in TN than AP. *While the overall sex ratio for AP is lower than that for TN, the reverse is true for the 0-6 years' age category. In other words, AP has a more favourable (although still unfavourable) absolute sex ratio for girl children than does TN.* Furthermore, the differential in AP between the child sex ratio and the sex ratio for all ages is smaller than the differential for the same in TN. Inter-district variations, which are significant in both states, also bear out this observation. District variations are also evident in AP but not to the same degree.

There is also a notable difference between rural and urban areas for these two states. The *child* sex ratio is more favourable to girl children in AP in *rural* areas, which is consistent with all-India, and with the higher rural sex ratios for *all ages* in both TN and all-India. However, in Tamil Nadu the *child* sex ratio is more favourable in *urban* areas.

However, there are important differences between the two states. As the analysis suggests, if discrimination against the girl child is measured through the sex ratio, it would seem to suggest that this is more of a problem in TN than AP. A decline *on the same scale* as TN or all-India has not been seen in the sex ratio for AP over the same period, although it did also witness an overall decline (despite periods where it increased), and then an increase during the period from 1991 to 2001. However, its variance and decline has been a lot smaller (see Figure 9 below). The pattern for TN appears to follow more closely that of all-India, compared to AP.

feminisms, the implications it has for an analysis of gender mainstreaming policy in India are not insignificant. The Indian women's movement had for many years been criticised as elitist and dominated by urban, middle class women, and in the 1980s and early 1990s, differences among women based on caste identity posed a formidable challenge to the coherence of the movement. The emerging *dalit* women's movement in the 1990s reflected these concerns and serves as an indicator of just how recently it is that the issue of diversity has become an important aspect of demands for gender equality in particular.[76] The issue of diversity poses some significant challenges to, and raises important questions for, nascent gender mainstreaming strategies in India, as has been the case in other contexts where gender mainstreaming has been superseded by strategies to mainstream more than just gender equality, otherwise known as 'diversity mainstreaming' (Squires, 2005b). However, given the prevalence of accommodative strategies in the arena of identity politics in India, the potential for diversity mainstreaming (as opposed to affirmative action strategies) may be overstated.

4.3 Socio-political constructions of gender in State politics

The remainder of the chapter explores socio-political constructions of gender in State politics in each State during the post-Independence period. Their significance is premised on the following theoretical assumptions: firstly, that party political and movement-based discourses in the State are partially constitutive of particular constructions of gendered identity; secondly, that these discourses may in part form the conditions of possibility for what can be articulated in development policy, and, thirdly, that these discourses may partially determine the extent to which women might mobilise collectively (particularly at the State level) for gender equality. In other words, the following discussion assumes that particularly dominant socio-political discourses in each State will have some bearing on how the state's vision of a desirable configuration of gender relations is discursively articulated in State-level development policy (discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6), as well as the extent to which this vision is contested by socio-political movements in each State (discussed further in Chapter 7).

---

[76] See for instance the recent edited collection by Anupama Rao on gender and caste (Rao, 2003).

Given constraints of space, the discussion is necessarily selective. For Tamil Nadu, I discuss the rise of Tamil cultural nationalist discourse and the politico-cultural project of its movement protagonists and party political conduit, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (hereafter DMK) and the 'paternalist populism' (Subramanian, 1999) of the AIADMK. I also draw on analyses of more recent developments in Tamil politics, to explore whether the emergence of a number of smaller movements and related political parties have offered alternative opportunities for conceptualising and articulating demands for gender equality beyond the dominant socio-political discourses in the State. For AP, I focus on analyses of women's participation in leftist agrarian movements in the State in the 1940s and 1970s, as well as the gendered populist style of leadership of NT Rama Rao (the leader of the regional Telugu Desam Party), and the much documented women's anti-arrack movement in the early 1990s.

4.3.1 Gendered discourses of populism and cultural nationalism in Tamil Nadu

A history of late 20th century Tamil politics shows the declining influence of the national Congress party in the State, the transformation of the anti-Brahmin Self Respect Movement into a political party, the Dravida Kazagham, and its later consolidation as the DMK, appealing to a Dravidian cultural nationalism, and the subsequent emergence of a similarly regional but rival political party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK).[77] Since 1967, when, under the leadership of CN Annadurai, the DMK was elected to the Tamil Nadu State Legislative Assembly, the State of Tamil Nadu has been governed by either the DMK (1967-1977, 1989-1991, 1996-2001, 2006- present) or the AIADMK (1977-1989, 1991-1996, 2001-2006). Since Annadurai's death, M. Karunanidhi has been leader of the DMK party. MG Ramachandran (hereafter MGR), a popular film actor turned politician and prominent DMK leader left the party in 1972 to form the ADMK (later renamed the All India ADMK). Upon MGR's death, a leadership struggled ensued through two factions; the first was lead by his widow, Janaki, and the second by his former co-star and AIADMK party propaganda secretary, J. Jayalalithaa. The latter subsequently won the leadership battle to succeed MGR as head of the party, and since then has retained its leadership.

---

[77] The ADMK later changed their party name to *All India* Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1972. For consistency, I will refer to them from here onwards as the AIADMK, even where referring to the party in the period prior to its change of name.

Discursive articulations of the concept of gender equality have emerged in various forms: from the radical social reform agenda of the Self-Respect Movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with its progressive ideas on gender relations to its premature demise in the mid 20th century, the subsequent interpretations of gender relations in cultural nationalist discourses of the DMK party, and the contrasting gendered discourses and politics of social welfare in the competitive populisms of the two main rival political parties emerging in the 1980s and beyond. Some have lamented the demise of the more progressive discourse on gender equality in the Self-Respect movement, such as inter-caste marriage, arguing that it represented a radical vision towards more equitable gender relations in the areas of marriage, work and community relations (see the work of S. Anandhi, MSS Pandian, S.V. Rajadurai and V. Geetha, cited in Harriss, 2002). These authors have sought to deconstruct the gendered cultural nationalist discourses of the DMK, which gradually pushed out those of the self-Respect movement, and rearticulated gender relations through notions of Tamil honour based on women's chastity. Rajadurai and Geetha (1996) discuss how the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) party attempted to recast Tamil history through the reinterpretation of classic Tamil literary works in order to generate popular support for a cultural nationalist Tamil identity. Representations of women and Tamil identity were positioned through notions of '*maanam*' (honour) which, *inter alia*, equated a woman's purity with the purity of the Tamil nation (ibid: 554). Anandhi argues that

> [a]s in the case of Indian nationalism, control over women and their sexuality has been central to the construction of Tamil identity and Tamil nationalism...Tamil nationalism was thus a masculine dream. Women, as markers of Tamil national identity, had to reaffirm the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct; and their gender interests could only be articulated within these parameters, set by the cultural nationalists.
>
> (Anandhi, 2005: 4876)

Thus women were largely positioned in Tamil nationalist discourse as the cultural repository of the nation. This was nowhere more evident than the gendered subjectification in Tamil nationalist discourse of woman as mother, in both the imaginary of *Tamilttay* (meaning Tamil mother) and in the *thai-kulam* (community of mothers) as cultural reproducers of the Tamil nation. Arguably, the mother icon is one of the most enduring images of Tamil cultural discourse throughout the twentieth century.

Firstly, Tamilttay, a previously elite literary concept in classic Tamil literature epitomized as the 'guardian deity of the Tamil-speaking community', and the personification of the Tamil language, was popularized and re-imagined as a 'frail and endangered mother to be protected by her "children", the loyal speakers of Tamil' (Ramaswamy, 2001: 19). Thus, the protection of Tamilttay featured prominently in protests against the domination of Hindi language in the newly independent Indian nation-state, and interestingly, sat uncomfortably beside the Hindi Indian nationalist imaginary of *Bharat Mata* ('Mother India') (Ramaswamy, 2001: 21).

Secondly, the importance given to women as mother of the Tamil nation, and specifically as a mother of Tamil sons as opposed to daughters, reified the role of motherhood in upholding the honour of the Tamil nation. The birth of a daughter instead of a son is considered to be a symptom of dysfunction. As CS Lakshmi explains,

> the Tamil mothers in classical Tamil literature have bodies which motherhood has tuned into sites of divinity, sanctity and purity. Their bodies are also sites where all societal notions of life and living seem to converge, endowing their bodies with some mystical qualities which make them 'naturally' produce what is termed 'the milk of valour' for their sons to infuse in their blood bravery and courage to make them warriors...
>
> (Lakshmi, 1990: WS-80)

The protection of Tamil mothers becomes central to Tamil masculinity. Women's identity becomes co-terminous with motherhood, and women as subjects of a gendered nationalist discourse are positioned as a supportive rather than a transforming element.

This supportive role of Tamil women has been reflected in the limited participation of women in Tamil political party organisations and associated forms of political organisational activity. Lakshmi (1990) comments on this phenomenon in terms of the DMK as a party political organisation and argues,

> the DMK party functioned in a way that put women in specific roles where they did not play a prominent role in making decisions or generating debates. Women's support for the party was expressed in ways considered 'womanly'... In 1975, the secretary of the women's wing of the head office of the party, could only list opening of orphanages and building of marriage choultries as active programmes for women... The DMK was familial in structure and women in the party occupied the same [subservient] position they did in families
>
> (Lakshmi, 1990: WS-81)

Outside of main party structures, similarly, women have often been excluded from a significant form of party political organisational activity in the form of cinema fan clubs, including those of

the AIADMK and the DMK (Dickey, 1993, 2003). The powerful symbiotic relationship between cinema and politics in Tamil Nadu has meant that cinema has been used as 'a political springboard' for aspiring politicians (with many leading politicians originally entering politics from the film industry) and has become one of the most effective ways for political leaders to communicate with the electorate (Dickey, 1993: 340).[78] In particular, cinema fan clubs are highly useful to politicians as they 'provide a pre-existing network of supporters, often highly organised, that can easily be transformed into a political cadre' (Dickey, 1993: 342). However, as Dickey explains, fan clubs

> are male institutions: virtually all members are [young] men... Women...rarely join, mindful that involvement in activities so public and unrestrained as those of fan clubs would harm their reputation and thus their chances of marriage. After marriage, most women are too busy with household work to be involved in outside organised activities. The vaguely licentious reputation of cinema also keeps them away...Unlike women, young men tend to have the time, the lack of family responsibilities, and the freedom of movement to permit participation in fan club work.
>
> (Dickey, 2003: 214, 216-7; see also Dickey, 1993)

The implications of these restrictions on women's participation in film fan clubs, inter alia, are the limited opportunities for women's induction into mainstream political parties, given that fan clubs have served as important training grounds for politicians (Dickey, 2003: 361)(Dickey, 1993: 361).[79]

While women were restricted access to fan association activities, the same could not be said of their access to MGR's films. The popularity that MGR gleaned through his films which was strategically beneficial for his consequent political career, as well as the AIADMK's to appeal to women, should not be underestimated. The narratives of social struggle against inequality, the representation of women in his films, and the treatment of female characters by the characters MGR played, had a direct bearing on his political persona, and reflected how, as an immensely popular figure in Tamil politics, he was able to shape debates about gender relations in Tamil society.

---

[78] A large literature exists on this relationship between cinema and party politics in Tamil Nadu. See especially Dickey (1993, 2003), Hardgrave (1973), and Pandian (1992).

[79] Although Dickey (1993: 357, note 7) does acknowledge that film clubs have occasionally involved women in their social service activities.

Pandian (1996) outlines several ways in which MGR's films appealed to women; firstly, through the anticipated subversion of conventional power structures in determining marriage choices such as parental authority and class and caste norms; secondly, by presenting MGR's character as a guardian and protector in contrast to an environment rife with physical and sexual violence towards women; thirdly, through the adoration of the mother-figure by MGR's character; and fourthly, by positioning MGR as the object of female desire (Pandian, 1996: 536-9). What may be overestimated, however, is the transformative potential of MGR's films with regards to prevailing gendered inequities in Tamil society. As Pandian argues,

> instead of developing a subversive critique of the iniquitous system which [MGR's films] portray, these films tend to iron out the contradictions and offer a neat solution for the injustice within the moral economy of the system' vindicating and reaffirming the system in the process
>
> (Pandian, 1996: 535)

Thus, with regards to their potential for articulation of gender-based oppression, MGR's films do not, 'lead to even an open-ended critique of the all-pervasive male domination in Tamil society....[M]onogamy, chastity, and all the symbols associated with these institutions of male domination are carefully elaborated and defended as embodying the foremost "womanly virtues"' (Pandian, 1996: 540). Ultimately, then, 'the resolution of the women's question goes hand in hand with reaffirming the existing order of male domination. There is no attempt whatsoever to transcend the existing order' (Pandian, 1996). Thus, MGR's films did little to envision or articulate the prospects for a more gender egalitarian order.

The paternalist approach to women evident in MGR's films also became prominent in State politics, as part of a competitive populist dynamic, made possible by the emergence of a rival party to the DMK, the AIADMK, during the early 70s, after MG Ramachandran left the DMK to form his own party in 1972 (Swamy, 1998). Issues of social inequality, welfare, justice, and development have been constituted through two competing styles of populism in the 1990s and beyond. Several authors suggest that, at least at the time when the ADMK emerged as a break-away faction of the DMK party in 1972, the two parties remained virtually identical in ideology; Dickey for instance suggests the split was more of a personality clash between Karunanidhi and MGR (Dickey, 1993). In contrast, Swamy argues that 'MGR's accession to power marked a shift in the politics of Tamil Nadu from one characteristically associated with issues relating to

upward mobility to one in which social welfare policies became the hallmark of the state' (1998: 119).

Both Swamy (1998) and Subramanian (1999) have attempted to define and analyse the two parties' distinct styles of populism. Swamy (1998) distinguishes between the 'empowerment populism' of the DMK and the 'protection populism' of the AIADMK. Similarly, Subramanian (1999) refers to the 'assertive populism' of the DMK' and the 'paternalistic populism' of the AIADMK. Both authors adopt a similar understanding of populism, which Swamy defines as 'a style of political rhetoric that describes society as a conflict between 'the common people' and a narrow elite, demanding greater privileges for out-groups on behalf of 'the people'' (Swamy, 1998: 110). The DMK's empowerment populism is based upon notions of upward mobility. Along with a cultural nationalist appeal to Dravidian, and later Tamil, identity, poverty was a significant mobilisational issue for the DMK, and formed an important part of the DMK's delegitimation of Congress as a representative of the poor in the 1967 election (Swamy, 1998: 117). But the DMK had problems appealing to the lower caste groups and the very poor which was exacerbated by the death of the popular DMK leader, C.N. Annadurai, in 1969, and the accession of M.K. Karunanidhi, who enjoyed more popularity with the backward classes but did not have mass appeal (Swamy, 1998).

In contrast to the 'empowerment populism' of the DMK, Swamy defines protection populism, associated with the AIADMK as 'a rhethoric that emphasises themes of vulnerability, offering to protect "the weak" and "truly needy"'(Swamy, 1998: 110). This correlates with Subramaniam's 'paternalist' populism variant (Subramanian, 1999). This variety of populism articulates the state as a paternalist and benevolent protector of the poor and vulnerable. Studies of both the popular appeal of the AIADMK and of their social welfare policies often emphasise how MGR's popular image in politics and the orientation of his policies drew on the roles he played throughout his film career (Pandian, 1992; Dickey, 1993). Swamy summarises some of the literature, identifying three recurring themes in MGR's film role, firstly, that of a crusader against tyranny; secondly, a champion of the poor; and thirdly, a protector of women (Swamy, 1998: 135). Similarly, MGR's policies focused, in a much more limited sense, on the poorest, rather than the backward classes or intermediate social groups and he specifically directed certain social policies

such as prohibition towards women (ibid: 119). MGR came from a high caste background but had a poor childhood due to the early death of his father and often referred to his 'mother 's plight' to justify his concern for widows and abandoned women (ibid). In part due to the appeal of MGR, his rhetorical style of 'protection populism', and his consistent appeal to women, the AIADMK opened up a gender and class gap in voting (ibid: 112). Women and the poorest groups made up the electoral base more significantly than that of the DMK; opinion polls cited by Swamy show that women and illiterate voters supported MGR in larger numbers than men and college educated voters, and opposition to Karunanidhi was more marked among women voters (ibid: 121). After MGR's death in 1987, his political heir and former co-star J. Jayalalithaa, continued his paternalist or protection populist legacy, after a brief factional dispute within the party.

The relevance of this discussion concerns how gender relations are articulated through the populist discourse of powerful political parties, and how the proximity of party politics at the State level to government, policy-making and the bureaucracy, and the development of an identity-based politics often prevents a more comprehensive policy of redistribution at the state level. The contrasting empowerment and protection populisms invoke a relative tension 'as visions of social justice...' which accordingly '...allows them to be championed by rival parties under competitive conditions' (Swamy, 1998: 110). Two important questions arise as a result of this discussion: firstly, to what extent does party politics and paternalist or empowerment populist styles of rhetoric affect the discursive character of gendered development policy; and secondly, to what extent does party politics impinge on the institutionalisation of a commitment to more gender-equitable government policy on development. Following the populism models, on the first issue, we might expect to find that the DMK have tried to forward the notion of empowering women but not necessarily the poorest women, and in a way which fits with cultural nationalist discourses. On the other hand, we might expect to see the AIADMK claim to be concerned with women's *welfare* but in a way that perpetuates their dependence on a paternalistic state, and one which sees its pursuit of gender equality only as a benevolent act rather than a constitutional obligation to its citizens. On the second issue, either way, one might expect that given the close identification of party politics with social policies, that party politics will have a profound impact on state-level discursive constructions of gender inequality as a

developmental problem; on the other hand, it is also possible that the state bureaucracy and administration may act with relative continuity and autonomy from the party political arena. In the latter case, it may be seen that party political actors will be more concerned with positioning and rearticulating state policy on gender equitable development according to their populist rhetorical styles, which nevertheless will have its own discursive implications for policy. These issues are examined later in Chapter 6, which analyses discourses of gender and development in State level policy.

While the above discussion of competing style of populist politics serves as a backdrop for the ensuing analysis of policy in Chapter 6, it is also important to mention a more recent development in Tamil politics. Authors such as Harriss (2002), Wyatt (2004), and Gorringe (2005) identify one new development as the increasing political mobilisation of *dalits* in Tamil Nadu and the rise of smaller caste-based parties in the State such as the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI), and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), a party appealing to the 'backward' caste community of Vanniyar concentrated in northern Tamil Nadu.

What is particularly interesting about this development however is its impact on the complex position of the *dalit* movement in Tamil Nadu in relation to gender, or more specifically, in relation to Tamil identity and Tamil nationalist constructions of gender relations discussed above, to the dalit movement's transformation into a party political organisation, and to the dalit movement's caste-based solidarity with *dalit* women. Anandhi argues that in the case of the DPI, its transition 'from a political movement to a party seems to have led to a dramatic dilution of its radicalism' (Anandhi, 2005: 4877). Previously, the movement had invoked the radical and progressive values of Periyar and the Self-Respect Movement, including the rejection of notions of the violent masculine imposition of women's chastity (ibid). Yet, more recent events such as the establishment of the Tamil Protection Movement by the DPI and the PMK demonstrate attempts of a revival of a pan-Tamil identity, in an attempt to 'expand their support base beyond their respective caste constituencies' (Anandhi, 2005: 4876). The apparent resilience of conservative attitudes to gender relations and women's sexuality, through invoking a cultural nationalist Tamil identity came to the fore during an episode in September 2005. Kushboo, a popular film actress in Tamil films, during an interview with a Tamil magazine on women's

sexuality spoke openly about cultural taboos on women's virginity and sexuality. The source of the ensuing controversy was Kushboo's argument that, contrary to cultural expectations, the occurrence of pre-marital sex meant that many women were not virgins at the time of marriage. The subsequent protests by the DPI and PMK claimed that the actress had insulted the morality and dignity of Tamil women and interestingly it was the women's wing of the PMK that then filed defamation cases against Kushboo in court. As Anandhi concludes, 'the past of the DMK has become the present of the DPI and the PMK' (2005: 4876). Moreover, the new position of the DPI as protector of an 'homogenised, hegemonic, collective identity of the "Tamil women"' serves to undermine the gains made by *dalit* women's organisations in the State to gain recognition both for a *dalit* women's identity, which differentiates both against that of upper caste women and of *dalit* men, and the multiple oppression suffered by *dalit* women (Anandhi, 2005: 4877). While the sentiments of the DPI and PMK were not necessarily those of the majority – with one editorial of an English daily newspaper likening the episode to a form of 'incipient Talibanism' (The Hindu, 2005b) – what these events demonstrate is the resilience of the DMK's early conservative cultural nationalist discourse which likened the dignity of the Tamil nation to the chastity of its women.

In summary, the DMK's early conservative cultural Tamil nationalist discourse rearticulated much of the more gender egalitarian ethos of the earlier Dravidian Self-Respect Movement, and positioned women as cultural repositories of the nation, foregrounding their role as mothers of Tamil sons. With the rise of the leadership of M.G. Ramachandran, the leader of the breakaway party the All-India Anna Munnetra Dravida Kazagham, women became one group among a number of favoured beneficiaries of his paternalist style of leadership, demonstrating a gendered and class-based style of populism.

Yet, neither the conservative cultural nationalist discourse of the DMK or the paternalist populist style of the AIADMK offered much potential for gender egalitarian relations in Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, both party political organisations present few opportunities for women's leadership and decision-making more generally in a way which challenges dominant norms of behaviour of women in Indian society, even when considering Jayalalithaa's leadership of the AIADMK subsequent to MGR's death in 1987. The emergence of a number of smaller movements and

related political parties have not offered much potential for a transformation towards more egalitarian gender relations, and have in some way rearticulated the dominant socio-political discourses in the State.

4.3.2 Left-wing agrarian movements, populism, and state co-optation in Andhra Pradesh

Since the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh along linguistic lines in 1956, the Congress Party dominated government and party politics in the state, until the 1980s, when a regional-based party, the Telugu Desam Party, was elected to the State Assembly in 1983.[80] The leader of the TDP, NT Rama Rao, was a populist leader and former film actor, who had rapidly established the party and come to power astonishingly within less than a year. The Congress regained political office in 1989 but were elected out of office later in 1994. The TDP thereafter held two terms of office, from 1994-1999 and 1999-2004, both largely under the leadership of Chandrababu Naidu, NTR's son-in law, after Naidu deposed NTR in a party leadership coup in 1995. Most recently, the TDP were voted out of office in the 2004 State Assembly elections, when the Congress Party returned to government.

The Telangana struggle was an anti-feudal struggle by rural lower castes which mobilised against forced labour (*vetti*) and exploitation by upper caste landlords in the Telangana region between 1946 to 1951. The movement operated through the Communist-dominated Andhra Maha Sabha, forming *sanghams* (movement groups) at the grassroots levels.

The Telangana movement differed significantly from the character of the women's movement at the time, because it attracted rural as opposed to urban women, and low caste as opposed to middle and upper caste women. Party support for women's symbolic participation in the movement remained on the margins, positioning women as largely 'supportive', despite acknowledging that their actual participation was extensive. One CPI party leader, Ch. Rajeshwar Rao, said of the Party, 'We praised women when they came, but we did not do anything to encourage them to come... They fought boldly, organised shelters, brought food etc. [Yet] the party made no special efforts to attract them.' (quoted in Lalita et al., 1989: 17).

---

[80] Prior to 1956, Brahmins dominated post-Independence State politics, and were replaced by the Reddys, a dominant peasant caste. The latter came to prominence in the state, benefitting from land reforms implemented as an outcome of the Telangana struggle which took place in the late 1940s.

The Party's reluctance to encourage women's participation was partly because of how the movement's struggle was conceptualised and partly because their participation went against societal norms. A CPI party document directly expressed this first limitation of the movement: 'We always viewed ...[women's] problems as a separate issue. Due to this attitude, we only succeeded in making them sympathetic to the movement, but could not involve them as a direct force in the fight' (cited in Lalita et al., 1989: 17) (cited in Lalita et al., 1989: 17). The second limitation was that women's participation in the movement went against conventional norms in society; 'women had to fight against traditional beliefs and a feudal outlook even to become a part of the political struggle' (Lalita et al., 1989: 263). This posed a problem for the party's encouragement of women '"because their protection was a problem"' (Ch. Rajeswar Rao, quoted in Lalita et al., 1989: 17), and thus they were seen as 'separate, embarrassing and burdensome' (Lalita et al., 1989: 263). Women's oral narratives of their experience in the Telangana movement suggest that 'women often felt used and then cast aside', and that within the movement there was a 'brooding, pervasive sense that women were "problems"', which would be articulated not necessarily explicitly but in 'everyday moments of dismissive encounter' (Lalita et al., 1989: 25).

Despite their symbolic marginal status in the Telangana movement, Lalita et al's analysis of women's oral narratives suggest that their participation was seen as liberating and empowering: 'moving into the struggle did mean a tremendous liberation for these women – they believed it was possible to break with custom – to travel alone, travel at night, carry guns, act as couriers, fight in squads – all of which they did' (Lalita et al., 1989: 261). They further note that women's

> ...involvement with the Party provided a significant growth in consciousness for the women. Reading, writing, discussing political questions, attending classes, addressing public meetings and organising women gave them a very positive sense of their role...It was as if the Party gave them a chance to make practical sense of whatever learning they had. It gave them the tools to understand their social reality and was a source of enormous strength and clarity. They felt that the struggle brought them wisdom, knowledge, clarity and enormous physical stamina.
>
> (Lalita et al., 1989: 261).

Yet this positive sense of the movement's contribution to women's subjective agency is accompanied by a frustration at 'what happened to women as a result, and how little, despite the enormous effort recorded in these autobiographical accounts, things have changed.' (Lalita et al.,

1989: 25). That women were asked to return to their families when the movement was called off could be no less than frustrating, as the oral narrative of Brij Rani attests: 'what do you think it means, to wield weapons in the struggle and sit before sewing machines now?' (quoted in Lalita et al., 1989: 18).

According to Suri, 'the emergence of the TDP heralded a new era in AP politics' as a result of increased inter-party competition and electoral choice (Suri, 2006: 283). Suri offers five different explanations for the formation and rise in popularity of the TDP party, which centre on firstly, intra-caste rivalry between the two dominant peasant castes , the Reddy's (which dominated the Congress Party) and the Kammas (who formed the TDP); secondly, the importance of the backward caste vote after their alienation from the Congress Party; thirdly, the issue of Telugu self-respect in protest at Indira Gandhi's centralising tendencies during the late 1970s and early 1980s and her encouragement of factionalism within the Congress party in AP; fourthly, increasing demands for state-level autonomy as a result of a conflict between an emerging regional bourgeoisie and their national counterpart; and lastly, the ability of the TDP to attract the vote of non-Congress political parties (Suri, 2006: 284-7). Suri concludes that all of these explanations have some merit, although each on their own are not sufficient to explain the rise of the TDP.

NTR's charismatic leadership and populist appeals also played an important part in the rise of the TDP. Kannabiran's study (1997) is one of the very few studies on the Telugu Desam Party to pay particular attention to the charismatic appeal of NT Rama Rao's paternalist and benevolent persona to women voters. As Kannabiran argues, 'women have always been central to the rhetoric of the Telugu Desam Party, since its inception. NT Rama Rao entered politics appealing to Telugu mothers and sisters to use their political will to bring his party into power, since his party was the only one that held the promise of a 'better life for women' (1997: 1237). In some ways similar to MG Ramachandran in Tamil Nadu, he drew on the patron-protector and benevolent elder brother roles he played as an actor in film (although NTR's characters were rarely depicted as common heroes, playing instead more mythological characters or kings) (ibid). NTR was particularly appealing to women because his rhetoric stood in stark contrast to the inability of the Congress government to stem to rising tide of violence against women in the state

(Kannabiran, 1997: 1236). Thus, 'when NTR came with his offerings of equal property rights and a safe and clean environment free of violence, women were more than eager to give him a chance...' (Kannabiran, 1997: ibid). His populist scheme of rice for Rs 2 a kilo was also popular among women. However, as the experience of women in campaigning for prohibition in AP shows however, NTR's willingness to address the demands of women voters was limited.

The struggles discussed so far were not specifically or solely 'women's struggles' but part of a larger struggle, and show the participation of women in more radical but still mainstream movements. In contrast, the anti-arrack movement of women in AP in the early 1990s was a specifically women-led movement against the sale of *arrack* (or '*saara*' in Telugu, meaning country liquor). The movement, crystallising in Nellore District in the early 1990s, and which led to the (albeit temporary) prohibition of arrack in the State, is now well documented (see for instance Anveshi, 1993; Pande, 2002; Reddy and Patnaik, 1993; Rao and Parthasarathy, 1997). The large scale mobilisation of poor lower caste women resulted from a State-directed literacy program which, beyond imparting literacy, sought to use literacy as a means for development and empowerment, and the materials used in these programmes deliberately sought to provoke debate on social issues. Through this program, women became increasingly agitated around what they came to see as the underlying reasons for domestic violence and poverty: the consumption of alcohol by male members of their households and the presence of arrack shops in their villages.

The political economy of arrack is significant to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Arrack is a source of excise revenue deriving from liquor sales and from the licensing fees from liquor contractors. In 1991-92, arrack was the largest source of revenue from liquor sales (Rs. 630.27 crore, nearly £79 million approximately), and excise taxes constituted 8 per cent of state taxes (Anveshi, 1993: 87). Arrack sales were also linked to the village labour economy in that landlords would often pay labourers in arrack tokens rather than cash or other goods. Furthermore, arrack sales had risen rapidly over the past decade (1981-91) as a result of a deliberate state-led marketing strategy known as '*varun vahini*' ('the flood of liquor') which packeted liquor in individual sachets, in part to facilitate more convenient consumption practices beyond conventional public drinking spaces (ibid). Thus, the Congress government in power at

the height of the movement's expansion was reluctant to concede to the demands of the women's movement because arrack constituted an important source of revenue as well as a source of power from the patronage of liquor contracts.

The women's anti-arrack movement in AP made significant gains in closing liquor shops, protesting against and preventing the state-sponsored sale and marketing of arrack, and eventually achieving their goal of prohibition in October 1993. The movement also achieved considerable changes in the lives of the lower caste, rural (but later also urban) women who participated in the movement, raising awareness among women, spreading the message of the movement, and encouraging other women to mobilise and protest against arrack as a means to combat domestic violence and poverty.

However, the anti-arrack movement in AP is an example of the state's willingness and ability to co-opt the demands of the women's movement, motivated by electoral compulsions to capture the women's vote (Kannabiran, 1997: 1237). Consequently, in AP, support for the movement began to evaporate as soon as it became a partisan issue because it was supported by the TDP opposition. As Rekha Pande observes (Pande, 2002: 360), '[m]any left wing groups and other political parties distanced themselves from this movement because now it was no longer an achievement of women but part of a party political platform'. The TDP were able to effectively convert its support of the prohibition movement into votes from women in the 1994 election; women's support was significant for the TDP's election victory in that year, and the newly elected TDP implemented prohibition soon after.

Prohibition was, however, lifted from November 1995, when the new leader of the TDP, Chandrababu Naidu, faced opposition to the increases in taxation which were intended as an alternative source of revenue in place of liquor excise duties (Pande, 2002: 360). Thus, it seemed that the influence of the women's vote was not enough to enable the continued support of prohibition. The reneged promises of the AP government on prohibition is just one example of the reluctance of the Indian state to uphold the demands for change generated through their very own programmes of social mobilisation and empowerment.[81] As Pande suggests, 'more telling

[81] Another example is that of the Women's Development Programme in Rajasthan, in which the State government's 'goal was to empower women and undo gender hierarchies, [but which] actually ended up repressing women and

than these policy changes [on prohibition] was the fact that the stories of the anti-arrack movement were no longer part of the texts used for [State-led] literacy [programmes]' (Pande, 2002: 360).

4.3.3 Comparative discussion

Comparing the socio-political and historical trajectories of the two states, we can observe that there are important similarities and differences both within and between the two states. This demonstrates the diversity of the broader social context at the subnational level. Both states have experienced their own regionally concentrated and historically contingent social movements which, while providing some consideration of the question of gender inequality in some cases, as well as the participation of women, they have ultimately provided limited substantial opportunities for changes in gender relations in these two states. Both states have also witnessed the emergence of regional parties, two of which have appealed specifically to women voters (AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and TDP in Andhra Pradesh), albeit problematically in a way which reinforces conservative gender norms of female subservience, sacrifice, and chastity. These regional parties have become politically institutionalised at the level of state government (and at the national level in more recent years) and therefore have become important actors in the institutional context of state-led development.

However, significant differences remain between the two states. As Suri (2006: 281) points out, unlike the regional party of the DMK (and later AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, 'the TDP did not emerge as a result of any antecedent struggle or sustained social movement...[Furthermore,] attempts to institutionalise another state party by splitting the TDP, a la Tamil Nadu, were not successful in AP'. Also, the presence Congress has survived political competition with the TDP in AP, but began to decline in influence in Tamil Nadu from the 1960s onwards, becoming only a marginal player in state level politics from the 1980s with the rise of the AIADMK. This suggests an interesting development in the increasingly complex relationship between state and national level development policy: the varied position of the Congress party in the two states

---

reconstituting patriarchy [in the face of women's collective mobilisation as a result of the programme] by such actions as ordering men to control their wives or else' (Sharma, 2001a: 1-2; see also WDP Fact Finding Team, 1992, cited in Sharma, 2001).

may result in different levels of influence of national level development policy on state level development, and this becomes even more complex when coalition politics is taken into account.

Notwithstanding the early feminist debates of the self-respect movement in Tamil Nadu, the women's movement appears to be stronger and more mobilised in AP, and this may be attributed to the stronger presence of left-wing politics in the state compared to TN. However, it is not clear what role women have played in the dalit movements emerging in AP from the 1980s onwards, since there are few detailed studies on the role of women in these movements, or whether these movements incorporated an understanding of the intersectionality of dalit women's oppression within the movements' discourse.

4.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the diversity of the broader social context is important for understanding processes and outcomes of gendered development at the subnational level. I have attempted to show that gendered development is a highly complex and nuanced phenomenon based on unequal relations of caste and class, as well as gender, and that it is hard to make blanket statements about the level of development at the subnational level. This suggests that not only is it too straightforward to assume on the basis of development indicators that women's status is higher and gender relations are more egalitarian in the southern states of India compared to the north, but also to assume that this is moreso the case in Tamil Nadu compared to Andhra Pradesh. In other words, the possibilities for articulating feminist strategies of gender-equitable development may be enabled or constrained by broader socio-historical and political developments. This insight cautions us against simplistic analyses of state level policies of development which do not pay particular attention to their embeddedness in state-specific socio-economic and historical contexts and the conditions of possibility these contexts constitute. With these discussions in mind, in the next chapter the analysis moves to a more narrow focus on the gendered institutional context of state development policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.

5 THE GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter Three, I discussed the gendered character of national development policy as well as a number of initiatives to mainstream gender at the national level. In particular, I paid attention to certain gendered discourses produced by, and embedded within, state institutions, such as the Planning Commission, as well as institutional structures and mechanisms that were created for the purposes of making the state more responsive to women, such as the National Commission for Women and the Ministry of Women and Child Development. This chapter seeks both to expand on that discussion and reposition the focus towards institutions at the subnational level, looking at the states of AP and TN. Little attention has been paid to 'state feminist' institutional strategies at the subnational rather than national level in India, or their link with state level policy. The aim here is to specifically explore the *institutional context* for gender mainstreaming in development policy at the state level. This chapter is concerned with the 'institutional politics of pursuing feminist policy ambitions' (Goetz, 1997b: 3). As such, this chapter combines, on the one hand, the concern of gender mainstreaming strategies in transforming *institutional* norms and practices, as well as on the other, the state's role in formulating (gender-equitable) development policy. It directly engages with one of the central questions of this thesis in that it concerns how the state becomes an institutional site of struggle for the constitution of gender-responsive development policy. This chapter also serves to present the institutional *context* for the state's *discourse* on gender-equitable development, which is explored further in the next chapter.

A major underlying premise of the chapter, and one which has been contentious in the literature, is that feminists need to engage with the state in order to bring about change, but that this engagement should proceed with caution. In the first half of the chapter, I explore how the state is an ensemble of gendered organisational and institutional norms and practices and how these

embedded norms and practices reproduce the 'state' as a gendered institution (Brown, 2006; Pringle and Watson, 1992). By endorsing the view held by feminist theorists of the state more generally, I argue that gendered norms and practices embedded within state institutions in India create an institutional context which is not conducive to feminist policy goals and strategies, including some tokenistic and accommodationist efforts to increase the descriptive representation of women within these institutions. This does not rule out the possibility of change, however, as the institutional sites within which dominant gendered discourses of development are embedded are themselves open to contestability and challenge (Weedon, 1987: 109).

With this potential for change in mind, in the second half of the chapter, I discuss how these institutional norms and practices have to some extent determined the possibilities for feminist efforts at institutional transformation. I argue that both feminist-initiated and state-initiated, or 'state-feminist' (Stetson and Mazur, 1995), strategies for transforming state institutions towards more gender-equitable goals in the two case study States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh represent a complex assortment of opportunities and limitations, some offering more potential for feminist intervention and transformative change than others, and with notable differences both between and within the States' institutional contexts. More generally what this demonstrates is the insight of feminist poststructural approaches to the state – that the 'state' is understood not as a monolith or as a unitary force of government but as an ensemble of various organisational and institutional structures, norms, and practices, which do not always act in unison, sometimes even contradictorily (Pringle and Watson, 1992; Rai, 1996; Waylen, 1996).

More specifically it demonstrates that the institutional contexts for women, gender and development policy have developed in ways that can be considered distinctive to individual states at the subnational level in India. This clearly has implications for the study of both national and subnational policy and emphasises the need to recognise the historical specificity of the institutional context from which policy emerges. Such a recognition is important both to understand the conditions of possibility for gendered development policy as much as the strategies required to transform it, given the presupposition that feminist interests 'do not pre-exist, fully formed, to be simply 'represented' in the state, but have to be actively forged and, arguably, it is in the domain of the state that they are formally constituted' (Watson, 1992: 186-

7). This chapter draws on my own analysis of policy documents, fieldwork interviews, and other primary data, as well as the most relevant secondary literature.

5.2 The Gendered Institutions of the State

Goetz (1997b: 10) suggests that 'in deconstructing institutions by gender, it is easiest to begin by identifying their gendered effects, or their "gendering" outcomes, and move from there to understanding how they are actually *constituted* by gender difference'. Therefore, to understand how the state reproduces itself as a gendered organisation, this chapter begins by looking at how the State is both descriptively and substantively gendered; 'descriptively' (the gendered effects or outcomes) in the sense of the disproportionate representation of men and women in State government employment and women's underrepresentation in state structures (both as political representatives in electoral democracy but also as part of the bureaucracy; and 'substantively' (constitutively gendered) in the sense of how the reiteration of gendered institutional norms and practices constantly reproduce the state in complex ways as an ensemble of gendered institutions. To demonstrate the substantive component, I focus on gendered bureaucratic norms and practices and also how the distribution and concentration of men and women in different sectors and departments of government suggest that their employment and positioning represents and reproduces gendered hierarchies within state institutions. In turn, this demonstrates where policy issues concerning women, gender and development, are located in, and how they are constituted by, the gendered hierarchy of bureaucratic government.

5.2.1 The descriptive representation of women

Tamil Nadu

GoTN directly employs more than 350,000 women, representing almost a third of government employees out of a total of just over 1.1 million employees (figures for 2004-05 in GoTN, 2006b). This figure includes State government employment, and employment in State public undertakings and local bodies. Women are more numerous at the local level, outnumbering men (around 42 per cent men and 58 per cent women). This is reversed at the State level (around 63 per cent men and 37 per cent women). More noticeably, men far outnumber women in State

public undertakings (approximately 91 per cent men and 9 per cent women) (ibid). This may represent the more autonomous, private-sector orientation of many state public undertakings, which is often seen as a more hostile employment environment towards women.[82] As Sheela Rani Chunkath, a senior woman IAS officer from Tamil Nadu cadre, was reported as saying, 'government service, in general, is more accepting of women and more gender friendly than the private sector' (Santhanam, 2005).

In terms of senior levels of the state bureaucracy, according to the Civil List, 38 out of 293 IAS officers posted in Tamil Nadu as of the start of 2007 were women officers, representing approximately 13 per cent of the senior levels of the bureaucracy in the State (GoI, 2007a). This has not changed much from the proportion in 1985, when women IAS officers made up 11.4 per cent of all IAS officers in Tamil Nadu, or 32 officers (Goyal, 1989). Currently, the most senior women IAS officer in Tamil Nadu, as determined by year of induction into the IAS, is C.K. Gariyali, who holds the post of Principal Secretary to the Governor (GoI, 2007a). In December 2002, the State government appointed Lakshmi Pranesh as its first woman Chief Secretary, the highest bureaucrat in the State government (she later retired in 2005). Despite these two examples of senior appointments, women still only occupy a handful of senior posts in the State level bureaucracy.

Women's participation in formal electoral politics at the State level, both as contesting candidates in State Assembly elections and as Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) in TN, has increased over the last two decades. However, in terms of numbers, men still dominate; women represented only 6 per cent of election candidates and only 9 per cent of candidates elected in the most recent elections in 2006 (see Table 2).

Similarly, the number of women ministers in the cabinet, or Council of Ministers, has been consistently low. Under the current DMK government elected in 2006, three out of thirty one Ministers which make up the Council of Ministers are women (or just under 10 per cent), one of

[82] More detailed sex-disaggregated data on levels of seniority or by identity groups such as SC, ST, OBC and so on, are not published.

Table 2 Women in Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections (1984-2006)

		1984	1989	1991	1996	2001	2006
Women candidates	No. of candidates	46	78	102	158	112	156
	% of total candidates	3	3	4	3	6	6
Women elected	No. of elected	8	9	32	11	25	22
	% of total elected (Total no. = 234)	3	4	13	5	11	9
Vote share of women candidates (%)		4	3	9	5	10	10

Source: Election Commission of India (www.eci.gov.in)

whom, Dr Poongothai, holds the portfolio of Minister for Social Welfare (GoTN, c.2006). The other two Ministers, Geetha Jeevan and Tamilarasi, hold the portfolios of Minister for Animal Husbandry and Minister for Adi Dravidar Welfare, Hill Tribes and Bonded Labour, respectively. Under the previous AIADMK government (2001-2006), three of the twenty four Ministers were women (or over 12 per cent), one of whom included the Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa (GoTN, n.d.-a). Again, a woman Minister was appointed the portfolio of Social Welfare (P Vijaylakshmi Palanisamy). The other Minister, B Valarmathi, was appointed as Minister for Rural Industries. These low numbers of women in the Cabinet are despite the fact that twenty women MLAs belonging to the AIADMK were elected to office. Similarly again, under the DMK government elected in 1996, only two out of twenty five ministers were women, one of whom, S.P. Sarkuna Pandian, was appointed as Minister for Social Welfare, and the other, S. Jenefer Chandran, as Minister for Fisheries (GoTN, n.d.-b).

Andhra Pradesh

According to its official Employee Census 2006, the State Government of Andhra Pradesh employs nearly 1.3 million people, the majority of which work for the State Government (46.65%), more than a quarter for Local Bodies (26.07%), and nearly a fifth for Public Sector Undertakings (19.47%).[83]

[83] The Government of Andhra Pradesh publishes two reports, 'Manpower Profile' and 'Andhra Pradesh At a Glance' which include sex-disaggregated data on public sector employees, drawn from the government's periodical employee census. However, these publications were not available for sale at the time of my visit in Andhra Pradesh and they are not published outside of India. Employee census data that is available is highly disaggregated by department and is not available in a readily comparable format to the data on Tamil Nadu.

In 1985, in AP the proportion of women IAS officers was only 5 per cent, or 15 women IAS officers (Goyal, 1989: 428). Since then, this figure has almost trebled. In Andhra Pradesh, there are currently forty one women IAS officers as of 2007, some of which were on deputation to other organisations (GoI, 2007a). Out of a total of 307 IAS officers in AP, women IAS officers therefore represent just over 13 per cent of IAS officers in the State, a proportion similar to that of Tamil Nadu. In 2002, Sathi Nair was appointed the first woman Chief Secretary of Andhra Pradesh, at the age of 59, and six months before her official superannuation date.

In AP, during the last two decades, women's participation in electoral politics as candidates and elected representatives at the State level has increased both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of total candidates (see Table 3). The number of women contestants almost trebled from 1985 to 2004, as did the percentage of women as a proportion of total candidates contesting in Assembly elections. Similarly, both the number of women elected and the proportion of women among elected MLAs almost trebled between these dates. Despite this increase, however, women still only embody less than 10 per cent of contesting candidates and elected representatives.

Table 3 Women in Andhra Pradesh Assembly Elections (1985-2004)

		1985	1989	1994	1999	2004
Women candidates	No. of candidates	66	70	127	157	161
	% of total candidates	3	4	4	7	8
Women elected	No. of elected	10	17	8	28	26[84]
	% of total elected (Total no. = 234)	3	6	3	10	9
Vote share of women candidates (%)		3	4	3	10	12

Source: Election Commission of India (www.eci.gov.in)

Political parties in AP have shown varying inclination to increase their own numbers of women candidates in Assembly elections. In terms of absolute numbers, the Telugu Desam Party (hereafter TDP) and the Congress (I) Party (hereafter "Congress" or "INC"), as the two largest parties in the state, regularly nominate large numbers of women (compared to other parties). For the TDP, the number of women contesting on a party ticket in the five elections since 1985 has

[84] Not included in this figure is Christine Lazarus, the Anglo-Indian MLA nominated in 2004, and from 1990-1994. Another woman MLA, Della Godfrey, was the Anglo-Indian nominated MLA under the previous TDP government.

increased, albeit at times inconsistently, from 12 in 1985 to 50 in 2004 (but only 7 in 1994). The Congress party have not shown a similar trend; it has fluctuated in nominating between 16 and 30 women over the period 1985-2004. A similar trend is the increasing proportion of women contestants to the total for each party, although this is far more marked for the TDP (again with the exception of 1994) than Congress; while the proportion of women contesting for the TDP has risen from 5 per cent in 1985 to 19 per cent in 2004, the same for the Congress Party has not shown such a sizeable increase, from 7 per cent in 1985 to 9 per cent in 2004.

In AP, under the current Congress (I) State government, four out of forty one ministers in the Cabinet are women (AP Online, n.d.). One of the four, Rajyalakshmi Nedurumalli, holds the post of Minister for Women Development and Child Welfare, Disabled Welfare and Juvenile Welfare.[85,] Under the previous TDP government (1999-2004), there were only three women ministers (and all were new to electoral politics). The first, S. Saraswati, held the portfolio of Minister for Women Development and Child Welfare. The second, *Alimineti* Uma Madhava Reddy, another newcomer, was elected in 2000 in a bye-election, brought about by the death of her husband and former Home Minister A. Madhava Reddy (The Hindu, 2004d). She was subsequently appointed Minister of Social Welfare. The third woman minister, K. Pushpa Leela, also newly inducted into politics, was elected in 1999 and given the portfolio of Social Welfare Minister.[86] In contrast to these relative newcomers, in 1999, Pratibha Bharathi became the first women speaker of the AP Legislative Assembly. Her appointment was unopposed. Bharathi, a TDP MLA, has been elected consistently from the same constituency since 1983. She also served as Social Welfare Minister in 1983, 1985, and 1994, under the former Chief Minister NT Rama Rao, and served under former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu as Minister for Higher Education in 1998 (Indian Express, 1999). Bharathi was not reelected, however, in 2004. Another experienced woman MLA, Gummadi Kuthuhalamma, was appointed Deputy Speaker of the State Legislature Assembly in 2007. Kuthuhalamma has served four terms as a Congress MLA, elected from the same constituency in 1985, 1989, 1999, and 2004. In 1994 she contested

---

[85] The remaining three are P Sabita Reddy, Minister for Mines and Geology, Handlooms and Textiles, and Spinning Mills; Aruna Kumari Galla, Minister for Medical Education and Health Insurance; and Dr Geetha Reddy, Minister for Major Industries, Sugar, Commerce and Export Promotion.

[86] More detailed information on past Council of Ministers is not accessible. GoAP does not include this information on its websites. Grover and Arora (1998) provide detailed information of government ministers only up until 1984, and thereafter only include the names of the Governor and the Chief Minister for each successive year until 1997.

as an Independent and lost the election to a TDP candidate, the overall winning party, coming third after a female Congress candidate.

5.2.2 Strategies to increase women's descriptive representation

Tamil Nadu

The State Government of Tamil Nadu is one of a number of State governments which have sought to increase the presence of women in government employment by adopting affirmative action policies.[87] Reservation for women in government employment first came in March 1989 when the government amended the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules (the State Government's personnel policy) to reserve 30 per cent of all direct recruitment vacancies for women, within the existing categories for reservation (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes, as well as the 'General Turn') (GoTN, 2007d: 33). Women were also entitled to compete alongside men for the remaining 70 per cent unreserved posts. A reservation within the reservation also applied to 'destitute widows', ringfencing 10 per cent of the posts reserved for women (ibid). Significantly, the State policy also stipulated that 'women alone shall be appointed to post in any institution or establishment specially provided for them', and men would only be appointed to such posts when 'suitable and qualified' women were not available (GoTN, 2007d: 33). However, data on recruitment against reservations is not available and so it is difficult to analyse the extent to which reservations in recruitment policy have made a discernible impact on the number of women in government employment. A different, and somewhat uncharacteristic, strategy to increase numbers of women in government institutions was observed when, in 2001, under the AIADMK government the Finance Minister announced plans to start 'exclusive coaching programmes' for women at centres to be set up in Chennai and Madurai, to 'encourage women to join the All India Services and Central Services' (Ponnaiyan, 2001: 17, para 69).

---

[87] It should be acknowledge that this is not a standard practice across all states within India. In 2005, in answer to a question posed by a member of the Rajya Sabha, a Government of India Minister of State for Human Resource Development listed ten State governments as having State-level reservation for women in government posts (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Tamil Nadu) with the State government of Bihar providing reservations for women belonging to the backward caste category only (Rajya Sabha, 2005a). In contrast, there are no reservations for women in government posts at the central level.

In the same year, the State announced affirmative action to bring more women into State level government committees. A policy note for 2001-02 announced thirty per cent reservation for women in all statutory and non-statutory committees, '[c]onsidering the imperative need to involve women in decision-making as a step towards empowerment' (GoTN, 2001a: section 3.7). This development was also mentioned in the Budget Speech of the State Minister for Finance in 2001 (Ponnaiyan, 2001: 24, para 97). Again, however, a lack of accessible data inhibits an understanding of whether this affirmative action policy is being implemented, regardless of whether it is actually achieving its aim of empowering women through participation in decision-making. A quick glance at the composition of the thirty eight steering committees constituted for formulating the Eleventh Five Year Plan suggests that this is uneven and that women's participation depends on the position they hold in government (GoTN, 2006a). As a result, the sectorally divided structure of women's participation in the committees is determined by, and reproduces, the tendency for women to be appointed to the so-called 'soft' sectors of government like Social Welfare and Health and Family Welfare (discussed further below).

In terms of women political representatives, both the DMK and AIADMK have frequently expressed their support for the Women's Reservation Bill which would reserve a third of seats for women in both National and State Assemblies. At the party level, the AIADMK has fared slightly better in this regard and has committed to 33 per cent reservation in the party organization recognizing 'the demand for recognition of women and according them equal status as men in public life' (AIADMK website, n.d.). As a result, the AIADMK has been acknowledged as one of the only parties in India to make a 'conscious move to bring many more women into decision-making levels and posts within the party' (Ghosh, 1999). The party has also put forward a higher proportion of women candidates at State level elections (as seen above). Whether this translates to a more substantively meaningful participation of women is debated however, given the heavily centralized character of the AIADMK party (e.g. Palshikar, 2004).

Andhra Pradesh

Like GoTN, the GoAP has also utilized affirmative action policies for recruiting more women into government employment. GoAP first introduced 30 per cent reservation for women in

government jobs in 1984. The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) currently states that 33.3 per cent of State and sub-State vacancies are reserved for women, the highest percentage of all reserved categories in AP government employment (GoAP APPSC, n.d.).[88] The APPSC also provides for relaxations on the maximum age requirement in recruitment rules which is otherwise set at either 26 or 28 years of age (depending on the post applied for). Age constraints vary for different categories of reservation: it is extended to 40 years of age for widows, divorced women and separated women not remarried applying for SC and ST reserved posts and 35 years for all other posts (ibid).

In terms of women in party politics, there is relative consensus among the major political parties in Andhra Pradesh that the Women's Reservation Bill should be passed at the national level to reserve 33.3 per cent of seats in national and state level assemblies. Furthermore, both the TDP and the Congress party have committed to increasing the number of women in important party organization posts through reservation. The TDP's policy states that

> At least 50% of the executive committee positions, right from the primary level to the State level, shall be reserved for the Women, Dalits, Girijans, Backward classes and the minorities. Care shall be taken to see that women are given proper representation in all levels of Party positions, and in the people's representatives [sic] for various [government] bodies.
>
> (Telugu Desam Party, n.d.)

Similarly, a third of all party organisation posts in the Congress Party have been reserved for women since the All India Congress Committee voted in the resolution in December 1998 (Indian Express, 1998b). Before this, the party operated a 15 per cent quota for women (Wolkowitz, 1987). In terms of State Level Committees, the current composition of State Legislative Assembly Committees under the Congress government elected in 2004 suggests an inconsistent approach to the inclusion of women MLAs. In many committees, women are the minority; in others there are no women; and one, the Women's Welfare Committee consists of only women.[89]

---

[88] 25 per cent are reserved for Backward Classes, 15 per cent for Scheduled Castes, 6 per cent for Scheduled Tribes, 3 per cent for the physically disabled, and 1 per cent for Ex Servicemen.

[89] A lack of historical data on committees under previous governments prohibits a comparison between parties and over time.

5.2.3 Comparative conclusions on the descriptively gendered state

As the analysis here shows, while there has been a visible increase in the numbers of women in government, over the last two decades., women are descriptively under-represented in government and do not form a significantly large presence (in terms of numbers) in electoral politics, state government employment, or public office, with the exception of a few notably experienced women bureaucrats, and current and former MLAs and Ministers. Strategies for increasing descriptive representation have employed, or have indicated intentions of employing, mostly positive discrimination strategies through reserving vacancies and positions for women but this has not been uniform. Reservation has been implemented at the panchayat level in both States, but the Women's Reservation Bill which would reserve seats for women in State Assemblies (and the National Parliament) is still to be passed, even though political parties in both States have expressed their support for the Bill. Political parties in both states have meanwhile made (at least rhetorical) commitments to reserving positions in their party organizations and on State-level committees, although admittedly with the nomination of women political representatives, in some cases this can effectively increase their obligation to the political leadership when in public office and therefore diminish the impetus for change. Reservation for women in government jobs occurs at the State Subordinate Services level in both AP and TN (though not all States), yet reservation is not an instrument of increasing women's descriptive representation in the higher levels of bureaucracy, such as the IAS. Yet where a reservation policy does exist, it is difficult to link the increased numbers of women in state institutional structures to affirmative action strategies given the lack of data linking recruitment to reservation policies.

Highlighting the descriptive underrepresentation of women in state institutions is not enough to argue convincingly that the state is a gendered institution. Instead it can be seen more as a manifestation of how the complex configuration of institutional norms and practices are gendered in ways which constitute women - as gendered subjects - as incompatible with such norms and practices and therefore exclude them from participating in the same institutions. In other words, the descriptive underrepresentation of women may be seen as an *effect* of the substantively gendered norms and practices in state institutions. As Brown argues, 'the elements

of the state identifiable as masculinist correspond not to some property contained within men but to the conventions of power and privilege *constitutive* of gender within an order of male dominance' (Brown, 2006: 188). To some extent, the presence of more women in government may *disrupt* institutionally embedded assumptions of organizational culture – that the public sector is dominated by men – regardless of whether they *themselves* bring about a change in institutional norms and practices. As such, it is understood that increasing the participation of women in state institutions will necessarily involve a *substantive* change in these institutions themselves.

5.2.4 The substantively gendered state

Tamil Nadu

Can we observe at the State level in TN and AP the same patterns that Thakur observed at the national level in terms of gendered distributional patterns of men and women in terms of postings? A survey of IAS officers in AP and TN verifies Thakur's observation to some extent.[90] In TN, women have tended to hold posts in the Department of Social Welfare (responsible for Women and Child Welfare). Interestingly, however, at the level of Secretary the pattern of appointment is more representative of the service as a whole, where many of whom have been men officers, indicating that seniority is also a factor. In planning and finance, Thakur's observations can also be confirmed – these departments have indeed been dominated by men with the exception of a few women officers. The post of Principal Secretary, Finance Department for example has been held by only four male bureaucrats since 1989. One senior women IAS officer from TN cadre is quoted as saying: 'We are waiting now for a woman to be posted as Finance Secretary...When that happens, the last bastion of the male officer would have fallen...' (Santhanam, 2005).

[90] Data for this comparison has been sourced from various reports of IAS transfers reported periodically in the press and confirmed by records on the Ministry of Personnel website detailing the career history of individual IAS officers (GoI, n.d.-b). Data is limited to those IAS officers still active in government service at the time of access (but not those who have left since), as well as officers on leave or on deputation to foreign assignments. These limitations on data prevent a more thorough historical analysis for which the availability of continuous data is more limited and less accessible.

A number of state service conduct rules, some of which apply only to the lower levels of government employment, suggest that the state government has attempted to institutionalize some of its more progressive anti-discrimination legislation in state government employment codes of conduct. For example, rule 3A of the Government of Tamil Nadu's Government Servants Conduct Rules prohibits any government servant from giving, receiving, demanding, or abetting the giving and receiving of dowry as defined by the Government of India's Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (GoTN, 2005c: 4). Rule 19 also prohibits government servants from entering into bigamous marriages (GoTN, 2005c: 21). Sexual harassment of women, or more specifically 'working women' or 'any woman at the work place' (harassment of men is not referred to) is also prohibited under Rule 20A (GoTN, 2005c: 22). Government servants in a position of authority are also expected to take steps to prevent sexual harassment (ibid).

However, several other government employment rules and norms suggest instead that government service is deeply imbued with gendered norms which discipline women employees by restricting their autonomy and by interpellating them as marginal subjects in the gendered imaginary of the typical government employee. One example is how the small family norm and family planning is tied to entitlements of female government employees to maternity leave. Firstly, implicit in GoTN rules on entitlements to maternity leave is that only married women are eligible. Secondly, the 90 day maternity leave on full pay entitlement available to permanent (and some non-permanent) female government employees is restricted to women with less than 'two surviving children' (GoTN, 2007c: 136). This was reduced in 1993, where previously the rules for entitlement stated that 'maternity leave will not be admissible to married women Government servants with more than three children' (GoTN, 2007c: 136). Furthermore, the state makes explicit reference to special leave entitlements for women and men undergoing operations for sterilization and for women for operations to insert contraceptive devices (GoTN, 2007c: 266). Thus, through government employment rules and entitlements, the State government is encouraging women and men employees to adopt a small family norm and the use of family planning technologies.

Another example is how numerous official manuals on government personnel service rules demonstrate that the dominant gendered interpellation of the government servant is as a male

subject, indicated by almost ubiquitous references to 'he' and 'his' and hardly ever accompanied by a 'she' and 'her'. This is particularly evident in one rule pertaining to the posting of government personnel under or near relatives or in relation to their links with private employment in the interest of preventing corruption:

> 'Every member of a State Service... other shall inform his immediate official superior of any reason that there may be why it is undesirable in the public interest that he should be employed in a particular district or division *such as the near relationship of himself or his wife* to any person or persons residing in that district or division.'
>
> (GoTN, 2005c: 20, my emphasis)

This strongly suggests that the state's imaginary of the government employee subject is male.

Andhra Pradesh

Data available on gendered patterns of postings of male and female bureaucrats confirms some of Thakur's observations at the national level. Women have rarely occupied the most senior posts in the state. As noted earlier, Sathi Nair was the first woman officer to be appointed Chief Secretary in the State. Out of the twelve IAS officers posted as chief secretary to the government since 1991, the top bureacratic post at the state level, only one has been a woman. The sectoral location of bureaucrat postings also shows some gendered trends. Judging by data available since 2000, equal numbers of men and women have served in the Department of Women's Development and Child Welfare, GoAP, including at the senior secretary level (see Table 4 below). While this appears prima facie to suggest that there is no outright association of women with this post, if one looks at the relative proportion of women officers to men officers in the IAS in AP this would suggest that women are more likely to be posted in this department than men.

Data on officers appointed to the top post of Principal Secretary in the Finance Department throughout the 1990s shows that this post has been dominated by male officers, although some female IAS officers, such as Veena Ish and Vasudhra Mishra, have served in lower Secretary posts in the department.

Table 4 Women and Men Officers Posted to Department of Women Development and Child Welfare since the year 2000

Name	Sex (M/F)	Date appointed to post
Vasuda Mishra	F	May 2006
Prabhakar D Thomas	M	August 2004 -May 2006
Dr Prasanta Mahapatra	M	October 2003-October 2004[1]
Minnie Matthews	F	June 2002-October 2003
Dr. S. Chellappa	M	October 2001 – June 2002
S. P. Singh	M	June 2001-October 2001
Comal R Gayathri (aka Gayathri Ramachandran)	F	November 1999-March 2001

Source: (GoI, 2007a,, n.d.-b)
Notes: [1]Overlap with successor due to awaiting posting

State civil service norms in AP mirror much of those already discussed for TN: a contradictory mix of gender-responsive and coercive rules for government employment on issues such as dowry, sexual harassment, maternity leave policies, and small family norms. An even more illustrative example of the gendered embodiment of the civil servant as male is articulated in relation to regulations on bigamous marriage. The same service rule demonstrates that, in AP more so than TN, recognition of minority communities and personal laws appears to be more embedded.

> *No Government employee* who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government, notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him…*No female Government Servant*, whether unmarried or widow or divorced, as the case may be, shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission of the Government, though the parties are governed by the personal law which otherwise permits contracting more than one marriage while the prior marriage is subsisting.
>
> (GoAP, n.d.: 36-7, my emphasis)

As this demonstrates, government employees are inherently imagined as male, and female government employees are therefore marked as Other.

What the foregoing analysis of the substantive gendered norms of state-level administration suggests is two things. Firstly, at risk of simplification, despite variations in the specific institutional context, bureaucratic norms are fairly similar in terms of the aggregate institutional

location – in other words, *between* States. However, the analysis also suggests that, secondly, *within* states this is not so much the case. State institutional norms vary according to specific institutional locations *within* states such as in Finance or Planning compared to Health or Social Welfare. Thus, while bureaucratic norms seem to remain stable despite institutional differences between states, within states bureaucratic are internally varied.

Despite this observation, there still remains a perception that the civil services within the southern states are generally more gender egalitarian. Thakur's respondents observed that the prevalence of gender stereotyping in the bureaucracy reflected the regional variation of gender relations in India more generally. She notes, with specific reference to TN and AP,

> Of the women who replied that they did not feel there was gender stereotyping in the nature of posts held, several specifically added that this view only applied to their state governments – Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh – and that stereotyping was possibly more likely in the case of the Central Government...From this data, it emerges that the nature of gender stereotyping of posts tends to correspond with the overall situation of gender disparities within a particular state. This correspondence underscores the fact that the IAS and the way it functions is part of a wider societal context, and thus cannot be viewed in isolation.
>
> (Thakur, c.1997: 18-19).

The regional difference in gender relations was an observation made frequently in several interviews for this thesis research, suggesting that the southern states were considered both more gender egalitarian (and thus potentially more conducive to gender-equitable development policy) and also better administered states. On the first point, CK Gariyali, the seniormost women IAS officer in TN has stated elsewhere, that 'Tamil Nadu is a great State to serve in, as culturally, women are held in high regard here compared to other States' (quoted in Santhanam, 2005).

Does this mean then that IAS training procedures which attempt to endeavour to inculcate into officers an all-India *espirit de corps*, in order to transcend regional differences in officers' backgrounds, and to cultivate a sense of belonging to a larger entity, are not effective? Potter and others have shown that despite attempts to cultivate an all-India sense of identity, regional differences in bureaucratic norms and practices between States were evident (Potter, 1986: 211).

These arguments raise a series of important inter-related questions and implications for adopting gender mainstreaming strategies as part of bureaucratic reforms in AP and TN, which hinge on this assumption that the *perception* of the southern states as more gender egalitarian may have an

effect on the possibilities for presenting gender-equitable development policy as consistent with bureaucratic norms and practices in these two states. To what extent does this discourse of southern state comparative egaliatarianism reproduce itself and actually constitute the gendered norms embedded in bureaucratic formation of development policy? Conversely, does this discourse close off investigative efforts to scrutinise less egalitarian norms and practices in these states? And to what extent does it lead to an underestimation of the need for change in the Southern States towards more gender-equitable bureaucratic norms and practices? These questions are important but beyond the scope of this thesis as it would require further comparative analyses of states other than those under study here. Continuing in the following section, I consider the extent of institutional development of state-level machineries for women in each state in order to explore the institutional openings for feminist transformative strategies.

5.3 Feminist bureaucratic spaces? The State-level machinery for women

As discussed in Chapter 3, a feminist bureaucratic-structural intervention is defined as an intervention where 'women [and men] create new structures within government or university administrations specifically designed to benefit women (such as women's policy units, women's studies programmes, or ministries for women's affairs)...' (Eisenstein, 1989, 1991, cited in Witz and Savage, 1992: 39). In Chapter 3, I briefly explored the development of the national machinery for women in India, including the Ministry of Women and Child Development and the National Commission for Women, and argued that the bureaucratic-structural strategy has been a prominent strategy in the Indian national context, particularly more so than a bureaucratic-individual or 'femocrat' strategy, but that it has not been without problems. Nevertheless, as Weedon argues, 'in order to have a social effect, a discourse must at least be in circulation'. Feminist bureaucratic-structural strategies are, at least, a way of 'getting your foot in the door' and creating some space, albeit limited, for feminist negotiation with the state and are a complementary strategy to a more transformative and destabilising gender mainstreaming strategy.

It is a central argument of this thesis that, given the federalist model of government in India, the institutional context for gendered development policy *at the subnational level* is important, and

increasingly so since the early 1990s. Therefore, it is not sufficient to consider only those institutional developments and feminist strategies which are aimed at the national level, but to look also at the level of state governments. Here I focus on the development of the state level machinery for women, including government departments responsible for 'women's welfare', State Commissions for Women, and parastatal agencies administering government programmes for women, gender, and development. The analysis that follows serves to explore comparatively the different trajectories of State level initiatives both within and between Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and the variations in institutional context. In the conclusion I consider the resulting implications these institutional developments have for strategies to mainstream gender in development policy.

Tamil Nadu

No separate government ministry or department for women or gender equality exists at the state level in GoTN. Policy and programmes specifically targeting women and charged with women's welfare and development have been located mostly within two State government departments – the Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Rural Development. Until the DMK government came to power in the 1967, the Women's Welfare Unit was located in the Home Department of the State government. Subsequently, it was removed and upgraded to the status of a full department, and named the Social Welfare Department, and included welfare of the disabled and welfare of children among its list of broadened activities (Rao, 2003: 359). The Social Welfare Department has since been one of the main departments involved in policy issues and programmes for women (with some inter-departmental co-ordination for schemes from other departments). Not surprisingly given their departmental location, many of these schemes are welfare oriented and include assistance to 'women in difficult circumstances', working women's hostels, incentives and assistance schemes for inter-caste marriage, widow remarriage, and marriage of the daughters of poor widows, and most famously the Nutritious Meal Programme, a nutritional intervention which provides a daily meal in schools for children (discussed further in Chapter Six)

The Social Welfare Department has also been the administrative parent department of the semi-autonomous government undertaking, the Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of

Women (TNCDW, discussed below), since the Corporation's inception in 1983. The Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare, an IAS officer, has also acted as Chairman of the Corporation at times. This institutional arrangement persisted until as recently as July 2006 when administrative control of the Corporation was transferred to the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj.

Until the late 1990s, the Department for Rural Development administered a UNICEF-funded (until 1996) Central Government scheme called the Integrated Rural Development Programme and its subcomponent, the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA). This sub-component specifically targeted women and mobilised them to form self-help groups of around twenty women for the purposes of thrift and credit, as well as other social and educational activities (in some ways similar to the scheme that GoTN would set up a few years later). Government funding was split in a 75: 25 ratio between the Central government and State governments. DWCRA had varying results, most notably its lack of coverage of poor women. In 1999, DWCRA, its parent scheme, the IRDP, and several other rural development and employment-generating schemes were merged under a new Central government scheme with the aim of converging the services of the erstwhile schemes into one holistic programme. The new scheme, *Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana* (SGSY), continued to emphasise the importance of self-employment through the SHG model, and thought it important to target poor women as key beneficiaries.

During the 1990s, both state governments of TN and AP established State Commissions for Women. The impetus for this came from the national level, with the introduction of the National Commission for Women's Act in 1990 and the provision it made for individual States to form their own State-level Commissions for Women.

The State Commission for Women in TN was constituted in 1993. It is currently located in the building which houses the TNCDW, in Guindy, Chennai. The mandate of the Tamil Nadu State Commission for Women (TNSCW) is to 'protect the rights and to safeguard the welfare of women' (GoTN, 2005a: 26). This largely entails taking up legal cases on behalf of women and raising awareness about women's rights through legal literacy programmes. The Commission has also in the past conducted gender sensitization training for members of the police force, the

judiciary, and Government Revenue officers. The Commission includes a Chairperson and nine part time members. In 2007, these nine members were specified as including the following: the Secretary to Government of the Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, two women MLAs, one IAS officer and one Police officer, two reputed public women, one lawyer, and the Director of Social Welfare (to act as member-secretary) (GoTN, 2007b: 10).

The position of chairperson of the Commission was first held by Justice Padmini Jesudurai, notable for being the first woman judge of the Madras High Court. In March 2002, Vasanthi Devi, a prominent social activist and a former University Vice Chancellor, took over the position of chairperson. Arguably, Vasanthi Devi had perhaps the most visible impact of the three women to hold the post of chairperson of the State Commission for Women and she continues to speak out on women's rights since leaving the Commission. After Vasanthi Devi's tenure came to an end in March 2005, the post became vacant and the commission lapsed. Shortly after the DMK was elected to government in 2006, the National Commission for Women representative member for the Southern States, Nirmala Venkatesh, called on the new Chief Minister Karunanidhi to reconstitute the commission and appoint a chairperson. Subsequently, the current chairperson of the Commission, K.M Ramathal, was appointed in 2007.

As the Commission was established by a government order, with only provisions for the State to constitute a Commission rather than a statutory obligation, it does not have statutory powers like the National Commission for Women and most other State Commissions (with the exception of the Haryana State Commission for Women). Furthermore, its continued operation relies on the good will of the government to reconstitute the Commission, appoint its Chairperson, and provide adequate funds and powers. At an AIDWA conference in 2005, former Chairperson Vasanthi Devi reiterated her previous call in 2003 that the Commission lacked power and status. She called for the Commission to be granted more funds, infrastructure, and powers (The Hindu, 2005a), supporting Poornima Advani's (Chairperson of the National Commission for Women) appeal to the GoTN Chief Minister (J. Jayalalithaa) two years earlier (The Hindu, 2003d). In a separate statement, the Chairperson of the National Commission for Women, Poornima Advani, praised the TN Commission for its achievements despite the constraints it faced (The Hindu, 2005c).

The lack of status of the Commission can also be seen in the relationship of the Commission with the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission, compared to the national level. The State's Human Rights Commission based in Chennai was constituted in 1997, making Tamil Nadu the fifth State to constitute such a commission. At the federal level, the Chairperson of the National Commission for Women sits on the National Commission for Human Rights as one of its members. This is not the case with the State Human Rights Commission in TN. While the State Commission for Women is more narrowly focused on legal redressal of atrocities against women than women's wider economic and social development, the lack of support for the commission from the State Government is perhaps indicative of the latter's limited commitment to gender equality.

The 1990s in Tamil Nadu saw the progressive expansion of a government program aimed at women's development, first through the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD)-funded Women's Development Project from 1989 to 1998, and subsequently, the continuation of the former program in *Mahalir Thittam* (Women's Scheme), funded by GoTN. Both projects have been implemented by a semi-autonomous government undertaking, the Tamil Nadu Corporation for Women's Development, which was until recently under the administrative control of the Department of Social Welfare.

The TNCDW was established in December 1983 and registered under the Companies Act (1956). IFAD's involvement in the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project officially ended on 31st December 1998, after a one year extension. A year before the IFAD funded project ended, the government launched its own project called *Mahalir Thittam* as an extension and large scale replication of the TNWDP. The new scheme envisioned enrolling 10 *lakhs* (1 million) women onto the scheme and, like the previous scheme, forming groups of no more than twenty women into self-help groups. By 2004-05, the target was increased to cover another 15 *lakhs* (1.5 million) women over the following three years (GoTN, 2004: section 4.2).[91]

---

[91] Most of the analysis which follows is based on Mahalir Thittam rather than the IFAD-funded TNWDP. This is because firstly, much of the available program documentation relates to Mahalir Thittam; secondly, because Mahalir Thittam, as a much larger scale project, has generated important dynamics of its own; thirdly, it has claimed to have incorporated lessons learnt from various evaluations of the IFAD project (which I also draw upon in my analysis);

From its initial beginnings in one district (Dharmapuri), the programme grew to cover all thirty districts of the State. Thus, from its initial origins from one pilot district, over the course of thirteen years, the program witnessed a significant upscaling, extending to cover all districts of the State, including both rural and urban areas.[92]

The Corporation and Mahalir Thittam involve a diverse range of different actors, including both governmental and non-governmental, at various levels of a vertical and spatial hierarchy. Indeed, for the TNCDW, a 'unique' feature of the project was the TNCDW's 'onerous' task of co-ordinating a number of different agencies to work towards the goals of the project (TNCDW, 2000a: 9). The key institutional actors included Banks (solely the Indian Bank under the IFAD-funded TNWDP), NGOs, the Government, and the women's groups.

The Corporation operates at the state, district and block (local) level. The project management unit (PMU) is based at TNCDW headquarters in Chennai; project implementation units (PIUs) are based in the project districts; and a number of committees are based at the State, district, and local levels (TNCDW, 2000b).[93] The PMU is headed by a Chairperson who on occasion might also hold the post of Managing Director, assisted by an Executive Director. The first appointed Chair under the IFAD-funded TNWDP, Valamarthi Jebaraj (Chairperson TNCDW, 1991-1996),

---

fourthly, an analysis of Mahalir Thittam, as the later programme of the two, also enables a more current understanding of the program; and lastly, of course space limits the extent to which I can analyse both programs.

[92] Under the IFAD-funded phase, the project initially began in 1990 in Dharmapuri district, with plans to extend it to another two districts (Salem and the erstwhile district of South Arcot, which was later split into Cuddalore and Villupuram districts in 1993). These three districts were selected by the project as the 'most backward districts in the State with respect to the status of women' (IFAD, 1989: 7-8). The program was later extended to another two districts (Madurai and Ramanathapuram) to cover five districts in total, by the end of the IFAD phase. With the launch of *Mahalir Thittam* in 1997-98, in the first phase of expansion the project included the same TNWDP districts[92], as well as eight further districts.[92] In the second phase of expansion in 1998-99, the project was extended to cover a further seven districts[92] and then another seven districts in phase three, 1999-2000.[92] Its focus was rural-based until in 2000-01, the scheme was extended to all Town Panchayats and Municipalities in the 28 districts covered by the project (TNCDW, 2000a: 5). In 2002-03, it was announced that the scheme would be expanded to include Chennai, eventually covering all thirty districts of Tamil Nadu.[92]

[93] At the district level, the PIU is headed by a Project Officer with a number of Assistant Project Officers. Given the large scale replication of Mahalir Thittam, the project required significant co-ordination between the Project Management Unit in Chennai and the District Project Units. At the District level, the District Project Co-ordination Committee is headed by the District Collector, with the District Project Officer for TNCDW as the Member-Secretary, and the remaining members are composed of district government line department heads, bank, NGO, and NABARD representatives, two elected representative women SHG members, 'two women with proven commitment to women's issues', and secretaries of the local Block Level Co-ordination Committees. The latter is made up of NGO representatives, bankers, the Assistant Project Officer from the District PIU, and one representative from each SHG in the Block (TNCDW, 2000b: 23-25)

who was a political appointee, former MLA, and, according to the media, a loyal supporter of the Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa (The Hindu, 2001) was an exception. All other Chairpersons and Managing Directors, as well as Executive Directors, have been IAS officers from the State level bureaucracy. The Chairperson is usually a senior bureaucrat of at least Joint Secretary rank, requiring around sixteen years of service, although higher and lower ranked officers have also occupied this post. IAS officers appointed to the post of Chairperson of the Corporation have almost invariably been women, but other senior posts have often been staffed by male officers. Yet, there does not seem to be a preferred pattern of career service for appointing the Chairperson – previous appointees had prior experience in a range of sectors from agriculture, and health and family welfare, to energy, planning, and finance.

The Corporation also worked closely with the State Department of Rural Development, and helped to administer a Central government scheme: IRDP, its subcomponent targeting women called DWCRA, and its subsequent forms as discussed above. The Department of Rural Development represents an important participating line department as it has access to extensive funding from the central government as well as close links with the District Rural Development Administration (DRDA) at the sub-State level. Recently, in July 2006, the Government of Tamil Nadu, under the new DMK government, decided to move the TNCDW from under the administrative control of the Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Rural Development. According to the Rural Development Department, the rationale for this move was 'to bring about greater synergy and better coordination in implementing various schemes for Self Help Groups' (GoTN, 2007a: 30). The move also coincided with a new role for the TNCDW vis-à-vis the recently approved World Bank project, the Tamil Nadu Empowerment and Poverty Reduction Project (TNEPRP; also known as *Vazhndhu Kaatuvom*). The TNCDW's role is no less diminished in the new project structure but rather changed in orientation.[94] Key personnel involved with MaThi will continue to be involved in the new project.

---

[94] The post of Project Director of TNEPRP is held by the Executive Director of TNCDW. The Project Director (TNEPRP)/Executive Director (TNCDW) as well as the Managing Director of TNCDW sit on two State-level committees for the project - the Governing body and the Executive Committee. The Governing Body, the higher level committee of the two, is chaired by the Finance Secretary with the Social Welfare Secretary as Vice Chair. It consists of fifteen members including secretaries of various State level departments and other officials, the convenor of the State Level Bankers Committee (SLBC), and representatives from NGO and community organizations,

The lauded autonomous status of the Corporation is also somewhat debatable given that its most senior staff members are IAS officers, and at least two Chairpersons have in the past also held the position of Secretary for Social Welfare. At the State Level, the two committees responsible for directing policy are also headed by senior government bureaucrats; the Central Project Co-ordination Committee (CPCC) headed by the Chief Secretary of the Government of Tamil Nadu, as well as a TNCDW review committee headed by the Development Commissioner (who is also the Finance secretary). But day-to-day autonomy exists, the PMU undertakes monthly reviews of the project and manages operations, and the Board of Directors take decisions over operational, and sometimes policy, issues. The IFAD Completion Evaluation Report looked positively on the TNCDW's position in government and its semi-autonomous status as a government undertaking as a factor contributing to the success of the project:

> The positioning of the DEW in the Government structure contributed to the success of project implementation in that it was able to benefit from the support of government authorities and line departments while minimizing undue political or bureaucratic interference due to its close association with IFAD and knowledge of the latter's implementing procedures and loan agreement clauses.
>
> (IFAD, 2000)

But in acknowledging this autonomy, it neglected to consider that it was also more sheltered from public scrutiny at the State level.

The TNCDW's cordial relationship with bank agencies involved in the project was celebrated by the Corporation. Banks were considered the 'most important partners', an 'excellent working relationship' had been built with the State Level Bankers Committee, and NABARD was deemed 'an important ally' (TNCDW, 2000a: 5). But the Corporation also recognized the need for delivering gender sensitization training to banking partners. The Corporation, with some assistance from NABARD, delivered training and orientation programs to bank employees involved with MaThi in order to sensitise them to the core principles of the project and also in the delivery of microcredit loans to SHG members. The TNCDW reported that training and orientation had generated interest among bankers in linking SHGs with credit and has enabled SHGs to open accounts with ease (TNCDW, 2000a: 8). It had also positively influenced bankers'

---

academia, and industry. The Executive Committee is chaired by the Social Welfare Secretary, and has a similar constitution of members but is slightly smaller with ten members. The Project Director also heads the Management Team.

perceptions about the potential of women SHGs as 'a promising business segment' with high repayment rates (ibid). Such positive evaluations, however, glossed over a more complex picture. The need for banker orientation was clearly necessary – according to the IFAD completion evaluation in 2000, 'a significant proportion of the women interviewed stated that bankers' attitudes had not changed towards poor women' (IFAD, 2000). Furthermore, external dynamics beyond the control of the Corporation also frustrated the institutionalization of sensitization and orientation training. The TNCDW reported that movement of Bank staff from one district to another required repeated rounds of orientation training (TNCDW, 2000a: 8).

As for the involvement of NGOs in the project, a diverse range from welfare and charity-oriented voluntary organizations such as the Women's Indian Association to more professionally oriented NGOs such as MYRADA participated. NGOs represented a key partner in the delivery of training and support to SHGs. But their transformative potential was somewhat diminished by the competitive dynamic among NGOs – high levels of competition *with each other* to get government funding for setting up groups, which at times involved 'poaching' some SHG members from existing groups to form new ones (personal communication, NGO in Salem district, 6th June 2007).

Part of the mission of Mahalir Thittam was 'to advocate changes in government policies and programmes in favor of disadvantaged women' (TNCDW, 2000b: 17). Like many microcredit programmes for women, the Corporation's program design aimed to inculcate a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture' in program participants (Rankin, 2004: 189; discussed further in Chapter 7) but it said less about the Corporation's own institutional culture. It was not clear whether the Corporation had a self-reflexive organizational gender policy of its own, or considered one necessary. Yet, on a positive note, the Completion Evaluation Report suggested that the project had made a complementary and 'unmistakable' impact on the organization:

> major increases in funds and influence have resulted from project activities and new, purpose-built premises have been built. This effect can be observed in various aspects of DEW's activities, with better-trained and more motivated staff, more confident management and greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state authorities. DEW has matured into a solid institution, capable of implementing poverty eradication programmes efficiently and of providing invaluable advice to GOTN and others on policy and related issues
>
> (IFAD, 2000)

Andhra Pradesh

In Andhra Pradesh, policy issues and administration relating to women, gender and development are concentrated in just a few government departments, the two most prominent being the Department of Women Development and Child Welfare, and the Department of Rural Development.

The Department of Women Development and Child Welfare (DWD&CW) was established in its original form in 1952 as the Women's Welfare Department in what was then Madras State. It became the Department of Women and Child Welfare in 1973, and was later renamed as the Department of Women Development and Child Welfare in 1989 (GoAP DWD&CW website). DWD&CW classifies its activities into two categories: i) implementation of the part-World Bank-funded Central Government's Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and ii) welfare-oriented schemes for women, children, and the elderly, such as working women's hostels, *Swadhar* (a Central government sponsored scheme for 'women in difficult circumstances), schemes to compensate for discrimination against girl children, and state homes for the elderly (GoAP DWD&CW, n.d.). DWD&CW has also been involved in measures to investigate cases of domestic violence and dowry practices and compensate women victims, as well as efforts to combat trafficking of women in Andhra Pradesh. The dominant scheme of the Department is the ICDS programme, which is implemented through a network of more than 66,000 local *anganwadi* centres, largely dominated by women *anganwadi* workers, reaching nearly 2 million women, nearly 7 million children, and nearly 4 million adolescent girls (figures for 2004-05; GoAP DWD&CW, n.d.).

In contrast, the Department of Rural Development (DRD) has been more closely involved with anti-poverty and development programmes for women. DRD is the implementing agency of the Central Government scheme, the IRDP, discussed above, since it was introduced in a number of states including Andhra Pradesh in 1982. During the 1990s and beyond, the programmatic set-up has undergone several changes specific to Andhra Pradesh. In 1999, when the Central Government merged the components of the IRDP in to the new scheme, SGSY, women's self-

help groups remained a separate component (and continued to be popularly known as DWCRA). These groups existed alongside self-help groups formed under a World Bank-funded project specific to Andhra Pradesh called *Velugu* (meaning 'light' in Telugu). Then, when the new Congress government came to power in the State Assembly elections in 2004, the programmatic organisation again changed. In 2005, *Velugu* was merged with SGSY and renamed *Indira Kranthi Pratham.*

With these programmatic changes came symbolically significant but practically minor changes in their administrative set-up. Previously, in 2001, the Department for Rural Development had established the Commissionerate for Women's Empowerment and Self-Employment. Before that, one of two wings in the Department for Rural Development was referred to as DWCRA after the name of the scheme. Mooij (2002: 37) argues that the creation of this new Commissionerate reflected the importance political leaders assigned to this programme, as part of the government's focus on women. The emphasis on women was rescinded however when, in January 2005, as part of a larger departmental reorganisation parallel to the programmatic convergence mentioned above, the Commissionerate for Women's Empowerment and Self-Employment was merged with the Commissionerate for Rural Development, creating instead an SHG (self-help group) wing in the Department for Panchayati Raj and Rural Development.

In Andhra Pradesh, the State Commission for Women was first constituted in 1999 - later than its counterpart in Tamil Nadu - after the Andhra Pradesh Women's Commission Act was passed in March 1998 with Presidential approval. The Act provided for a Commission consisting of a Chairperson and six other members from AP, including one each from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Minorities Communities (GoAP, 1998: article 5:1). Members were to hold office for five years. The Act stated that the Chairperson 'shall be an eminent women [sic] committed to the cause of [the] welfare of women with sufficient knowledge and experience in dealing with women's problems' (ibid: article 5:2). It also stated that members of the Commission should be

> women of ability, integrity and standing who have served the cause of women or have had sufficient knowledge and experience in law or legislation, administration of matters concerning the advancement of women for protection or leadership of any trade union or voluntary organization for women for protection, upliftment and promotion of common interests of women

(ibid: article 5:1)

The Commission could also invite subject experts to advise members.

Both Chairpersons of the Commission to date have been political appointees, though this applies less to the first Chairperson, Susheela Devi, appointed in 1999, than to the Chairperson taking over in 2004, Mary Ravindranath. Susheela Devi's background was in legal advocacy and she had worked as the State's Public Prosecutor prior to her appointment (interview, May 2006). It is likely that her background influenced the emphasis she placed on raising women's awareness of their legal rights in her role as Chairperson of the Commission. Mary Ravindranath was appointed to the Commission in 2005, after unsuccessfully contesting in the State Assembly Elections in 2004 on a Congress Party ticket in Secundarabad constituency. She had previously been elected to the same constituency in 1989, but was not subsequently re-elected in 1994 and lost again in 1999, both being elections which saw the rival party, the TDP, elected to office. In 2006, Ravindranth had called on the Chief Minister to demonstrate support for her authority in relation to what she perceived as disrespect towards her leadership among Commission members (The Hindu, 2007a). In contrast, members accused the chairperson of poor leadership and bad administration of the Commission. In July 2007, Ravindranath was asked by the Chief Minister to resign as Chairperson after a very public dispute with another member of the Commission (who was also asked to resign) (The Hindu, 2007b). Media reports quoted the Chief Minister of accusing Ravindranath of damaging the reputation of the Commission as a result of the media coverage of the dispute .

Importantly, unlike the Tamil Nadu Commission for Women, the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Women was granted statutory powers, including its own budget allocated by government and the same powers as a Civil Court to try legal cases. The Commission's wide mandate as outlined in the Act includes examining legal provisions and state recruitment practices affecting women, inspecting state institutions such as jails, police stations, and state-owned women's hostels; submitting an annual report to government on the Commission's activities and their recommendations; and conducting or commissioning research and maintaining data on the condition of women in the State (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1). Notably, the Commission's mandate also includes participating in, and advising on, the 'planning process of socio-economic

development of women' (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1: xi) and to 'undertake promotional and educational research so as to suggest ways of ensuring due representation of women in all spheres and identify factors responsible for impeding their advancement' (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1: xiv). Despite this wide mandate, the Commission focused on legal and educational aspects, including raising awareness about HIV/AIDS, improving women's legal literacy and awareness, setting up a civil court dedicated to women's issues (the *Mahila Lok Adalat*), inspecting a State prison, and trying to bring together a women's university consortium. It did not involve itself much with the planning process nor did it have much to do with independently monitoring and evaluating the growing women's self-help group programme in the State. Indeed, when a member of the National Commission for Women visited a number of villages surrounding Vijayawada in June 2006 regarding allegations of harassment of women by micro-finance organisations in the state, the State Commission for Women was not a central presence (author's fieldnotes, June 2006).

In Andhra Pradesh, the goal of gender-equitable development has formed part of a more mainstream program (not segregated for women) at the *parastatal* level to address rural poverty, compared to its counterpart in Tamil Nadu. The Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) was established as an independent, autonomous society registered under the Public Societies Act to serve as the main implementing agency for Velugu, the World Bank-funded project in Andhra Pradesh, commencing in June 2000. Velugu comprised of two phases. [95]Both these phases have been continued under the name of Indira Kranthi Pratham (IKP) under the new Congress government.[96]

Velugu's model was largely based on the UNDP's South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme (SAPAP) which was implemented in three districts in the State from 1996-2000 and was deemed to be successful in building community based institutions for and by the rural poor to address rural poverty. Velugu/IKP operates on the self-help group model, with primarily women-only

---

[95] The first was the Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project (ADPIP) in 180 selected 'backward' mandals of six districts of the state,[95] from 2000-2005, and with funding of Rs. 600 crores (approximately £73.5 million)[95]. The second phase of Velugu was the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project (APRPRP), in selected 'backward' mandals of the remaining 16 districts, from 2003-2008, with funding of nearly Rs. 1500 crores (approximately £184 million)[95].

[96] As mentioned earlier, IKP also includes the Central government SGSY programme after the latter was merged with Velugu in 2005, and which SERP also administers.

groups of around 15-20 members. Micro-finance activities are seen as a cohering force for the groups and provide an entry point for the program's social mobilisation and social change objectives. Self-help groups are then clustered into Village Organisations (VOs) and further federated to form Mandal Samakhyas. VOs are involved in monitoring and strengthening their SHGs as well as village level development activities. Mandal Samkhya leaders are given training by SERP and other contracted agencies to implement components of the project; they also take up larger scale activities compared to SHGs and VOs and help to strengthen VOs. By December 2004, more than 440,000 SHGs, more than 27,000 VOs, and nearly 750 Mandal Samakhyas were involved with the program (GoAP, 2005b: 7; GoAP Dept of Rural Development, 2005: 7).

The Gender Strategy involved five interventions, four of which required that mainstream institutional processes and activities took into consideration gender issues: these were 'mainstreaming gender in CIF activities', 'promoting gender awareness among project stakeholders', 'introducing engendered project management', and 'implementing gender disaggregated [Monitoring and Evaluation]' (World Bank, 2003: 25). Gender is one of a number of cross-cutting issues in the program for which SERP has appointed functional specialists at the State level as State Project Directors (a few examples include marketing, micro-finance, disability, and institution building) and at the district level. While Velugu/IKP is a mainstream program designed to reduce rural poverty, gender is seen as a key component of the program, not least because women form a majority of SHG members, but also because it adopts a complementary and potentially harmonious view of gender relations. Specifically, the program endorses the view that 'poor communities are able to achieve poverty alleviation through self-managed grassroots institutions by harmonising the concerns of men and women' (SERP, c.2002: 37). Thus, the project seeks to expand beyond women-only groups to form men's groups and youth groups, based on the recognition that the 'organization of women's groups alone would not help in either eliminating poverty or empowering women; the process can be triggered and made sustainable when all members of the family are organized' (SERP, c.2002). To some extent, operationalising this strategy has not been as clear cut, however (discussed further in Chapter 6).

While SERP is considered independent and autonomous of government, it has considerable links with government and many of its most senior staff are government personnel.[97] Notwithstanding some intermittent periods, one IAS officer, T. Vijaya Kumar, has held the post of CEO of SERP for the longest period since it was established; prior to 2002 the founding CEO was K. Raju, who more recently became the Commissioner for Rural Development, GoAP.

Despite this strong government presence, an interesting institutional feature of SERP is its mix of personnel; non-government personnel form a significant part of SERP, as the discussion above about the program's approach to gender indicates. P. Jamuna, the current State Project Director for Gender, joined SERP in 2003, and has a background in the women's movement. Likewise, many of the State Project Directors do not have a background in government service. Additionally, subject experts appointed from the NGO sector sit on the General Body Council. Rural development professionals are recruited as community co-ordinators at the mandal level as 'change agents': 'key functionaries who facilitate social transformation in direct participation with the people' (SERP, c.2002: 13). Furthermore, SERP has often approached State-based NGOs and educational institutions to compile training material or evaluate policies and strategies. For example, the Centre for Women's Development at the National Institute of Rural Development in Hyderabad was consulted to provide inputs into the program's gender strategy. Another example is APMAS, a Hyderabad-based, professional development sector NGO, part-funded by the UK's Department for International Development, which has been a significant influence on the evolution of assessment techniques of micro-finance activities in the programs that SERP administers.

SERP is also notable for the extent to which program participants are involved in the functioning of the programme. Participatory identification and assessment approaches have been a lauded feature of the program. Ten Mandal Samkhya leaders (all of them women) are selected by the

---

[97] SERP falls under the administrative control of the Department of Rural Development. The Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh acts as Chairperson of SERP, and the Minister for Rural Development is Vice Chairperson. The latter is also President of SERP's Executive Council. IAS officers also hold important senior posts in SERP. The Principal Secretary for the Department of Rural Development at the State level is Vice President of the Executive Council and also sits on the General Body Council of SERP. The Chief Executive Officer of SERP is an IAS officer who heads the State Project Management Unit in Hyderabad. He is also member-convenor of the Executive Council, and secretary of the General Body.

government to sit on the General Body of SERP. Furthermore, program participants become part of the program's administration through its federated structures.

Under the TDP government, the significant presence of non-government personnel emerged as a source of political controversy, with the Congress Party, then in opposition, accusing the TDP government of ensuring that Velugu, and by implication SERP, lacked transparency and accountability, and that it bypassed democratically elected institutions of government at the sub-state level (The Hindu, 2003a). Manor has noted that the TDP Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu, suspicious of the possibility of Congress control in local bodies, preferred to operate through non-elected committees and user associations 'which he is able to pack with his own party loyalists' (Manor, 2004: 273). He also notes however that Congress was also guilty of undermining panchayat authority for the same reason. It is clear from a programmatic comparison of Velugu (prominent under the TDP government) and IKP (under the Congress government) structure that the District Administration, for example, did not have a major role to play in the former, and by merging the SGSY scheme (administrated by the DRDA) with Velugu, this repositioned their role within the State's anti-poverty programme. Yet Congress have not radically altered the role of SERP; in fact most recently as June 2007 the government have awarded SERP a leading role in setting up a new agency along similar lines to deal with urban as opposed to rural poverty (GoAP, 2007c). Although it appears at first sight that government personnel will play a larger role in the new agency, provisions for non-government functional specialists remain part of the institutional design and SERP have been given a key technical role in its establishment (GoAP, 2007a,, 2007c).

Conclusions on bureaucratic structural strategies and comparative discussion

To what extent do the institutional structures discussed above represent opportunities for feminist transformative strategies? The two State-level government departments most visibly identifiable with women were not originally designed to be 'women's policy units', with the purposes of acting as a nodal agency to influence government policy in other departments. Instead they were largely designed for the purposes of delivering welfare-oriented schemes to women, seen as a more vulnerable, disadvantaged and weaker section of society, ghettoizing women as beneficiaries of state welfare assistance into one department. Significantly, neither have

feminists been able, nor have state governments been inclined, to convert these departments in AP or TN into such a nodal agency at the state level, despite their relative success at the national level with the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Furthermore, the presence of a department to which women's issues are consigned, has also encouraged most other departments, with the exception of a few departments such as Education, and Health and Family Welfare, to disregard what they see as 'women's issues', or to refuse to consider how their portfolios relate to gender equity.

Instead, state governments have established State Commissions for Women, but with varying efficacy, and have sought to staff these Commissions with their own loyal party affiliates. Both State Commissions for Women have provided some room for questioning the political marginalization of women and issues of gender equity. However, they tend to be focused largely on legal issues and are more a protective arm of government, trying to prevent future, and investigating current, atrocities against women. Often, a lack of resources and political status means they are reduced to a mechanism of redressal for past injustices, and even then, with a reduced mandate they are often overstretched.

While the State Commission for Women in Andhra Pradesh was established with more powers than its counterpart in Tamil Nadu, it was not always able to use them as effectively, partly due to the capacity of the Commission's leadership and commitment. The Commission in Tamil Nadu had fewer powers but did manage to be a vocal lobbying instrument, even if this was centred mostly around an appointed leader.

As semi-autonomous agencies, parastatal agencies engaged in women, gender, and development offer a more complex set of opportunities than government departments or State commissions for women. They have both involved a larger range of actors from different backgrounds, offering potentially more opportunities for involvement of non-government personnel and feminist-oriented NGOs, although the quality of involvement has not been consistent, due to variations in access, strategic input, and impact on social and institutional transformation, with SERP seemingly offering more potential than the TNCDW.

Significantly, Velugu/IKP is largely a mainstream program with gender as a cross-cutting concern and intervention for social change in the project; *Mahalir Thittam* focuses largely on women rather than gender, and appears to be more integrationist in approach.

The respective Departments of Rural Development in AP and TN have also played significant parts in state-level initiatives on women, gender and development, although it is too early to understand the difference that TNCDW's move to the Department of Rural Development might have on the program's policy approach and implementation practices.

5.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, at the same time as women are descriptively underrepresented in state government institutions, substantively gendered norms and practices of state government institutions limit how both women as potential policy-makers and how gender equity as a policy issue is constituted in policy making processes. The bureaucratic-individual strategy holds less potential as a feminist strategy given the incommensurable norms and practices of the bureaucracy with such an approach. The bureaucratic-structural strategy is more complex and has provided varying options for feminist transformative strategies.

Some isolated examples suggest successful efforts to challenge the gendered bureaucratic institutions of the state government. Nevertheless, the state machinery for women in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh has largely failed to overcome resistance to the institutionalization of a commitment to ideals of gender equality or to provide adequate support and encouragement to individuals that support such a project. Strategies by the state have been concerned mostly with increasing descriptive representation through affirmative action policies, more than attempting to change the gendered norms and practices of institutions itself. State structures appear outward-oriented, concerned more with increasing the delivery and efficiency of pre-designed programmes than with inward self-reflection on how they are themselves gendered organisations. While the government has implemented a number of initiatives, it has overall not sought to build a conducive institutional context in a way which ensures a comprehensive and institutionalised commitment to gender mainstreaming.

Yet, the plurality of institutions which have been established in the last two or more decades for women's welfare, development, and empowerment demonstrate precisely the notion that the state is a not a monolith but an ensemble of institutions, with some offering more scope for feminist intervention than others. Furthermore, recent changes suggest that this is not a static process, but a dynamic one, which offers cautious hope for feminist engagement with the state. For this reason, in the next chapter, I explore in more detail State government discourse in AP and TN on women, gender, and development to understand how gender-equitable development is shaped as a policy issue (or not), to what extent it forms a central concern in the State governments' mainstream development policy, and how feminists might better understand State policy through its discourse(s), in order to change it.

6 STATE LEVEL DISCOURSES OF GENDER EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the institutional context for gender mainstreaming strategies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, including the development of the State-level institutional machinery for women in each State. In this chapter I look at the gendered discourses of development underpinning State-level development policy. The purpose of identifying and analyzing these discourses is to problematise the discursive articulations of gendered development and the policy strategies they constitute in order to understand exactly 'what is being mainstreamed when we mainstream gender' (Eveline and Bacchi, 2005). It is to 'encourage deeper reflection on the contours of a particular policy discussion, the shape assigned a particular "problem"' (Bacchi, 2000: 48), in this case the relationship between constructions of 'gender' and of 'development' in State policy. Policy is therefore understood as a site of discursive articulation and discursive activity (Bacchi, 2000) and 'it is only by looking at a discourse *in operation*, in a specific historical context, that it is possible to see whose interests it serves at a particular moment' (Weedon, 1987: 111). The ultimate aim of this chapter, then, is to understand how discourse affects what can be said, thought, or done in policy, the particular meanings which arise as a result, and the possibilities these meanings create for gender mainstreaming strategies and the opportunities they foreclose.

I argue that three gendered discourses of development may be identified in state policy, which I label 'protective-paternalist', 'competitive-capabilities', and 'structural-transformative'. I aim to show how these three discourses, while also internally complex, articulate gendered development in very different ways to each other, which helps to explain the divergent policy approaches (and absences) to gender-equitable development in the state. I also argue that important similarities and differences are evident in terms of the relative dominance or marginalization of policy discourses on gender equitable development both *within* and *between* the two states, which makes for a highly complex but interesting comparative analysis. Furthermore, discourses of

gender and development often, but not always, reflect the wider development discourse in the state. These two observations suggest that both the wider discursive and institutional context matters to how some discourses become embedded within policies and others do not, and that this is a highly complex process. I conclude by arguing that all three discourses present limited opportunities for gender mainstreaming, although the third – the structural-transformative discourse – perhaps holds the most potential, but still has its own limitations.

In order to demonstrate these arguments, in the first section, I provide a brief background to each state government's development policy since the 1990s, focusing on two identifiable discourses of development: that of reformist and populist discourses. I then go on to examine in more detail articulations in State policy of the three discourses of gendered development named above. I follow this with a comparative discussion, before concluding on the opportunities these discourses create or foreclose for mainstreaming gender in development in state level policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I draw upon a wide range of governmental and non-governmental documentary and non-documentary sources. Government documentary sources include significant government planning and policy documents, government program documentation such as annual reports and training manuals, government evaluative reports, and budget speeches. I also draw upon my own fieldwork interviews, as well as press coverage and secondary literature. For Tamil Nadu, I have focused specifically on discourses articulated within the State government's Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), supplemented by other relevant planning and policy documents. For Andhra Pradesh, I have examined discourses articulated by 'Vision 2020', a longer term comprehensive development policy released by GoAP in 1999. Also included is an analysis of policy discourses of the parastatal program for women's self-help groups as outlined in the previous chapter (that of TNWDP/Mahalir Thittam for Tamil Nadu and of Velugu/IKP for Andhra Pradesh).

6.2 State Level Development Policy: Reformist and Populist Discourses

As already established, the States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have both been labeled as reform states in that, since the Central government announced liberalization reform policies in

1991, these two States have also embarked on a similar economic reforms agenda. As at the national level, this reforms agenda poses significant implications for gendered development discourse in the State, particularly in how the role of the State is being reimagined as well as the State's commitment to social and human development issues and the social sector programmes and policies it devises and to which it allocates funding. As discussed in Chapter Four, state level policy in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh has articulated a populist discourse, based upon the compulsions of electoral democracy. This populist discourse interacts in significant ways with the reformist discourse of development which has emerged during in the 1990s. Here I outline the main features of these two wider state level development policy discourses as a backdrop to the articulation of gender-equitable development discourse in each State.

6.2.1 Tamil Nadu

From the mid 1990s onwards, but particularly between the years 2001-2004, the development policy of the State Government of Tamil Nadu articulated a *reformist* discourse of development, which in many ways resembled the Government of India's reformist discourse discussed earlier in Chapter Three. This discourse was particularly evident in the Government of Tamil Nadu's Tenth Five Year Plan and a number of reform-oriented policies which followed thereafter. The reforms envisaged a restructuring of the public sector, including the downsizing of government, an increased role for the private sector in state development, but perhaps most prominently, fiscal reforms, which were prompted by the state's fiscal crisis towards the end of the 1990s.

A re-envisioning of the role of the state was evident in the Government of Tamil Nadu's Eighth Five Year Plan. The re-envisioned role of the state was to create 'a conducive environment for building *individual capabilities* and encouraging private initiative' (GoTN, 2003c, my emphasis). GoTN's Tenth Five Year Plan's policy statement on governance reforms defined governance as relating to 'the management of all such processes that, in any society, define the environment which permits and enables individuals to raise their capacity levels, on one hand, and provide opportunities to realize their potential and enlarge the set of available choices, on the other' (GoTN, 2003c: 901)

> This Government recognises the important role played by Government employees in implementing development and welfare programmes of the Government. Government employees will have to also recognise that at a time of extreme fiscal distress, they have to come forward to share the distress. It is the policy of this Government to ensure the welfare of its employees. At a time of extreme financial stress, it has been difficult to entertain requests for increases in pay and allowances.
>
> (Ponnaiyan, 2003)

Policies ensuing from this shift in the state's development discourse, for instance, the partial privatization of the road transport sector and closure of loss-making Public Sector Units (PSUs), downsizing government, and encouraging public-private partnerships in infrastructure development (GoTN, 2003c: 37). Government subsidies such as food subsidies under the Public Distribution System and power subsidies for farmers were either reduced or modified to improve targeting (GoTN, 2003c: 42-3). Governance reforms included streamlining administrative procedures, including a single window clearance for private investors as well as downsizing government. A New Industrial Policy was announced in 2003, reiterating a number of reforms outlined in the Tenth Five Year Plan reiterating aimed at increasing investment in the state.

Reforms relating to public sector privatization, downsizing government, government employee entitlements and benefits were accompanied by legislation aimed at disciplining labour relations. In 2002, the Tamilnadu Essential Services Maintenance Act (TESMA) was brought into force which prohibited government employees of selected 'essential services' from going on strike. The following year several thousand government employees went on strike to protest reductions in government employee entitlements and customary benefits. In response to the strike, the government invoked TESMA, dismissing a large number of those on strike and also penalizing those who were subsequently reinstated by recognizing the strike period as a disruption in service without pay, adversely affecting employee entitlements. In the meantime, the government replaced the striking government employees with temporary casual contractees.

Fiscal reforms were considered an essential part of the wider reforms agenda: as the Finance Minister explained, 'a stable fiscal situation is an essential pre-requisite for enabling the Government to implement its development agenda' (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9). The government sought to establish a firm consensus on the need for fiscal reforms. The Finance Minister declared that 'there cannot be two opinions on the urgent need to rectify the fiscal imbalance

before it completely paralyses the functioning of the Government. Fiscal recovery is in the best interests of the State and has to be above political differences, compulsions and expediency' (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 29). The need to signal the commitment to fiscal reforms were also positioned as central to attracting state-level investment by external agencies, which impacted on the government's ability to compete with other states. In 2003, the Finance Minister stated in his budget speech:

> external funding agencies like the World Bank had moved away from Tamil Nadu in the absence of any effort at fiscal reforms by the previous Government. Meanwhile, all neighbouring States have benefited by such assistance and have been able to go in for larger Plan outlays while Tamil Nadu was left behind. This Government has shown the will to undertake the reforms necessary for restoring the fiscal health of Tamil Nadu and taking the State forward on a higher growth trajectory.
>
> (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 10)

As a means to institutionalize fiscal management and financial discipline at the State level, the Government of Tamil Nadu introduced the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2003, which the Finance Minister suggested would 'save future governments from experiencing the serious fiscal problems that we have had to confront' (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9).

The reformist discourse emerged in state policy in spite of a history of *populist* policies in Tamil Nadu embedded in political party discourse, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four. Populist discourses in Tamil Nadu have been labelled as either empowerment/assertive or protective/ paternalist, and have been associated with DMK and AIADMK governments respectively (Subramanian, 1999; Swamy, 1998). However, from the 1990s onwards the discursive articulation of a reformist agenda within the Government of Tamil Nadu's development policy discussed above, emerged as an alternative discourse of state development policy, challenging the hitherto populist discourse. To some extent, the reigning in of populist policies had much to do with the state's fiscal crisis, with the latter providing a useful entry point for the reformist discourse. Frequently, reformist policies were justified by the AIADMK on the basis of the hefty fiscal deficit, which was partially attributed to liberal expenditure by the previous DMK government. Under the reformist discourse, populist policies were implicitly seen as unnecessarily expensive and wasteful; repeated reference to 'reining in' the fiscal deficit suggested that expenditure had been wild, uncontrollable and irresponsible. However, the government was quick to point out that the fiscal reforms should be considered with 'the people'

in mind, particularly the 'vulnerable sections of society', taking care not to alienate the electorate (Ponnaiyan, 2003). Interestingly, the fiscal reforms were presented as a separate agenda to the wider development agenda - the Finance Minister declared in his budget speech in 2003 that 'this Government has the onerous responsibility of integrating the reform priorities with the development imperatives of the State. The interests of the poor and the needy have to be protected' (Ponnaiyan, 2003).

Significantly, while the Government's stand on the wider reform policies remained relatively unmoved in the turbulent few years in the state between 2001 and 2004, this period of second generation economic reforms in Tamil Nadu was interrupted following the national Lok Sabha elections in May 2004. With the AIADMK having failed to win a single seat in the elections, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa reversed a number of reforms undertaken in the previous three years and reinstated a number of populist policies. The policy reversals included *inter alia* a reduction in the electricity tariff, the restoration of free farm power supply, and relaxation of restrictions on eligibility for food subsidies under the Public Distribution System. Perhaps the most significant reversal however was the dismissal of disciplinary proceedings against striking government employees from the previous year, and the reinstatement of several thousand government employees who had been temporarily hired to cover for the striking government workers but had been dismissed only a few days earlier to their reinstatement. This stood in stark contrast to the earlier reform policies of government downsizing and disciplining labour relations. The repeal of TESMA, the legislation which was invoked during the strike to dismiss or penalizing striking government employees, was one of the DMK's manifesto promises which they later fulfilled in June 2006 after being elected into the state government (GoTN, 2006d).

The media were quick to link the policy reversals to the Lok Sabha defeat, especially considering the upcoming State Assembly Elections in Tamil Nadu in 2006. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa publicly rejected this representation (BBC World, 2004). She also justified the reduced tariffs for electricity as a special protective measure to relieve domestic consumers particularly those affected by drought, claiming that 'no other State provides such relief to all families in the domestic category in order to protect them' (The Hindu, 2004a). The World Bank were disappointed with the moves and stated that the policy reversals

threatened the progress made on fiscal reforms, and warned that 'Tamil Nadu has little choice but to return to the path of fiscal consolidation if it is to meet its development goals' (World Bank, 2005: iv).

Thus, the reformist discourse was restricted by a discourse of populism based on an electoral-democratic logic. The 2006 State Assembly elections was a strong demonstration that a populist discourse remains strong in Tamil Nadu. The DMK, for instance, offered major populist concessions including free colour TV sets and rice subsidized as Rs 2 a kilo as part of its 2006 State Assembly Election campaign.

6.2.2 Andhra Pradesh

Since the mid-1990s, State government commitment to the economic reforms process in Andhra Pradesh has been characterized by aggressive self-promotion as a reform-oriented government, as well as, unlike most other reform-oriented States, an extensive of the economic reforms agenda to encompass a wider transformationalist project of governance reform (Kirk, 2005; Kennedy, 2004; Mooij, 2003). The State government's strong pro-reform stance was clearly articulated at the meeting of the National Development Council in 2002, when the then Chief Minister of AP Chandrababu Naidu stated,

> Reforms are no longer a matter of choice but have become a matter of necessity...In an increasingly competitive world unless we reform we will be in danger of being left behind.
>
> (Naidu, 2002)

The strongest identifiable articulation of the TDP government's reformist discourse can be found in the State government's *Vision 2020*, an 'ambitious' vision for the achievement of economic and human development and governance reforms by the year 2020. Released by the State government in January 1999, *Vision 2020* was compiled in consultation with a global consulting firm McKinsey, and was supported by the UK's Department for International Development.

Vision 2020 proposed that the role of the state would need to shift: 'from being primarily a controller of the economy, it must become a facilitator and catalyst of its growth' (GoAP, 1999: 8). The policy proposed that by stimulating economic growth, it could in turn bring about development through increased incomes as a result of new employment opportunities.

Furthermore, economic growth would also increase state resources which could then be invested in social sectors to combat poverty, and improve education and health, and build infrastructure to provide services such as water supply, transport, and housing (GoAP, 1999: 1). Governance reforms proposed a transition to 'SMART' government administration – simple, moral, accoutantable, responsive, and transparent. Investments in education and health were deemed important to increasing productivity to meet the high rates of economic growth required (GoAP, 1999: 7). The high demand for infrastructure would require 'large-scale private investment', which in turn would be facilitated by a 'regulatory environment that enables private investment and facilitates business' (GoAP, 1999: 14)

Vision 2020 proposed a restructuring of government expenditure according to concerns of efficiency. The emphasis on reduced and targeted allocation of government subsidy in the social sector was heavily concerned with 'leakages', and that schemes should 'provide only for those with a genuine need' (GoAP, 1999: 57). For example, on food subsidies the Public Distribution System (PDS), Vision 2020 stated

> To ensure its sustainability, it is critical to target the PDS at clearly identified groups who are poor, vulnerable, or risk-prone. Since food subsidies are consumption- rather than investment-oriented, they are inherently less efficient than public employment programmes. Moreover, targeting such subsidies, i.e., ensuring that most of the benefits go only to the poor, is difficult, making these programmes expensive. In Andhra Pradesh, *such programmes should be used only to provide relief to genuinely vulnerable groups*
>
> (GoAP, 1999: 58)

The government also proposed the privatization of particular sectors such as higher education and healthcare, suggesting that the 'the private sector, operating in a competitive situation, is better able than governments to provide efficient, rationally priced and high quality services in many areas' and that 'the State's support in such areas should gradually be limited to ensuring access for the poor to these services' (GoAP, 1999). Privatisation would increase the quality of service provision and 'free Government resources and attention for higher priority developmental goals'. (GoAP, 1999).

Vision 2020 proposed to build on *Janmabhoomi*, ostensibly a large-scale exercise in participatory development which had established in parallel to the local panchayats a number of non-state community groups at the local level such as Water Users Groups to monitor irrigation

schemes and Mothers Committees to oversee child education and the Integrative Child Development Services scheme at the local level. Self Help Groups would also be encouraged.

In line with the governance reforms, in 2001 the AP government set up a new division of the General Administration Department to oversee the administrative reforms, and in the same year, with a £6 million pound grant from the UK's Department for International Development, established the Centre for Good Governance in Hyderabad as an academic think tank for advising on state level reforms.

The World Bank has been a substantial international donor of the economic and governance reforms in Andhra Pradesh and the State constitutes one of a few Indian States where the World Bank has received agreement from the Central government to enter into subnational lending agreements with State governments (Kirk, 2005). The first AP-specific World Bank project, the Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Project, was approved in 1998, and planned interventions in education, health, nutrition, roads, irrigation, and governance and fiscal reforms (World Bank, 1998).

The AP government's willingness to avail of World Bank funding has received criticism in the state from various corners. Left parties criticized the state government for acquiescing to anti-imperialist forces and media reports suggested that the BJP central government stalled approval to the APERP loan in 1998 from a nationalist perspective of *swadeshi* (self-reliance) (Indian Express, 1998a). A third criticism positioned Naidu's pro-Bank reform approach as 'a "betrayal" of the state's autonomy – a charge that resonated with an AP political tradition of asserting Telugu "self-respect" after years of central government interference in its affairs' (Kirk, 2005: 292). Despite criticism from the Congress party whilst in opposition, they have continued to avail of World Bank funding since they were voted into government at the state elections in 2004.

As emphasised in Chapter 4, *populism* has been a characteristic feature of electoral politics in Andhra Pradesh since the emergence of the Telugu Desam Party under NT Rama Rao in the early 1980s. However, the economic reforms increasingly espoused by the new Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in the mid 1990s suggested that the TDP was beginning to reject this style of

politics, partly based on claims of fiscal necessity (for instance, refer to the discussion in Chapter 4 on the political economy of prohibition). Nevertheless, on two occasions, both of which were highly significant for their timing, Naidu reverted to populist promises of concessions. The first instance occurred just three months before the State Assembly elections in October 1999, in which Naidu managed to secure a second mandate. In early July 1999, Naidu launched the 'Deepam Scheme', which aimed to provide 1 million LPG (liquid petroleum gas) connections to poor women in rural areas who were members of groups formed under the DWCRA programme (Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas). This made Naidu very popular among women voters. It also did not help the opposition Congress Party when they protested against the scheme, pointing out that the launch of the scheme had violated the Election Code of Conduct as it had occurred after elections had been announced. As Murty explains, the

> TDP cleverly used this as proof to show that the Congress was opposed to this welfare measure...All this created a feeling among women voters that the Congress was trying to thwart this scheme. As such they alienated themselves from Congress (I) and identified with [the] TDP.
>
> (Murty, 2001: 222)

Several commentators have suggested that the impact of this scheme on women voters and their electoral choices had a decisive impact in the following elections, securing a large vote bank for Naidu (Murty, 2001: 222). However, after the elections the Deepam Scheme was to come under criticism from DWCRA groups citing the high increases in the costs of LPG refill cylinders.

The second instance occurred before the State Assembly election in 2004, when the opposition Congress party was voted into government. One of Congress' campaign promises was free power to farmers and continuation of the Deepam Scheme. They later extended this to all below-poverty-line families regardless of whether they were members of self-help groups, although members would be allocated extra points for eligibility, as would individuals with low incomes and small family size, among other criteria.

As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the Janmabhoomi scheme of the TDP government attracted strong criticism from Congress, accusing the TDP government of bypassing the panchayats, whilst trying to avoid acknowledging that this was because Congress had a stronghold there.

The newly elected Congress government terminated the Janmabhoomi programme almost immediately when it came to government in 2004 (GoAP, 2004).

6.2.3 Comparative state level discourses of development

Both states have embarked on a reformist agenda, emphasizing a new role for government, including (partial) privatization, increased efficiency in public sectors, government expenditure and government administration, deregulation in favour of the private sector. GoAP's vision was more comprehensive and far-reaching than that of GoTN, although execution has perhaps been more extensive in Tamil Nadu. Kennedy's comparison of the two States' approaches to economic reforms suggests a significant difference in the way each State government politically positioned the reforms:

> Both states are pursuing reforms, but while Andhra Pradesh 'trumpets' its support for them...successive governments in Tamil Nadu (representing both the DMK and the AIADMK) have acted far more discreetly, avoiding wherever possible taking a public stand in support of market reform, and certainly displaying no inclination to situate economic reform within a larger transformationalist development agenda built around a vision of radical citizen-oriented governance reform.
>
> (Kennedy, 2004: 44)

Furthermore, both states' reform agendas have been limited by populist discursive logics, which are arguably more embedded in Tamil Nadu but have proven decisive in both states in stalling some reforms efforts. This has been particularly evident at the time of elections. Thus the analysis of gendered discourses of development in the following section needs to be understood against a backdrop of the introduction of a reformist discourse of development in the 1990s but also the limitations of the latter to challenge and overcome the embedded populist discourse in both states.

6.3 Discourses of gendered development

6.3.1 Mapping dominant and marginal discourses

Against the backdrop of the broad-based reformist and populist discourses of state development policies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh mapped above, in this section I discuss discourses of gendered development which often are articulated strongest in policies on women, gender and development but which are also evident in polices which do not pay particular attention to the

status of women, their development or empowerment, or gender (in)equality. At least three discourses of gendered development can be identified in State government policies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I have labeled these discourses *protective-paternalist*, *competitive-capability*, and *structural-transformative*. 'Women's empowerment' as a signifier is prominently articulated in the latter two, but its context-specific meaning differs in important ways. Below I begin by outlining some of the dominant characteristics of these discourses which have been identified inductively in state policies, bearing in mind that identifying such *ideal types* in discursive articulations in policy is more messy given that multiple discourses are frequently interspersed in policy.

Protective-paternalist

The protective-paternalist discourse depicts particular groups in society, such as women, as 'weak' and 'vulnerable', as lacking full autonomy, and, therefore, in need of 'protection'. The state is characteristically depicted, often in the guise of a supreme leader, as a benevolent patron, or 'leader-as-donor' (Subramanian, 1999: 75). Paternalist policies focus on minimal provision and basic needs (Subramanian, 1999: 75). The large-scale distribution of resources among groups by the state is presented as a charitable and altruistic gesture, something akin to gift-giving (Goodell, 1985). In turn, the positioning of the state as a benevolent leader 'encourages supporters to assume an attitude of reverence and gratitude' (Subramanian, 1999: 75). Because resource distribution by the state is depicted as altruism, this enables the state to ensure that its relationship with the beneficiary is non-reciprocal because 'altruism requires that nothing be returned' (Goodell, 1985). It also means that 'beneficiaries' have an ambiguous relationship with paternalist policies in that 'because these programs are granted and withdrawn at the discretion of the state, when they are neither designed in response to local request nor subject to sustainable local pressures, they preclude any continuity that the local "beneficiaries" themselves might be able to affect...' (Goodell, 1985: 253).

A protective-paternalist state often displays an attitude of '*benevolent sexism*', or 'a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver)' (Glick and Fiske, 1996: 491). For example, the state's protection of women is presented as an

affectionate and caring gesture. As opposed to 'hostile sexism', which is defined as an overt antipathy towards women (Barreto and Ellemers, 2005: 634; drawing on Glick and Fiske, 1996), benevolent sexism 'provides a comfortable rationalization for confining women to domestic roles' (Glick and Fiske, 1996: 492).

Competitive-capabilities

The competitive-capabilities discourse draws on a liberal, integrative, equal opportunities model of equality in which it is assumed that, notwithstanding instances of discrimination, the rules of society are generally fair. Such instances of discrimination are seen as aberrations, and as barriers to equal competition among individuals in society. It is the task of the state to remove such barriers to create a level playing field and ensure equal opportunities for women to compete with men. Thus, the state as a facilitator implements preferential policies such as ensuring access to education and employment in order to develop the capabilities of those individuals. 'Removing the barriers' initiates a process of empowerment whereby the individual will be able to fulfill their 'full potential', enabling them to become 'self-reliant'. It also ensures that development is more efficient.

Eliminating discrimination towards women and enabling access for women to education and employment is often presented in utilitarian terms for the benefits that accrue to the overall objective of development rather than as an intrinsically beneficial process for women, or on the basis of rights, justice, or entitlement. As Squires suggests, 'the potential weakness of this approach is that it may privilege those concerns that fit most readily with dominant policy-making rationalities, thereby obfuscating the normative and contested nature of gender equality and privileging the 'objective' knowledge of gender experts' (2007a: 148).

Structural-transformative

A structural-transformative discourse posits that inequality is often the result of inequitable power relations and power asymmetries and recognises the centrality of power to the process of transforming inequitable relations. It tends to focus on empowering 'vulnerable' and 'marginalized groups' rather than individuals. It emphasizes the importance of enabling the participation of marginalized groups and augmenting their role in decision-making and agenda-

setting, often aiming to improve their access to mainstream institutional bodies. Increased participation is understood to enable the empowerment of poor and marginalized groups because it enables democratic deliberation and collective action. This takes place either through the creation of new institutions or through the transformation of existing mainstream norms, structures and processes which have led to marginalization and inequality. Thus, the onus of transformation is not restricted to individuals themselves but to mainstream institutions. Because of its focus on structural inequalities and on groups rather than individuals, a structural-transformative discourse is the most likely of all three discourses to recognize the inter-sectionality of multiple structural inequalities deriving from caste, class, gender, religion, age, disability, and so on. However, one limitation of this discourse is the tendency to emphasise group differences to the point of reinforcing them at the expense of others, privileging some groups or some forms of inequality over others, and thus attention to intersectionality is not always adequately recognized or understood.

6.3.2 Gendered development discourses in State policy

Tamil Nadu

The strongest articulations of the *protective-paternalist* discourse were found in many of the more populist and welfare-oriented schemes of the development policy of the State Government of Tamil Nadu, which are often presented as part of a state-provided protective social safety net for those excluded from the processes of national or state-led development. The Government of Tamil Nadu's Department of Social Welfare commonly depicts women as weak, and as one of a number of 'vulnerable' groups which are in need of protection by the state. Particularly 'vulnerable' women are identified as the deserving beneficiaries of the state's 'affection': 'among women, pregnant women, lactating mothers, the poor women living below poverty line, widows and destitutes deserve more affection and assistance' (GoTN, 2003a). Women are grouped along with children, the destitute, the elderly, street children, 'delinquent' children and 'juveniles' and the disabled (GoTN, 2003c). Along with children, women are homogenized as 'the most disadvantaged category of population' in respect of indicators on literacy, health, mortality, and dependency on agricultural livelihoods (GoTN, 2003c: 319).

Many of the State level policies articulating a protective-paternalist discourse are concentrated under the administrative control of the Department of Social Welfare. Two prominent schemes of the AIADMK government have aimed to address the practice of female infanticide. The first, the 'Cradle Baby Scheme', began in 1992 and was a reactive measure to address the prevalence of female infanticide, which it saw as a 'menace' and 'evil practice'. The scheme operated by enabling parents to give up their girl children for adoption at birth and transfer them into state care anonymously through the provision of cradles in reception centres in state institutions such as government hospitals, primary care centres and children's homes. The main concern was to 'enable the rescue of female children abandoned by their biological parents due to various social circumstances' (GoTN, 2003c: 332). The second was the Girl Child Protection Scheme, also introduced in 1992, whereby the government deposited a sum of money on behalf of a girl child, which she would receive on her 20th birthday and could be used, the policy suggested, to fund higher education studies or to 'defray marriage expenses', a euphemistic term for dowry (GoTN, 2003c: 332). The many conditions attached to the scheme stipulated that the parents should have a low income, should have undergone sterilization, should not have any male children, and should be under 35 years of age. The girl child also had to complete her 10th standard education and appear for the public examination. Both these schemes were reintroduced when the AIADMK party came back into government in 2001, and have been continued by the DMK since the party were elected into government in 2006.

A number of other schemes of the Department of Social Welfare include assistance (cash payments) for marriage for various women and girls in difficult circumstances such as widows, 'deserted wives', orphan girls, and daughters and school children of poor widows. Many of these come with conditions also, mostly income ceilings as well as age restrictions for the bride (but not the groom, 18-30 years). Sewing machines are given to destitute widows to assist them with a livelihood, and free textbooks are given to school children of poor widows and free bicycles are given to Scheduled Caste girls as an incentive for their education. The Department, through the Tamil Nadu Social Welfare Board also assists a number of Family Counselling Centres run by voluntary organizations, for the purpose of 'preserv[ing] the basic social unit of a family' (GoTN, 2005b: 230). These policies position the state as a benevolent and charitable figure that protects vulnerable women such as the girl child and poor and destitute widows. Thus, through

these schemes the state becomes the paternal figure writ large. An implicit heteronormativity and social conservatism underpin many of these policies.

In contrast, the Government of Tamil Nadu's *competitive-capability* discourse stressed the removal of barriers to gender equity (GoTN, 2003c: 328), and the 'removal of gender bias' (GoTN, 2002: para 2.34). The Government of Tamil Nadu's Tenth Five Year Plan explicitly acknowledged the failure of a constitutional guarantee of equality combined with legislation to bring about social change:

> ...[T]he mere enactment of laws does not change attitudes, and ironically, these advances in social legislation have engendered in some measure an attitude of complacency whilst the views of society towards the position of women have not changed much over the years.
>
> (GoTN, 2003c: 319)

The failure of legislation to bring about gender equality justified affirmative action, particularly in the areas of education and employment, and the Tenth Plan set targets for fifty per cent reduction in 'gender gaps' in literacy and wage rates by 2007 (GoTN, 2003c: 32).

The stress on efficiency and consequentialist arguments of utility meant that the concern for women's empowerment was often articulated as a mutually supportive objective of poverty reduction. For example, the Government of Tamil Nadu's Tenth Five Year Plan explained that 'promoting micro credit with groups of women is increasingly seen as the panacea for reducing poverty and empowering women' (GoTN, 2003c: 328). Indeed, sometimes the objective of women's empowerment was *subordinated* in favour of poverty reduction, predicated on some problematic assumptions concerning women's status, family income, and the household. Policy often failed to distinguish gender-inequitable development and poverty as distinct problems, and instead collapsed the two. This assumes a necessarily positive relationship between women's empowerment and rising household income, which, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four is somewhat problematic (also see especially Jackson, 1996).

That poverty reduction is foregrounded as a rationale for women's empowerment, is only one way in which the latter was presented in *utilitarian* terms. Women's empowerment was commonly described as an investment in human resources, which will benefit overall economic development. Within this economistic discourse, women are viewed as assets, as inputs into the

economic development process. Human development is conceived as an input for economic development: 'a country's real wealth is its human resources. If human resources develop, then the country's economy will also develop' (GoTN, 2002: 1). Like with the subordination of women's empowerment to poverty reduction, women again become highly responsible for the nation's economic and human development: 'the economic development of a country depends largely upon the status of its human resource development. The index of a nation's social development is the status of its women '(GoTN, 2002: 1).

While the Tenth Five Year Plan did stress a competitive-capability discourse of gendered development, the strongest state level articulation of this discourse comes from the Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women, the parastatal agency discussed in the previous chapter which was responsible for implementing the state-led self-help group program Mahalir Thittam. Empowerment objectives of the scheme emphasized the importance of dismantling barriers to women's empowerment: a key objective was to enable poor and disadvantaged women through capacity-building to 'cross all social and economic barriers and thereby facilitate their full development into empowered citizens'. Social empowerment entailed the *dismantling* of various *barriers* to women's and girls' equal development. Economic empowerment would be achieved by greater access to financial resources outside the household and equal access and control over resources within the household, a 'significant increase' in women's incomes, reduced vulnerability of poor women to crisis, and financial self-reliance of women (TNCDW, 2000b: 18). Women's empowerment was understood to have both intrinsic and utilitarian rationales for women's empowerment. As the original IFAD project document stated, 'the principal objective of the project is the economic and social upliftment of women to *enhance the welfare of their families* and to improve their status in the family and the community' (IFAD, 1989).

Mahalir Thittam emphasised that empowerment was about making *choices*, that only women and not 'outsiders' could empower women. Consistent with the government's wider reimagining of the state's role in development, TNCDW policy suggested that only government and non-government institutions could play a supportive, *facilitative* role in this process (TNCDW, 2000b: 18). In contrast to the protective-paternalist discourse, women were interpellated as

responsible agents: one policy statement acknowledged that 'women are aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, family resources and risk taking ability...Accordingly, it is the women themselves who would be the best judges in respect of economic activities and levels of credit required' (GoTN, 2001a: section 3.1). Women were positioned as centrally responsible for their own empowerment, and thus, despite the emphasis elsewhere on changing structures, the implicit thrust was on women who themselves *had to change.*

It was also clear, however, that the self-help group program of TNCDW made a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' choices, and thus between good and bad SHG members. Mahalir Thittam, and its predecessor the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project, was a highly integrative project and less so a transformative one. As the original IFAD project document stated, the aim was to 'increase [women's] income-earning potential by *integrating* them into the regular delivery system for credit and technical support services, to raise women's level of awareness and, through the strength and mutual support of group interaction, to encourage self-reliance, both individually and communally and foster the confidence to strive for social change' (IFAD, 1989: 8, my emphasis). As a former TNCDW official made very clear, the explicit focus of the Corporation's programme, was on *women* rather than *gender* (interview, June 2007). Notwithstanding the affirmative emphasis on the empowerment of women and 'social change', the project primarily involved integrating women into the mainstream, by repositioning them as creditworthy and potentially capable individuals in need of an enabling environment in order to participate in mainstream processes and institutions.

However, because the parallel structure of the self-help group and its associated processes and practices had to be created in order to empower women suggests that this was still a strategy which emphasized women's difference. Women's access to institutional credit was made possible by the operational dynamics of the self-help group model adopted which relied on 'social capital', defined as informal networks, benefits, and norms generated by associational practices. Microfinance organizations, mainstream development agencies, and commercial banks positively associate 'social capital' with the dynamic of peer pressure, which enables higher repayment rates for creditors (Rankin, 2002; Mayoux, 1995). Such outcomes rely upon what Rankin calls a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', nurtured within microfinance

programmes by a detailed and strict regime of disciplinary practices on group members. Accordingly,

> 'it is women's responsiveness to the discipline of weekly repayment schedules - and to a highly disciplinary institutional culture involving wearing uniforms, chanting slogans, singing songs and taking oaths – that may be credited for the extraordinarily high repayment rates of most microfinance programmes'
>
> (Rankin, 2004: 189).

Such a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture' was evident in Mahalir Thittam, with the cultivation of a number of self-regulating technologies which mould individual and group behaviour around programmatic norms, which included highly detailed grading and assessment procedures which in turn determined access to credit. The SHG model gained significant support from the banking sector, which, also driven by efficiency concerns, was persuaded that the self-help group model is an effective and cost-efficient way to expand the demand for institutional credit and savings among the newly creditworthy rural poor. As one Reserve Bank of India circular to commercial banks emphasized

> ...the linking of SHGs with the banks is a cost effective, transparent and flexible approach to improve the accessibility of credit from the formal banking system to the unreached rural poor. It is expected to offer the much needed solution to the twin problems being faced by the banks, viz recovery of loans in the rural areas and the high transaction cost in dealing with small borrowers at frequent intervals.
>
> (RBI, 1996)

The advantage of self-help groups consisted of lower transaction costs because the model enabled the bank to deal with groups rather than individuals, high repayment rates which were facilitated by the institutional dynamics of peer group pressure among self-help group members, and the absence of a pre-requisite for individual security for collateral from debtors, which was instead provided by group collateral.

It also enabled the implementing agency to govern a large number of program participants from afar, including encouraging them to govern themselves through federating individual groups into higher bodies, and thus appealed to the efficiency concerns of the wider development discourse of the state government. Women's self-help groups were also seen as a highly convenient and accessible institutional delivery entry point for other government schemes. The convergence of all government poverty alleviations schemes through self-help groups was listed as one of the main focus areas for Social Welfare under the Tenth Five Year Plan of Tamil Nadu (GoTN,

2003c: 330). However, as a former TNCDW official observed, the attention from other government departments often increased the burden of participation on women SHG members (discussed further in Chapter 7). Instead of opening upwards and ushering in a process of self-reflection across different government departments, through a logic of 'convergence' different departments effectively closed down and inwards towards delivery at the local level.

The *structural-transformative* discourse was perhaps the most marginal gendered development discourse in state policy, but it was manifest in several policies. Development policy in Tamil Nadu recognised the two problems of, firstly, structural gender inequalities which prevent women from possessing an independent economic asset base, and secondly, poverty and the low incomes of poor households. For example, the Tenth Five Year Plan states,

> To be asset less, unemployed, illiterate, destitute and yet over worked, tired and weak is the lot of most rural women in India...[T]hrough their lack of recognition in society, women are powerless, deprived of access to improved means of production through credit, technical advice, training, marketing skills etc.
>
> (GoTN, 2003c: 328)

One of the reasons for women's lower status was that 'crucial decision making powers within the households are still with the males'(GoTN, 2003c: 320). Furthermore, it was also acknowledged that women's income is often crucial in poor households.

> ...[A]lthough accorded little social status or recognition, women's earnings are frequently essential to the survival of the family. In many cases women are the actual de facto heads of the family by virtue of desertion, migration, illness, unemployment or the addictive habits of their husbands.
>
> (GoTN, 2003c: 328)

This recognition and positioning of women as a member whose (at least economic) contribution is 'essential to the survival of the family' stands in tension with how, elsewhere, women are positioned as dependent subjects. For instance, contrast the previous statements with the following critical observation:

> Within the family, a woman is treated as a **social** and financial dependent, controlled by the family in every aspect of her life; having had little or no education, her worth is measured in terms of her ability to produce male children or bring in money/assets; she no longer belongs to her father's family whilst her position in her husband's family is conditional.
>
> (GoTN, 2003c: 320)

Jayalalithaa's *18 Point Programme for Women and Child Welfare,* otherwise known as *Vision 2010*, and released when the AIADMK was elected back into office in 2001, aimed to revive the *15 Point Programme* previously unveiled in 1993. The programme emphasized a number of 'critical governance issues' which the programme sought to reform, and which indicated a willingness to transform the gendered practices and orientation of the state bureaucracy (GoTN, 2001b). Significantly, the programme emphasised the need for a gender sensitive approach as the 'hallmark' of the programme. The 'patriarchal attitude of Indian society' was identified as 'one of the major underlying causes for the violations and non-fulfilment of many of the rights of children and women...and the low status given to women and girls' (ibid: 13). The programme listed the sensitization of 'management styles, techniques and work culture in government departments' towards issues relating to women and children, although it did not elaborate further on what this would entail. However, these initiatives didn't seem to have a prominent place in the state policy priorities.

Mahalir Thittam articulated a number of policy aims which articulated a structural-transformative discourse: one aim was to 'create or reorient' processes and institutions to enable women's participation and decision-making, another envisioned a co-operative and egalitarian relationship between men and women 'as equal partners' and sought to 'inspire a new generation of women and men to work together for equality, sustainability, and communal harmony, and a further three aims sought to achieve 'equality of status of poor women as participants, decision makers and beneficiaries', to promote and ensure women's human rights; and to influence Government policy in favour of 'disadvantaged' women (TNCDW, 2000b: 17).

Andhra Pradesh

Notwithstanding the populist appeals of NT Rama Rao's TDP government up to the mid 1990s, the *protective-paternalist* discourse was perhaps the weakest of the three discourses in Andhra Pradesh State development policy. Even if at times GoAP recognised women as a vulnerable group, it was often followed by a policy commitment to empower women or eliminate the discrimination which had led to their marginalisation. In other words, their vulnerability was understood as an aberration and not something inherent to women as a group. Policy attention to vulnerable women was not justified on the basis of affection or nurture. For instance, the Girl

Child Protection Scheme in AP aimed to 'eliminate gender discrimination, to eradicate female infanticide, to improve the sex ratio and empower and protect the rights of girl children and women' (GoAP, 2005a) The scheme aimed to facilitate 'the emergence of a girl child to become a strong and assertive individual who will command equal status and respect in society' (ibid). This stronger articulation of a equality and rights-based perspective stands in contrast to the benevolent charity articulated by the Tamil Nadu state policy (although the AP policy still employed criteria enforcing small family norms). Likewise, a number of AP government policies on child trafficking and adoption regulations for which the state could potentially articulate a protective-paternalist role, particularly in the wake of an adoption-trafficking scandal in 2001, have not articulated a paternalist discourse.[98]

The *competitive-capabilities* discourse was by far the most dominant gendered development discourse articulated in development policy at the state level. *Vision 2020* emphasised building capabilities in nutrition, education, health and employment to ensure a healthy, skilled and educated workforce. It emphasised removing barriers to gender equality based on policies which would enable equal treatment of women and men, proposing that 'a girl child born in this year will have as many chances as her brothers will to go to school, find a job and live a healthy and productive life' (GoAP, 1999: 2). The policy envisioned that through empowerment, women and girls would be enabled to 'fulfil their roles as equal shapers, with men of the economy and society' (GoAP, 1999). Women were positioned as assets to state and national development, with immense potential as untapped resources: 'women represent 50 per cent of the population, yet their productive potential remains largely untapped' (GoAP, 1999: 68). Investment in women's empowerment in areas such as education were often justified by the positive externalities they produced for families (in the form of increased income expenditure on the household improving nutritional, health, and educational levels of other household members) and on the perceived effect of women's education in lowering fertility levels. For example, Vision 2020 in AP stated

---

[98] Child trafficking is a particularly serious problem in Andhra Pradesh, and in 2001 it emerged that several adoption agencies which rehoused girl children given up for adoption were actually bogus agencies which were trafficking girl children including across state borders. This prompted the government to ban a scheme which allowed for the 'relinquishment' of unwanted girl children to state institutions, in a similar manner to that of the Cradle Baby scheme in Tamil Nadu. The government also prohibited non-state agencies from carrying out adoptions. Critics of the ban have suggested that the ban will not solve the problem and may increase instances of unmonitored abandonments and female infanticide (see Nair and Sen (2005) and Sharma (2001b) for a discussion of these events in AP and their wider implications).

> Education also leads to improvement in other critical areas such as health and family planning. Studies have shown that educated women can take better decisions about nutrition and healthcare for their families. They are also more open to family planning and have fewer children.
>
> (GoAP, 1999)

Women were positioned as highly responsible for the overall development process: 'Andhra Pradesh's development goals cannot be achieved without harnessing the potential of its women' (GoAP, 1999: 84). Their empowerment was seen as 'critical to achieving the transition to development' (Vision 2020, p. 68). Vision 2020 saw women's increasing participation in employment as a positive development, and to encourage this development further, it proposed to 'eliminate' a number of gender inequalities such as women's 'lower pay and restricted access to employment opportunities and skill development'. A combination of strategies were prescribed including the enforcement of equal pay legislation, continuing its 'hard' affirmative action policy of reserving a third of government and public sector jobs for women, and softer affirmative action strategies of targeted schemes for providing training, self-employment, and institutional credit linkages (GoAP, 1999: 69). Policies in Vision 2020 to bring about equitable development of 'vulnerable' groups sought to combine both soft approaches to affirmative action and more temporary protective safety nets:

> Andhra Pradesh's long-term programme for developing its people, i.e., building their capabilities through healthcare and education and creating employment opportunities through economic growth, will sharply reduce the number of such vulnerable people in the State. However, until these developmental goals are achieved, the poor and other vulnerable groups must be protected and provided with an acceptable standard of living.
>
> (GoAP, 1999: 56-7)

Alongside encouraging women into the workforce, the government also pledged to increase the provision of childcare, albeit leaving largely undisturbed the expectation that women and adolescent girls were the primary caregivers in the household.

The strongest articulation of a *structural-transformative* discourse of gendered development in Andhra Pradesh was found in the self-help group program administered by the parastatal agency, the Society for the Elimination of Poverty. To recall, this agency was responsible for implementing the World Bank assisted Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project (APDPIP), its successor, the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project (APRPRP) – both of which were known collectively as Velugu, and then later under the Congress government, the

Indira Kranthi Pratham scheme which had merged Velugu with a central government self-help group scheme, the SGSY. The project design of Velugu articulated a strong explicit commitment to social transformation; one of its guiding principles aimed to 'alter the relations of power' (SERP, c.2002: 4). Also like Vision 2020, participatory development was also given high priority. Velugu envisioned that it was 'through decentralized, community based, people participatory approach alone that the poor are made equal partners in eliminating poverty and enable themselves to change their destinies' (SERP, c.2002: 1). The participatory features of the programme were considered particularly important for enabling agency of the poor (SERP, c.2002: 2). The programme claimed to foreground a 'positive rights-based empowerment approach' (SERP, c.2002: 2).Inequitable power relations were considered central to understanding the pervasiveness of poverty:

> Poverty has become deep rooted as large sections of people are denied equality in the control of resources and are not included in the decision making process. As such widespread poverty must be seen as a political process as it denotes undeniable violation of human rights.
>
> (SERP, c.2002: 1)

The poor were interpellated as competent and independent agents: '...the poor have tremendous potential to help themselves and that this potential can be harnessed by organizing them. The poor have demonstrated that when adequate skills and inputs in community organization, management and action are provided they can shape their destinies' (SERP, c.2002)

The programme demonstrated that it was not restricted to just micro-credit but also involved a powerful social-transformative component. Gender was one of a number of 'action-oriented strategies' for social mobilisation and social change in the program. The gender strategy of Velugu claimed to extend beyond targeting of women to address gender specific disparities (SERP and Centre for World Solidarity, 2006: 2). It also recognised differences *among* women; 'women are a hetereogeneous group and that gender inequalities are linked with other inequalities related to caste, class and religion' (ibid).

Emphasis was placed on training and sensitisation of both program participants and personnel. A Gender Resource Group was established at the State level for the purposes of consultation and training, comprising 'representatives from various sectors like academicians, law, research, education, NGOs working on gender issues, activists on women's empowerment, health, human

rights etc.' (SERP, c.2002: 32). A similar arrangement existed at the district level. Social action committees are established at village level to address social issues. The project claimed that gender equity concerns had been built into guidelines and criteria for funding sub-projects from the Community Investment Fund. Women were trained to act as paralegal workers in order to address violence against women in a number of the project districts. Internally, SERP established its own HR policy on sexual harassment in the organisation which has become operational (GoAP Dept of Rural Development, 2005: 53).

However, there were still considerable limitations to the model adopted by SERP. One of these concerned the opportunities for group members to opt for non-conventional forms of livelihood. As a senior official involved in SERP commented

> ...we have decided to focus on the existing livelihoods of the rural poor... We realized with a project of our scale...even to support existing livelihoods itself is quite a complicated task. So rather than pick up new livelihoods, we decided to focus on whatever they're doing...Whatever people are doing, it is our duty to support those livelihoods, rather than identify new livelihoods depending on our own particular choice. However, wherever there are new opportunities which we can tap with the support of some NGOs this requires a longer period of time. That also we have facilitated in a few cases.
>
> (Vijay Kumar, in World Bank, 2004: c. 30 mins 43 secs)

Furthermore, as discussed further in the next Chapter, convergence of departmental schemes of the government through SERP was strongly emphasised, and this created problems for SERP for co-ordination and administration these schemes, but also demonstrated that the self-help groups were seen as a popular institutional delivery point for the government.

6.4 Comparative discussion: discursive interaction within and between states

While I have presented varied policy articulations of three dominant gendered discourses of development, it is important to acknowledge that that at least traces of each discourse could be found in most policies. Furthermore, because of the existence of these three competing discourses both within and across government departments, the policies which were then established to address the specific discursive construction of gendered development not surprisingly were varied and sometimes contradictory.

Important similarities between states are evident in the gendered development discourses of state policy. Common to both states is a commitment towards intervention to improve the status of women in the form of some kind of affirmative action, even if the proposed action does little to challenge gender inequities. Development policy in both states also embodies a strong appeal to a utilitarian, rather than intrinsic or rights-based perspective of gender-equitable development. Yet, some discourses were articulated more prominently in one state compared the other. While, the competitive-capabilities discourse was also observed in both states, the protective-paternalist discourse was strong in Tamil Nadu but not so much in Andhra Pradesh, and in contrast, the structural-transformative discourse was much stronger in Andhra Pradesh than Tamil Nadu.

Particular differences were evident at the parastatal level. The parastatal programmes in Tamil Nadu under study are characterized by a less radical, more integrative approach, whereas those in Andhra Pradesh envision a much more transformative project of altering power relations through the social mobilization and participation of the poor. The contrast is stronger in Andhra Pradesh where there is a considerable emphasis on rights-based empowerment of the poor at the parastatal level, even though the self-help group model, popular in both States, appeals to the *efficiency concerns of the wider development* discourse of the two state governments.

On some level, parastatal policy was seen as a stronger articulation of *the more critically* informed elements of the wider state policy. In other words, parastatal policy in Tamil was a stronger articulation of the competitive-capabilities discourse of state policy, and in Andhra Pradesh the traces of the structural-transformative discourse in state policy were augmented in the programs of SERP. This suggests an interesting feature of parastatal policies: that to some extent they are able to transcend the more conservative elements of state policy (although whether this creates a conducive kind of agency for gender mainstreaming will be discussed further in the next chapter). The interesting question that remains is why might this be the case? Could it be that the relative autonomy of parastatal agencies and the increased circulation of gendered development discourses due to international agency funding creates openings for more gender-responsive policies? Nevertheless, parastatal agency discourse still resembled in many ways the wider state level development discourse. So on other hand, this suggests that the discursive possibilities for strategies of State-level gender-equitable development are still

strongly determined by, or at least have a strong inter-textual link with dominant state-level discourses of development.

Finally, analyzing policies as a product of the discourses they articulate was not a straightforward exercise. Policy was not always inferential from the most prominent diagnoses of gendered development policy 'problems', which perhaps suggests only the superficial institutional sedimentation of more progressive discourses and the ability of more conservative or established discourses to endure in policy. For example, in Tamil Nadu structural-transformative constructions of gendered discrimination against the girl child and preferences for male children, practices of female infanticide, female foeticide and dowry, became transformed into the targets of protective-paternalist policies. This enabled the state to perform a protective-paternalist role while leaving unchallenged societal norms which sanctioned such discrimination. On the other hand, in AP where the protective-paternalist discourse was weak, policies which might have been considered protective-paternalist in Tamil Nadu enunciated a more structural-transformative discourse.

6.5 Conclusions

What then are the implications of these discursive configurations for opportunities to mainstream gender in development policy? The analysis of opportunities for gender mainstreaming in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is often complicated by the absence of an explicit discussion in policy of the conceptual 'diagnosis' of policy problems. Even less evident is a specific acknowledgement or commitment to 'gender mainstreaming' *per se* – which seems to be a significant characteristics of the acceptance (or not in this case) of gender mainstreaming strategies at the state level. One mention is made of gender mainstreaming in Jayalalithaa's 18 Point Programme, but as outlined earlier this was largely a redundant feature of the policy. Part of the mission of Mahalir Thittam was 'to advocate changes in government policies and programmes in favor of disadvantaged women' (TNCDW, 2000b: 17). However, such 'mainstreaming' was not designed to take place at an organizational level in the Government for the purposes of effecting change in wider government policy. In contrast, any prospect of mainstreaming gender across the State Government as a transformative strategy was superseded by a discourse based on efficiency which prioritized convergence and streamlined delivery of

schemes and benefits to women through the institutional opening of the SHG (discussed in more detail in the next chapter). Involvement with and exposure to the women's empowerment programme was relatively limited to departments in close proximity. Given the scale of the programme, sensitisation of government participants to gender issues even on paper included only those directly involved with the programme, if at all. What was notable of *Vision 2020* was that the absence of the explicit language of 'gender mainstreaming' seemed to be context-specific. A 'mainstreaming' strategy appears as a policy instrument in the Vision 2020 document with regards to disability, but not with regards to gender equality. Similarly, a rights-based approach to gender equality is also marginal in *Vision 2020,* but a rights-based discourse is prevalent within policy discussions of child welfare.

For the most part, if either government has sought to address the problem of gender-inequitable development at all, gender and development policy in both TN and AP has adopted a combination of integrative and affirmative action policies. The possibility for the emergence of a potentially more radical, destabilizing, and transformative discourse of empowerment has been 'colonized' by a more liberal, integrative discourse (even though the possibility of the latter's fixity is never complete, while it is still dominant). Furthermore, the policy objective of empowering women has an ambiguous relationship with the achievement of gender equality. Firstly, women's empowerment is not commonly justified by an explicit commitment to gender equality *per se*. Often, it involves a more implicit commitment to gender equality, that of raising women's status, which only occasionally make references to the comparative status of men. Furthermore, where references to gender equality or gender equity are made, these are often highly ambiguous. If nothing else, this demonstrates that, in the context studied here, the term 'women's empowerment' is polysemic, and thus malleable and highly contingent, and often connotes more than it is able to deliver. No doubt this justifies the scrutiny surrounding its appropriation by governments, mainstream development agencies, and professional and technocratic NGOs in contrast to its more radical beginnings.

Squires argues that 'as long as gender equality is framed by dominant considerations of utility with respect to other existing policy priorities, mainstreaming will remain an integrationist rather than a transformative practice, manifesting a strategy of inclusion rather than displacement'

(Squires, 2007a: 150). Thus, as long as development policy in both states articulate gendered development in terms of efficiency and the positive externalities investing in 'women's development' and 'women's empowerment' can have on wider development processes, processes of development are less likely to be scrutinized for gender-inequitable processes and outcomes. Furthermore, given the importance of income-generating schemes and the prominence of rural development departments, gender-equitable development will continue to be associated with poverty reduction, and the wider impact of processes of development will continue to evade policy attention. Thus, the possibilities for a transformative approach to gender mainstreaming at the state level, at present at least, are highly questionable. In the next chapter, I examine the kinds of agency constituted by the institutional and discursive contexts already discussed, in order to understand whether these kinds of agency offer opportunities for more transformative gender mainstreaming strategies for state level policy.

7 GENDERED DEVELOPMENTAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I mapped the various, competing discourses of gendered development in State-level and parastatal policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. I paid particular attention to how these discourses interpellated particular actors such as the state and women as subjects and objects of development, whether weak and dependent or agents of and participants in development processes. I argued that these discourses differed across different institutional and policy contexts according to the relative dominance of a particular discourse. In this chapter, the aim is to explore the possibilities for, and limitations on, agency as a result of these discursive and institutional practices. By examining the gendered developmental subjectivities which emerge as a result, it is possible to understand not only the extent to which there exists possibilities for agency, but also what kind of agency this might be, and most importantly, the possibilities that this agency creates for particular individuals and groups to promote or obfuscate efforts to mainstream gender into development policy.

To recall from Chapter 2, the concept of 'agency' employed in this thesis is based on the theoretical premise that agency comes from, firstly, the authority accorded to each subject as positioned within a particular discourse, and secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the simultaneous existence of different subject positions and the ensuing dislocatory effect of competing discourses, which creates momentary openings for creative capacity and agency. Thus we may define two possibilities of agency – agency within discourse, and agency as a result of dislocation. The focus on the discursive articulation of gendered developmental subjects in the previous chapter thus enables an understanding of 'how it becomes possible for subjects to act as agents...' (Doty, 1997: 384). Thus the focus should be not only how some subjects are accorded more agency than others *within* a particular discourse, but also the possibilities that arise for agency due to the existence of the complex interaction of multiple, unstable, open, and

competing discourses, and the potential these dislocatory moments offer for transformative change. The more hegemonic a discourse, the least likely it is that alternative subject positions which emerge, and the fewer opportunities for dislocatory agency.

I argue that the possibilities which emerge as a product of the institutional and discursive positioning of subjects and agents of development are highly complex and differentiated both between and among different sets of actors, and between and within different institutional and discursive contexts. I conclude that while the extent of agency is in some cases quite substantial, it is not always the right kind of agency to enable mainstreaming strategies.

In order to demonstrate this argument, the analysis presented in this chapter encompasses a non-exhaustive array of actors including the women SHG members of the respective parastatal programs in each State, bureaucrats and parastatal agency personnel, political leaders, and the women's movement within (and, where relevant, beyond) each State. I also briefly acknowledge in the conclusion a number of important actors, which were originally beyond the remit of this study, but for whom the process of data collection and analysis revealed to be important – these include the role of NGOs, banking institutions, and international organisations. As discussed in Chapter One, without political will and commitment from political leaders it is likely that gender mainstreaming initiatives will fail, as will they if bureaucrats formulating and implementing development policies are unsupportive or if supportive bureaucrats have little control over policy content and processes. The agency of women SHG members and of members of the women's movement is perhaps the most important to understand in terms of enabling a more deliberative democratic model of gender mainstreaming. As Squires argues, 'state feminist' policy agencies 'can facilitate the influence of feminist arguments for women's political representation, and the inclusion of women in decision-making processes, but only where the women's movement is cohesive on this issue and the policy environment is receptive' (Squires, 2007b: 176). In other words, without a strong women's movement making political demands on the state, and on which is also representative of the poor rural women that are numerically dominant in SHGs, state policy agencies supportive of feminist arguments will find it difficult to promote such arguments and feminist participation within state policy-making processes.

Given the wide range of actors in different institutional settings, the comparative analysis for Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is not presented separately, as has been the case in previous chapters, but rather is presented *in passim*.

7.2 The Women of the Self-Help Groups

How does the discursive positioning of women as subjects in the State's gendered development discourse create possibilities for, or constraints on, women's agency? In this section I argue that, because the competitive-capability discourse and the structural-transformative discourse both interpellated women as responsible agents, these discourses increased women's potential for agency relative to their interpellation as weak, vulnerable, and dependent subjects of a paternalist protectionist discourse. However, I also argue that it was in the production of this new gendered developmental subjectivity that presented potentially more detrimental implications for women.

The agency accorded to women SHG members had in many cases a number of empowering effects in each State, as suggested by program evaluations. A major trend has been the large proportion of SHG members contesting elections at the panchayat level – one study estimated that nearly one third of SHGs in AP have at least one member that has contested elections and nearly a quarter of SHGs have members that have been elected to the panchayats (EDA/APMAS, 2006).[99]

Policy instruments which aimed to empower women were substantially (although not wholly) directed towards women and their *self*-improvement, suggesting that the problem of their disempowered status remained with women alone, and that it was women who had to build their own capacities in order to participate in mainstream development processes. In part, this was suggested by the focus of State policies articulating a competitive-capability discourse, obligating women to take advantage of the preferential policies designed for them. This was noticeable in both States' policies.

---

[99] Although as the study also notes, 'in the southern states, nearly all the women SHG members who stood for election came from families active in local mainstream politics', suggesting that 'selection as a candidate for the panchayat, therefore, is typically a question of money, contacts, and political networks outside an SHG' (EDA/APMAS, 2006: 59).

However, the emphasis on women's self-improvement was far more noticeable in Tamil Nadu, at the parastatal level in TNCDW. Nothing exemplified this more than when, during a visit to the TNCDW headquarters in December 2005, an official in TNCDW passed to me the most recent copy of *Mutram* ('courtyard'), the Corporation's monthly newsletter for SHGs (see Figure 10). It had on the front cover a picture of a potter's wheel which, the official explained to me, signified 'a woman moulding herself', through a process of self-development. In other words, women were expected to mould themselves into newly empowered women. While this may be seen as increased agency for women to act on themselves in a refashioning project of the self, it suggests limits on the reasons why women were perceived to be initially disempowered. Thus a key narrative in evaluations of project success focused on the extent to which the women participants of the programme the transformation had taken place.

Program literature suggests a tendency to overstate the program's success, which is consistent with the logic inherent in development programs to produce narratives of success (Mosse, 2005: 8; Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). This was phenomenon was more observable in Tamil Nadu than in Andhra Pradesh, a possible explanation for which partly concerned the more vocal scrutiny of women's organizations in AP, discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

In the more critically informed microfinance literature, there is a strong recognition that microcredit programs serve to discipline rather than empower women participants. As discussed above, the popularity of microfinance programmes for women among banking and credit agencies rests on the perceived twin advantages of low transaction costs and high repayment rates. Such outcomes rely upon what Rankin calls a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', nurtured within microfinance programmes by a detailed and strict regime of disciplinary practices on group members. Accordingly,

> 'it is women's responsiveness to the discipline of weekly repayment schedules - and to a highly disciplinary institutional culture involving wearing uniforms, chanting slogans, singing songs and taking oaths – that may be credited for the extraordinarily high repayment rates of most microfinance programmes'
>
> (Rankin, 2004: 189).

Figure 10 Mutram, a potter's wheel, and the self-regulating technologies of empowerment discourse

Such a 'highly disciplinary institutional culture', I argue, can be observed in both Mahalir Thittam and Velugu/IKP. The effect is the cultivation of a number of self-regulating technologies which moulds individual and group behaviour around programmatic norms, which also enables the implementing agency to govern a large number of program participants from afar. In part, this works through a neoliberal discourse which transfers the responsibility for development from the state onto non-state actors, including individuals and communities (Rankin, 2002: 10). However, I argue that while this develops a new managerial subjectivity for women, it is not necessarily empowering in ways that might challenge gender inequalities.

Embedded in the program design of both AP and TN parastatal programs is a detailed and strict regime of practices which every group must adhere to and will be graded upon, determining their creditworthiness for formal lending. The grading process involves a detailed list of criteria for evaluating SHG performance including frequency of meetings, attendance at meetings, member participation in meetings, frequency of savings, average savings per month, criteria relating to internal loans and rotation of savings, repayment of internal and formal loans, book-keeping, group accounts auditing, and group regulatory mechanisms. Group members are responsible for maintaining and updating on a regular basis seven different books and registers. Groups that meet weekly are marked higher than those that meet less frequently, as are groups that save more regularly (the most marks for weekly savings), have higher attendance (above eighty percent is deemed high) and higher participation ('high' is again above eighty percent). Groups that score highly overall in the grading process, normally undertaken by their facilitating NGO, then become eligible for applying for formal credit. As a result, while individual members join a group based on entitlement criteria, determined by poverty line estimates, the group's access to formal credit, a key component of the scheme and marker of group success, is based on performance-related criteria, and criteria which are largely unrelated to social empowerment objectives.[100]

As in many SHG-based microfinance programs, the SHG model adopted in both Mahalir Thittam and Velugu/IKP relied on group pressure to enforce the repayment of loans, both internally and to the formal lending agency. The willingness of group members to exert peer pressure on other group members is frequently cited both as an effective means of loan recovery and an attractive prospect for lending agencies in terms of reducing transaction costs by reducing the level of external intervention in groups. In part, this group compliance is enforced by a collective oath-taking ritual at the start of every meeting.[101]

However, while these discursive practices discipline and regulate the behavior and norms of program participants, such disciplinary technologies are never fully successful and complete, and

---

[100] Although it has to be noted that these scheme somewhat crudely award 'bonus points' to groups for preventing dowry payments and occurrences of female infanticide

[101] The *MaThi* pledge was designed by MYRADA, an NGO working with TNCDW. At the time of research, it was not clear whether there was a scheme-wide oath for groups in Velugu/IKP.

that 'what we have, instead, are partial and contradictory subjects of development who occupy certain identity slots that development discourse creates for them while contesting others' (Sharma, 2001a: 8).

In the case of Mahalir Thittam in Tamil Nadu, the role envisioned for SHGs was extensive, proposing that SHGs would become a key institutional component in the delivery of government programmes. The programme envisioned 'massive and intensive involvement and participation of SHGs' in government schemes which, it was expected, would lead to 'greater transparency, outreach and impact of economic development programmes' (TNCDW, 2000b: 47). This emphasis on convergence placed an undue burden on self-help group members as a former TNCDW official explained:

> ...in some ways, there were some negative implications also, because other government departments... basically everyone started eyeing these groups. The Health Department thought it was just easier to piggyback on the regularity of these institutions...For example, health schemes, family planning, education department started wanting to go through them for promoting family school enrolment. ...The nutrition scheme for women and children, nutrition, the importance of regular AIDs monitoring...Everything started being piggybacked onto these groups which in some ways was good up to a point but in some ways, it became, it could have become a burden... [O]thers thought it was efficient to work through these groups.....things started working better through the groups. There were also concerns that there was too much being expected of these groups. We had to make that as part of the training, including training of trainers, [saying to them].'you know it has to make sense for you, don't just take on every social service without building your capacity to do so. And it's ok to say yes to certain things and find other ways to do other things'... Basically we wanted the women to do what they wanted out of their choice, rather than dictating, being pressured by other departments... It was just more efficient to have all services converged... it was efficient, and everybody was tempted to do that...
>
> (Interview with former TNCDW official)

Furthermore, governmental and non-governmental agencies were urged to 'use the organizational capabilities of SHGs to improve local governance' (ibid). SHGs became involved in running fair price shops of the Public Distribution System, government sanitation programs, and in a case reported by the media in October 2006, the IKP Mahila Mandal Samakhya had contracted with the state's public sector power utility to act as an intermediary to supply power, guard against power theft, and administer billing and revenue collection (The Hindu, 2006).

The participation of programme beneficiaries in State empowerment programs at a level which establishes some level of decision-making regarding the direction of the program is understood

to be an enabling factor for women's agency, even if alone it is not a sufficient condition for women's empowerment (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). As outlined earlier in Chapter 5, opportunities for women SHG member's participation in the SHG programs varied between Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and was more institutionalized in the AP program than in TN.

A potential opportunity for agency arises in the programmatic thrust to federate SHGs into higher level institutions, as it aims to create an institutional mechanism for the collective organization of SHGs and increase their bargaining power and collective voice (Nair, 2005). It also provides a mandated space for SHG members to come together and articulate and discuss their own experiences of the program and to raise issues for debate (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006: 383).

Both SERP and TNCDW have adopted the objective of federating SHGs into larger units. In Tamil Nadu, this objective slowly evolved over time; in AP it was built in to the program model from the beginning; but given that the Velugu program in AP was designed several years later, the thrust towards federating occurred around a similar time.[102]These federated institutions act as apex organizations for SHG members, providing services such as book-keeping and training. They also act as onlenders to SHGs, and in turn are sustained by the interest they charge SHGs for loans, as well as the marginal interest earned on the savings they hold.

SHG federations have been viewed positively by both parastatal agencies in AP and TN. For example, a TNCDW report suggested that 'federations can be very successful when the decision-making process and the operations at the group level are truly democratic, efficient and based on sound operational principles in the overall interest of group members' (TNCDW, 2000a). A senior TNCDW official suggested that the quality of those federations formed had varied, but was optimistic about their potential (interview, TNCDW official, January 2006). One evaluation of federations in the AP program observed that 'federations of SHGs are fast becoming powerful voices expressing the social and economic needs of the poor' (Deshmukh-Ranadive, 2004: 1). Furthermore, to some extent, federating SHGs may reduce the burden placed on individual SHGs

[102] In Tamil Nadu, SHGs are federated into block level federations (BLFs) and then into cluster level federations (CLFs). SHG Federations in Tamil Nadu are are sometimes referred to as *kalanjiams* (following the Dhan Foundation approach). In Andhra Pradesh, SHGs are federated into Village Level Organisations and then into Mandal Mahila Samakhyas, the latter being located at the mandal (sub-district administrative area) headquarters.

as the government shifts its focus to federations as implementing agencies. However, a study by APMAS, an NGO closely associated with the AP parastatal, suggested that federations are highly dependent on the promoting organization and the staff that the latter transfer to support the federation (Reddy and Prakash, 2003).

Providing a structural mechanism for collective voice, identity, and increased bargaining power is only one of a number of concerns driving parastatal efforts to federate SHGs. One of the most prominent is to enable the sustainability of SHGs. Perhaps more significant however, are three other key commonly cited concerns identified by Nair (2005: 15-18) : that of reducing transaction costs (of agencies dealing with SHGs), reducing the incidence of default among SHG lenders, and reducing the cost of SHG formation. Key questions remain as to what extent does the purpose behind federating SHGs and the activities in which the federations are engaged produce an effect which disciplines rather than enables? To what extent does this disciplining dynamic restrict the potential of federations to provide individual and collective agency to SHGs?

7.3 Bureaucratic actors

Discursive and institutional practices of development policy and programs demonstrated a number of ways in which the agency of bureaucratic actors was both enabled and constrained. Narratives of gender-sensitised bureaucrats constitute a potential new developmental subjectivity for bureaucratic actors. Potential opportunities for gender-sensitisation existed in either of two ways: gender training, and exposure to gender-equitable development concepts and practices through postings to parastatal programs. On the first option, there did not appear to be a state level policy in either state on gender training. The respective state departments of personnel were responsible for training at the State level, and operated training programs on the basis of nominations from other State government departments. As a result, training at the IAS level is often only voluntary, based on individuals identifying their own training needs and putting themselves forward, as well as demand driven, based on the identification by individuals, through their department heads (which also have the ability to control training requirements). In terms of gender training in particular, given the time at which it was introduced at the LBS

National Academy of Administration, most IAS officers now in senior positions would not have received gender training as part of their induction period in Mussorie. However, most have the opportunity to attend gender training during their mid-career training. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not always initially well received: one IAS officer recalled a situation to me in which participating IAS officers raised several hostile questions towards the gender trainer at the beginning of a two-day session, and which made the participating officer uncomfortable. Fortunately, the trainer was able to overcome these hostile questions and participants were more compliant throughout the remainder of the session as a result (interview, IAS officer, June 2007). But it is less clear as to how this might differ among individual bureaucrats, across the two states, and across different government departments and parastatal agencies within states, particularly given the gendered pattern of postings outlined earlier in Chapter Five.

The other option, exposure through postings, seems also to have varying potential. In Tamil Nadu, the IFAD Completion Evaluation report of the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project (the precursor to Mahalir Thittam*)* claimed that officials associated with the program had undergone a change in mindset. The report stated: 'the skepticism of the officials has given way to appreciation for the efforts of the SHG members. They now appreciate the SHGs for their efforts in saving regularly, selecting proper beneficiaries for different enterprises, the excellent recovery made by them, the regular conduct of meetings, etc' (TNCDW, c.1998: 10). One former official of TNCDW expressed to me when interviewed that they had derived a 'tremendous amount of personal satisfaction' from being involved in the project and that it had been 'personally enriching' (interview, March 2006). The same official stated that many involved in the project were relatively more sensitive to the concept of gender inequality when they were posted on, but acknowledged that the challenge was to institutionalise these changes (ibid). Another official suggested that after having been posted to the TNCDW for a period of time, she became associated with posts which had a similar empowerment orientation (interview, June 2007). She also suggested that the extent to which gender sensitization remained at the level of the bureaucratic subjectivity and did not transfer into the personal lives of bureaucrats demonstrated that gender sensitization had its limits.

The emphasis on convergence in both states' reformist discourse created varying possibilities for agency for senior parastatal personnel. One the one hand, the importance given to the parastatal agency relative to other government departments particularly social sector departments had the effect of increasing the agency of senior personnel by positioning them as gatekeepers to a large number of potential beneficiaries of government programmes as well as an existing institutional structure through which delivery could be managed. However, this was also potentially constraining as parastatal personnel became partially responsible for implementing the agendas of other government departments in addition to the programs their own agency was promoting. For instance, SERP personnel felt the pressure of the government's emphasis on converging departmental schemes through SERP and the self-help groups.

> The expectations from the government were very high. And we were struggling to meet the competing demands of the variety of departments. The Health department wanted us to do this work, the AIDS Controller wanted us to do this work, the Agriculture department wanted our collaboration. So we became victims of our own success. So we had all departments wanting to ride on the institutional arrangements...So we've now learned to say no... quite forcefully also. Unless institutions are strong they really can't cope with the various competing demands. So this was a very important challenge that we faced.
>
> (Vijay Kumar of SERP in World Bank, 2004: circa 1 hr 20 mins 30 secs)

Furthermore, parastatal personnel often had to negotiate with other agencies which sometimes required articulating project goals in a language that would be more acceptable to the different actors the agency had to interact with, but in a way which had the potential to dilute more transformative goals. As one former official of TNCDW expressed, when negotiating with different agencies it was necessary to 'bridge' the discourse of the program with their own institutionally embedded discourse in order to convince them of the merit of the Corporations proposals. Finance Ministry officials had to be convinced of the programme's worth on efficiency grounds (often using a cost-benefit framework). Politicians in contrast had to be convinced that not only was there a popular demand for the programme, but that the programme would be a 'vote winner'. The task of the TNCDW official was to demonstrate the benefits of the program in these respective terms. Once convinced, however, the operational autonomy of the program was largely secure (interview with former TNCDW official, June 2007). In contrast, P. Jamuna, the State Project Director for gender in SERP suggested that she worked relatively autonomously from both the World Bank and senior personnel at SERP (interview, June 2006).

Reformist discourse which sought to ensure the stability of tenure among bureaucrats offered increased potential for agency to the extent of improving the autonomy of bureaucrats from interference by political leaders. Political leaders may transfer bureaucrats as a means to exert control over policy and over powerful bureaucrats and to ensure important sectoral postings are staffed by supportive bureaucrats (which contests the notion of impartial government service). For instance, in both states, there was evidence of bureaucratic transfers immediately after elections. In this sense, the relative continuity of senior civil service personnel SERP in AP demonstrated considerably more autonomy at the parastatal level than that which was demonstrated by more frequent transfers in the TNCDW in Tamil Nadu.

7.4 The Political Leadership

Two factors enabled a high degree of agency among the most senior party political leaders in the two states when in government as Chief Ministers. The first relates to the centralization of party political leadership. Three out of four political parties (AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu and the TDP in Andhra Pradesh) in power in the two States during the case study period were regional political parties, known for their high degree of centralized leadership (Palshikar, 2004; Suri, 2002). The centralization of party political leadership in AP is far more notable for the TDP than the Congress Party , and not surprisingly given that the latter is a national party and because the Congress Party leaders in AP are accountable to the national party leadership. Centralised leadership has been the case for both the TDP's founder leader, NT Rama Rao, and for his successor Chandrababu Naidu. Srinivasulu argues that the TDP

> is a highly personalised party therefore there has been an overt and excessive focus on the persona of Naidu. In fact, he has assumed an iconic status with regard to the State-level economic reforms in the international and national press and in the eyes of international donors and captains of domestic big business.

Suri (2002: 71) argues that the impact of centralization in the TDP in Andhra Pradesh was demonstrated when the party experienced losses in the panchayat elections in 2001.

Chandrababu Naidu, as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1995 until 2004, came to personify the State's reform enthusiasm, and was dubbed 'the CEO of Andhra Pradesh' for his business-like style and pro-technology reforms. Naidu's pro-reform persona and commitment to

reforms was central to the State government's relationship with the World Bank; as Kirk suggests, 'despite AP's weaker track record, Naidu impressed the Bank as a dynamic market advocate who was prepared to take tough measures and inject greater professionalism into governance' (Kirk, 2005: 293). Kennedy suggests that Naidu's exaggerated overt reform enthusiasm was a conscious strategy to send strong signals to potential investors that the State government was commitment to substantial economic and governance reforms (Kennedy, 2004: 51). Moreso than the Tamil Nadu State Government, the Government of Andhra Pradesh needed to adopt this signalling strategy because of the State's comparatively lower indicators on economic growth, human development, and infrastructure (Kennedy, 2004: 51).

The second factor, discussed in the previous chapter, was the paternalist discourse articulated in government policy, and the effects of a paternalistic discourse which through personalization and association of development and welfare schemes by the party restricted the capacity for less senior political leaders to champion policy issues. This dynamic appeared more dominant in Tamil Nadu.

It is clear from the previous chapter that political leaders are subjects positioned differently within competing reformist and populist discourses and are thus subject to competing logics. As Subramanian notes, 'populist regimes face pressure to deliver in some way on their promises to increase the entitlements of emergent groups, and retain support only if they do so' (Subramanian, 1999). The way in which political leaders have resorted to populist politics in AP suggests that populism in Andhra Pradesh is of a qualitatively different character to populism in Tamil Nadu.

In Chapter 4 I raised the issue of whether gendered development policy in Tamil Nadu might be more closely associated with either the 'assertive/empowerment' populist style of the DMK or the 'paternalist/protective' populist style of the AIADMK (Subramanian, 1999; Swamy, 1998). It is possible to argue that the DMK were often also paternalist towards women, even though they have been more closely associated with assertive or empowerment populism.

Not surprisingly given the populist orientation of politics in Tamil Nadu discussed in earlier chapters, social welfare schemes were often closely associated with, and officially credited to,

party political leaders. As Harriss-White observes, the introduction under MGR's ADMK government of a nutritional intervention which provided a daily meal in schools for children (the Nutritious Meal Scheme) was closely associated with him. But this close association also meant that it became 'heavily politically personalized', and when the DMK came to power, they were keen to associate the scheme with the party and did so by adding one fortnightly egg to the meal provision (Harriss-White, 2004b: 53). Similar 'embellishments' were made when the AIADMK party came back to power in the 1990s (ibid).

Protective-paternalist discourses articulated in state policy in Tamil Nadu expressed reverence to, the Chief Minister for his or her leadership for the welfare and development of society. While this was more common in policy documents of the Social Welfare department, they were also found in more public arenas such as the Budget Speech with regards to the then Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa's leadership. These reverential expressions were often in reverence to their 'able' or 'skillful' leadership or their personal commitment to ensuring the welfare of the poor: 'our Hon'ble Chief Minister... is striving hard to see that no stone is unturned in realizing the goal of making the disadvantaged sections to get the fruits of development' (Government of Tamil Nadu, 2007: 1).

The same political personalization of social welfare in Tamil Nadu can be seen with State government programmes for women's development, the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project and its successor, Mahalir Thittam. Both the DMK and the AIADMK parties and their respective leaders have sought to be closely affiliated with the programme in various, and usually unsubtle, ways. Firstly, like a number of government schemes, Mahalir Thittam was also politically personalized through being identified with a late political leader and popular figure in Tamil Nadu. On International Women's Day in March 2000, M. Karunanidhi, then Chief Minister, renamed Mahalir Thittam as '*Annai Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninaivu Mahalir Thittam*', in memory of the mother of a former Chief Minister and founder of the DMK party, the late C.N. Annadurai. To some extent this presented the government programme as an act of benevolence.

Secondly, different governments led by the two rival political parties have sought to identify the growth of women's self-help groups in the State and the perceived success of the scheme with

their term in office. For example, while the IFAD-funded phase of the programme began in 1989, under the DMK government, some policy statements released during the latter years of the more recent AIADMK government (2001-2006) have erroneously traced the start of the program to 1991-92 (GoTN, 2004: 47).[103]

Thirdly, Chief Ministers have closely associated themselves with the program through visual literature related to the program. Images of Jayalalithaa has appeared on promotional literature of Chennai-based branded SHG products as well as the government's promotional brochure on SHG success stories in Tamil Nadu (see Figure 11 below).[104] During a visit to the District Project Implementation Unit in Chennai, I also noticed a picture of Jayalalithaa, the then current Chief Minister, on the wall close to the ceiling next to the clock. While it is not an uncommon practice to have a picture of the current Chief Minister displayed in government buildings, it represents the important part charismatic leadership and personalized politics plays in Tamil Nadu, including within government programmes for women's development.

The monthly newsletter of TNCDW, *Mutram*, distributed to SHG members in the State, has also served as a means of delivering the Chief Minister's message to a large number of women and their families. Events and features involving political leaders in the DMK and AIADMK appear relatively frequently in the magazine, suggesting that party political leaders are keen to communicate with women SHG members as beneficiaries of a government program. This also generates a different level of exposure to government and party politics for the members as well as an association of the program with different political leaders rather than the bureaucracy.

There is also evidence to suggest that political leaders have tried to mobilize women SHG members as potential vote banks. The AIADMK in Tamil Nadu has been accused in the past of trying to encourage SHG women to campaign on the party's behalf. In 2004, during the Lok

---

[103] In 2001-02, 2002-03, and 2003-04, the policy statement had previously expressed this as the programme receiving 'its first growth thrust in 1991-92', which would be more accurate, but omitted the start date of the program as 1989.

[104] Two things need to be noted here. Firstly, the examples of literature given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are in English but were also available in Tamil. Secondly, it is not uncommon to find graphics used as a supplementary means of communication in order to make such literature accessible to non-literate members. However, the latter point does not diminish the claim that the literature is personalised by political leaders, as is the case in this example.

Figure 11 Promotional literature for the 'Chenmathi' (abbreviating Chennai Mahalir Thittam) brand of SHG products (left) the Chennai District Project Implementation Unit of TNCDW (middle) and success narratives of the TNCDW (right)



Sabha election campaign period both the rival DMK, the left-wing CPI(M) and AIDWA appealed to the Election Commission protesting at the alleged AIADMK's coercion of SHG members (The Hindu, 2004b,, 2004c; cf. Kalpana, 2005). In AP also, SHGs have become somewhat politicized, as one study reports:

> Apart from being a possible source of women candidates for panchayati raj, SHGs are perhaps more obviously emerging as a factor in local politics as potential vote banks. This was most evident in the South, especially in AP where, apart from the fact that the majority of groups are government-promoted, the substantial numbers of SHGs in practically every village represent an obvious rallying point for all political parties. Local supporters of political parties interact closely with SHG members and leaders. SHG members are brought in large numbers to political meetings and to meetings organized by the government. During any election, different parties distribute money to SHGs, and SHGs have in turn begun to demand funds and benefits.
>
> (EDA/APMAS, 2006: 67)

Kennedy also explains the different extent of signaling in the two States in terms of 'internal political constituencies', for which she identifies two significant determinants: firstly, the level of political party fragmentation in the State (which increases electoral competition), and secondly, the degree of 'political mobilization of Dalits and other traditionally low status groups (Kennedy, 2004: 52). She concludes that Tamil Nadu's greater fragmentation and higher mobilization helps to explain why the State government chose to pursue economic reforms with less fanfare than that observed in AP, where her two determinants were relatively absent (Kennedy, 2004: 52). However, can the same be said when we shift our focus to the women's movement in each state, and consider their level of political mobilization particularly in relation to the Dalit movement? Perhaps not, in at least two senses. Firstly, as was suggested in Chapter 4, authors such as Anandhi (2005) have questioned the extent to which the Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu has been willing to consider the discrimination faced by Dalit women and their political demands as core issues of the Dalit movement, and this too without reducing issues such as the rape of Dalit women in episodes of caste-based violence to acts which symbolise of the oppression of Dalit men. Secondly, despite the bipolarity of the party political system in Andhra Pradesh, women's groups associated with the Left parties are quite vocal in the State, something which I return to later. Therefore, the significance of Kennedy's argument for the agency of political leaders in promoting reforms in the face of the fragmentation and mobilization of political constituencies shifts somewhat when applied to the context of State government welfare and development schemes for *women*.

Furthermore, many political observers have attributed the TDP's election defeat in 2004 in part to Naidu's overt reform stance (see for instance Sridhar, 2004). As explained in Chapter 4, populist politics in Andhra Pradesh is driven in part by the compulsions of electoral democracy, and the women's vote has for long been considered important in the State. Women have been perceived by the TDP as an important constituency, at least in terms of electoral votes, and proved crucial in voting in the TDP to government in 1994 and keeping them in office in 1999. But Ayyangar suggests that in the 2004 elections 'the vote against Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP was not a mandate against the World Bank programmes espoused by the incumbent *but for it* [sic], *and more of it* [sic]' (Ayyangar, 2004: 1993).

To an extent, then, the political leaders of both State governments have witnessed (actual or anticipated) challenges to their reform agendas, which have forced them to revert to populist politics. The implications of populist politics as a means to soften (or contradict) economic reforms is not confined to each State. Srinivasulu (2004: 6, n.3) suggests that the Congress Party's election victory in Andhra Pradesh in 2004, which came about partly as a result of their promise of free power to the agricultural sector, persuaded the AIADMK State Government in Tamil Nadu to implement the same.

7.5 The role of the women's movement at the State level

Perhaps one of the most surprising findings of examining the engagement of different actors has been the near absence of critical feminist engagement in issues related to self-help groups, more widely in India, but particularly in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh where such schemes are more extensively developed. The extent of engagement by the women's movement in AP and TN with state policies and programmes has not been uniform across different sectors. While the women's movement have been more engaged in campaigning in favour of or against particular legislation on such issues as rape, dowry, and coercive population policies, it appears that the movement has been less directly involved with state-led development policies and programmes. This is particularly marked in relation to state-led SHG programmes for women on two counts; firstly, and perhaps not surprisingly, few feminist-oriented women's movement organizations are involved as SHG promoting organizations working in collaboration with government

programmes; secondly, few women's movement organizations have really engaged critically with state-led SHG programs in order to scrutinize and monitor them from the sidelines for the impact they have on women SHG members. As an experienced feminist consultant observed,

> We really need to look at self help groups a little more critically and see what's happening, because unfortunately ...if you look at it, none of the organisations with a strong feminist orientation are running self help groups... maybe it's because...it's within the nature of the feminist movement, I don't know, but we really need to look at it more carefully.
>
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

A far more significant presence is that of development NGOs which do not always have an explicit feminist agenda. This may be due to the largely rural character of the SHG movement. Advocacy is more common among urban women's movement organizations than the NGOs in the rural areas implementing poverty alleviation programmes (IDS Bridge, 1995: 59).

Not surprisingly because of their partisan association, women's wings of political parties appear to be far more critical of the government when their own party is not in government. In both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, women's organizations affiliated to the Left parties have been the most vocal among various women's movement groups in their scrutiny of the respective State government's schemes for women's empowerment.

However, Soma KP suggests that there has been little interaction between government and civil society organizations more generally with regard to SHG programs.

> Despite their burgeoning numbers in the development landscape of the country, there has been little dialogue on experiences with SHGs and their potential for empowerment or poverty reduction between civil society actors and policy makers regarding the expectations from SHGs, the ground level realities as well as possible ways of strengthening SHGs in order that they may serve better the interests of poor women.
>
> (Parthasarathy, 2006)

Anandhi and Swaminathan argue, the institutionalization of women's studies in higher education institutions in Tamil Nadu has affected the capacity for feminist research and scholarship which might purposefully engage with and influence State policy towards gender-equitable development (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006). As they explain, the institutionalization of Women's Studies in Indian institutions of higher education from the 1970s onwards was a purposeful exercise in 'the generation and analysis of data with a view to uncovering significant trends in patterns of social and economic organization which affect women's position in the long

run' (ICSSR Advisory Committee on Women's Studies 1977, cited in Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006: 4444). It was hoped that women's studies would serve as a means to challenge 'the marginalization and misrepresentation of women in social science disciplines and scholarship' as well as playing a critical interventionist role in the production of knowledge about women's role in, and the impact upon gender relations, of the processes of modernity and development (ibid: 4444-5). Yet, it was the way in which women's studies were institutionalized in Indian higher education that affected the possibilities of the newly established discipline to contribute to the production of knowledge concerning these processes: 'the disproportionate stress on extension activity as an important component in carrying out women's studies substantially diluted the earlier conceptualisation of women's studies as a "critique of knowledge production"' (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006).

They conclude that despite a high profile for women's studies in the State,

> Academic enquiry into women's experiences, exploring the interconnection between gender, sexuality, caste and women's studies and linkages with various disciplines has not formed part of the women's studies programme in Tamil Nadu. Even as these centres are incapable of influencing government policies related to women, the outreach programme has gained popularity among the government agencies since women's studies centres have been instrumental in uncritically carrying out the state's "women's empowerment" programme.
>
> (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006: 4451)

Therefore, the feminist academic-activist link for contesting State policy is relatively weak in Tamil Nadu due to the low institutional capacity of women's studies as a discipline to engage critically with, rather than merely implement, government policy on gender and development, and this has arguably reduced the potential influence such a collaboration might have on State policy.

Women's groups affiliated to the Left parties in Andhra Pradesh are particularly strong. The Andhra Pradesh Mahila Samakhya[105], a women's organization affiliated to the National Federation of Indian Women (which is in turn affiliated to the Community Party of India) has

---

[105] In Andhra Pradesh, there are three similar sounding but quite distinct organisations; firstly, the AP *Mahila Samakhya*, as described above, secondly, the Andhra Pradesh *Mahila Samatha* Society (http://www.apmss.org) which is part of the Government of India's *Mahila Samakhya* programme on educational empowerment operating in selected States, and thirdly, the *Mahila Mandal Samakhyas* which are federated organisations part of the Velugu/IKP programme of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

been persistently vocal. Women's groups in AP in particular are acutely aware of how political parties have treated them as vote banks in the past, and as a result, have been keen to hold political leaders to account for the pre-election promises they make to women voters. In December 2003, just a few months before the election, Chandrababu Naidu announced a series of populist measures targeted specifically at members of DWCRA groups, including cellular phones and increased subsidies on bank loan interest (The Hindu, 2003c). Just a few days later, a State-level meeting of women's SHGs criticized Naidu for exploiting them for political gain and demanded he implement his promises (The Hindu, 2003b).

However, it is only in the last few years that feminist organisations have been vocal on the limited empowering effects of self-help group programmes. As Kameswari Jandhyala, former AP Mahila Samakhya Director points out,

> 'in Andhra Pradesh, the home as it were of the self-help strategy, even the celebrated Nellore example, where women moved from strength to strength through literacy, struggles against arrack and mobilising savings, has yet to be fully researched to establish the sustainability of the gains made by women. Though autonomous women's groups joined their rural sisters to push the prohibition agenda, there has been little engagement with what is happening in the lives of the self-help group members.'
>
> (Jandhyala, 2001)

A number of recent developments have generated further debate and have illustrated the extent to which the women's movement is critically engaged with State-led SHG programs for women. In 2006, a collective of three women's development NGOs released a report suggesting that women's participation in SHGs has increased their access to credit but has become an extra burden and has had little empowerment effects otherwise (Nirantar, 2007).

A critical juncture occurred in 2007 around the introduction of a Government of India Bill which proposed to regulate the microfinance sector (the Micro Financial Sector (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2007). Led by the CPI-affiliated women's organization AIDWA, women's groups Women's groups designated the Bill as a 'black Bill', as they anticipated that if passed in its current form it would have a negative impact on poor women as consumers of micro-finance products and services.

A more worrying observation concerns the lack of critical research being conducted on the effects of self-help group schemes. According to one observer, there is a silent but strong lobby

in India against the kind of critically engaged research which might draw out some of the more disempowering effects of self-help group schemes, and significantly many organizations which commonly fund research on SHGs are reluctant to fund more critically informed research (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007). She also suggests that what research exists SHGs in India is most often commissioned research which is driven by donors as an input into project planning rather than independent research and that this is having a negative impact on the extent to which institutions of higher education, which are often constrained financially, can conduct critically informed research on SHGs. As she explains,

> ...The quality of research has come down in India... partly because over the last at least ten years, there is more commissioned research than independent research... [A] lot of the research is purely driven by the projects that they are funding. So the whole world of commissioned research has actually squeezed institutions and there is very little money.
> (interview with Vimala Ramachandran, December 2007)

This suggests that feminist organizations which have recently begun to critically engage the state on issues relating to self-help groups and the state's questionable claims to women's empowerment, should also integrate into their demands the necessity for *independent* funding of research into the impact of state-led self-help group programs on women participants and gendered development inequalities in India more generally. While this may create hierarchies as to which feminist organizations then become involved in the research process at the expense of others, it may offer a first step towards stimulating increased democratic deliberation to usher in more transformative mainstreaming strategies.

7.6 Conclusions

I have argued that there are two potentially constraining and two potentially enabling discursive effects on the agency of women SHG members. Constraining effects include the interpellation of women (particularly poor women) as hyper-responsible agents of development and the disciplinary power of SHG program practices. Enabling effects include the potential for collective mobilization and articulation as a result of programmatic drives to federate SHGs, as well as the participation of women SHG members in decision-making structures within and outside of program structures. According to the program design, this is a more embedded feature of the AP State SHG program, although Tamil Nadu's program has organically evolved to also include this.

I have also argued that in relation to the agentic capacity of bureaucratic actors and parastatal agency personnel to mainstream gender within State-level policies and programmes, the constraining institutional context of the bureaucracy which closes down the creative potential for prospective 'policy entrepreneurs' or 'femocrats' (both remarkably lacking within the State bureaucracy as a result) is counter-balanced by the need for co-ordinating bureaucrats and parastatal agency personnel to negotiate between different actors and their discursive frames. While the relative autonomy of parastatal agency personnel appears to be significant in both States, the continuity of appointment and freedom from bureaucratic-institutional transfers is more evident in AP than TN. In both States, parastatal agencies provide bureaucrats with opportunities to work with a wider range of actors, moreso in AP than TN. The agency of bureaucratic actors seems to be higher in the parastatal programs, particularly in AP. Reformist discursive emphasis on convergence can increase their agency by enabling them to become important gatekeepers, but can also constrain their agency as they are expected to implement the agendas of other government departments.

The agentic capacity of political leaders was discussed with reference to the competing logics of reformist and populist discourse which both constrain and enable agency, and compared to the effect of the centralization of political party leadership and paternalist discourses in augmenting the agency of political leaders. While political leaders exercise considerable agency, although not unlimited (both reformist and populist discourses have particular limiting effects), this agency is often not conducive to transformative gender mainstreaming strategies. This is despite the fact that demands of accountability to women as voters may to some extent determine their policy priorities and the recognition given to women in state policy. Both states have extremely centralized political parties with the exception of the Congress Party in AP, and moreso for the AIADMK than the DMK in Tamil Nadu, and this centralization allows only the most senior political leaders agency and also impacts on the extent to which political parties are accessible to the advocacy of external actors. The personalization of social welfare schemes by political leaders within the framework of a paternalist discourse is more evident in TN than AP. In AP, Chandrababu Naidu's personal association with development policy has in fact been quite the opposite – one of a liberalizing reformer. As reformers, political leaders were constrained by the populist logic which was driven by electoral considerations and, in Tamil Nadu by a party

political legacy of social movement discourse. As populists, they were constrained by the need to reform. Constraints of populist discourse appeared to be considerably effective at stalling the reformist agenda in both states. The protective-paternalist discourse enhanced the agency of political leaders as benevolent leaders although this was more embedded in Tamil Nadu than Andhra Pradesh, and this may be a legacy of the Dravidian parties' former social movement background and its consolidation of as political parties elected to government. The more centralised leadership of the TDP in AP, and the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh places limits on the structural-transformative discourse which emphasises deliberation. Given the emphasis on policy expertise, a competitive-capability discourse requires that political leaders work closely with bureaucratic actors, which both enables them as reformers but constrains them as populists.

Analysis of the possibilities for agency of the women's movement produced perhaps the most surprising observation, and the most worrying for feminist strategies. In both TN and AP one finds a relative lack of advocacy of autonomous (as opposed to party-political affiliated) women's movement organizations on State-led SHG programs, as well as the presence of a large number of non-feminist NGOs, as well as a lack of critically informed research on the effects of state level policies of gendered development. Opportunities for the institutional support of feminist activists from academic research have also been restricted. This has serious implications for the capacity of feminist civil society organizations to engage the state for transformative change.

What conclusions can be drawn as to whether the various kinds of agency identified in this chapter are enabling or constraining for transformative gender mainstreaming strategies. Studies of actor participation in gender mainstreaming strategies generally distinguish between two models: 'expert-bureaucratic' and 'participative-democratic' (Squires, 2007a). While the former is integrationist, the latter is agenda-setting and potentially transformative. As their labelling suggests, the 'expert-bureaucratic' characteristically draws upon technical gender expertise, and the 'participative-democratic' invites civil society organizations to participate in the process of policy deliberation.

Where policy attempted to address concerns of gender-equitable development, in both states the prominent gendered development discourse, the competitive-capabilities discourse, articulated an integrative approach to gender-equitable development, and reflected an expert-bureaucratic model of mainstreaming. This seems to be slightly more the case in Tamil Nadu than Andhra Pradesh, as given SERP's more institutionalized collaboration with NGOs, it appeared to offer prospects for a more conducive institutional context for a more participative-democratic model of gender mainstreaming which emphasizes participation and democratic deliberation due to the prominence of a structural-transformative discourse. But given that this discourse is more prominent at the parastatal rather than state level, the possibilities for this model of gender mainstreaming are limited. Furthermore, as Squires points out 'consultation with non-governmental organizations is not synonymous with the democratic participation of citizens'. This is particularly evident given that some of the more prominent NGOs that work with both SERP and the TNCDW were professional, technocratic, and consultancy type NGOs. Another impediment to a participative-democratic model is the observation that to shift to 'a participative-democratic model of mainstreaming would require a more extensive injection of state funding into civil society' (Squires, 2007a). In the context of the emphasis on fiscal prudence in the reformist discourse of both states, it seems that funding is not likely to come from government for this purpose. It is also questionable whether the participatory and deliberative spaces envisaged by federating SHGs provide such a space for democratic debate given that they are also have the potential to be disciplinary, but furthermore, they assumed that women members will have the resources to participate in deliberation.

CONCLUSIONS

Strategies to mainstream gender in development policy in India are an under-explored area of the literature on gender, development and the Indian state. In this thesis I have sought to explore three factors which, I argue, influence the emergence of a gender mainstreaming approach to development policy in India, namely, institutions, discourse and agency. I began by suggesting that institutional context matters, that gendered discourses of development frame policy, and that the successful pursuit of a mainstreaming strategy will depend on the possibilities for agency provided by both the complex interplay of institutional norms and practices within state structures and the varied discursive constitution of gendered development. I argued that a combination of feminist institutionalist and feminist discourse analytic approaches were particular suited as a methodology for their focus on power, change, institutional contexts, and policies as discursive activities.

Institutions, discourse, and agency: comparative findings

The research findings on national policy suggested that a number of initiatives at the national level had attempted to transform national development institutions and state structures in order to bring about gender-responsive development policy, albeit with varied success, and that national development plans had demonstrated increasing attention to the gendered dimensions of development, although not unproblematically. Government policy demonstrated integrationist and agenda-setting models of mainstreaming, and employed affirmative action to integrate women into the process of national development. While gender-inequitable development was articulated through a discursive frame of gender difference and a policy strategy of women's empowerment, this empowerment was often articulated as a means to integrate women and did not substantially alter the overall model of development.

The research findings from the comparative analysis of the subnational case studies demonstrated a highly complex assortment of institutional, discursive, and agential factors, all of which had a significant impact on the possibilities for mainstreaming gender in development

policy. On institutions, similarities were observed between the two states in terms of the descriptive and substantive gendering of state institutions. However, within the two states, the gendered institutional context of state development was significantly internally differentiated, and the institutional structure for gender and development policy had developed in the two states in different ways, suggesting that the state level institutional context mattered. The rural development sector had been a considerably strong influence in both states' programs on women's empowerment, although this was more formally institutionalised in AP, but more recently has been consolidated in TN. This suggests a convergence between the two states in terms of the sectoral administration of policy on women, gender and development, although in Tamil Nadu this recent move was also driven by party political considerations of patronage.

The analysis of state level gendered discourses of development identified three discourses: protective-paternalist, competitive-capability, and structural transformative, all of which differed according to institutional context both within and across states. These three discourses differed in significant ways as to how they constituted (or not) gender-equitable development as a policy concern, with the protective-paternalist as the most conservative, the competitive-capabilities as the most liberal and integrationist, and the structural-transformative as potentially the most radical and participatory. Overall, the competitive-capabilities discourse appeared to be dominant in the more reformist-oriented state development policy in both states. The protective-paternalist discourse was far more prevalent in Tamil Nadu, especially in the Department of Social Welfare and was particularly influenced by a populist discourse in state level politics. The structural-transformative discourse was more prevalent in Andhra Pradesh but this was mostly limited to the parastatal level, although did find some articulation in the more aggregated state level policy. Thus, the wider development discourse appeared to affect significantly the possibilities for the discursive articulation of gender-equitable development.

Finally, the research findings on agency suggested considerable variations in the possibility for agency, although despite these differences they reflected most frequently an expert-bureaucratic model of gender mainstreaming (where explicit policies on gendered development existed). Women were constituted as subjects and objects of development policy differently through each discourse, ranging from weak, dependent and vulnerable, through to hyper-responsible and

altruistic heroines of national development. While the former offered little room for agency, the latter offered extensive possibilities, but the kind of agency it offered was contingent on the disciplinary logic of particular institutional norms and discursive practices. In other words, their agency was dependent on a strategy of empowering the individual rather than the collective, and empowerment as a *particular kind of individual*, a subjectivity based on integration into the mainstream rather than the transformation of the mainstream. Political leaders were positioned differently both through wider reformist and populist discourses of development and specifically gendered discourses of development, all of which offered different opportunities for agency, both enabling and constraining. Bureaucratic agency appeared to be high in both states but more so at the parastatal level in Andhra Pradesh, and was more conducive to an integrationist, expert-bureaucratic model of gender mainstreaming rather than an agenda-setting, participative-democratic model. Women's movement organisations were positioned with relative little agency as a result of institutional norms and structures and discursive practices, and non-feminist NGOs occupied a far larger role instead. The wider institutional environment was also not conducive to their participation or critical engagement with state programs and policies and thus did not offer significant opportunities for a more participative-democratic model of gender mainstreaming.

Another dimension that this thesis has sought to explore is the significance of the difference in institutional contexts between the central government and state governments. Beyond the comparative analysis of the two case study states, one clear finding was the absence of explicit attempts to adopt a mainstreaming strategy at the subnational level, when compared with the national level. In other words, at the national level gender mainstreaming *was* one of the strategies being employed by state and non-state actors to bring about a more gender-responsive development policy. However, the main focus of this thesis was not on national but subnational policies. I posited that it was important to analyse gendered development policy and the possibilities of gender mainstreaming at the *subnational* level, given the increased autonomy of Indian states as a result of national level reforms after 1991. Significantly, when the focus shifted from the national level to the subnational level from Chapter 4 onwards, the case study chapters demonstrated that there was little activity in terms of explicit strategies to mainstream gender in development at the state level when compared with the national level. In fact, the strong concern in both states with efficiency and 'convergence' of policy resources was quite the reverse of a

mainstreaming strategy, in that both state governments attempted to increase the efficiency of delivery of development policies and programs with top-down, pre-designed policy, rather than reflexively introspecting on its own gendered norms and practices influencing policy. The lack of gender mainstreaming take-up at the subnational level is significant as it suggests that the opportunities for gender mainstreaming are different at the subnational level compared to the national level. One possible explanation for this is that, compared to state governments, the national government is less insulated towards its obligations to international fora, one of which is to demonstrate that it is engaging with initiatives to improve the gender-responsiveness of its development policy (for instance, in terms of being signatories to international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing). If this is so, then it has serious implications for gender mainstreaming strategies at the subnational level. Furthermore, the institutional norms and practices of the state government departments in which women's development was concentrated as a policy issue showed that in neither state was this department more representative of what is often termed as a women's policy agency or part of the state level machinery for feminist policy goals. In other words, the (albeit partial and limited) transformation that had taken place at the national level in augmenting the status and policy orientation of the (now) Ministry of Women and Child Development had not occurred, or had been resisted, at the subnational level. Thus, state-level government departments for women's development or social welfare in AP and TN do not (yet) offer an institutional opening for mainstreaming strategies at the subnational level.

Limitations and opportunities for further research

Therefore, the research presented in this thesis generated a complex array of insights into how institutions, discourse, and agency affected efforts to mainstream gender in development policy at the subnational level in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, and thus it may be concluded that the research aims and objectives were achieved. However, the research findings were also limited in a number of ways, all of which offer significant potential for further research.

A limitation of the research design derived from the use of the comparative method, which at times restricted the depth of coverage that was possible for each case study. For example, for Chapter 7 the coverage of at four different sets of actors in two states and at (at least) two

different institutional levels of the state prohibited a deeper examination of each actor and their possible agency. However, the learning that a comparative approach made possible was more than that which could have been achieved with one case study (or even multiple case studies but without a comparative link) and therefore taking a comparative approach did play an important role in creating another layer of analysis and insight. For example, the use of the comparative method highlighted the different institutional developments at the subnational level which suggested a significant difference in the approach to gendered development policy between the two states and thus potentially differing possibilities for gender mainstreaming.

Another limitation that emerged was the lack of focus on gendered development in the form of masculinity/ies, even though this would still be encompassed in a study of gendered development. Little has been written about development policies in India in terms of masculinities, and program components which focus on masculinity are not common, although there is evidence to suggest that they are emerging. For instance, one TNCDW official recounted to me that program officials increasingly realised the importance of sensitising the male family members of women SHG members, and particularly boys and young men, in managing expectations in relation to changing stereotypical gender roles and the gendered division of labour (interview, former TNCDW official, June 2007). There is also evidence to suggest that wider gender equality program initiatives in India are beginning to include men and boys in their sensitisation efforts on domestic violence. Thus the practice of including men and boys in programs and policies concerning gendered development and understanding the impact of changing gender relations under processes of development is still at a nascent stage in India, particularly compared to the extent of initiatives in other regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean (Bedford, 2007), but it is emerging nonetheless.

For some, perhaps this will come as a welcome development, in that the exclusive focus on women of a lot of programmes has meant that attention to gender becomes lost and limits the potential of programs for women to actually transform existing unequal gender relations. A TNCDW official admitted that the programme was for women, but was perhaps not necessarily about gender (interview, former TNCDW official, June 2007). Furthermore, including a focus on gendered developmental masculinities might enable programs to problematise and thus

destabilise the hegemonic negative stereotype of poor men as irresponsible, violent alcoholics, who are resistant to change. As Mary E. John explained more than a decade ago

> the discovery of women's economic efficiency ends up effectively collaborating with views of marginalised men as incapable and irresponsible...[P]oor women are being feted as 'good' subjects who make 'sound economic sense', whereas their unruly men, seen as prone to violence, especially if they be dalits or Muslims, become the 'bad' subjects of modernity...
>
> (John, 1996)

Unfortunately, such a stereotype often emerges as a result of well-intentioned program efforts to highlight the issues of domestic violence, alcoholism and the role of the program in generating changes in intra-households relationships, often between women SHG members and their husbands. This is certainly a controversial issue, and in no way am I attempting to suggest that this stereotype is only a stereotype and not borne out in practice, but it also needs to be examined for the discursive effects such a stereotype has in shaping the identity of male subjects of development processes. In other words, we need to examine what are the potentially limiting and disciplining effects of discourses of gendered development on *marginalised men* as well as women.

Perhaps a more important effect of focusing on development masculinities is the destabilisation that occurs in terms of making visible that which is invisible. As I demonstrated in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 6, a deconstruction of the discourses which are articulated within national development policy suggests that 'men as men' are commonly not made visible as a category of development and thus by focusing on developmental masculinities, men as subjects of development become centrally visible to any analysis of gendered development. While men are likely to occupy a number of development subject positions categorised in national development discourse, such as farmers, landless labourers, entrepreneurs and so on, focusing explicitly on *men* as subjects of development may work to make their privileged position within the hierarchy of gendered developmental subjectivities more visible and thus available for deconstruction - an essential part of any project which seeks to destabilise entrenched unequal relations of power.

It is also important to bear in mind however that for others, focusing on developmental masculinities may be interpreted as diverting attention away from 'women's issues' and may represent an increasing dilution of commitments to women. For some, this has already happened

with the shift from women to gender, for instance in the terminology of gender budgeting rather than women's budgets. It is also tempting for Indian NGOs to adopt this new agenda, employing the language of masculinities, because they are closely linked to donor funding agendas. Thus, to some extent, the priorities of international donors may have a role to play in introducing a component which addresses masculinities in development, but such initiatives need to be careful that at least non-governmental agencies consider the implications of adapting to changing demands in funding. It also highlights the importance of transnational feminist activism to critically engage with international development organisations to address the international asymmetrical power relations inherent in the production of hegemonic discourses of gendered development.

A major finding of the study which requires further research is the lack of critical engagement of the women's movement with state-led self help group programs, in terms of scrutinising their effects on the women who participate in these programs. While more engagement has emerged very recently, this is still a significant observation. As the research here has shown, a crucial element is the lack of critically informed and independent research on state-led self help group programs in India, which might enable the women's movement to engage the state. Perhaps an even more significant observation however is the reluctance of the women's movement to be involved in SHG programs for fear of co-optation.

A fruitful area for further research is a comparative analysis of the presence of international bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, in terms of the meeting of institutional norms and practices, and their relation to the type of gendered development discourses articulated within Indian development policy. As the discussion in Chapter 7 suggested, clearly the presence of international donors is an important factor in the State level initiation of programs on women, gender and development. Direct and indirect involvement of bilateral and multilateral donors include organisations such as the World Bank, the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD), UNDP, DANIDA (the Danish development agency), UNICEF, and UK Department for International Development (DFID) to name just a few. A sizeable number of foreign non-governmental development organisations are also closely linked to state programs addressing gender and development issues. With the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Empowerment and

Poverty Reduction Project in Tamil Nadu in late 2005, in both states the World Bank is now a common factor in gender and development policy.

One issue that became even clearer in the course of the research for this thesis was just how little research had been conducted on the Indian state as a gendered institution, in terms of its gendered norms and practices of the civil service, particularly the latter's impact on the state's gendered development policy, and at the *subnational* level as opposed to the national level. This was surprising on several counts. Firstly, media coverage has included a few high profile cases where top women civil servants have been passed over for appointment to very senior positions or where alleged cases of sexual harassment in the civil services have come to public attention. Secondly, initiatives in India in the 1990s and beyond (which I discussed in Chapter 3) have explicitly focused on transforming state institutional norms and practices to make them more responsive to the gendered character of development policies, programs, processes, and outcomes. Thakur's study was one of a few studies that explicitly addressed this issue, but few have followed. To some extent, this seems to be partly due to issues of access – the two major initiatives to study institutional gendered norms and practices have come from the Indian civil service themselves. However, in order to understand how to transform the gendered institutional norms and practices of the state, much greater understanding is required. This thesis contributes to that understanding but much remains to be done.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary sources:

Abrahamsen, R. (2000) Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, London: Zed Books

Agarwal, B. (1994) 'Gender, Resistance, and Land: Interlinked Struggles Over Resources and Meanings in South Asia', *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 22 (1), pp. 81-125

Agarwal, B. (1998) 'Environmental management, equity and ecofeminism: debating India's experience', *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 25 (4), pp. 55-95

Agnihotri, I. & Mazumdar, V. (1995) 'Terms of Political Discourse: Women's Movement in India, 1970s-1990s', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 30 (29), pp. 1869-1878

Akerkar, S. (1995) 'Theory and Practice of Women's Movement in India: A Discourse Analysis', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 30 (17), pp. WS2-WS23

Anandhi, S. (2005) 'Sex and Sensibility in Tamil Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 40 (47), pp. 4876-4877

Anandhi, S. & Swaminathan, P. (2006) 'Making it Relevant: Mapping the Meaning of Women's Studies in Tamil Nadu', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 41 (42), pp. 4444-4454, available online at http://www.epw.org.in/epw/uploads/articles/9577.pdf

Anveshi (1993) 'Reworking Gender Relations, Redefining Politics: Nellore Village Women Against Arrack', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 28 (January 16-23), pp. 87-90

AP Online (n.d.) 'Council of Ministers', online at http://www.aponline.gov.in/apportal/contact/listofcontacts.asp?id=01, last accessed 1st August 2007

Appadurai, A. (1993) 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', pp. 314-339 in Veer, P. v. d. & Breckenridge, C. A. (Eds.) Orientalism and the Postcolonia Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Apthorpe, R. & Gasper, D. (1996) Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses, London: Routledge

Arora, D. (1999) 'Structural Adjustment Program and Gender Concerns in India', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29 (3), pp. 328-361

Athreya, V. & Chunkath, S. R. (2000) 'Tackling Female Infanticide: Social Mobilisation in Dharmapuri, 1997-99', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (December 2nd), pp. 4345-4348

Ayyangar, S. (2004) 'Why Women Did Not Vote for TDP', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (May 15th), pp. 1992-3

Bacchi, C. (2000) 'Policy as Discourse: What does it mean? Where does it get us?' *Discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education,* 21 (1), pp. 45-57

Bacchi, C. (2004) 'Policy and discourse: challenging the construction of affirmative action as preferential treatment', *Journal of European Public Policy,* 11 (1), pp. 128-146

Bacchi, C. L. (1999) Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems, London: Sage

Baden, S. & Goetz, A.-M. (1998) 'Who needs [sex] when you can have [gender]? Conflicting discourses on gender at Beijing', pp. 19-38 in Jackson, C. & Pearson, R. (Eds.) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. London: Routledge.

Bagchi, A. K. (1982) The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Banerjee, M. (2004) 'Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu: Mamata and Jayalalitha Compared', pp. 285-308 in Jenkins, R. (Ed.) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bardhan, P. (1990) 'Dominant Proprietary Classes and India's Democracy', pp. 214-224 in Kohli, A. (Ed.) India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barreto, M. & Ellemers, N. (2005) 'The burden of benevolent sexism: How it contributes to the maintenance of gender inequalities', *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 35, pp. 633–642

Basu, A. (1993) 'Feminism Inverted: The Real Women and Gendered Imagery of Hindu Nationalism', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,* 25 (4), pp. 25-36

Basu, A. (1999) 'Women's Education in India: Achievements and Challenges', pp. 135-157 in Ray, B. & Basu, A. (Eds.) From Independence to Freedom: Indian Women Since 1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Batliwala, S. & Dhanraj, D. (2004) 'Gender Myths that Instrumentalise Women: A View from the Indian Frontline', *IDS Bulletin,* 35 (4), pp. 11-18

Beall, J. (1998) 'Trickle Down or Rising tide? Lessons on Mainstreaming Gender Policy from Colombia and South Africa', *Social Policy and Administration,* 32 (5), pp. 513-534

Bedford, K. (2007) 'Embracing the Other Half of Gender? Why The World Bank Cares About Men in the Post-Washington Consensus Era', PSA Annual Conference, University of Bath, 11th-14th April

Benería, L. (Ed.) (1982) Women and Development: The Sexual Division of Labour in Rural Societies, New York: Praeger Publishers.

Benería, L. & Sen, G. (1982) 'Class and Gender Inequalities and Women's Role in Economic Development', *Feminist Studies,* 1 (1), pp. 157-76

Bergeron, S. (2003) 'The Post-Washington Consensus and Economic Representations of Women in Development at the World Bank', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5(3), pp. 397-419

Bhagwati, J. & Srinivasan, T. N. (1993) India's Economic Reforms, New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, Government of India

Bhattacharya, M. (2003 [1989]) 'Bureaucracy and Politics in India', pp. 318-327 in Chakrabarty, B. & Bhattacharya, M. (Eds.) Public Administration: A Reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Boserup, E. (1970) Women's Role in Economic Development, New York: St Martin's Press

Brown, W. (2006) 'Finding the Man in the State', pp. 187-210 in Sharma, A. & Gupta, A. (Eds.) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.

Byres, T. J. (1998) The State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Caplan, P. (1985) Class and Gender in India: Women and Their Organisations in a South Indian City, London: Tavistock Publications

Chakravarty, D. (2004) 'Expansion of Markets and Women Workers: Case Study of Garment Manufacturing in India', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 39 (45), pp. 4910-4916

Chakravarty, S. (1987) Development Planning: The Indian Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chambers, R. (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last, London: Intermediate Technology Publications

Chappell, L. A. (2002) Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada, Vancouver: UBC Press

Chatterjee, N. & Riley, N. E. (2001) 'Planning an Indian Modernity: The Gendered Politics of Fertility Control', *Signs,* 26 (3), pp. 811-845

Chatterjee, P. (1989) 'The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question', pp. 233-253 in Sangari, K. & Vaid, S. (Eds.) Recasting Women in India: Essays in Colonial History. New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Chatterjee, P. (1997) 'Development Planning and the Indian State', pp. 271-97 in Chatterjee, P. (Ed.) State and Politics in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chaudhuri, M. (1996) 'Citizens, workers and emblems of culture: An analysis of the First Plan document on women', pp. 211-235 in Uberoi, P. (Ed.) Social reform, Sexuality and the State. London: Sage.

Chhibber, V. (2003) Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

Chhotray, V. (2004) 'The Negations of Politics in Participatory Development Projects, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh', *Development and Change,* 35 (2), pp. 327-352

Chidambaram, P. (2004) 'Union Budget Speech of the Finance Minister 2004', Ministry of Finance, Government of India, , Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 8th July, available online at http://indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs200405.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008

Chidambaram, P. (2005) 'Union Budget Speech of the Finance Minister 2005', Ministry of Finance, Government of India, , Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 28th February 2005, available online at http://indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs200506.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008

Chowdhry, G. (2000) 'Communalism, nationalism and gender: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Hindu Right in India', pp. 98-118 in Ranchod-Nilsson, S. & Tetreault, M. A. (Eds.) Women, States and Nationalism: At home in the nation? London: Routledge.

Cooke, B. & Kothari, U. (Eds.) (2001) Participation: the new tyranny?, London: Zed Books.

Corbridge, S. & Harriss, J. (2000) Reinventing India: liberalisation, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press

Cornwall, A. & Brock, K. (2005) Beyond Buzzwords: "Poverty Reduction", "Participation" and "Empowerment" in Development Policy: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Overarching Concerns, available online at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/f25d3d6d27e2a1acc12570cb002ffa9a/$FILE/cornwall.pdf, last accessed 1st January 2008

Craske, N. (1998) 'Remasculinisation and the neo-liberal state in Latin America', pp. 100-120 in Waylen, V. R. a. G. (Ed.) Gender, Politics and the State. London: Routledge.

Crush, J. (Ed.) (1995) Power of Development, London: Routledge.

Da Corta, L. & Venkateshwarlu, D. (1999) 'Unfree Relations and the Feminisation of Agricultural Labour in Andhra Pradesh, 1970-95', *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 26 (2&3), pp. 71-139

Das Gupta, M. & Bhat, P. N. M. (1997) 'Fertility Decline and Increased Manifestation of Sex Bias in India', *Population Studies,* 51 (3), pp. 307-315

Das, S. K. (2005) 'Reforms and the Indian Administrative Service', pp. 171-196 in Mooij, J. (Ed.) The Politics of Economic Reforms in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Das, V. (1976) 'Indian Women: Work, Power, and Status', pp. 129-145 in Nanda, B. R. (Ed.) Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing house Pvt. Ltd.

Desai, M. (1998) 'Policy Approaches to Women and Poverty Eradication', *Indian Journal of Social Work,* 59 (4), pp. 998-1010

Deshmukh-Ranadive, J. (2004) Women's Self-Help Groups in Andhra Pradesh - Participatory Poverty Alleviation in Action: Case study commissioned by the World Bank, available online at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/reducingpoverty/docs/FullCases/India%20PDF/India%20Andhra%20SHGs.pdf, last accessed 5th November 2007

Dickey, S. (1993) 'The Politics of Adulation: Cinema and the Production of Politicians in South India', *Journal of Asian Studies,* 52 (2), pp. 340-372

Dickey, S. (2003) 'Opposing Faces: Film Star Fan Clubs and the Construction of Class Identities in South India', pp. 212-246 in Dwyer, R. & Pinney, C. (Eds.) Pleasure and the Nation: The History, Politics and Consumption of Public Culture in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Dietrich, G. (1995) 'Women's Struggle for Production of Life: Public Hearings of Women Workers in Informal Sector', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (July 1st), pp. 1551-1554

Doty, R. (1996) Imperial encounters: the politics of representation in North-South relations, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press

Doty, R. L. (1997) 'Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structural Problematique in International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International Relations,* 3 (3), pp. 365-392

Drèze, J. & Sen, A. (2002) India: Development and Participation, New Delhi: Oxford University Press

Dudley-Jenkins, L. (2003) Identity and Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged, London: Routledge

Duffield, M. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merger of Development and Security, London: Zed Books

Dunn, D. (1993) 'Gender Inequality in Education and Employment in the Scheduled Castes and Tribes of India', *Population Research and Policy Review,* 12, pp. 53-70

Dyson, T. & Moore, M. (1983) 'On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and Demographic Behavior in India', *Population and Development Review,* 9 (1), pp. 35-60

EDA/APMAS (2006) Self Help Groups in India: A Study of the Lights and Shades, available online at http://www.apmas.org/pdf%5Cm.pdf, last accessed 16th December 2007

Elson, D. & Pearson, R. (1981) "Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers': An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing ', *Feminist Review,* 7 (Spring), pp. 87-107

Escobar, A. (1992) 'Planning', pp. 132-145 in Sachs, W. (Ed.) The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power. London: Zed Books.
Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. (Eds.) (1985) Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eveline, J. & Bacchi, C. (2005) 'What are we mainstreaming when we mainstream gender?' *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 7 (4), pp. 496-512
Fairclough, N. (2005) 'Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism', *Organisation Studies,* 26 (6), pp. 915-939
Ferguson, J. (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine: "development", depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ferguson, K. (1984) The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy, Philadelphia: Temple University Press
Fischer, F. (1998) 'Beyond Empiricism: Policy Inquiry in Postpositivist perspective', *Policy Studies Journal,* 26 (1), pp. 129-146
Fischer, F. & Forrester, J. (Eds.) (1993) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, London: UCL Press.
Forbes, G. (1982) 'Caged Tigers: First Wave Feminists in India', *Women's Studies International Forum,* 5 (6), pp. 525-536
Forbes, G. (1998) Women in Modern India, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press
Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock Publications
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Press
Frankel, F. (2005) India's Political Economy 1947-2004: The Gradual Revolution New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2nd
Franzway, S., Court, D. & Connell, R. W. (1989) Staking a Claim: Feminism, Bureaucracy and the State, Cambridge: Polity Press
Geetha (1990) 'The Tamil Nadu Construction Workers' Union', pp. 182-193 in Sen, I. (Ed.) A Space Within The Struggle: Women's Participation In People's Movements. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
Ghosh, J. (1999) 'Women in Indian Politics', *Frontline,* 16 (20), available online at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1620/16201030.htm
Glick, P. & Fiske, S. T. (1996) 'The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 70 (3), pp. 491-512
Goetz, A.-M. (Ed.) (1997a) Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development, New York: Zed Books.
Goetz, A. M. (1997b) 'Introduction: Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development', pp. 1-28 in Goetz, A. M. (Ed.) Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development. New York: Zed Books.
Goodell, G. E. (1985) 'Paternalism, Patronage, and Potlatch: The Dynamics of Giving and Being Given To", *Current Anthropology,* 26 (2), pp. 247-257
Gorringe, H. (2005) Untouchable Citizens: Dalit Movements and Democratisation in Tamil Nadu, New Delhi: Sage

Goyal, S. (1989) 'Appendix II Social Background of Officers in the Indian Administrative Service', pp. 425-433 in Frankel, F. R. & M.S.A.Rao (Eds.) Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Green, D. M. (2002) 'Constructivist Comparative Politics: Foundations and Framework', pp. 3-59 in Green, D. M. (Ed.) Constructivism and Comparative Politics. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Grillo, R. D. & Stirrat, R. L. (1997) Discourses of Development: Anthropological Perspectives, Oxford: Berg
Grover, V. & Arora, R. (1998) Encyclopaedia of India and her States: Vol. 7 Andhra Pradesh, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2nd edition
Guha, S. (2003) 'The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c.1600-1900', *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 45 (1), pp. 148-167
Gupta, A. (2001) 'Governing Population: The Integrated Child Development Services Program in India', pp. 65-96 in Hansen, T. B. & Stepputat, F. (Eds.) States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham: Duke University Press.
Gupta, A. & Sharma, A. (2006) 'Globalization and Postcolonial States', *Current Anthropology,* 47 (2), pp. 277-307
Haas, P. M. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination', *International Organisation* 46 (1), pp. 1-35
Hafner-Burton, E. & Pollack, M. A. (2002) 'Gender Mainstreaming and Global Governance', *Feminist Legal Studies,* 10 (3-4), pp. 285-298
Hajer, M. A. (1993) 'Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain', pp. 43-76 in Fischer, F. & Forrester, J. (Eds.) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. London: UCL Press.
Hall, P. (1989) The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Hall, P. & Taylor, R. (1996) 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies,* 44, pp. 936-57
Hanson, A. H. (1966) The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans 1950-1964, London: Oxford University Press
Hardgrave, R. L. (1973) 'Politics and the Film in Tamilnadu: The Stars and the DMK', *Asian Survey,* 13 (3), pp. 288-305
Harriss-White, B. (2001) 'Gender-Cleansing: The Paradox of Development and Deteriorating Female Life Chances in Tamil Nadu', pp. 125-154 in Rajan, R. S. (Ed.) Signposts: Gender Issues in Post-Independence Thought. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Harriss-White, B. (2002) Development, Policy and Agriculture in India in the 1990s: QEH Working Paper Series No. 78, available online at http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps78.pdf
Harriss-White, B. (2004a) India Working: Essays on Society and Economy, New Delhi: Foundation Books
Harriss-White, B. (2004b) 'Nutrition and its politics in Tamil Nadu', *South Asia Research,* 24 (1), pp. 51-71
Harriss, J. (1998) 'Development Studies and the Development of India: An Awkward Case?' *Oxford Development Studies,* 26 (3), pp. 287-309

Harriss, J. (2002) 'Whatever Happened to Cultural Nationalism in Tamil Nadu? A Reading of Current Events and the Recent Literature on Tamil Politics', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* 40 (3), pp. 97-117

Hawkesworth, M. (2003) 'Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions', *The American Political Science Review,* 97 (4), pp. 529-550

Herring, R. J. (1999) 'Embedded Particularism: India's Failed Developmental State', pp. 306-334 in Woo-Cummings, M. (Ed.) The Developmental State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Himmelweit, S. (2002) 'Making Visible the Hidden Economy: The Case for Gender-Impact Analysis of Economic Policy', *Feminist Economics,* 8 (1), pp. 49-70

Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse, Buckingham: Open University Press

Howarth, D. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis', pp. 1-23 in Howarth, D., Norval, A. J. & Stravrakakis, Y. (Eds.) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

IDS Bridge (1995) Background report on gender issues in India: key findings and recommendations, Brighton: Bridge, Institute of Development Studies, available online at http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/re32c.pdf, last accessed 12th October 2007

Inhetveen, K. (1999) 'Can Gender Equality be Institutionalized? The Role of Launching Values in Institutional Innovation', *International Sociology* 14 (4), pp. 403-422

Jackson, C. (1996) 'Rescuing Gender From the Poverty Trap', *World Development,* 24 (3), pp. 489-504

Jackson, C. & Pearson, R. (Eds.) (1998) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy, London: Routledge.

Jahan, R. (1995) The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development, London: Zed Books

Jain, D. (1996) 'Valuing Work: Time as a Measure', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (October 26th), pp. WS-46-WS-57

Jakimow, T. & Kilby, P. (2006) 'Empowering Women: A Critique of the Blueprint for Self-Help Groups in India', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies,* 13 (3), pp. 375-400

Jandhyala, K. (2001) 'State initiatives', *Seminar,* 505 (Special issue: Towards Equality: A Symposium on Women, Feminisms and. Women's Movements), available online at http://www.india-seminar.com/2001/505/505%20kameshwari%20jandhyala.htm, last accessed 5th December 2007

Jeffrey, C. & Lerche, J. (2000) 'Stating the Difference: State, Discourse and Class Reproduction in Uttar Pradesh, India', *Development and Change* 31 (4), pp. 857-878

Jeffrey, P. & Jeffrey, R. (1998) 'Silver Bullet or Passing Fancy: Girls' Schooling and Population Policy', pp. 239-258 in Jackson, C. & Pearson, R. (Eds.) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. London: Routledge.

Jenkins, R. (1999) Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Jenkins, R. (2003) 'How federalism influences India's domestic politics of WTO engagement (and is itself affected in the process)', *Asian Survey,* 43 (4), pp. 598-621

Jenkins, R. (2004a) 'Introduction', pp. 1-25 in Jenkins, R. (Ed.) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Jenkins, R. (Ed.) (2004b) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
John, M. E. (1996) 'Gender and Development in India 1970s-1990s: Some Reflections on the Constitutive Role of Contexts', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 31 (47)
John, M. E. (1999) 'Gender, Development and the Women's Movement: Problems for a History of the Present', pp. 100-124 in Rajan, R. S. (Ed.) Signposts: Gender Issues in Post-Indepence India. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
Kabeer, N. (1994) Reversed Realities: Gendered Hierarchies in Development Thought, London: Verso
Kabeer, N. & Murthy, R. K. (1999) 'Gender, Poverty and Institutional Exclusion: Insights from Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA)', pp. 166-194 in Kabeer, N. & Subrahmaniam, R. (Eds.) Institutions, Relations and Outcomes: Framework and Case Studies for Gender-Aware Planning. New York: Zed Books.
Kabeer, N. & Subrahmanian, R. (Eds.) (1999a) Institutions, Relations, Outcomes: Framework and Case Studies for Gender-Aware Planning, New York: Zed Books.
Kabeer, N. & Subrahmanian, R. (1999b) 'Introduction', pp. vii-xi in Kabeer, N. & Subrahmanian, R. (Eds.) Institutions, Relations, and outcomes: Frameworks and Case Studies for Gender-Aware Planning. London: Zed Books.
Kalpagam, U. (2000) 'The Colonial State and Statistical Knowledge', *History of the Human Sciences,* 13 (2), pp. 37-55
Kalpana, K. (2005) 'Situating microcredit in India: some reflections', pp. 149-158 in Guérin, I. & Palier, J. (Eds.) Microfinance Challenges: Empowerment or Disempowerment of the Poor? Pondicherry: French Institute of Pondicherry.
Kannabiran, K. (1997) 'Gender in Mainstream Politics: Case of the Telugu Desam Party', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 32 (May 31st), pp. 1236-1239
Kapadia, K. (2002a) 'Translocal Modernities and Transformations of Gender and Caste', pp. 142-179 in Kapadia, K. (Ed.) The Violence of Development: The Politics of Identity, Gender and Social Inequalities in India. London: Zed Books.
Kapadia, K. (Ed.) (2002b) The Violence of Development: The Politics of Identity, Gender and Social Inequalities in India, London: Zed Books.
Karlekar, M. (2004) 'A Note on the Empowerment of Women', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies,* 11 (2), pp. 145-155
Kaviraj, S. (1991) 'On State, Society and Discourse in India', pp. 72-99 in Manor, J. (Ed.) Rethinking World Politics. Harlow: Longman.
Keating, C. (2001) 'Maneuvring Gendered Nationalisms: Jayalalitha Jayaram and the Politics of Womanhood', *Women and Politics,* 22 (4), pp. 69-88
Kennedy, L. (2004) 'The Political Determinants of Reform Packaging: Contrasting Responses to Economic Liberalisation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu', pp. 29-65 in Jenkins, R. (Ed.) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Kenny, M. (2007) 'Gender, Institutions and Power: A Critical Review', *Politics,* 27 (2), pp. 91-100

Kenny, M. & Paantjens, M. (2006) 'Towards a Feminist Institutionalism: Connecting Gender, Power and Change', FIIN Edinburgh Workshop, Edinburgh, 8-9 December 2006
Kirk, J. A. (2005) 'Banking on India's States: The Politics of World Bank Reform Programs in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka', *India Review,* 4 (3), pp. 287-325
Kudva, N. (2003) 'Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in Karnataka, India', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society,* 16 (3), pp. 445-463
Kulshreshtha, A. C. & Singh, G. (1996) 'Domestic Product by Gender in the Framework of 1993 SNA', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 31 (51), pp. 3330-3334
Kumar, R. (1989) 'Contemporary Indian Feminism', *Feminist Review,* 33, pp. 20-29
Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso
Laffey, M. & Weldes, J. (2004) 'Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis', *Qualititative Methods,* 2 (1), pp. 28-30
Lahiri, A. K., Chakraborty, L. S. & Bhattacharyya, P. N. (2005) Gender Budgeting in India, New Delhi: UNIFEM/NIPFP, 'Follow the Money' Series
Lakshmi, C. S. (1990) 'Mother, Mother-Community and Mother-Politics in Tamil Nadu', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 25 (42 & 43), pp. WS-72-WS-83
Lal, D. (1997[1983]) The Poverty of Development Economics, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2nd edition
Lalita, K., Kannabiran, V., Melkote, R., Maheswari, U., Tharu, S. & Shatrugna, V. (1989) 'We Were Making History': Life Stories of Women in the Telangana People's Struggle, New Delhi: Kali for Women
Landman, T. (2003) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: an Introduction, London: Routledge, 2nd edition
Lazar, M. (Ed.) (2005) Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leys, C. (1995) The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Oxford: James Currey
Liebert, U. (Ed.) (2003) Gendering Europeanisation, Brussels: Peter Lang.
Lowndes, V. (2002) 'Institutionalism', pp. 90-108 in Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. 2nd edition ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mackie, T. & Marsh, D. (1995) 'The Comparative Method', pp. 173-188 in Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Macmilllan.
Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (2003) 'Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas', pp. 3-38 in Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (Eds.) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
Majone, G. (Ed.) (1989) Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Manor, J. (1995) 'India's Chief Ministers and the Problem of Governability', pp. 47-73 in Oldenburg, P. (Ed.) India Briefing: Staying the Course. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.
Manor, J. (2004) 'Explaining Political Trajectories in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka', pp. 255-284 in Jenkins, R. (Ed.) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
March, J. G. & Olsen, J. P. (1984) 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review,* 78 (3), pp. 734-749

Mars, T. (1974) 'The National Academy of Administration: Normative Vocabularies and Organisational Reality', pp. 315-382 in Schaffer, B. (Ed.) Administrative Training and Development: A Comparative Study of East Africa, Zambia, Pakistan, and India. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Mathur, K. (Ed.) (1996) Development Policy and Administration, New Delhi: Sage.

Mawdsley, E. & Rigg, J. (2002) 'A Survey of the World Development Reports I: discursive strategies', *Progress in Development Studies,* 2 (2), pp. 93

Mayoux, L. (1995) From Vicious to Virtuous Circles?: Gender and Micro-Enterprise Development, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, available online at http://www.unrisd.org/UNRISD/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/5901781754e7c91580256b67005b6af7/$FILE/opb3.pdf,

Mazumdar, V., Sharma, K., Buch, N. & Sujaya, C. P. (2001) Gender and Governance - A Country Paper (India), New Delhi: Centre for Women's Development Studies

Mazur, A. (2002) Theorising Feminist Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press

McNay, L. (1992) Foucault and Feminism, Cambridge: Polity Press

McNay, L. (2000) Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press

Mehta, A. K. (1996) 'Recasting Indices for Developing Countries: A Gender Empowerment Measure', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (October 26th), pp. WS-80-WS-86

Mies, M. & Shiva, V. (1993) Ecofeminism, New Delhi: Kali for Women

Miller, C. & Razavi, S. (1998a) 'Introduction', pp. 1-19 in Miller, C. & Razavi, S. (Eds.) Missionaries and Mandarins: Feminist Engagement with Development Institutions. London: UNRISD/Intermediate Technology Publications.

Miller, C. & Razavi, S. (Eds.) (1998b) Missionaries and Mandarins: Feminist Engagement with Development Institutions, London: UNRISD/Intermediate Technology Publications.

Mitchell, T. (1991) 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics', *The American Political Science Review,* 85 (1), pp. 77-96

Mohanty, C. T. (1984) 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses', *boundary 2,* 12 (3), pp. 333-358

Mooij, J. (2002) Welfare Policies and Politics: A Study of Three Government Interventions in Andhra Pradesh, India. *ODI Working Paper No. 181.* London.

Mooij, J. (2003) Smart Governance? Politics in the Policy Process in Andhra Pradesh, India, London: Overseas Development Institute, ODI Working Paper No. 228, available online at http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp228.pdf, last accessed 5th November 2007

Moore, D. B. & Schmitz, G. J. (1995) Debating Development Discourse: institutional and popular perspectives, London: MacMillan Press

Moser, C. (1993) Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training, London: Routledge

Mosse, D. (2001) 'People's Knowledge', Participation and Patronage: operations and Representations in Rural Development', in Cooke, B. & Kothari, U. (Eds.) Participation: the New Tyranny? London: Zed Books.

Mosse, D. (2005) Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, London: Pluto Press

Mottier, V. (2004) 'Symposium on Feminist Methodologies: Feminist Political Theory', *European Political Science (ECPR)*, 3 (2), pp. 79-84

Mukherjee, M. (1996) 'Towards Gender Aware Data Systems: Indian Experience', *Economic and Political Weekly,* (October 26th), pp. WS-63-WS-71

Mukhopadhyay, M. (2004) 'Mainstreaming Gender or "Streaming" Gender Away: Feminists Marooned in the Development Business', *IDS Bulletin* 35 (4), pp. 95-103

Mukhopadhyay, S. (2003a) 'Introduction', pp. 1-23 in Mukhopadhyay, S. & Sudarshan, R. M. (Eds.) Tracking Gender Equity Under Economic Reforms: Continuity and Change in South Asia. New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Mukhopadhyay, S. (2003b) 'Status of Women under Economic Reforms: The Indian Case', pp. 89-122 in Mukhopadhyay, S. & Sudarshan, R. M. (Eds.) Tracking Gender Equity Under Economic Reforms: Continuity and Change in South Asia. New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Mukhopadhyay, S. & Sudarshan, R. M. (Eds.) (2003) Tracking Gender Equity Under Economic Reforms: Continuity and Change in South Asia, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Murthy, R. K. (1998) 'South Asia', pp. 29-54 in Cummings, S., Dam, H. v. & Valk, M. (Eds.) Gender Training: The Source Book. Oxford: Oxfam GB.

Murthy, R. K. (Ed.) (2001) Building Women's Capacities: Interventions in Gender Transformation, New Delhi: Sage.

Murty, K. R. (2001) Parties , Elections and Mobilisation, New Delhi: Anmol Publications, D. Suran Naidu (ed)

Naidu, C. (2002) 'Speech of Shri N. Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister, Andhra Pradesh', 50th National Development Council Meeting, New Delhi, 21st December 2002, available online at http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/pl50ndc/andhra.pdf, last accessed 5th November 2007

Nair, A. (2005) Sustainability of Microfinance Self Help Groups in India: Would Federating Help?: World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3516, available online at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/03/06/000090341_20050306103912/Rendered/PDF/wps3516.pdf, last accessed 21st November 2007

Nair, P. M. & Sen, S. (2005) Trafficking in Women and Children in India, New Delhi: Orient Longman

Nayar, B. R. (2001) Globalisation and Nationalism: the changing balance in India's economic policy, 1950-2000, London: Sage

Nirantar (2007) Self-Help Groups - Relevance to Poverty Alleviation and Women's Empowerment, New Delhi: Nirantar, available online at http://www.solutionexchange-un.net.in/mf/comm_update/res-06-130607-24.doc last accessed 16th December 2007

North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press

Paantjens, M. (2006) 'Institutional Change and Stability: the Case of Gender Mainstreaming', Political Studies Association Women and Politics Annual Conference: Feminist Ethics, Feminist Politics and the States We're In: Critical Reflections in Uncertain Times, Edinburgh, 11th February 2006

Palshikar, S. (2004) 'Revisiting State Level Parties', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 39 (14-15), pp. 1477-1479

Pande, R. (2002) 'The Public Face of a Private Domestic Violence', *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 4 (3), pp. 342-367

Pandian, M. S. S. (1992) The Image Trap: M G Ramachandran in Film and Politics, New Delhi: Sage

Pandian, M. S. S. (1996) 'Politics of Representation: Women in the Films of M.G. Ramachandran', pp. 533-549 in Sathyamurthy, T. V. (Ed.) Region, religion, caste, gender and culture in contemporary India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Parpart, J. L. & Marchand, M. H. (1995) 'Exploding the Canon: An Introduction/Conclusion', pp. 1-22 in Marchand, M. H. & Parpart, J. L. (Eds.) Feminism/Postmodernism/Development London: Routledge.

Parthasarathy, G. & Anand, J. (1995) 'Employment and Unemployment in Andhra Pradesh: Trends and Dimensions', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 30 (15), pp. 811-821

Parthasarathy, S. K. (2006) Institutionalising Gender, Engendering Institutions - Issues for consideration for the 11th plan, available online at http://www.solutionexchange-un.net.in/mf/comm_update/res-06-130607-01.doc last accessed 16th December 2007

Patel, I. (1998) 'The Contemporary Women's Movement and Women's Education in India', *International Review of Education,* 44 (2-3), pp. 155-175

Peters, G. B. (1998) Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods, Basingstoke: Macmillan .

Pieterse, J. N. (2001) Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions, London: Sage

Potter, D. (1986) India's Political Administrators 1919-1983, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Potter, D. (1996) 'The Prime Minster and the Bureaucracy', pp. 155-177 in Mathur, K. (Ed.) Development Policy and Administration. New Delhi: Sage.

Prabhu, K. S., Sarker, P. C. & Radha, A. (1996) 'Gender-Related Development Index for Indian States: Methodological Issues', *Economic and Political Weekly,* October 26th, pp. WS72-WS79

Pringle, R. & Watson, S. (1992) "Women's Interests' and the Post-Structuralist State', pp. 53-73 in Barrett, M. & Phillips, A. (Eds.) Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rai, S. (1996) 'Women and the State in the Third World: Some Issues for Debate', pp. 5-22 in Rai, S. & Lievesley, G. (Eds.) Women and the State: International Perspectives. London: Taylor and Francis.

Rai, S. (1999) 'Democratic Institutions, Political Representation and Women's Empowerment: The Quota Debate in India', *Democratization,* 6 (3), pp. 84-99

Rai, S. (2001) Gender and the Political Economy of Development, Cambridge: Polity Press

Rai, S. (2003a) 'Institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women: mainstreaming gender, democratizing the state?' pp. 15-39 in Rai, S. (Ed.) Mainstreaming gender, democratizing the state: institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rai, S. (Ed.) (2003b) Mainstreaming gender, democratising the state?: Institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, Manchester: Manchester University Press (on behalf of the United Nations).

Rai, S. & Sharma, K. (2000) 'Democratising the Indian Parliament: the 'Reservation for Women Debate", pp. 149-165 in Rai, S. (Ed.) International Perspectives on Gender and Democratisation. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Rai, S. M. (2002) 'Political representation, democratic institutions and women's empowerment', pp. 133-146 in Parpart, J. L., Rai, S. M. & Staudt, K. (Eds.) Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and development in a global/local world. Abingdon: Routledge.
Rai, S. M. (2003c) 'The National Commission for Women: The Indian Experience', pp. 223-242 in Rai, S. M. (Ed.) Mainstreaming gender, democratizing the state?: Institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women. Manchester: Manchester University Press/United Nations.
Rajadurai, S. V. & Geetha, V. (1996) 'DMK Hegemony: The Cultural Limits to Political Consensus', in Sathyamurthy, T. V. (Ed.) Region, Religion, Caste, Gender and Culture in Contemporary India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Raju, S. (1997) 'The issues at stake: An overview of gender concerns in post-independence India ', *Environment and Planning A,* 29, pp. 2191-2206
Ramaswamy, S. (2001) 'Virgin Mother, Beloved Other: The Erotics of Tamil Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial India', pp. 17-56 in Rajan, R. S. (Ed.) Signposts: Gender Issues in Post-Independence India. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Randall, V. (2006) 'Legislative Gender Quotas and Indian Exceptionalism: The Travails of the Women's Reservation Bill', *Comparative Politics,* 39 (1), pp. 63-82
Randall, V. & Waylen, G. (Eds.) (1998) Gender, Politics and the State, London: Routledge.
Rankin, K. (2001) 'Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit, and Rational Economic Woman', *Economy and Society,* 30 (1), pp. 18-37
Rankin, K. N. (2002) 'Social Capital, Microfinance and the Politics of Development', *Feminist Economics,* 8 (1), pp. 1-24
Rankin, K. N. (2004) The Cultural Politics of Markets: Economic Liberalisation and Social Change in Nepal, Toronto: University of Toronto Press
Rao, A. (Ed.) (2003) Gender and Caste, New Delhi: Kali for Women/Women Unlimited.
Rao, B. S. & Parthasarathy, G. (Eds.) (1997) Anti-Arrack Movement of Women in Andhra Pradesh and Prohibition Policy, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd.
Reddy, C. & Prakash, L. (2003) Status of SHG Federations in Andhra Pradesh: APMAS Assessment Findings. *SHG Federation Workshop* New Delhi, APMAS.
Reddy, D. N. & Patnaik, A. (1993) 'Anti-Arrack Agitation of Women in Andhra Pradesh', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 28 (21), pp. 1059-1066
Rees, T. (1998) Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union: Education, Training and Labour Market Policies, London: Routledge
RNGS (2002) RNGS News (No. 8/ January 2002): Research Network on Gender, Politics, and the State, available online at http://libarts.wsu.edu/polisci/rngs/pdf/newsletter8.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008
Rose, N. & Miller, P. (1992) 'Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government', *British Journal of Sociology,* 43 (2), pp. 173-205
Rossi, B. (2004) 'Revisiting Foucauldian Approaches: Power Dynamics in Development Projects', *Journal of Development Studies,* 40 (6), pp. 1-29
Roy, T. & Borowiak, C. (2003) 'Against Ecofeminism: the Splintered Subject of Agrarian Nationalism in Post-Independent India', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,* 28 (1), pp. 57-89
Rudolph, L. I. & Rudolph, S. H. (1987) In Pursuit of Lakshmi: the Political Economy of the Indian State, London: University of Chicago Press

Rudolph, L. I. & Rudolph, S. H. (2003 [1987]) 'The State and Its Permanent Government', pp. 265-278 in Chakrabarty, B. & Bhattacharya, M. (Eds.) Public Administration: A Reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sachs, J., Varshney, A. & Bajpai, N. (1999) 'Introduction', pp. 1-25 in Sachs, J., Varshney, A. & Bajpai, N. (Eds.) India in the Era of Economic Reforms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Santhanam, K. (2005) 'At the apex of administration', *Metro Plus: Chennai in The Hindu*, available online at http://www.hindu.com/mp/2005/11/10/stories/2005111001040200.htm, last

Sarkar, T. (1993) 'The Women of the Hindutva Brigade', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 25 (4), pp. 16-24

Scheyvens, R., Nowak, B. & Scheyvens, H. (2003a) 'Ethical Issues', pp. 139-166 in Scheyvens, R. & Storey, D. (Eds.) Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide. London: Sage.

Scheyvens, R., Scheyvens, H. & Murray, W. E. (2003b) 'Working with Marginalised, Vulnerable, or Privileged Groups', pp. 167-193 in Scheyvens, R. & Storey, D. (Eds.) Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide. London: Sage.

Schuurman, F. J. (Ed.) (1993) Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory, London: Zed Books.

Scott, J. C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven/London: Yale University Press

Sen, A. (1990) 'Gender and Cooperative Conflicts', pp. 123-149 in Tinker, I. (Ed.) Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, G. (2000) 'Gender Mainstreaming in Finance Ministries', *World Development*, 28 (7), pp. 1379-1390

Sen, G. & Grown, C. (1988) Development Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives, London: Earthscan Publications

Sharma, A. (2001a) 'Women's Development through 'Empowerment': The Gender of the State and the State of Gender in India', Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Stanford University

Sharma, A. & Gupta, A. (Eds.) (2006) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.

Sharma, R. (2001b) 'Children as commodities', *Frontline*, 18 (10), available online at http://frontlineonnet.com/fl1810/18100350.htm, last accessed 2nd January 2008

Shastri, V. (1997) 'The politics of economic liberalization in India', *Contemporary South Asia*, 6 (1), pp. 27-56

Skocpol, T. (1985) 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', pp. 3-37 in Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. (Eds.) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Skoda, U. (2004) 'The politics-kinship nexus in India: Sonia Gandhi versus Sushma Swaraj in the 1999 general elections', *Contemporary South Asia*, 13 (3), pp. 273-285

Squires, J. (2000) Gender in Political Theory, Oxford: Polity Press

Squires, J. (2005a) 'Evaluating Gender Mainstreaming Strategies in the Context of EU Diversity Strategies', PSA Annual Conference, University of Leeds, Leeds, 5th-7th April

Squires, J. (2005b) 'Is Mainstreaming Transformative? Theorising Mainstreaming in the Context of Diversity and Deliberation', *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, 12 (3), pp. 366-388

Squires, J. (2007a) The New Politics of Gender Equality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Squires, J. (2007b) 'Review of Joni Lovenduski (ed), "State Feminism and Political Representation", Cambridge University Press, 2005', *Parliamentary Affairs,* 60 (1), pp. 170-179
Sridhar, V. (2004) 'Neoliberalism Spurned', *Frontline,* 21 (12), available online at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2112/stories/20040618004402300.htm, last accessed 22nd November 2007
Srinivasulu, K. (2004) Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in the 2004 Election in Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad: Centre for Economic and Social Studies, available online at http://www.cess.ac.in/cesshome/wp%5CGAPsWP-1.pdf, last accessed 22nd November 2007
Standing, H. (2004) 'Gender, Myth and Fable: The Perils of Mainstreaming in Sector Bureaucracies', *IDS Bulletin,* 35 (4), pp. 82-88
Staudt, K. (1997) 'Gender Politics in Bureaucracy: Theoretical Issues in Comparative Perspective', pp. 3-34 in Staudt, K. (Ed.) Women, International Development and Politics: The Bureaucratic Mire. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Templeton University Press.
Stephen, F. (2001) 'Empowering Women in Gram Panchayats Through Training', pp. 133-156 in Murthy, R. K. (Ed.) Building Women's Capacities: Interventions in Gender Transformation. New Delhi: Sage.
Stetson, D. M. & Mazur, A. G. (Eds.) (1995) Comparative State Feminism, London: Sage.
Subrahmanian, R., Kabeer, N., Mathur, K., Rajagopal, S. & Thakur, S. G. (1999) 'Lessons Learned: Gender Training Experiences with the Indian Government', pp. 392-407 in Kabeer, N. & Subrahmanian, R. (Eds.) Institutions, Relations, and Outcomes: Frameworks and Case Studies for Gender Aware Planning. London: Zed Books.
Subrahmanyam, S. (2003) 'Regional Disparities: Causes and Remedies', pp. 517-544 in Hanumantha Rao, C. H. & Mahendra Dev, S. (Eds.) Andhra Pradesh Development: Economic Reforms and Challenges Ahead. Hyderabad: Centre for Economic and Social Studies.
Subramanian, N. (1999) Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press
Sunder Rajan, R. (2003) The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in Postcolonial India, London: Duke University Press
Sunderland, J. (2004) Gendered Discourses, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Suri, K. C. (2002) Democratic Process and Electoral Politics in Andhra Pradesh, London: Overseas Development Institute, Livelihood Options, available online at http://www.odi.org.uk/Livelihoodoptions/papers/ReportDraft1.doc, last accessed 2nd January 2008
Suri, K. C. (2006) 'Telugu Desam Party', pp. 281-310 in de Souza, P. R. & Sridharan, E. (Eds.) India's Political Parties. New Delhi: Sage.
Swaminathan, P. (1994) 'Development Experience(s) in India: Gendered Perspectives on Industrial Growth, Employment and Education', *Social Scientist,* 22 (3/4), pp. 60-92
Swaminathan, P. (2002) 'The Violence of Gender-Biased Development: Going Beyond Social and Demographic Indicators', pp. 69-141 in Kapadia, K. (Ed.) The Violence of Development: The Politics of Identity, Gender and Social Inequalities in India. London: Zed Books.

Swaminathan, P., Jeyaranjan, J., Sreenivasan, R. & Jayashree, K. (2004) 'Tamil Nadu's Midday Meal Scheme: Where Assumed Benefits Score Over Hard Data', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 39 (44), pp. 4811-4821

Swamy, A. (1998) 'Parties, Political Identities and the Absence of Mass Political Violence in South India', pp. 108-148 in Basu, A. & Kohli, A. (Eds.) Community Conflicts and the State in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Tannen, D. (1994) Gender and discourse, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Thakur, S. G. (2000) '"More Equal than Others?" Gender Bias in the Constitution of Bureaucratic Merit in the Indian Administrative Service', pp. 102-146 in Kabeer, N. & Subrahmanian, R. (Eds.) Institutions, Relations and Outcomes: Framework and Case Studies for Gender-Aware Planning. London: Zed Books.

Thakur, S. G. (c.1997) Increasing Awareness for Change: A Survey of Gender and the Civil Services, Mussorie: Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration

Thelen, K. (1999) 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2, pp. 369-404

Thelen, K. & Steinmo, S. (1992) 'Historical institutionalism in comparative politics', pp. 1-32 in Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. & Longstreth, F. (Eds.) Structuring politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tinker, I. (1990) 'The Making of a Field: Advocates, Practitioners, and Scholars', pp. 27-53 in Tinker, I. (Ed.) Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Toye, J. (1993) Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd

True, J. (2003) 'Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy', *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 5 (3), pp. 368-396

Upadhyay, U. D. (2000) 'India's New Economic Policy of 1991 and its impact on women's poverty and AIDS', *Feminist Economics,* 6 (3), pp. 105-122

Van Hollen, C. (1998) 'Moving Targets: Routine IUD Insertion in Maternity Wards in Tamil Nadu, India', *Reproductive Health Matters,* 6 (11), pp. 98-106

Verloo, M. (2001) Another Velvet Revolution? Gender Mainstreaming and the Politics of Implementation, Vienna: Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menchen

Verloo, M. & Lombardo, E. (2007) 'Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach', pp. 21-49 in Verloo, M. (Ed.) Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Visvanathan, N., Duggan, L., Nisonoff, L. & Wiegersmas, N. (Eds.) (1997) The Women, Gender and Development Reader, London: Zed Books.

Watson, S. (1992) 'Femocratic feminisms', pp. 186-204 in Savage, M. & Witz, A. (Eds.) Gender and Bureaucracy. Oxford: Blackwell.

Waylen, G. (1996) 'Democratization, Feminism and the State in Chile: The Establishment of SERNAM', pp. 103-117 in Rai, S. (Ed.) Women and the State: International Perspectives. London: Taylor and Francis.

Waylen, G. (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview', pp. 1-17 in Randall, V. & Waylen, G. (Eds.) Gender, Politics and the State. London: Routledge.

WDP Fact Finding Team (1992) 'Development for Whom? Critique of Rajasthan Programme', *Economic and Political Weekly,* 27 (5), pp. 193-198

Weedon, C. (1987) Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory, Oxford: Blackwell

Weiner, M. (2002) 'The struggle for equality: caste in Indian politics', pp. 193-225 in Kohli, A. (Ed.) The success of India's democracy. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press/Foundation Books.

Weir, M. (1989) 'Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States', pp. 53-86 in Hall, P. (Ed.) The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. Guildford: Princeton University Press.

Williams, G. (1997) 'State, discourse, and development in India: the case of West Bengal's Panchayati Raj', *Environment and Planning A,* 29 (12), pp. 2099-2112

Witz, A. & Savage, M. (1992) 'The gender of organizations', pp. 3-62 in Savage, M. & Witz, A. (Eds.) Gender and Bureaucracy. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wodak, R. (Ed.) (1997) Gender and discourse, London: Sage.

Wolkowitz, C. (1987) 'Controlling Women's Access to Political Power: a Case Study in Andhra Pradesh, India', pp. 205-225 in Afshar, H. (Ed.) Women, State and Ideology: Studies from Africa and Asia. London: MacMillan.

Wyatt, A. (2004) 'The Turn Away from Cultural Mobilisation in Contemporary Tamil Nadu', pp. 234-256 in Zavos, J., Wyatt, A. & Hewitt, V. (Eds.) The Politics of Cultural Mobilization in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Government and policy-related documents:

CSWI (1974) 'Towards Equality', Department of Social Welfare, Government of India,

GoAP (1998) Andhra Pradesh Women's Commission Act. *1998/9.*

GoAP (1999) 'Swarna Andhra Pradesh - Vision 2020', Government of Andhra Pradesh

GoAP (2004) 'Janmabhoomi - Discontinuation of the Programme - Orders - Issued (G.O.Ms.NO.8. Dated:30-6-2004)', Department, P., Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online at http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20Links/Departments/Planning/Govt-Gos-Acts/2004/GO.Ms.8.2004.html, last accessed 6th November 2007.

GoAP (2005a) 'Announcement of new Insurance Scheme for Protection of Girl Child on International Women's Day celebrations on 8th March, 2005 – Guidelines – Issued (G.O.Ms.No. 16)', Department of Women Development and Child Welfare, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online at http://anganwadi.ap.nic.in/guidelines/gcpsgl.doc, last accessed 4th June 2006.

GoAP (2005b) 'Department of Rural Development Annual Report 2005', Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh

GoAP (2006) Statistical Abstract 2006, Hyderabad: Government of Andhra Pradesh

GoAP (2007a) 'Memorandum of Understanding between Mission for the Elimination of Poverty in Municipal Areas (MEPMA) and Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP)', Department of Municipal Administration and Urban Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh

GoAP (2007b) 'Socio-Economic Survey', Planning Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online at

http://www.aponline.gov.in/Apportal/SocioSurvery0607/economic_Survey.html, last accessed 04/10/07.

GoAP (2007c) 'Strategy for Elimination of Urban Poverty – Establishment of Mission for Elimination of Poverty in Municipal Areas (MEPMA) (GO Ms. No 414 Dated 04/06/07)', Department of Municipal Administration and Urban Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh

GoAP (n.d.) 'Vigilance Manual Vol. IV', Andhra Pradesh Vigilance Commission, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online http://apvc.ap.nic.in/js/download.asp?file=./Vol-IV.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008

GoAP APPSC (n.d.) 'Information Brochure': Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online at http://appsc.ap.nic.in/, last accessed 1st August 2007

GoI (1989) 'Measure to increase SC/ST representation in the services under the Government through direct recruitment (Govt Circular No. 36012/13/88-Estt (SCT)', Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, available online at

GoI (1992) 'Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997)', Planning Commission, Government of India

GoI (1995) 'Proceedings of the Second National Workshop on Improvement of Statistics on Gender Issues', New Delhi, May 2nd

GoI (1997) 'Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002)', Planning Commission, Government of India

GoI (1999) 'Proceedings of the International Seminar on Time Use Studies', Ahmedabad, 7-10 December 1999

GoI (2001) 'National Policy for the Empowerment of Women', Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, available online at http://wcd.nic.in/empwomen.htm, last accessed

GoI (2002a) 'Department of Women and Child Development: Annual Report 2001-02', Department of Women and Child Development, Government of India, available online at http://wcd.nic.in/annual_report.htm, last accessed 2nd January 2008.

GoI (2002b) 'eCensus India: Issue No. 7', Office of the Registrar General, Government of India, available online at http://www.censusindia.net/results/eci7_page3.html, last accessed 7th October 2007.

GoI (2002c) 'National Human Development Report 2001', Planning Commission, Government of India, available online at http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/nhdrep/nhdreportf.htm, last accessed 16th October 2007.

GoI (2002d) 'Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007)', Planning Commission, Government of India

GoI (2003) 'eCENSUSIndia Issue No. 15', Office of the Registrar General, Government of India, available online at http://www.censusindia.net/results/eci15.pdf, last accessed 19/09/07.

GoI (2004) 'Report of the Committee on Civil Service Reforms', Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, Government of India, available online at http://darpg.nic.in/arpg-website/ReportsAndPublication/HotaCommittee.asp, last accessed 6th December 2007.

GoI (2005a) 'Concepts and Definitions: Census 2001': Office of the Registrar General, Government of India, available online at http://www.censusindia.net/results/concepts_def.htm, last accessed 10/10/07

GoI (2005b) 'Department of Women and Child Development: Annual Report 2004-05', Department of Women and Child Development, Government of India, available online at http://wcd.nic.in/ar2004-05/annual_report_2004.htm, last accessed 2nd January 2008.
GoI (2005c) 'Platform for Action: 10 Years After - India Country Report', Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India
GoI (2007a) 'Civil List 2007: The Indian Administrative Service', Ministry of Personnel Government of India, available online at http://persmin.nic.in/civillist/StartCL.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007
GoI (2007b) 'Economic Survey 2006-07', Ministry of Finance, Government of India, available online at http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2006-07/esmain.htm, last accessed 03/10/2007.
GoI (2007c) 'Selected Educational Statistics 2004-05', Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, available online at http://education.nic.in/stats/SES2004-05.pdf, last accessed 10/10/07.
GoI (n.d.-a) 'Administrative Reforms Commission': Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, available online at http://arc.gov.in/, last accessed 2nd January 2008
GoI (n.d.-b) 'Executive Record Sheet Generator (IAS Officers)', Ministry of Personnel Government of India, available online at http://persmin.nic.in/ersheet/startqryers.asp, last accessed 9th December 2007
GoI (n.d.-c)Ministry of Personnel Circular on Reservation, http://persmin.nic.in/Circulars/Establishment(Res)/Reservation_LT.html, last accessed 2nd January 2008.
GoI & British Council (1996) Gender Planning Training Project: End of Project Seminar, New Delhi: Department of Personnel and Training, GoI
GoTN (2001a) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2001-02', Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2001-2/social-e-2001-02.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007.
GoTN (2001b) 'GO MS No. 190 18.12.2001 Social Welfare - Dr. J. Jayalalithaa 15 Point Programme for Child Welfare - Revived as Tamilnadu 18 Point Programme for Women & Child Welfare - Orders - Issued', Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu
GoTN (2002) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2002-03', Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2002-03/swnmp2002-03-1.htm, last accessed 6th November 2007.
GoTN (2003a) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2003-04', Department of Social Welfare & Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu
GoTN (2003b) 'Tamil Nadu Human Development Report', Nadu, G. o. T., Social Science Press
GoTN (2003c) 'Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-2007', State Planning Commission, Government of Tamil Nadu
GoTN (2004) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2004-05', Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu

GoTN (2005a) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2005-06', Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, Government of Tamil Nadu

GoTN (2005b) 'Government of Tamil Nadu Annual Plan 2005-06: Chapter 8.2 Social Welfare', State Planning Commission, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/ap2005-06/ch_8_2.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008.

GoTN (2005c) 'Tamil Nadu Government Service Conduct Rules, 1973', Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/acts-rules/pandar/tngsc1973.pdf, last accessed 19th July 2006.

GoTN (2006a) 'Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012): A List of Steering Committees/Working Groups - Composition and Terms of Reference', State Planning Commission, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/eleventhplan/steering_working_committee.pdf, last accessed 8th June 2007.

GoTN (2006b) 'Statistical Handbook of Tamil Nadu: Chapter 17 Employment', Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/deptst/Employment.pdf, last accessed 17th August 2007.

GoTN (2006c) 'Tamil Nadu - An Economic Appraisal 2005-06', Department of Evaluation and Applied Research, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/dear/index.htm, last accessed 23rd October 2007.

GoTN (2006d) 'Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 131 June 7th 2006', Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/acts-rules/law/ACT_10to12_131_07JUN06.pdf, last accessed 6th November 2007.

GoTN (2007a) 'Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Policy Note 2007-08', Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/pdf/rural_development.pdf, last accessed 17th August 2007.

GoTN (2007b) 'Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme Policy Note 2007-08', Programme, D. o. S. W. a. N. M., Government of Tamil Nadu

GoTN (2007c) 'The Fundamental Rules of the Tamil Nadu Government', Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/acts-rules/pandar/tngovfr.pdf, last accessed 8th December 2007.

GoTN (2007d) 'Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules (Corrected up to 15th May 2007)', Ministry of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Tamil Nadu, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/acts-rules/pandar/tnsssr-web.pdf, last accessed 1st August 2007.

GoTN (c.2006) 'Council of Ministers', online at http://www.tn.gov.in/tnassembly/ministers.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007

GoTN (n.d.-a) 'Council of Ministers of Twelfth Assembly 2001-2006', online at http://www.tn.gov.in/tnassembly/assembly2001/archives/ministers.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007

GoTN (n.d.-b) 'Council of Ministers with their Portfolios 1996-2001', online at http://www.tn.gov.in/tnassembly/assembly96/archives/minister.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007

GoTN (2007) 'Department of Social Welfare Policy Note 2007-08', Department of Social Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu

IFAD (1989) Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Board on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of India for the Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project, Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development, available online at http://www.ifad.org/english/operations/pi/ind/i240in/documents/EB-89-36-R-11-REV-1-e.pdf, last accessed 4th June 2007

IFAD (2000) 'India: Tamil Nadu Women's Development Project Completion Evaluation Report', Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development, available online at http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/prj/region/pi/india/r240ince.htm, last accessed 06/06/2007

LBSNAA (2003) Integration of Gender Issues into the Existing Syllabi of LBSNAA (Workshop Report), Mussorie: Lal Bahadur National Academy of Administration

NCSEWWIS (1988) 'Shramshakti', National Commission on Self Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector, Government of India

Ponnaiyan, C. (2001) 'Government of Tamil Nadu Finance Minister's Budget Speech 2001-02', Minister of Finance and Law, Government of Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 18th August 2001

Ponnaiyan, C. (2003) 'Government of Tamil Nadu Finance Minister's Budget Speech 2003-04', Minitry of Finance, Government of Tamil Nadu, Government of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 21st March 2003, available online at http://www.tn.gov.in/budget/archives/budgetspeech2003-04.pdf, last accessed 15th May 2007

Rajya Sabha (2004) 'Department-Related Standing Committee on Human Resource Development: Hundred Fifty-Third Report on Gender Budget Analysis (Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 21st December 2004)', Rajya Sabha Secretariat, available online at http://rajyasabha.nic.in/book2/reports/HRD/153rdreport.htm, last accessed 2nd January 2008.

Rajya Sabha (2005a) 'Unstarred question no. 2795: Job Reservation for Women', Rajya Sabha, available online at http://164.100.47.4/rsq/quest.asp?qref=107756, last accessed 9th December 2007

Rajya Sabha (2005b) 'Unstarred Question No. 3198: Men Women Ratio in Government Offices', Rajya Sabha, available online at http://164.100.47.4/rsq/quest.asp?qref=104644, last accessed 9th December 2007

SERP (c.2002) APDPIP Progress Report June 2000-March 2002, Hyderabad: Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available online at http://www.velugu.org/downloads/Velugu_Progress_Report.pdf,

SERP & Centre for World Solidarity (2006) Women's Self-Help Group Organisations in India; Opportunities for Counselling and Legal Assistance, Hyderabad: SERP/Centre for World Solidarity

Telugu Desam Party (n.d.) 'Bye Laws', online at http://www.telugudesam.com/html/bye-laws.htm, last accessed 1st August 2007

TNCDW (2000a) Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninavu Mahalir Thittam Annual Report 1999-2000, Chennai: Tamil Nadu Corporation for Development of Women Ltd., available online at

http://www.tamilnaduwomen.org/ANNUALREPORT99-2000.htm, last accessed 02/11/07
TNCDW (2000b) Mahalir Thittam Working Manual, Chennai: Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women
TNCDW (c.1998) Report of the State Level Workshop Held 30-09-97 to 01-10-97 at Chennai, Chennai: Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women Ltd.
UNDP India (n.d.) 'State Human Development Reports': United Nations Development Program India Country Office, available online at http://www.undp.org.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=80, last accessed 06/10/07
World Bank (1998) Project Information Document for Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Project: World Bank, available online at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/04/05/000009265_39809 29101911/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf, last accessed 2nd January 2008
World Bank (2003) APRPRP Project Appraisal Document (Report No. 24771-IN), South Asia Regional Office: World Bank
World Bank (2004) 'Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project (AP DPIP) India: Team Debriefing, and Meeting with Vijay Kumar - Managing Director to AP DPIP': World Bank, available online at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTIND KNOWLEDGE/0,,contentMDK:20841951~menuPK:2291452~pagePK:64168445~piPK: 64168309~theSitePK:825547,00.html#, last accessed 2nd January 2008
World Bank (2005) Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation in Tamil Nadu: Notes on Selected Policy Issues: The World Bank: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region

Press sources:

BBC World (2004) 'Jayalalitha's Interview to BBC World's HARDtalk India': BBC World, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/tamil/highlights/story/2004/09/040930_jayainterview.shtml, last accessed 31st December 2007
Indian Express (1998a) 'Centre clears World Bank funding AP projects', 2nd December 1998, available online at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981202/33650304.html
Indian Express (1998b) ' A third of Cong posts for women', December 19th 1998, available online at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981219/35350514.html
Indian Express (1999) ' Pratibha Bharati is Andhra Pradesh Assembly's first woman Speaker of AP', November 12th 1999, available online at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19991112/ipo12001.html
The Hindu (2001) 'Valamarthi Jebaraj in a spot', 24th November, available online at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/11/24/stories/04242237.htm
The Hindu (2003a) 'Cong. seeks to probe Velugu implementation', January 21st, available online at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/21/stories/2003012104840400.htm
The Hindu (2003b) 'DWCRA members allege exploitation by Naidu', 9th December, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/09/stories/2003120906110400.htm

The Hindu (2003c) 'DWCRA members set to go cellular', 6th December, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/06/stories/2003120605370400.htm
The Hindu (2003d) "Statutory powers elude women's panel", October 29th 2003, available online at http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/29/stories/2003102906880400.htm
The Hindu (2004a) ' Power tariff reduced for domestic sector', June 1st 2004, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2004/06/01/stories/2004060108380100.htm
The Hindu (2004b) 'Stop meeting, DMK tells EC', April 1, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2004/04/02/stories/2004040211780400.htm
The Hindu (2004c) 'Stop use of SHGs for poll campaign: CPI(M)', 29th March, available online at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2004033011730300.htm&date=2004/03/30/&prd=th&
The Hindu (2004d) ' Uma Madhava Reddy still rides sympathy wave', April 15th 2004, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2004/04/15/stories/2004041510580300.htm
The Hindu (2005a) 'Funds and powers sought for Commission for Women', Sunday 7th August, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/07/stories/2005080713980300.htm
The Hindu (2005b) 'Intolerance that is intolerable', 19th November, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2005/11/19/stories/2005111901711000.htm
The Hindu (2005c) ' `Register houses in the name of couple", 21st January 2005, available online at http://www.thehindu.com/2005/01/21/stories/2005012116430500.htm
The Hindu, (2006) 'Transco inks pact with Mahila Samakhya', 20th October 2006, available online at http://www.hindu.com/2006/10/20/stories/2006102013050300.htm
The Hindu (2007a) 'Differences plague Women's Commission', July 24th, available online at http://www.thehindu.com/2006/07/24/stories/2006072416890500.htm
The Hindu (2007b) 'YSR asks Mary, Padmaja to quit', 14th July 2007, available online at http://www.thehindu.com/2007/07/14/stories/2007071453610600.htm

APPENDICES

Appendix I – Developments in the National Machinery for Women

Source: Adapted from Murli Desai (1998).

Phase	Date	Event	Key significance
Welfare Phase (1951-74)	1953	Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB) established	Symbolised welfare approach to women's problems
	1956	CSWB Schemes launched	Scheme of Condensed Courses of Education for Adult Women Scheme for Socio-Economic Programmes for Women
	1972	Central Scheme of Assistance for Construction of Hostel Buildings for Working Women initiated	Widened in 1980 to include day care centres for children.
	Early 1970s	Crash Scheme for Rural Employment Food for Work Programme Drought Prone Areas Programme Desert Development Programme	To strengthen base of rural economy Seemingly gender-neutral, but male-biased as males seen as heads of households, benefits assumed to trickle down to family members
	1974	*Towards Equality* report published	Report published by the Committee on Status of Women (CSWI), Department of Social Welfare. Operationalised by National Plan of Action 1976.
Women's Development Phase (1975-1985)	1975	CSWB initiated two schemes in accordance with Fifth Five Year Plan policy	Scheme of Assistance to Voluntary Organisations for Crèches for Working and Ailing Women's Children; Scheme for Vocational Training of Adult Women
	1975	Ministry of Social Welfare scheme launched	Scheme of Functional Literacy for Adult women
	1976	National Plan of Action for Women	Operationalised recommendations of *Towards Equality* report (1974)
	1976	Women's Welfare and Development Bureau set up in Ministry of Social Welfare	
	1976	Equal Remuneration Act	
	1977-78	Ministry of Social Welfare scheme launched	Scheme for Setting up Women's Training Centres or Institutes for Rehabilitation of Women in Distress
	1978-79	Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) launched	Gender-neutral policy supplying credit and subsidies to proportion of the rural poor below the poverty line. Several more gender-neutral rural development schemes implemented 1980-83.
	1979	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	Passed by UN, into force as a treaty in 1981, but not ratified by India until 1993 as compulsory registration of marriages deemed impractical.

	1982	Sub-scheme of IRDP launched	Sub-scheme called Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA).
	1985	Department of Women and Child Development set up	New department within Ministry of Human Resource Development. Department now funds CSWB sponsoring welfare and development schemes for women.
	1986	National Policy on Education	Included a chapter on "Education for Women's Equality
	1986	Twenty Point Programme against poverty	Included a separate point on Equality for Women
	1988	National Perspective Plan for Women, 1988-2000	Published by core group led by Margaret Alva established by Department of Women and Child Development, focusing on mainstreaming women's issues in policies and programmes.
	1988	Shramshakti	Study published by the National Commission into lives of poor women in rural and urban areas, led by Ela Bhatt.
Women's Empowerment Phase (1986-)	1990	National Commission for Women Act	National Commission for Women set up as a result in 1992 as a national statutory body.
	1991	National Plan of Action for the SAARC Decade of the Girl Child 1991-2000	Formulated by the Department of Women and Child Development.
	1991	New Economic Policy and Structural Adjustment Programme	Reduction in social sector including the public distribution system.
	1996	National Policy for the Empowerment of Women	Draft finalised.

Appendix II – Tables for Gendered Development Indicators (Supplementary to Chapter 4)

Table 5 Population and general profile indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India

	Tamil Nadu	All-India
Population (2001)	62.4 million	1,028.6 million
Decadal population growth rate (% increase, 1991-2001)	11.7	21.5
Population density (persons per sq. km)	480	325
SC Population (% of total population)	19.0	16.2
ST Population (% of total population)	1.0	8.2
Main language(s) spoken (3 most populous)[1]	Tamil (87%)	Hindi (40%)
	Telugu (7%)	Bengali (8.3%)
	Kannada (2%)	Telugu (8%)

Source: Census of India, 2001
Notes:
[1] Data from Census of India1991

Table 6 Economic Indicators for Tamil Nadu and all-India

		Tamil Nadu	All-India
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) (Rs. Crore)[1]		148907	N.A.
Per capita income (Rs.)[1]		23358	20936
Sectoral composition of Gross State Domestic Product (G(S)DP) (%), 2006-07	Primary	13.9[3]	18.5
	Secondary	28.5[3]	26.4
	Tertiary	57.6[3]	55.1
Growth in State Domestic Product (G(S)DP, % increase, 2006-07	Total	8.3[4]	9.2
	Primary	10.0[4]	2.7
	Secondary	8.1[4]	10.0
	Tertiary	8.0[4]	11.1

Source: Government of India Economic Survey 2006-07 (GoI, 2007b), Tamil Nadu Economic Appraisal 2005-06 (GoTN, 2006c)
[1] Figures for 2003-04, based on current prices.
[2] Advance estimates for 2006-07 at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from GoI (GoI, 2007b: Table 1.2)
[3] Figures for 2005-06.
[4] Figures for growth over period 2004-05 to 2005-06.

Table 7 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Tamil Nadu and all-India

			Tamil Nadu	All-India
Incidence of Poverty, 1999-2000		Total	20.6	27.1
(% population below poverty line)		Rural	22.1	23.6
		Urban	21.1	26.1
Decline in Poverty Incidence		Total	16.63	8.51
(in percentage points)	1983 to 1993-94	Rural	21.51	8.38
		Urban	7.19	8.43
		Total	13.91	9.87
	1993-94 to 1999-2000	Rural	11.93	10.18
		Urban	17.66	8.74

Source: National Human Development Report (GoI, 2002c).

Table 8 Work Participation Rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
% of Total Population Classified as Workers	Total	58	31	52	26
	Rural	59	41	52	31
	Urban	56	18	20	4

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 9 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

			Tamil Nadu		All-India	
			Main	Marginal	Main	Marginal
% Main and Marginal Workers of Total Workers	Total	Males	90	10	87	13
		Females	76	24	57	43
	Rural	Males	87	13	85	15
		Females	73	27	54	46
	Urban	Males	94	6	93	7
		Females	85	15	79	21

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 10 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

			Tamil Nadu		All-India	
			Males	Females	Males	Females
Male and Female Workers as a % of Total Workers	Cultivators	Total	64	36	67	33
		Rural	63	37	67	33
		Urban	68	32	75	25
	Agricultural Labourers	Total	49	51	54	46
		Rural	48	52	53	47
		Urban	56	44	60	40
	Household Industry Workers	Total	43	57	52	48
		Rural	41	59	49	51
		Urban	46	54	57	43
	Other Workers	Total	79	21	82	18
		Rural	76	24	77	23
		Urban	80	20	86	14
	Total Workers	Total	65	35	68	32
		Rural	59	41	64	36
		Urban	75	25	83	17

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 11 Literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
% of Population Literate (aged 7 yrs and above)	Total	82	64	75	54
	Rural	77	55	71	46
	Urban	89	76	86	73
	SC	64	46	55	35
	ST	43	28	48	28

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 12 Changes in literacy rates for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 1991-2001

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Increases in literacy rates of population aged 7 years and above, 1991-2001 (percentage points)	Total	9	13	11	14
	Rural	10	13	13	16
	Urban	3	6	5	9
	SC	5	11	5	11
	ST	7	8	8	10

Source: Census of India, 1991, 2001. 1991 data cited in GoI (GoI, 2002c: 190-1)

Table 13 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Educational achievement as % completing each stage of formal education	Literate without educational level	10	10	3	4
	Below Primary	15	17	24	28
	Primary	28	30	25	28
	Middle	17	18	17	15
	Total before Secondary	**70**	**75**	**69**	**76**
	Matric/Secondary	16	13	15	13
	Higher secondary/Intermediate Pre-University/Senior secondary	6	6	7	6
	Non-technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree	0	0	0	0
	Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree	2	0	1	0
	Graduate and above	6	5	8	5
	Total Secondary and above	**30**	**25**	**31**	**24**

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 14 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Tamil Nadu and All-India, 2004

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Gross Enrolment Ratios[1]	Classes I to V (6-11 yrs)	119.52	117.23	110.70	104.67
	Classes VI to VIII (11-14 yrs)	109.22	104.66	74.30	65.13
	Classes IX to X (14-16 yrs)	82.89	78.32	57.39	45.28
	Classes XI to XII (16-18 yrs)	42.65	45.14	30.82	24.46
	Total for Classes I to XII	**97.08**	**94.54**	**79.75**	**72.32**
	Higher Education (18-24 years)	13.03	9.95	11.58	8.17
Dropout Ratios[1]	Classes I to V (6-11 yrs)	1.94	0.14	31.81	25.42
	Classes I to VIII (6-14 yrs)	24.62	23.24	50.49	51.28
	Classes I to X (6-16 yrs)	57.27	52.71	60.41	63.88

Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Higher Education, Government of India (GoI, 2007c)
Notes: [1]Defined as the percentage of enrolment in/dropout from classes to the estimated child population in the age band for that class. Figures exceeding 100% reflect enrolment in classes by children outside of the class age band.

Table 15 Sex ratios for Tamil Nadu and all-India, 2001

		Tamil Nadu		All-India	
		All ages	0-6 yrs	All ages	0-6 yrs
Sex ratio (no. of females per 1,000 males)	Total	987	942	933	927
	Rural	992	933	946	934
	Urban	982	955	900	903
	Change since 1991 (no. of females per 1,000 males)	+6	-12/0[1]	+6	-14/-32[1]
	SC	999	959	936	938
	ST	980	N.A.	978	N.A

Source: Census of India, 1991, 2001.
Notes: [1]Figures show change for rural/urban areas, using data from the Census of India 1991 cited in GoI (2003: 1-2).

Table 16 Population and general profile indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

Indicator	Andhra Pradesh	All-India
Population (2001)	76.2 million	1,028.6 million
Decennial population growth rate (1991-2001) (%)	14.6	21.5
Population density (persons per sq. km)	277	325
SC Population (% of total population)	16.2	16.2
ST Population (% of total population)	6.6	8.2
Main language(s) spoken (3 most populous)[1]	Telugu (85%)	Hindi (40%)
	Urdu (8%)	Bengali (8.3%)
	Hindi (3%)	Telugu (8%)

Source: Census of India, 2001
Notes:
[1]Figures are from Census of India 1991.

Table 17 Economic Indicators for Andhra Pradesh and all-India

Indicator		Andhra Pradesh	All-India
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) (Rs. Crore)[1]		166953	N.A.
Per capita income (Rs.)[1]		21372	20936
Sectoral composition of G(S)DP (%)	Primary	26.6[2]	18.5
	Secondary	21.6[2]	26.4
	Tertiary	51.8[2]	55.1
Growth in Gross State Domestic Product (G(S)DP, % increase], 2006-07)	Total	7.15	9.2[3]
	Primary	-1.37	2.7[3]
	Secondary	11.56	10.0[3]
	Tertiary	10.24	11.1[3]

Source: GoI Economic Survey 2006-07 (GoI, 2007b); GoAP Socio Economic Survey 2007 (GoAP, 2007b);
Notes:
[1] Figures for 2003-04, based on current prices.
[2] Advance estimates for 2006-07 annual GDP growth on preceding year at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from GoAP (2007b).
[3] Advance estimates for 2006-07 at Constant (1999-2000) Prices, from GoI (2007b: Table 1.2)

Table 18 Poverty Incidence and Trends in Andhra Pradesh and all-India

			Andhra Pradesh	All-India
Incidence of Poverty, 1999-2000 (% population below poverty line)		Total	15.8	27.1
		Rural	11.1	23.6
		Urban	26.6	26.1
Decline in Poverty Incidence (in percentage points)	1983 to 1993-94	Total	6.7	8.5
		Rural	10.6	8.4
		Urban	(2.0)[1]	8.4
	1993-94 to 1999-2000	Total	6.4	9.9
		Rural	4.9	10.2
		Urban	11.7	8.7

Source: NSS data cited in National Human Development Report (GoI, 2002c)
Notes:
[1] Parentheses denote an increase in poverty incidence

Table 19 Work Participation Rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
% of Total Population Classified as Workers	Total	56	35	52	26
	Rural	58	43	52	31
	Urban	51	13	20	4

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 20 Distribution of workers by main and marginal status for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

			Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
			Main	Marginal	Main	Marginal
% Main and Marginal Workers of Total Workers	Total	Males	90	10	87	13
		Females	72	28	57	43
	Rural	Males	89	11	85	15
		Females	72	28	54	46
	Urban	Males	93	7	93	7
		Females	80	20	79	21

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 21 Distribution of males and females within worker categories for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

			Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
			Male	Female	Male	Female
Male and Female Workers as a % of Total Workers	Cultivators	Total	66	34	67	33
		Rural	66	34	67	33
		Urban	74	26	75	25
	Agricultural Labourers	Total	47	53	54	46
		Rural	46	54	53	47
		Urban	56	44	60	40
	Household Industry Workers	Total	43	57	52	48
		Rural	41	59	49	51
		Urban	50	50	57	43
	Other Workers	Total	80	20	82	18
		Rural	77	23	77	23
		Urban	84	16	86	14
	Total Workers	Total	62	38	68	32
		Rural	58	42	64	36
		Urban	80	20	83	17

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 22 Literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
% of Population Literate (aged 7 yrs and above)	Total	70	50	75	54
	Rural	65	44	71	46
	Urban	83	69	86	73
	SC	55	37	55	35
	ST	39	22	48	28

Source: Census of India, 2001

Table 23 Changes in literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh, and all-India, 1991-2001

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Increases in literacy rates of population aged 7 years and above, 1991-2001 (percentage points)	Total	15	18	11	14
	Rural	18	20	13	16
	Urban	7	12	5	9
	SC	13	16	5	11
	ST	14	13	8	10

Source: Census of India, 1991,2001. 1991 data cited in GoI (2002c: 190-1)

Table 24 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Educational achievement as % completing each stage of formal education	Literate without educational level	4	4	3	4
	Below Primary	22	28	24	28
	Primary	29	34	25	28
	Middle	10	10	17	15
	Total before Secondary	**65**	**75**	**69**	**76**
	Matric/Secondary	16	13	15	13
	Higher secondary/Intermediate Pre-University/Senior secondary	9	7	7	6
	Non-technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree	0	0	0	0
	Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree	1	0	1	0
	Graduate and above	9	5	8	5
	Total Secondary and above	**35**	**25**	**31**	**24**

Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Higher Education, Government of India (GoI, 2007c)

Table 25 Gross Enrolment Ratios and Dropout Rates for Andhra Pradesh and All-India, 2004

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Gross Enrolment Ratios	Classes I to V (6-11 yrs)	96.05	97.40	110.70	104.67
	Classes VI to VIII (11-14 yrs)	73.73	69.68	74.30	65.13
	Classes IX to X (14-16 yrs)	55.83	50.18	57.39	45.28
	Classes XI to XII (16-18 yrs)	48.39	35.54	30.82	24.46
	Total for Classes I to XII	**75.38**	**71.98**	**79.75**	**72.32**
	Higher Education (18-24 years)	14.57	8.55	11.58	8.17
Dropout Rates	Classes I to V (6-11 yrs)	31.77	32.14	31.81	25.42
	Classes I to VIII (6-14 yrs)	57.72	61.08	50.49	51.28
	Classes I to X (6-16 yrs)	62.30	65.24	60.41	63.88

Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 2004-05, Department of Higher Education, Government of India (GoI, 2007c)
Notes: [1]Defined as the percentage of enrolment in/dropout from classes to the estimated child population in the age band for that class. Figures exceeding 100% reflect enrolment in classes by children outside of the class age band.

Table 26 Sex ratios for Andhra Pradesh and all-India, 2001

		Andhra Pradesh		All-India	
		All ages	0-6 yrs	All ages	0-6 yrs
Sex ratio (no. of females per 1,000 males)	Total	978	961	933	927
	Rural	983	965	946	934
	Urban	965	958	900	903
	Change since 1991 (no. of females per 1,000 males)	+12	-14/-4[1]	+6	-14/-32[1]
	SC	981	N.A	936	N.A
	ST	972	N.A.	978	N.A.

Source: Census of India, 1991, 2001.
Notes:
[1]Figures show change for rural/urban areas, and are from Census of India 1991 data cited in GoI (2003).